Social Science / Data Science

Jo Guldi: Towards a Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time

Part of the Social Science / Data Science event series

Recorded on March 8, 2023, this video features a lecture by Jo Guldi, Professor of History and Practicing Data Scientist at Southern Methodist University. Professor Guldi’s lecture was entitled “Towards a Practice of Text-Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time: The Persistence of Memory in British Parliamentary Debates in the Nineteenth Century.”

Co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the UC Berkeley Department of History, and D-Lab, this talk was presented as part of the Social Science / Data Science event series, a collaboration between Social Science Matrix and D-Lab.

Abstract

A world awash in text requires interpretive tools that traditional quantitative science cannot provide. Text mining is dangerous because analysts trained in quantification often lack a sense of what could go wrong when archives are biased or incomplete. Professor Guldi’s talk reviewed a brief catalogue of disasters created by data science experts who voyage into humanistic study. It finds a solution in “hybrid knowledge,” or the application of historical methods to algorithm and analysis.

Case studies engage recent work from the philosophy of history (including Koselleck, Erle, Assman, Tanaka, Chakrabarty, Jay, Sewell, and others) and investigate the “fit” of algorithms with each historical frame of reference on the past. This talk profiles recent research into the status of “memory” in British politics. It profiled the persistence of references to previous eras in British history, to historical conditions per se, and to futures hoped for and planned, using NLP analysis. It presented the promise and limits of text-mining strategies such as Named Entity Recognition and Parts of Speech Analysis for modeling temporal experience as a whole, suggesting how these methods might support students of social science and the humanities, and also revealing how traditional topics in these subjects offer a new research frontier for students of data science and informatics.

About Jo Guldi

Jo Guldi, Professor of History and Practicing Data Scientist at Southern Methodist University, is author of four books: Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Harvard 2012), The History Manifesto (Cambridge 2014), The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights (Yale 2022), and The Dangerous Art of Text Mining (Cambridge forthcoming). Her historical work ranges from archival studies in nation-building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts. She has also been a pioneer in the field of text mining for historical research, where statistical and machine-learning approaches are hybridized with historical modes of inquiry to produce new knowledge. Her publications on digital methods include “The Distinctiveness of Different Eras,” American Historical Review (August 2022) and “The Official Mind’s View of Empire, in Miniature: Quantifying World Geography in Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” Journal of World History 32, no. 2 (June 2021): 345–70. She is a former junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

Listen to the lecture below, or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Jo Guldi: Towards a Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change Over Historical Time

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[JAMES VERNON] Good afternoon, everyone. My name is James Vernon. And I am a teacher in the history department. And I’m delighted to be able to welcome Jo Guldi back to Berkeley today.

Before I get going, I have been told by Marion that I need to remind everyone that the event is co-sponsored by the History Department; and by the Data Lab, D-Lab; and by the Social Science Matrix. So there’s a great team of co-sponsorship that speaks to the enormous interest in Jo’s work across the campus.

I’ve known Jo for probably close to 20 years, which is a little embarrassing– 15, for sure, but not far off 20. She’s one of the most fearless and most energetic scholars that I know. And before I try and explain something about the work that she does, I should let you know that she already published more books than I have. And I’m probably almost twice her age.

She has published her first book, which is very special to me because we worked on it a little together, and was published by Harvard in 2012. And it’s called Roads to Power– Britain Invents the Infrastructure State. Jo did her graduate work here at Berkeley. But in a way that is absolutely characteristic of Jo and the types of work that she does, she came out of comp lit into urban planning and architecture to settle finally in history.

But while she was in history, she was already very much taking the digital turn and helping to build the conversations that ended up at the D-Lab here on campus. Her next book was The History Manifesto that she co-authored with– oh, this is embarrassing. I’m blanking on his name.

[JO GULDI] David Armitage.

[JAMES VERNON] David Armitage, the very distinguished professor in my field of work and a professor at Harvard. And then this year, she has– last year, she published the book that you can see on the table here that she was talking about a lunchtime today, The Long Land War– The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, which is published very beautifully by Yale. And because Jo is Jo, there is now another book that she is going to be talking about today called The Dangerous Art of Text Mining, which is coming out very shortly with Cambridge University Press with this very striking image as its front cover.

So what unites or what brings together the different types of writing and scholarship that Jo does? What I love about Jo’s work is that it’s constantly pushing us to think both methodologically about how we produce scholarship. But it’s also continually in that process urging us to think about questions of scale. And for historians especially, that’s a really profound question.

And it’s led Jo to a very intense engagement with the growing field of digital humanities to think about the way in which working through methods like text mining we can work on a scale both geographically and temporally that historians are usually very uncomfortable at working at. Because historians tend to generally be very grounded in an archive that gives them a very specific relationship to time and to space. And Jo had always been pushing at that boundaries in a way in which she’s traveled between archival scholarship and her work in terms of digital methods.

The other thing that I want to say about Jo’s work, which I think brings together the different projects that she’s worked on is, to me, being a continuing preoccupation with the question– with two questions. One is about the nature of power.

Often, for Jo, that’s about thinking about state formation and the set of new technologies of power that came into the world in the 19th and the 20th century. But Jo has always been deeply interested in those groups of people who mobilize against those new technologies of power and of regulation. And I think The Long Land War and The Road– and the book on The Road to Power are really great examples of that type of scholarship.

And then the other element that was there for Jo, I think even when she began in comp lit was an absolute preoccupation with what she began by talking about as landscape. And Jo was profoundly influenced by scholars in the history of architecture and urban planning around the politics of landscape. But the question of land and understandings of property and property rights have really been at the center of the types of historical questions that she’s been asking in her scholarship.

So all of which is to long windedly key up the talk that she’s going to do for us this afternoon on The Dangerous Art of Text Mining– A Methodology for Digital History, which I’m delighted to say as someone who was trained in the history of politics is going to be dealing in part with the vast amounts of text that were collected by various forms of publication, including Hansard, the official collection of the Houses of Parliament in Britain. Jo, it’s wonderful to have you here. And we’re really looking forward to your talk.

[JO GULDI] Thank you so much, James. It’s really a delight to be here. It’s a delight to be among old friends, old advisers, new friends at a time when Berkeley is initiating initiatives like The Matrix and the D-Lab and text mining and data science. I hope to hear more about those conversations at dinner, including getting the names right.

But I’m very grateful to Marion, in particular, for facilitating this in such a way that such a diverse set of audiences could come together and to the History Department to being willing to host a nonconventional history talk. We had a great discussion of the archival book. We talked about archives at noon. So if you weren’t– if you were there, hi again. And if you weren’t there, archives are real. But we’re not talking about them right now. Right now, we’re going to talk about data.

So there is no doubt that today, social science is becoming a big data subject. As part of that process, fields make new discoveries. In political science, economics, and sociology, investigations into robustness, inductive versus deductive thinking, correlation versus causality, and false positives have generated important new standards.

Because history is both a social science as well as a qualitative discipline in the humanities with an appreciation for description, our processes will look different as history starts to engage data. It will need new standards of validation. Temporal experience as a criterion of successful discovery means slightly different work than the work proposed in fields which take certainty as the standard alone.

Because we are ultimately a positivist science descended from the Enlightenment, we in history must take an interest in those specific findings about events, periodizations, and other temporal experiences contained within our textual archives. And here, I believe could be the beginning of a productive new dialogue across the social sciences about the best practices for characterizing temporal change over time and validating conclusions made on the basis of algorithms.

So in today’s talk, I’d like to tell you about what validation might look like when applying text mining to the analysis of the experience of past events. I’ll be introducing three historical concepts– memory, periodization, and archive– and telling you about applying statistics and machine learning to gain insight about these categories of temporal experience. But first, I want to tell you a little about what text mining is, how validation is traditionally performed in history, and why I recommend working with standards of meaning from the field of history when engaging in text mining.

Mining refers specifically to the extraction of valuable metallic auras from the Earth and metaphorically to any process that extracts rare and valuable content from its surrounding context. Data mining begins with counting but includes statistical transformations to test for relationships, such as correlation and significance. And text mining typically treats text as the data in question.

It begins with computational transformations that break up and classify digital strings of archival text into units representing constituent words and phrases. We’re just counting words. Next, we might apply statistical manipulations in order to study those meaningful signals and their relationships typically using the kind that trained analysts from the humanities and social sciences would like to detect in the course of reading but now carrying out that analysis on a bigger scale.

Validating the results of quantitative text mining represents a new terrain that requires thinking with the tools of multiple disciplines. In history, as with other fields in the humanities, problems of believability have been traditionally linked to forms of dense qualitative description of unique objects. So consider, for example, this surveyor’s notebook from Ireland in the 1880s, which includes notes on local farmsteads, the cost of rent, and economic investments by peasants, all of which is easy enough to translate into the numbers on a spreadsheet.

But there are also elements of the surveyor’s notebook that I would find in the archive that are more difficult to discern when abstracted into data. The shape of the book is about gay big, which means that it’s ideally organized so that it can fit into the pocket of a traveling code. And I can take it with me on the railroad as I visit the farmsteads across Ireland. It’s a traveler’s notebook.

Reading up on the imprint leads me to discover that it was created in a woman-owned paper shop in Dublin for the purposes of accommodating travelers. So there are many travelers of the era who might be taking notes with devices such as this. It’s only by reading the invisible context of the data, not just the data itself, that one might learn about the surveyor’s politics and how his beliefs in designing a participatory economy factored into his new method of surveying the landscape, therefore, collecting rents and asking how much of the local investment originated with the tenant versus the landlord.

Relevant details for answering that question are located not in the object or in the biography of the surveyor or our deck– sorry, are located in this object as an object or in the biographies of the surveyor and has other published writings, not in the words on the page that would be transcribed in the process of text mining.

So it follows that text mining only ever applies to a sliver of the available knowledge about the past. It offers no replacement for the archive as a whole or the practice of history as a whole, a field that’s potentially concerned with the life of surveyors as well as the agrarian rebellions and political movements with which they intersect.

So just to make it super clear, I’m not talking about creating a magic button that says, make history now, and outdating the entire history department. You’re still going to need them. Are we clear? Yes? OK, good.

The surveyor’s notebook also illustrates the kinds of expertise that have traditionally been necessary to manufacture a compelling interpretation of the past. The readers’ willingness to trust qualitative descriptions often hinges on forms of expertise such as paleography, rhetoric, the history of technology or the history of the book. A deep training in these specialized skills like how to read the surveyors’ handwriting supports the individual historian skills of appreciating specific details that support meaningful interpretation of the object.

So we like our details. We like knowing that there’s expertise behind these facts and interpretations. And what this means is that if practitioners from history are going to trust me when I start touching computers, they’re going to want a similar level of maniacal detail engagement from the new field of text mining.

They will want to test the bias of each data set as well as the limits and promise of every algorithm as well as the result of what happens when the algorithm is applied. It’s not going to be enough in history to treat the algorithm like a black box. It will get me jeered out of the history seminar.

Above all, historians expect some reckoning with meaning with significant stories that have not been previously heard yet, yet which harness the potential of shaking up our understanding of the past, adding fundamentally new information to our stories about nations, institutions, individuals, and human experience in general.

Discussions of accuracy and meaningfulness are vital for text mining because the tools of text mining are by their nature reductive. They produce meaning by taking a knife to the data about the past, reducing past experience to a minimized selection of experience and information. Each data-driven visualization produced by text mining is merely one of the possible representations of what Timothy Tangherlini in the front row called the vast unread behind the data analysis.

Every exercise in data mining works with a portion of possible truths housed in the totality of each historical archive, such that any given interpretation of data necessarily represents massive information loss. Yet, text mining is powerful if done right. If the analysis of text mining are visualized successfully, a tiny image offers at least potentially an outsized return on investment, distilling shelf miles of text into a valuable, pithy representation of what those words did.

So a single visualization might reduce the story of a single institution’s politics and how they’ve changed over 100 years as in this visualization of the state of the union addresses over time. Or it might give us a mirror of what stories people have told us about how COVID was transmitted or how American novelists present white characters and Black characters and how those representations in fiction have changed over time in a more diverse nation whose publishing industry has remained biased according to the standards of the 1950s.

But there are also many data-driven analysis of texts that purport to offer substantive insight and fail. Such failures of text mining occur when algorithmic distillations of text are misapplied with the result of analyses that are empty biased or simply false. So failing to account for the limits and bias of archives is the major reason for retractions of several recent articles published in science on the papers of the National Academy of Science and attacked by historians.

For example, in this representation of the history of the world associated with an article in the Journal of Science and circulated on the Nature website, which failed to represent– which claimed to represent the history of migration all over the world but failed to acknowledge any activity by non-whites, including the transportation of enslaved humans across the Atlantic as a part of world history, left out some important things.

A second problem sometimes encountered is failing to account for grammatical relationships, which creates representations of language based on bags of words that may miss something. One of the– you may have noticed that the Wordle used to be all over the front page of American newspapers. It disappeared around the time that Trump was elected, possibly because the Trump speeches and the Obama speeches create exactly the same word cloud.

They both say the American people over and over and over again. That’s because all of the grammatical relationships and the two-word phrases are left out, which means that it’s just economy America and the people in the economy. If you do what– I wrote this without thinking about you in the front audience. But I’m just– if you do what Tim Tangherlini does and you put the grammar words back in, then you have all of these other relationships, which are much more telling about the distinctiveness of populist speech on the left versus populist speech on the right.

So don’t leave out the grammar. A third problem is failing to engage with existing knowledge about the past, which results in data-driven text mining that’s simply redundant. For instance, famously, the publications by the Culturomics group which invented ngrams, their conclusions included the fact that Nazi Germany censored books. We already knew. We knew that. Not new. Not a discovery. And unimpressive to historians. Many chuckles in the history department about that one.

So in a qualitative/quantitative question like the determination of relevant historical events, validation is more than a matter of p-values and error bars. A validation practice that’s satisfying to historians as well as the theorists of information must demonstrate intimacy with algorithms and their parameters as well as the technical interest in the results of those algorithms applied to historical questions. It must model temporal experience in a way recognizable to historians with a capacity for innovation and what we already know about the past.

The former criterion requires an appreciation of statistics, the ladder of history. In metallurgy, the field that understands geography and the physiognomy of the Earth, the way you get to value to the valuable ore is geology. In human experience, the fields that understand meaning and value about what’s changing the past are the humanities and social sciences and history in particular.

We have already established that the appreciation of the bias in each archives is a matter of robust analysis. So allow me to introduce my data. I’m talking about the collection of the speeches of the UK parliament from 1806 to 1911. So these are the speeches of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

The major speeches were recorded. More of them were recorded over time. Here are the members of the House of Commons. Gladstone is up front. The Lord Chancellor’s on the back. All of these people have papers. Often, it’s the text of the speech they intend to read.

Their speeches are going to circulate outside parliament to the rest of the nation. Because up there, in the gallery, there are journalists. Towards the end of the century, they’re taking note by shorthand. Earlier, they have more primitive methods. They’re trying to write down all of the memorable speeches to be republished the next day in the newspaper.

Those speeches are bundled by one printer, in particular Thomas Curson Hansard. And so the printed speeches are known as Hansard. Hansard is my data set. It’s now a data set. It was turned into a data set for the first time in the 1990s. It was cleaned in the early 2000s. My lab cleaned more.

It’s comprehensive, periodic, and well preserved. One of the nice things about working with Hansard is that we know what’s in and what’s out. It’s not like the Google Books data set, which is random assortment of printed text that could be novels or magazines or essays biased in all sorts of directions.

We know how parliament was biased. Do you see any women? No. People of color? Not so much. We know. We know who they are and what’s in and what’s out. So we can describe it very well. And when we’re modeling change, we know what kind of change we’re talking about.

My data is, as I said, 1806 to 1911. It’s a big data. It’s 46,000 individual speakers, 100,000 separate debates, and a million speeches, about a quarter billion words in all. It’s too much to read.

Also, we have also established that the discipline of history represents a guide to the analysis of texts in the past that are meaningful. In my forthcoming book, The Dangerous Art of Text Mining, I argue for beginning with the building blocks of historical understanding. And I show that list here– memory, period, archive event, influence, change over time, and modernization.

These are concepts from the field of history which have been heavily theorized. The philosophy of history has engaged some of these terms for a century to help us understand different elements of temporal experience. The historical past is not all one. There are multiple pasts.

So I believe that in bringing these concepts into dialogue with data science, it’s possible to advance towards a newly robust practice of digital history and also to add to the robustness, usefulness, and meaningfulness of the practice of data science itself. In this talk, I’m prepared to show approaches to the three of the categories I mentioned here– memory, periodization, and archive. If time remains, I’ll join those case studies to one of my theoretical publications on critical search about how to move from qualitative and quantitative data to meaning.

Can I put you to work? Please hand out. So first, let’s take the concept of memory. Memory was introduced by Maurice Halbwachs at the beginning of the 20th century as distinct from history, which is the study of what actually happened in the past, in its totality. Memory is collective, anchored to place and to oral tradition. It’s the source of identity.

History is institutional and expert. It’s bound up with enlightenment dialectics of argumentation about the truth of what happened. Memory studies traces the popular partial and often deeply political reception of the past in contrast to the study of history proper, which applies social science to pursue the truth of the totality of past experience.

So historians have canonically studied memory through the creation of new rituals and monuments, whether Tudor funerary monuments like this one, which was created to tell you all that Richard Boyle, Earl of Cork, was a really cool dude; or the monuments that commemorated Civil War generals, which have become more problematic in a more enlightened age; or through such instances of invented rituals like the invention of academic regalia or the Scottish kilt.

And what follows, I’m concerned with acts of memorialization in speech. What happens when a politician says, I remember the Boston Tea Party? Well, they didn’t say that a lot in the British Parliament in the 19th century. They said, I remember the Glorious Revolution. But which events did they memorialize the most?

So let me show you a first instance. And then we’ll get to the images. This is a very baby instance. And then we’ll get to the images in your handout in just a second. Let’s begin with the simplest possible search for memory.

I’m looking for numbers between 1066 and 1911 and the parliamentary debates that were mentioned more than 20 times in any given year. Now, this could misfire. It’s possible that somebody says, 1067, and they are counting bales of hay or talking about conversions from the metric system.

But the strong diagonal line suggests that the numbers are meaningful because people in the past tended to– people in parliament tend to refer to legislation in their own year, the previous year, the next year. Next year, in 2024, we’re going to pass this bill. Last year, we passed that bill of 2022.

So we refer to those mentions a lot. Occasionally, they refer to deadlines expected in the future like that 1870 is the deadline for a diplomatic convention. Spot checking the numbers annotated in this graph confirms that they are almost universally references to years.

So the visual form of the chart is itself a modest innovation. I adopted a single dot plot to represent what I call a double timeline, meaning time is on the x-axis and time is on the y-axis. And the x here on the x-axis is the year of mention.

So this is the date of the political speech when Gladstone is saying the Glorious Revolution. On the y-axis is the year mentioned. So this is the year that’s mentioned in the text, the date that appears in the number.

And it lends itself to some starter observations. Some years are being added while others are dropping off each year, producing the diagonal. But that’s not all we find. I won’t tell you about all of the conclusions. You can say a lot of interesting things.

But one of the first interesting things to look for is strong vertical lines, suggesting a moment of memorialization. So that strong vertical line is 1838. 1838 is the date of the Tamworth Manifesto, the making of the modern Conservative Party associated with Benjamin Disraeli. It’s a moment when Conservatives are reforming themselves in order to argue against Whig ideas about modernity and the Conservative claim to an aristocratic idea of Britain is grounded in the conviction that Conservatives accurately represent the ancient aristocratic past, the glory days of Britain.

And so what do the Conservatives do in parliament? They start sprinkling their speeches with really completely random associations from the Tudor and Stewart years. Like, it’s not enlightening reading if you look at the 1567 and 1592 and 1667 and you ask, why are they debating these years?

They’re talking about the status of the earldom of Mar. They’re talking about Tudor funerary vestments like what priests are supposed to wear officially on certain days to celebrate certain sacraments. It’s not really important stuff. It’s not vital to the life of the nation. What they’re doing is symbolically signaling, I am attached to the ancient Tudor and medieval past. I know about all these things that happened in the Tudor age because I, a Conservative, have this special relationship to the past.

So you can imagine– you can imagine pursuing a question of memory like this by hand. But the success of this method confirms that the computer can with great efficiency identify changing relationships to the past simply by the simplest possible way of looking for numbers. Now, we get a very different perspective on memory and relationships to the past if we start applying different text mining methods.

And part of what I’m going to argue for in terms of a validation process appropriate to history is this process of exploring the data, exploratory data analysis via iterating over separate methods. So in machine learning, it’s giving us something called named entity recognition in which the computer recognizes the parts of speech on the level of the sentence.

And it makes a guess about which of these noun phrases, noun-like phrases might be the name of a person, the name of a place, or the name of an event based on suggestions by, for example, the different parts of speech around that noun-like phrase.

So if we ask the computer to guess about the events from the sentences in Hansard and then we give each of those events a number– those numbers are added by me– then we can organize them again in a double timeline. And we can track the phrases not mentioned with numbers but the actual phrase like the phrase “the French Revolution” over time.

So, again, tracked over time, here’s the date of the speech. There’s the date of the actual event. This is not surprising at all in British history. There’s book after book about 19th century history that says the British were terrified that the French Revolution was going to happen in Britain and it would lead to the decapitation of the aristocracy and the seizure of their lands.

So they never stop talking about it. So it’s very nice that that’s confirmed. But what we didn’t know is we didn’t know that the Crimean War has that duration of sustained memory. In contrast to most of the colonial wars, you see the Boer War or the Zulu war, the Egyptian war, the Persian war which are forgotten about. There’s a tiny shadow lingering of memory.

So we can learn something about the persistence of memory. The other one that stands out is the plan of campaign. The plan of campaign is very important to me. Because in the other book, I start with Ireland in the 1880s because of Irish activism.

This is the moment when the Irish tenants who weren’t allowed to an owner inherit land rise up against the landlords and say, we want our land back. It’s called the Plan of Campaign. And they don’t stop talking about the Plan of Campaign after it happens, which tells you something about manufacturing memory maybe on behalf of the Irish lobby.

But one of the– but this is a troubling chart in another way because there aren’t that many events from social history. There’s the Great Exhibition, which isn’t remembered that long, maybe a decade after it happens. But where are the peasants? Where are the post-colonial subjects?

Britain’s a big place. We know that Parliament is mostly an aristocratic institution, not for the entire century. But there should be some other kinds of events. Why is the computer only finding the wars? Well, the answer is that it’s a matter of scale.

And so if I control the vocabulary, the max n, the maximum number of mentions per year in the previous chart was 989. Here, it’s 77. So we’re going down in terms of scale. We’re using scale. And controlling of vocabulary is a way of exploring social events.

So we’re looking just for social events. And so these events are spoken about a degree less. It’s not that the computer didn’t find them. But they’re less numerous. So they didn’t show up unless you know that social event history is something you should look for.

This chart gives us an interesting opportunity to compare the persistence of memory around the Irish famine and the Bengal famine. The Irish famine is talked about in parliament nearly every year after it happens. The Mongol famine which should be– they’re really talking about the Bengal famine of 1880. So the number is wrong there– is forgotten about virtually after it happens despite millions upon millions dead.

So you see the bias of empire, in which the Irish have representation. But the citizens of Bengal don’t have representation. It shows up immediately– parliament is incapable of memorializing what happened despite its responsibility for the famine.

There’s clear data that parliament is mainly ignoring the colonies. And this is something that I’ve published about in other studies. The exception that shows up in the data– and this tracks with the consensus in British history– is the Great Revolt also known as the Indian Mutiny. The Great Revolt of 1857 is remembered every year because the British are reminding themselves that they have to be very afraid of Indian subjects and it’s necessary to arm themselves against them.

The tool seems to work to identify and compare patterns of memory. Much of this, we already knew. But we didn’t know it with the specificity until– with the same level of specificity until it could be measured.

So let’s look, again, at a smaller subset, descending, again, by another factor. And here, the max n is lowering from 77 to 6. So we’re going down by a factor of 10. Again, we’re looking for events that match the bigram riot. So famous riots in British history. What are they talking about?

Riots are a matter of a local uprising usually involving the working class dealt with by parliament hastily– often hastily and quickly forgotten, although one of the things that springs out from this analysis is the lasting memory of the Gordon and Featherstone riots.

The Gordon riots, we know about. We know about them in 1780. We don’t know about the way in which they’re being invoked in parliament in the late 19th century. And the same with the Featherstone riots.

Here, we get into a really specific frame of a question for investigation. The most remembered early riots are the Rebecca riots and the Gordon riots. But why is it that the Hyde Park riot of 1866 seems to evoke comparisons with the Gordon riots of 1780, whereas the Wexford riot of 1883 and later riots, this comparisons utterly vanish? What does the obsolescence of memory tell us about how contemporary riots were interpreted?

So in contradistinction to the previous charts of events, here’s a fundamentally new question about the vanishing of memory when we couldn’t have asked before text mining. So a decade ago, a student of history could have asked the question about any two riots and how they were invoked together. And they might have used keyword search to plumb the riots to at a time. But they could not have begun with an archive and an entire category of temporal experience, memory, and progressed from there to identify riots as a subject where the patterns of memory are full of surprises.

OK, so next, I’d like to move on to periodization, the issue of periodization. And, again, I have a handout. In the next case study, I’ll be applying an algorithm for finding statistical distinctiveness, TF-IDF to the problem of periodization. Now, in contrast to memory, periodization is a theory about how time is divided.

Historians argue about the significance of centuries and decades, posing questions like, when did the 19th century begin? The French Revolution is an excellent candidate. In short, we’re interested in what distinguishes one decade from another or one century from another as well as the possibility that some decades are just more historically meaningful than others. Big moment of change. Sometimes you feel like everything is changing around you.

So to investigate distinctiveness, I turn to a vintage statistical algorithm. This is old data science, not new data science, TF-IDF. TF-IDF was introduced in 1973 by statistician Karen Sparck Jones. It’s useful as a tool for class. It’s used in the library– in library schools as a tool for classifying articles by ranking the likelihood of each word document pair relative to all words and all documents in a data set.

So in my article, I applied this algorithm not to articles in the library, not asking what’s the word most distinctive of each article or each author, but to time periods. So hence, TF-IDF becomes TF-IPF, Inverse Period Frequency. What are the words that are most distinctive of each time period?

And the time period can vary. I can ask, what are the words most distinctive of each decade, of each 20-year period, of each year, of each week, of each day? So I wrote a 4-year loop and iterated through those periods. And the results are interesting.

At the level of the 20-year period, we get fairly predictable results that look something like a table of contents for textbook of British history. So the concerns of the day change from the Corn Laws and their effect at a time of harvest failure to the Bank of England and cash payments to the repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish famine to cholera and the temperance movement, rent strikes, and crofters rebellions, workingmen’s compensation, and public education.

That’s a pretty good approximation for what happened in the 19th century, according to Britain’s parliament. Those are the distinctive– some of the most distinctive historical events of each time period. So that’s no new information about British history.

But what this proves is that the technique could be applied to periodize any new corpora. So, for example, if you apply it to Reddit over the last 10 years– and we don’t really have a big theory about what the turning point of the last 10 years was. You could make up some theories. But my students have done this. They take the sexuality thread from Reddit. And then they can identify the moment of a transgender suicide that changes the conversation in the language that’s being talked about.

So we can use this kind of approach to periodize archives where we don’t have a working theory, of what the major events are or the major change points. Things become much more interesting when I start looking at the words that are most distinctive of a single day. So what the computer is looking for here is a word that was said 500 times on one day in British history and then never said again in parliament or maybe mentioned once a year.

So such a word is plumbers. Plumbers get one day in the entire 19th century. This is the date when the Plumbers Union comes to parliament with some materials that they want officially approved and discussed.

And it’s notable that once we go down to the level of 1 day, the concerns change. We’re looking at longer periods of time. We’re talking about matters of states. Middles periods of times, we talk about colonization. We talk about the railways. We talk about particular factories interest.

By the time we get down to one day, you’re seeing interests in Britain who only have enough power over parliament to command the attention of parliamentary representatives for single day out of the century. So there are lots of working class concerns. There are brewers and distilleries. There’s the issue of vagrants, what should we do about vagrants. There are the silk workers, their environmental concerns like smoke.

So time turns out to operate as something like an index of parliamentary attention. We can compare how much time each interest gets. The chartists, James, only get 1 month. Slavery gets 6 months. The abolition of slavery gets 6 months. The plumbers get 1 day.

So this gives us an interesting way of measuring parliamentary attention, bringing politics back into the meaning of temporality. Another intriguing aspect of these distinctiveness measures is that they can be adjusted in order to reveal different shapes of time. So what I’m talking about right now is essentially temporal fossils.

Temporal fossils are words or phrases that come into usage for single day or 20-year period. And then you never hear about them again. After the Irish– after the Corn Laws are discussed, we don’t go back and re debate the Corn Laws. After the railways are discussed, we don’t go back and redebate the railways of this at the same level. We might mention occasional railway bills. But there’s a moment of the railways that’s several months’ long.

But we can adjust that. We might be interested in different shapes of time. For example, words that come into being, neologisms that are talked about, and then they persist for the rest of time. So we can tweak the math to look for those. That would be historical novelty. And I gave you the timeline for historical novelty. We can look at last gasps, words that were used. And then in a certain time period, they go away.

So looking for different categories reflects different shapes of time. We can see– when we think about these investigations of what’s temporally distinctive, we have the possibility of many complementary objects of study, each of which can give us an intersecting feeling for what is coming and going relative to the past.

My third category of study is the archive. In history, the archive is key. Our findings are only as good as our ability to muster a record of specific documentary instances to prove an argument.

So one of the challenges in working with big data is to talk between distant reading, the overview, typically produced by word count, and close readings of an archive. That is, to move from the aggregate visualizations, like the ones I’ve been showing, back to specific speech acts that are recorded in the archive with names, dates, and verifiable records about exactly what happened. This is one of the trickiest moves to make but also one of the most vital to the discipline of history.

So the method that I’ll be applying in this section is word embeddings. And it offers one possible approach to the study of historical processes. Word embeddings can be used to detect many kinds of historical forces. But one of their virtues is to demonstrate the changing contexts in which certain words have appeared in historical debates.

So I’m showing you the collocates, the most distinctive collocates, words that appear in the same sentence as the key word environmentalist by 5-year period. So they very likely appear in the same sentence or certainly in the same speech. And here, we’ve switched from Hansard to the US Congress. Sorry, I tricked you. Ha-ha, we’re in America now.

1970 is the first decade in which people start using the neologism environmentalist in Congress. Word endings matter. I’m using the word environmentalist rather than environmental or environment because a hostile work environment or childhood learning environment would give us a totally different picture of what the changing discourse was about.

Word embeddings give me direct access to how the context in which they were debated was changing over time. So this image and the longer chart that you have on the first page shows the change in context. And if you glance over it, you’ll see many possible directions in which the inquiry could go.

We have the names of industries like the logging industry. We have the name of species that are being debated like different kinds of owls and fish. We have geographical regions that come in and out of the debate. At some points, the debate over environmentalism is mostly about the Pacific Northwest. Other times, it’s about California. Other times, it’s about international affairs.

So any one of these objects could be the next move for an inquiry. It’s up to the analysts to decide which of these are the most salient. Now, it’s because of other historical debates that I chose the question to inspect that I did.

And the other historical debate in question is, Oreskes and Conway’s engagement with the question of why American politics didn’t solve global warming way back in the 1970s when the scientists were like, hey, we just did the measurements and global warming is real– you should really do something. Because they did take it directly to Congress.

So Oreskes and Conway went through all of the paperwork on what the scientists discovered and when that information was presented to Congress and how politics was tilted away from the scientific consensus. And for that reason, I decided to focus on the moral discourse of environmentalism. In Oreskes and Conway’s account, the discovery of the climate emergencies in the 1960s was met with urgent pleas from the scientific community for federal attention and sustained research.

By the 1980s, however, a handful of rogue scientists with ties to fossil fuels companies have begun to deliberately distort the analysis of climate change using doctored graphics and bringing defamation lawsuits against the scientists who tried to argue with them on the basis of data. Week reporting in The Wall Street Journal further undermine the cause of the truth with the result that doubt was cast upon the broadcast consensus of climate science, which was routinely denounced as a hoax.

So by naming names, Oreskes and Conway bring something like a suit of litigation against The Wall Street Journal and other interlocutors. And we might call this the litigate of mode of writing in the humanities. Historians often imagine their work as that of litigants. And so my question was how far text mining could help us to specify the suit against figures in Congress for their role in sowing distrust against environmentalism.

In table 12.2, we see a distillation of the previous table. So just to be clear, the previous table 12.1, you just have the first 25 or so rows. But really, it’s a much longer table. It’s as long as the number– as the number of unique words in the corpus.

I read the first 500 rows. Out of those first 500 rows, I hand-selected anything that looked like a moral discourse like the word kook or the word hoax or the word elitist. And there were a lot of those terms. So that’s what I’m presenting to you in 12.2.

It’s word embeddings per 5-year period hand-sorted by me. There’s a human in the box. I could have used sentiment analysis. But for reasons I’m happy to discuss, I don’t trust it. I think the results are garbage when applied not to Amazon reviews but to Congress. Happy to say more. Definitely don’t apply it to the 19th century. Big trouble.

So moral discourse in 12.2. Two moments spring out. There are more moral discourse words in some eras than others. There’s 1975. There’s 2000. Things heat up. And then they cool down in the middle, which is interesting.

Importantly, the word embeddings don’t tell us how these words are being used. We can guess. But we don’t ultimately know whether people are saying, environmentalists are elitists. Or they could be saying, it’s so elitist that your fossil fuel industry is doing x. I’m going to call an environmentalist. We don’t know. We don’t know who’s the environmentalist. So we need to look more closely.

So the next several iterations– in the next several iterations, I show how I validated the context in which the term environmentalist appeared. I used word count, simple word count of bigrams to track what was being said about environmentalists. So these are literally two words that are welded together. They’re not saying, I’m going to tell the environmentalist that your fossil fuel dude is so radical. They’re saying, radical environmentalists did x– overzealous environmentalists did x

And this chart reveals a chronology. There’s a discourse of distrust at the beginning. But it escalates after 1995 to up to 80 mentions of these phrases in 2005 to 2009. The findings suggest that rhetoric of attacking environmentalists coincided with Newt Gingrich’s campaign to win Congress for the Republican Party during the 1990s, adopting the language focused strategy associated with Republican Fred Luntz and his famous 1990 memo Language– a key mechanism of control.

I present this to Americans. They’re like, oh, I know what that is. They didn’t know which phrases. They didn’t know how it intersected with environmental history. But they were like, oh, that’s Newt. Look, it changed things.

So next, I decided to investigate which speakers use the phrases like extreme environmentalists that we saw at the previous chart. It turns out that 90% of the phrases on the previous chart were coming from only six speakers, these guys. The chart also suggests that well before Gingrich, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska was already pioneering a rhetoric of mistrust.

So descending to the level of keywords and context, every speech in which Ted Stevens utters the phrase extreme environmentalist gives you precisely the story of what happened. Stevens coins the rhetoric of extreme environmentalists to sow mistrust against the defenders of the Alaskan Wildlife Refuge on behalf of the Trans-Alaska pipeline from 1973 to the end of the 1970s.

In the 1990s, he returns the phrase again in the context of this Luntz Gingrich political move in order to manufacture a memory of the success of labeling the extreme environmentalists. It worked for me. We were able to pass the law by just one deciding vote. Thank you, Spiro Agnew. You too can swing the Republican Party in these tough times against environmentalists if you just use phrases like mine.

He essentially tells the story in the middle of Congress. It’s a bit more coded than that. But he’s telling other Republicans how well this strategy works. He switches, again, in 2001, as you can see not on the screen but in your handout, the last page, where he swaps out the phrase extreme environmentalists for radical environmentalists in the aftermath of 9/11, making a nonexplicit but symbolic case for equating radical Islamism qua terrorism with radical environmentalism, also terrorism.

So by using computational approaches alongside conceptual questions such as the historian’s problem of explanation, the analyst can leverage the scalar power of the algorithm against questions that matter. Such an approach requires a commitment to a textual database like the US Congress to a series of methods at minimum word count and word embeddings as well as a working knowledge of debates over meaning in history and major forces in the 20th century.

The training required almost certainly places this work outside the grasp of the lone data analyst with no training in the humanities because context is that important. The most important part of this work is explanation in the sense of identifying which questions matter and how they matter. My case study leans heavily on historians like Naomi Oreskes for the relevant question, why did Congress not respond to the science of climate change who sowed the mistrust– who sowed the mistrust if you had to take them to a court of law? Would it stand up?

The project then treats word embeddings, word count, and guided reading as stops along the way towards a full argumentation, providing answers for the questions that already exist in the world. Text mining can support historical explanation but not automatically. The historical explanation that combines evidence for word embeddings will almost always have to rely on the analysts’ understanding of and appreciation for historical reasoning, historical context, and grand questions of historical change, none of which are provided in computational form.

So regarding text mining as an art, that requires a sense of what matters, engaged with the humanities and social sciences, produces a very different research process from a data science paper concerned solely with algorithmic innovation. So critical search is my theory about how moving between quantitative and qualitative analysis can be done. It requires the unpacking of the bias of each data set, of each algorithm, of each value inside each algorithm and constructively putting the results into a dialogue with primary and secondary sources.

The process here is submitted as an alternative to faddish adaptations of new tools and visualizations quickly applied or to following computer science questions about predicting the result of algorithms applied to historical topics where prediction is a problematic term. And I’m happy to say more on that. But that’s what’s in the book. I don’t like prediction because historians denounced it a long time ago. It doesn’t work for us, except in very minute cases such as military history. I’ll say more. Ask about it.

The theory of critical search departs from the fact that historians are ultimately liable to be persuaded by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches together, measuring data as an index for further reading and depth of the kind that we’ve provided in keywords and context. In the keywords– the critical search article, I outline three ideal steps that can be applied in any order iteratively while moving through this process.

Seeding refers to the discussion of the concepts, the archives, the individuals submitted as a focus of inquiry. Today, we talked about parliament, memory, periodization. So those terms come from elsewhere. The seeds come from elsewhere.

Broad winnowing means concentrating on one view of the document base and asking, what does the data say about what’s interesting here? So any of the visualizations we’ve looked at represents an opportunity for winnowing. That means moving from the overview of the 19th century as a whole to a particular why are the plumber’s talking to parliament. You can follow it up. We know everything except the plumbers. Or why is Ted Stevens the first guy winnowing down?

And then guided reading is the process of actually returning to what’s on the page to the primary source by the time we’ve got keywords in context. And it looks like what historians do anyway. They carefully read debates. They think about what matters. We’ve just had a shortcut to those texts that matters. And now, we need to think about them.

So you look at the document. You hold the book at your hand. You actually read the speech. We practice guided reading when we follow the visualization of the years mentioned in parliament back to the era of the Tamworth Manifesto in 1838.

And what this looks like in process might be way more complex. Here’s an attempt to put a flow chart around what my lab did once, not necessarily replicable. We seeded. We seeded again. We winnowed. We read. We seeded again. And then winnowed and read and then read some more.

The point is that it’s an iterative process and often guided by historians’ concerns about interpretation. We’re trying to use this process to unpack the black box of algorithmic methods to engage these three ideal processes until we understand historical change.

So where do we go from here? Well, I think digital history is at the beginning of a process, not at the end. This list of categories of temporal experience is just a starter. My experiments with mattering these categories of temporal experience to statistics, to algorithms, to machine learning is likewise just a beginning of– the beginning of a process. It’s not exhaustive.

But in order to be robust, the discipline of digital history needs to begin with some approaches to historical experience that will allow us to have concrete arguments, not over existential issues like whether text mining has a place in the academy, but over constructive approaches that can produce accuracy, specificity, and relevant meaning. Thank you very much.

[JAMES VERNON] You have plenty of time for questions both online and in the room.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER]This is fabulous. Thank you. So I have a question about the place that you see text mining fitting in with, say, the historiography of the Hansard Corpus. Because a lot of the time, when text mining or digital humanities gets brought up, it’s the story of rupture. No, we’ve got this new method that’s coming out from whole cloth. And so I appreciate the ways that you’re trying to bridge with earlier historiographical methods.

And so I want to ask the question in sort a funny way, which is like, was there something algorithmic or machinic about either the work of telling history prior to this, which you are picking up or refining in some way, and then similarly, with the parliamentarians themselves in the 19th century have thought of aspects of their work in that way?

And just, I think that Frank Luntz actually is a great figure for that because he goes out and says, why, yes, language does have arbitrary features to it. And so when you slice it out into 5-year periods and watch the words connect with other words relatively freely, it seems like there’s a neat– I don’t know– homology in method and object.

[JO GULDI] Thank you. Thank you. Yes, a fascinating question. So first, I think there are two questions embedded in the one. And one of them is about parliament and the– you started off asking about the historiography of parliament.

And in the longer discussion of validation that’s in the book, one of the things that– one of the moves that I make on behalf of Hansard is to say, it’s really interesting to work with Hansard because Hansard has been the basis for writing the history of the British nation for over 100 years. Nobody has read all of Hansard because it’s a quarter billion words. But enormous chunks of Hansard, of these speeches and debates have been read and digested in order to write the history of the abolition of the slave trade and so on.

So I bring that up because it offers a validation that I didn’t discuss. We’re talking about validating by multiple algorithmic essays into similar questions like multiple algorithms that can unpack memory. But one of the things that I’m concerned with is that then when I periodize the 19th century and I say, this looks familiar, it looks familiar because I’ve read those British history textbooks, some of which are based on histories written by people who read Hansard.

So it’s good if the machine’s model matches the model created by the humans who are doing the reading. So that’s a very rare expert mark to have for such a large corpus. And that’s one of the words that I– reasons that I fell in love with parliament, even though it’s an elite institution filled with white men and was trained as a social historian here.

I fell in love with it because it was like, we do need to test and compare the work of these machines to the work of historians. Few cases where we could do it, we could do it right here. If the machine approximates what the historian said when the historians read it, pretty good. Pretty good.

But then you have a second question, which is more like a rhetoric question about how modular speech is. And I think it’s a really good question because you’re right– Luntz knew something about speech and about rhetoric. And rhetorical manuals since Quintilian make use of the fact that we can categorize speech acts.

This one’s an extended metaphor. This one is a really compelling violent juxtaposition of two images designed to get your attention. Because they work. You can see them at work in the speeches of Julius Caesar or in Shakespeare or in Gladstone.

And I’ve contemplated research projects that would dive into that more fully. And I’ve talked to historians about this. And they’ve told me that this is profoundly uninteresting. But I think it might be interesting to people from other disciplines. So I’ll tell you what they are. And if you want them, go for it.

[INAUDIBLE]

Awesome, OK. So this is for you. So there are compilations of– there are compilations of speeches compiled as literature, as objects of study. By the end of the 19th century, William Jennings Bryan, the great populist in America, is compiling the world’s great speeches in 10 volumes. And most of it is from Hansard. Most of it’s from Hansard. There’s a lot of Disraeli. There’s a lot of Gladstone. There’s a lot of the debates over the slave trade, the debates over Warren Hastings.

So on the one hand, there’s an opportunity to look for textual reviews because we can figure out who’s quoting Shakespeare the most, who’s quoting other members of parliament, which members of parliament get quoted. We can figure out the characteristics of the speeches that get excerpted and republished in this form for rhetorical study.

And so I think there are lots of rhetorical questions about what speech is doing and what the patterns are inside the speech that are super fascinating in the literature department. Even though the history department might be left cold, it’s OK. Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I’m a PhD student in the history department. And I have two interrelated questions. I may sound like the devil’s advocate to the historians here. One is that you mentioned sentiment analysis and that you’re very skeptical of it. As we know and what I know right now, it’s very basic and can lead to a lot of inaccurate querying.

But as we work with them, as we read more and we know more, does it relate? Right now, we’re talking about a number of softwares, the current one being ChatGPT teaching itself to be more or less vanilla more colorful. Do you think change over time will lead us to have far more self-taught systems that be more sophisticated?

And I mean, what should historians remember in terms of the epics of doing that? Just a big question there. And the second question that I had was, right now, a lot of this data is in English and largely from Euro America. A lot of this in, say, the third-world non-English archives are still just being digitized. And I’m wondering how we can– I mean, whether exclusion or inclusion of those archives in the digital world– I mean, what are the ramifications, the larger ramifications of those for an LP or any kind of data mining?

[JO GULDI] Yes, thank you. Very intelligent question. Very smart. So sentiment analysis out of the box trained on Amazon product reviews and Twitter. Twitter is a total disaster when applied to the 19th century. Spending examples include that socialist is coded as fear.

So that might be true if you’re training the algorithm on– I don’t know– bros who code and buy things from Amazon. And then when they’re afraid of the toaster, they’re like, it’s socialist toaster. I think mom is also quoted as fear as in, I guess my mom would like this toaster. I don’t know. Like, it’s coming from some set of data.

But apply this to the era of the flourishing of Fabian socialism when parliamentarians talk about how great the socialist era will be when we have flush toilets in all residences in the city. They’re not afraid. They’re really excited because it’s not the Cold War.

So those distinctions become really important. It also gets really confused with rhetorical gestures. Disraeli and Gladstone get coded as massively sad because they say things like, I beg you to consider. Or a fear that my honorable friend has a false idea of information.

So those are rhetorical gestures that don’t actually convey a sentiment. So identifying the historical sentiments is a bit more tricky. And you can come up with a lot of garbage.

But I think that you’re right, that there are issues about training sentiment identification data sets on different types of speech. It would be too expensive and not really worthwhile to mechanical [? torque ?] it through Victorian Hansard. At least for my purposes, I wasn’t interested enough in sentiment analysis to spend valuable time and money on that.

But GPT technology seems to be– this seems to be one of the promising arenas. It cannot write history from scratch. It can do data training sets, maybe, said Nicole Coleman yesterday at Stanford. So she’s in the library. She does data. She was showing me how well it categorized some reports on fish from the 1970s. Could it categorize sentiment analysis? I don’t know. But it seems really plausible. I think that’s an excellent research project.

You ask about non-English archives. I’m not a specialist. But I will say that digital history deeply cares about this question because one of the values of history departments today in every history department is the representation of the Global South, is the representation of ethnic diversity, which we represent through hires to make sure that there is a professor of the Middle East and a professor of Russia and a professor of China, professor of Africa, a professor of African-American Studies in every department.

Even a tiny department like the one I work in, we try to aim for some of that diversity because we believe that the voices in those archives and– those archives tell us things that the voices in parliament will never tell us. We have to go back to those archives. So then, the question becomes, what’s the relationship of those archives to digitalization?

And perhaps the most compelling set of answers about that comes from Alex Hill, originally a literature scholar who was at the Columbia University library and has now migrated to a faculty position at Yale. And Alex Hill is responsible for a concept called nimble tense, which is about how to send packages to the Caribbean to ask local people to document their own documents and stories and then send us back the data so we can help with analysis rather than sending the much more expensive option of a graduate student to the Caribbean for several years to write down all of the stories.

So this is an acknowledgment that there are storytellers and archivists in many parts of the world that could become our collaborators in a process of documenting and preserving knowledge from the Global South or from other civilizations. And there’s an ethics of that. And perhaps the best book on that subject, the ethics of documentation, how to work with local groups and where this has been done really well is Roopika Risam of Dartmouth New Digital Worlds.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. I’m also a history graduate student. So I understand we all have our limits and in terms of archive. And I was just wondering, since it’s a new method that some of us will probably end up working, why is it that it’s also starts with top to bottom? Like, this parliamentary archive was used to write a certain kind of history– was used to write a certain kind of history. Why is it that a new methodology also takes that as a point of beginning?

So that also leads to another question. It’s like, some of us who do like microhistory or who have a very thin soul space, how can we contribute to a digital history method or in what ways taking something which doesn’t have a lot of flex source base and use that as a found this in person kind of original history method instead of something which is already a major archive?

[JO GULDI] Yes, excellent first question. So why is it true that digital history in our enlightened age replicates the bias of the 19th century? I mean, it’s like a zombie kind of history. Like, we got over a dead white man history. And yet, all we have in the digital space is more dead white men. I think it produces an appropriate level of a shock and horror reaction in history departments when that realization is made. And so I do a lot of apologizing and pointing to Roopika Risam and Alex Hill.

But the reason that it’s true is very important to understand. Many of these digitalization projects have been funded at the national level in the European Union. So the National Library of Sweden has digitalized the Swedish newspapers, the Swedish novels, and the Swedish parliament 300 years. Lots of data.

Finland has done the same. Britain did the same starting in the 1990s. Parliament funded it. So it was one of the first digitalization projects. It’s essentially nationalism all over again coordinated through the governing bodies and through libraries without historians in the mix.

Now, there’s an institutional response also coming from historians in the EU, where the conversation is actually about 10 years in the future from North American history departments. So this is something that we can learn from. So in Finland, for example, the historians have realized that leaving the question of what gets digitalized to the Finnish parliament results in nationalism. And that doesn’t match their values.

So humanities deans from 20 different universities have converged to write a 20 million euro grant proposal for the National Research Budget of Finland. And in this, they have asked lots of historians who have no digital skills whatsoever to help them rank in importance the archives that can be found in Finland. The archives that can be found in Finland, some of them are about the Finnish people. But some of them are about immigrants.

Some of them are about minorities. Some of them are about women. Some of them are about the working class. And they’re from all different periods. So we would probably want some diversity of time period like some medieval texts, some modern texts, some representation of immigrants, some representation of the geographical diversity of the country. And historians can have a really interesting conversation about that.

Now, what coordinating it on a national level means is that they can present– the humanities’ budget of Finland is like 0.5% of the National Research budget of the nation. A lot more goes to civil engineering. A lot more goes to public health. No offense. Public health is trying to cure cancer. Way to go.

But if history is able to, using 20 [INAUDIBLE] at a time, shift the conversation from 0.5% of the research budget to 2% of the research budget because we have a plan, then that’s a massive windfall for history. And you can start imagining capturing those archives and providing for future generations of historians and the public to understand the diversity of the nation’s past in a new way. So then, the digital history projects can be aligned with the values of the history department, which is very interesting.

And then, you ask about, what is it that a microhistorian can do where the microhistorians innovating in terms of method? Right now, the NIH is making a lot of grants to microhistorians. So I was just at Stanford. And I was meeting with a historian of the Middle East who was telling me about digitalizing one really big book of records of debt relationships. I was hearing from another historian of Latino experience in the United States, who came across one really cool archive that’s yellow pages of Latino New York. He’s mapping them all.

So those techniques look very different than mine. The microhistorical project that I would love to do to capture the voices of the working class in Britain– I know you’re standing right there. I would love to do to capture the voices of the working class in Britain is a text matching, a text similarity exercise, where we find a collection of working class pamphlets.

There aren’t that many of them relative to the speech is in parliament. But wouldn’t it be nice to know who in parliament sounds like the working class speeches, which ideas from the working class pamphlets get taken up into parliament, which ones persist for the longest time? So we can just as generations of post-colonial historians read the imperial archive against the grain in order to understand the politics of the Great Revolt and the permanent settlement.

So digital historians can also use microarchives to read the macroarchives of parliament against the grain. So that’s technically possible. And that’s actually, I think, one of the next most important hurdles for the discipline of digital history. And I’m very happy to pursue that with anybody who feels inclined to. Yes. Yes, please. Oh, sorry, there’s another–

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Yeah, so I’m glad you started with the critique that a lot of times, findings from text mining aren’t very surprising. I do computational stuff. And I haven’t really been impressed with most text mining findings for that reason.

And I was just hoping– like, I’m not a historian. So I was hoping that you could highlight in your results where that didn’t happen. Because I was looking at your findings here. And a lot of times, it was like, the parliament cared about the French Revolution as we already knew or these sorts of things.

And so I would just love for you to highlight– because I don’t really know history– where these sorts of methods surprised historians or where historians push back on your findings because they go against the grain and how– partly because I do think that a lot of text mining. You can just read it and come to the same conclusions. And I think that’s why it’s a lot of times very repetitive of stuff that’s been done decades previous. So if you could highlight that for us in terms of your own discipline, that’d be really interesting.

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks. So I showed one such moment here in 1838. We really couldn’t have found that with traditional methods. Is it Earth shattering to the process of 19th century British history to know that people were signaling– the new Conservative Party was signaling with these references to memory? It’s not Earth shattering. But it’s definitely a finding of a kind that we couldn’t find otherwise.

In one presentation, an American historian leapt out of their chair at this one. The first mention of the American Constitution in Hansard is in 1832. 1832 is the debate over the British Reform Act. So it’s whether the middle class gets the vote.

And that’s really interesting because Britain is heartbroken at losing its North American colonies and doesn’t know whether the American Constitution is a declaration of war or we should totally dismiss it. So the first time they acknowledge its existence in parliament is in 1832 is they’re deciding, should we also give more people to vote like they do in America? And some people in the House of Lords say some very nice things about the American Constitution and how it’s given America political stability.

So that moment of reflection also reaffirms that there’s this moment of America almost acting as a beacon to the world quite early, shocking the British discourse, and that we didn’t know. I gave the example of my students– I mean, The plumbers are a real finding. I passed by it quickly because I’m interested in the method, not the finding. But the plumbers could be a dissertation. It could absolutely be dissertation-length material in British history as could half a dozen of the other terms that I mentioned on this visualization.

So part of it is about the level of what constitutes shocking. Interesting versus shocking. Most of our findings when text mining the British Parliament shouldn’t be shocking because there have been literally hundreds of British historians reading Hansard over the last 100 years to understand the 19th century. So if aliens invaded and constructed the pyramids in the middle of the Victorian era, that would be shocking and would probably be wrong. We probably know about those things. But we can find interesting patterns that we didn’t previously know about.

But what is shocking that could get public interest is my students’ work that I was telling you about, where we don’t know what the last 12 years of transgender intellectual history are until you model it on Reddit, using some of these techniques. And then it jumps out. It’s like one particular transgender suicide. You could theorize that the transgender suicides are really important.

But there’s one that tilts the discourse. And you model the before. And you model the after. And they’re nothing like each other. So that, you couldn’t guess. And it’s newsworthy. So yeah, it’s an excellent question because I opened with the standard of meaning. The standard meaning is one of the things that history holds up. That’s why we examine historiography and what other people have– how other people have written the history before us. It is the standard to which we hold ourselves. And most of my articles engage that question in some way.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] First, I wanted to just mention about that 1830s American Constitution point. So I think that’s when the US gave the right to vote to white males regardless of income and property. And so that was like a major expansion. So maybe that could be when they started talking about the issue. I’m not sure. But that could be.

So my question– so I’m a Berkeley history alumnus from the ’90s. And I have a question about source. And when I was at Berkeley, I worked for almost 2 years at a group called the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation. It’s now at the SkyDeck building. We were there, PIRE. It’s called P-I-R-E.

So it’s an NGO. And my job was newspaper coding, going through old newspapers in regions and looking for keywords related to substance abuse like alcohol use and trauma. And so I learned then that relying on newspapers was actually a powerful way to affect policy because that was the idea. You rely on newspapers to tell people, to tell lawmakers, hey, we should ban certain things here and there.

So my question is more about war, the Iraq war. My cousin’s been sent to Fallujah for Phantom storm too. He has PTSD. A lot of bad things happen. But I remember when the war started, the military demanded that the news reporters, the news agencies had to be embedded within military units.

Now, Reuters and Al-Jazeera refused the reporters by acci– they say by accident, got blown up. And then after that, the news basically would report what the military wanted them to say. So my concern is that how historians go around these kinds of limits? Because I know that newspapers, they are very important. Of course, parliament, that’s– parliamentary discussions are much more efficient. But newspapers are constituted a major source of information to affect policy.

And then when I was at Berkeley, I remember one of my English professor saying that there was a military guy who said during the Vietnam War, there was overwhelming support. There was very little disaffection with the war or dissension. People were all behind it.

And then the professor was like, I don’t remember that to the young person. So this is– so I feel like a lot of stuff in the news is now coming up. And, of course, a few days ago, New York Times published an article about rectal feeding in Iraq against Iraqi civilians or people or suspects. And these things just coming out now.

Because when I– I remember when the Iraq war came out, the news kept saying, this is good. The Iraqi children, look, they’re all rushing out to greet us. They love us. And if you reported some independent news, you might end up gone. So yeah, what ways would historians use to circumvent these kinds of state-led blockages?

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks, really interesting question. So in the case of the experience of people in a war confrontation, a historian of the 20th century using traditional methods would consult the newspaper and then pursue oral history, diaries, newsletters, other written documents in order to account for and triangulate against the suppression of the official record that you’re describing.

And so what you’re essentially describing is the dangers of relying solely on an official corpus, whether parliament or the newspaper, and looking for those other records and the stories that they tell. So I take on board absolutely vital. And that’s why the discipline of history is not about to surrender its sword and shield to the data science department.

It’s going to continue teaching all of these techniques of engaging with archives. Or all of the archives going to get digitalized while there are oral history projects that are recording the testimony of people, activists in the anti-Apartheid movement of the 1980s, of Vietnam War. And these days, that testimony is often digitalized and digital in nature.

So there’s a possibility of putting the newspaper account of the Vietnam War into conversation, dialogue with the account of veterans themselves. And that could be really informative because there are algorithms for finding what’s in bucket A but not in bucket B. That’s really important, really important issue for the public.

Hasn’t been done yet. Hasn’t been done yet even for the low-hanging fruit. The low-hanging fruit is we have parliament. We have the British newspapers any day now from the living with machines project. We have the British novel.

The low-hanging fruit is what’s in the British novel that’s not in parliament, what’s in parliament that’s not in the novel. There are novelists who are in parliament like Benjamin Disraeli. There are novelists who were read by parliament who inspired reforms like Charles Dickens.

So there should be a lot of transference what’s the lag. And that’s a data-intensive project that some of us are dying to see, dying to see somebody go after it a really data-driven way.

You highlight another category that I would love to add to that list of historical concepts. And that’s corrections of memory after the fact– corrections of memory after the fact. So this happens in Congress itself. It happens in the newspaper. They say, whoops, we missed this 10 years ago. This was happening now. There’s an investigation. Oh, we did use torture in Guantanamo. We did use– torture was permitted, oops.

So in my methods, my methods would miss that because the investigation would track as the discussion. So in terms of memory, would show up because Guantanamo is over. And the memory section would show up. Now, we’re talking about Guantanamo after the fact.

So yeah, it’s interesting to play with corrections of memory as a particular genre. Is there a way just based on data of examining that? I think the memory discussions aren’t really thick enough enhancer defined up. The newspapers will offer more material. It’s a really interesting question. yeah, Thank you.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I have a quick question. You mentioned prediction is a problem. Could you elaborate on that? Because I believe a lot of these algorithms as well work in terms of prediction. And with success of things like GPT– so just predicting the next war type of stuff. So I’m just– are you saying it in general historical sense? Or are you saying it with regards to the algorithm? Just curious.

[JO GULDI] So prediction, the take in the book, I talk about prediction a lot. And I work it through many philosophers of history. I take prediction to Jill Lepore. And Jill Lepore says, you want to predict the future. Prediction is an inherently risky proposition.

I take prediction to Karl Popper. Karl Popper says, the field of history does not do prediction. We don’t believe that there are laws of history because human beings are inherently creative and come up with new responses, new forms of governance. So therefore, the search for historical laws is in its nature doomed.

I take prediction to Reinhart Koselleck. And Koselleck says with Arthur Danto’s ideal chronicler, if we had an ideal archive of every thought or mood or wish that every human had ever had, we could measure all of the repeated events against all of the singular events. And we could develop a total predictive mechanism. But we don’t have that because our archives are imperfect.

And then I take prediction to the military historians. And the military historians say, I have no problem with prediction. A military field, if there’s a hill and you can hide an army behind it, that predicts the fact that if there’s another military field, I can also hide an army there. It’s predictive. No problem.

So what that tells me is that there are limited– my discipline is hostile to the word prediction. But when I go over to the data science department or the computer science department, they’re like, what are you trying to predict? What is the most surprising discovery we can help you make? We have test sets and training sets. And they predict things. And the prediction is the measure of accuracy.

And so I say, oh. Oh, you’re using the word prediction in three different ways. You’re going to annoy four out of five historians just by using the word. Test and training data sets can be useful for teaching an algorithm about 19th century sentiment analysis. I’m not going to say, don’t do that. That’s great.

But maybe predicting the future, which some data scientists ala Peter Turchin are trying to do with historical data sets in a way that would be offensive to many historians, relies too much on a concept of laws of human behavior that can be predicted on the past, the basis of past conflict. And most of the history department thinks that that is not going to work– not going to work.

And yet, there is a conversation with mathematicians like Chris Noble, who we love. Kris Neilbo says, if you look at smaller data sets like Reddit threads– there’s some Reddit threads where they’re introducing new terminology every month. They’re using new words. There are other Reddit data sets where they’re always using the same vocabulary over and over. Again, which means maybe they’re refining their use of a couple of keywords– you can predict that these two communities are going to continue to operate in the same direction.

This is a really interesting investigation of prediction. I don’t know if it’s history. But it probably applies to the future. And you can predict some things about the future without annoying Karl Popper.

[JAMES VERNON] I have a really nerdy question about Hansard. And the Hansard, as you know, was created from an extra parliamentary campaign to try and ensure that the business of parliament was available to the British population. It was what we would now call an exercise in the transparency of governance. And yet, we also know that the way in which parliament worked changed really dramatically in the 19th century.

So I’m wondering whether– I mean, this seems a lot more basic than the forms of analysis that you’re doing. But I’m wondering whether one thing that seems that would be able to do with your techniques would be to understand how the performance of parliamentary debates change, whether there’s more space or less space given to parliamentary debate, whether more or less politicians are speaking or not.

And I’m wondering whether that’s just a level that you feel is not interesting. But it seems to me it could actually tell you something that historians working in paper archives find very hard to track. Whereas when you look at the size of your data set, you would be able to deliver that type of analysis.

[JO GULDI] Yes, absolutely. So I’m thinking of a book you put me on by Ryan Vieira, which suggests that after 1867, when the working class gets the vote, parliament stays longer later hours in parliament debating what the parliamentary representative can do for the silverware industry. Because they know that the next day in the newspaper, their speech is going to be reprinted. And they’re going to be held accountable by working men who can vote.

So Vieira’s book has no data. It has lots of evidence not in the form of data and not in the form of quantitative accounts. And it’s a trivial exercise to count the words and investigate 1867 and who’s spending more time.

So one of the reasons that we hold off on that is that the data, it seemed to me that as soon as we got into issues of representation, the speaker metadata was really important because it’s important to track the individuals who were introduced in 1867 but weren’t there before 1867. And the speaker metadata inherited from multiple past Hansard projects is unbelievably bad.

The digging into data project of 2010 spent a million dollars cleaning Hansard. So they– said and their data set was terrible. And their political scientist publishing data right now with that data set and its speakers, they have about 10% of accuracy. 1 in 10 cases is accurate, can be matched.

We worked with chemistry PhD who was used to working with genomic information to reconcile the speaker’s names. And we think we’re at 90% accuracy now. But I have not worked with that data because I’m waiting for my team to finish the cleaning process.

So that can absolutely be next up in terms of priority. It will probably– I think you’re right, that it promises great results. I would love to work with Ryan. Yeah.

[JAMES VERNON] It might be my nerdy question [INAUDIBLE].

Thank you, everyone, for coming and for your fantastic questions for Jo about her work. Can we give her round of applause? And thank you so much.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Lecture

Jo Guldi, “The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights”

Most nations in Asia, Latin America, and Africa experienced some form of “land reform” in the 20th century. But what is land reform? In her book, The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, Professor Jo Guldi approaches the problem from the point of view of Britain’s disintegrating empire. She makes the case that land reform movements originated as an argument about reparations for the experience of colonization, and that they were championed by a set of leading administrators within British empire and in UN agencies at the beginning of the postwar period.

Using methods from the history of technology, she sets out to explain how international governments, national governments, market evangelists, and grassroots movements advanced their own solutions for realizing the redistribution of land. Her conclusions lead her to revisit the question of how states were changing in the twentieth century — and to extend our history of property ownership over the longue durée.

Recorded on March 8, 2023, this talk was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI), and the Network for a New Political Economy (N2PE).

About the Speaker

Jo Guldi, professor of history and practicing data scientist at Southern Methodist University, is author of four books: Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State (Harvard 2012), The History Manifesto (Cambridge 2014), The Long Land War: The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights (Yale 2022), and The Dangerous Art of Text Mining (Cambridge forthcoming). Her historical work ranges from archival studies in nation-building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts. She has also been a pioneer in the field of text mining for historical research, where statistical and machine-learning approaches are hybridized with historical modes of inquiry to produce new knowledge. Her publications on digital methods include “The Distinctiveness of Different Eras,” American Historical Review (August 2022) and “The Official Mind’s View of Empire, in Miniature: Quantifying World Geography in Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates,” Journal of World History 32, no. 2 (June 2021): 345–70. She is a former junior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

Transcript

“The Long Land War,” Jo Guldi, Southern Methodist University

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MARION FOURCADE] All right. Hello, everybody. Welcome to Social Science Matrix And to actually this is the first event, formally public event, organized by the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative directed by Paul Pearson right here. So we’re very excited about that.

So today we are delighted to welcome Professor Jo Guldi from Southern Methodist University. She [INAUDIBLE] focus of history and practicing data scientist. She will discuss her book, The Long Land War– The Global Struggle for Occupancy Rights, which approaches the question of land reform from the point of view of Britain’s disintegrating empire.

Professor Guldi is the author of four books. The first one published, by Harvard in 2012, is Roads to Power– Britain Invents the Infrastructure State. In 2014, published by Cambridge, The History Manifesto. And then The Long Land War, published just last year by Yale University Press. And forthcoming is The Dangerous Art of Text Mining.

So you can see that the historical work, her historical work, ranges from archival studies by nation building, state formation, and the use of technology by experts and by historians. So she’s been a real pioneer also in the field of text mining for historical research.

So I’ll just mention a few upcoming events at Matrix. And the first one is actually the one at 4:00 PM today also by Professor Guldi, so where she will present a talk cosponsored by the Department of History and the Berkeley D-Lab and, of course, Social Science Matrix. And that talk is titled, Towards the Practice of Text Mining to Understand Change over Historical Time. So join us today at 4:00 PM.

And then next week on March 15, we will be having a Matrix on point panel entitled Myths and Misinformation, which brings together perspective from across the social sciences on the question of the spread of untruths and misinformation. And finally I’ll just mention, on March 23, we’ll have Phil Gorski from Yale University to present his recent book, The Flag and the Cross– White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy.

So without further ado, welcome, Jo, and–

Thank you so much.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

[JO GULDI] Thank you so much, Marion. I’m going to switch the slides. OK, thank you so much, Marianne. Thank you to the center, to Paul Pearson, for inviting me. It’s such a privilege to be with you in Berkeley and such a joy. This is where I did my PhD with the gentleman in the back. It’s an honor to be back.

This is my traveling copy. So I’m going to pass it around in case you would like to see. I am a funny kind of historian. I spend half of my time in archives doing normal historian archival things. And then I spend half of my time with computers, thinking about how the new techniques of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics can help historians to read more books than they would have read and make conclusions on a different scale or a different sort of conclusion.

In general, times being what they are, the latter kind of talk fills up the room every time because there’s so many data science majors and so many data science faculty. This work is not irrelevant to the present, land climate change or not, irrelevant issues. So I’m really grateful to everyone who’s made time to show up for this conversation.

The two I’ve been– so just to add on to Marion’s advertisement for the afternoon event, there will be no data in there. There’s a really simple table at one point. It wasn’t generated with a computer. It’s simple edition. [LAUGHS]

If you want to see computers, come back at 4:00. This is actual history. You can leave now if you want, but I’m really glad to those of you who aren’t leaving. Thank you. OK.

So I’d like to talk to you today about the historiographical questions that I wanted to engage in this book, The Long Land War, which came out in May. It’s a monograph on global land redistribution and occupancy rights, the right not to be displaced. The book represents the first attempt by a historian in something like half a century to reckon with the narrative of the episode sometimes referred to as land reform or agrarian reform along with a larger set of land use, land governance issues that include freedom from eviction, rent control, everything that looks like a right to housing, which I classify as a land issue, which is a sort of retro thing because in the United States we have departments of urban studies.

And then we have urban planning and rural land use. And those are understood as fundamentally different kinds of issues. Housing issues are not land issues to the views of many people in North America. I’m going to erase that difference in order to get us back in sync with an earlier time in the evolution of modern land use history.

Land reform, as I understand it, originated as an anticolonial movement for reparations. It was the first modern reparations movement– reparations in land. And the first ideas about a postcolonial reparations appeared in the 19th century in the course of anticolonial movement associated with the British Empire, specifically in Ireland. And I’ll returned to Ireland in a moment.

The rationale was that only by reversing the sins of empire, the confiscations associated with race-based exclusions on owning or inheriting property, was it possible to create an inclusive and therefore viable economy in the former colonies of Britain. In the 20th century, independent colonial movements across Latin America, Africa, and Asia took this British model, a land court reallocating who owns the property, usually with compensation, in new directions. Those movements effectively redistributed millions of acres across the face of the globe from the hands of hacienda and landlord systems where property was in the hands of the few, the rich, the money, the elite, and everyone else is a tenant paying rent, to systems of broadcast ownership by small farmers and householders.

It is hard to overstate the economic and political consequences of land reform for the 20th century. The World Bank offered– authored a report in 2008 maybe that argued that across all national and ideological traditions in nations where land reform had appeared, the Gini coefficient went down, meaning that it was– that however rich the nation might be, more people were able to participate in economic growth when that occurred. Revolutions and land reform touched almost every nation in the Global South, and those nations were all– but those movements were also intertwined with housing movements, anti-eviction movements, and intellectual currents about land use governance across the Global North.

Now land reform is a massively-challenging subject for a historian to take on. This will not be the final book on land reform by any stretch of the imagination. The global span is intractable. Temporal scale adds the advantage of being able to watch institutions rise, converge, and vanish. But it also amplifies the nature of the undertaking.

So I’d love to tell you about that work, about how I hoped that the digital would support longer time spans and more global comparisons, how the digital failed, and what I’d love to do with the digital. Bracket that. There’s a blog coming out on the Royal Historical Society website later this month. I’m not going to talk to you about it. I’m not going to tell you about the archives in Rome, New Delhi, Sussex, and Wisconsin that helped me get a handle on international currents, comparisons, and social movements.

I’d like to tell you about social theory. I’d like to tell you about what it’s like to reckon with the kind of theoretical orientation that allows a historian to engage Charles Tilly’s call for vast comparisons.

So the theoretical questions that allowed me to wrangle with an era of land reform were these. First, a history of the state told in terms of practices, borrowing techniques from the history of science, and crucially about the role of information in institutional infrastructures that reinforce certain ideas of collective and private ownership. Secondly, an approach to global history that is transnational, global, and transtemporal, which is based on excavating connections between land reform movements and intellectual traditions in different places. And finally, an investigation into the legal status of property and how it changed in the 20th century, which challenges received definitions of property, which was conceived as a universal law, an unchanging good that was discovered alongside the law of gravity in the 17th century and never changed again.

My argument is going to be big changes happen. I’m going to tell you what I think they are. So let’s dive in with the question of what is the state in the 20th century.

I wanted to ask questions about new forms of governance that came into being in this era, which ranged across several categories, including international initiatives, including attempts from the United Nations to plan a global extension service modeled on the American New Deal to support farmers, wherever they might be, and extending to concomitant attempts to map global land use around the world with the thinking that maps like the one in the upper right hand corner would provide member nations like India with the rationale to make sure that if I gave every seat in this room your own acre of land, I wouldn’t give Professor Pearson the loam and Marianne the rock and say, well, they’re equal because they’re one acre. And then Marianne wouldn’t be able to farm anything because all she has is rock, not viable soil. So we need a land use map.

Some historians like Stephen Masike have seen this map as a tool of imperialism just because it’s a big, international map at scale. I see it as a request coming from the postcolonial nations themselves for support, for information infrastructure, that allows them to make their own decisions and to affect postcolonial reforms. So the international actors are a new part of the story, not something that we see in the 19th century domain of European colonization.

What’s new in the 20th century includes new theoretical approaches to the problem of postcoloniality from the social sciences, as social scientists, some of them from nations like India, applied themselves to developing a theory of economic growth suited to nations composed primarily of peasants and small farmers. Their logic included often reversing Malthusian theories that cast population density as an impediment to growth, and arguing, as with this chart in the lower right-hand corner, that the density of farm population could be a resource up to a certain point for allowing more growth, more economic production overall as small farmers became small entrepreneurs, producing bucket factories and hoe factories on their former farm with the multitude of children that they had.

The actors include national initiatives, of course, including contemporary conversations in the US and the UK about extending state welfare to public housing, but also national initiatives in Tanzania, India, and elsewhere about disseminating land to the people, land to the tiller. And these initiatives– national, theoretical, international– are joined by nonprofits, activist nonprofits, like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundation and libertarian think tanks, which I’ll reference in a moment. And finally, there are social movements– social movements that include peasant protest movements, communist and worker movements, student protests, identity movements, pushing for housing and reparation and land. We’ll hear more about them in a second.

One thread that stands out about these actors is the degree to which land and housing movements were interrelated. Theories from Georgist economics, theories about self-built housing movements from anarchists like Colin Ward trickled across the borders of the urban and the rural, the Global North and the Global South. So I’m going to be trying to make some of those connections with you. It’s a long book. There are a lot of those connections. I’m just going to show you a smattering of splinters right now.

The competition of ideas and interests resulted in numerous showdowns. This was, as my title proclaimed, an era of war, a struggle to disseminate the land sometimes punctuated by bloody coups and famines, sometimes by less violent protests, which by the end of my period, 1974, had serious consequences that included the collapse of movements for the national redistribution of land and the replacement of that ideology on a national– international level by free market mechanisms coordinated at the World Bank. And I’ll give you my explanation for when and how that happened.

I came to argue for the emergence of land use governance alongside unions and inflation as one of the paradigmatic sites of ungovernability in the 1970s. Land use policies failed to provide enough housing, but the land use bureaucracies that had been established in the developed and developing world, once abolished, were replaced by free market laws that replaced state bureaucracy but likewise also failed to provide sufficient housing, resulting in new challenges to social equity.

If we ask about what’s historically new about this moment, another feature that stands out as this, a diversifying cast of actors. Unlike in the 19th and 20th century stories about the rise of bureaucracies in the imperial context, when we look at this 20th century story, we’re talking about national initiatives regulating housing access, operating in a world where those national actors have to interface with international actors and sometimes compete against nonprofits that assume state-like powers. All of these entities are using the techniques of gathering information and disseminating information that had been forged in the crucible of 19th century empire.

So let’s descend into a little bit more detail. Let’s take one of the international units that consumed my research– international actors at the level of the United Nations. When the UN was founded, it coordinated an international movement to protect rights of occupancy in the developed and underdeveloped world.

This was nowhere more clear and more relevant to land and housing issues than at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations with its motto, fiat pannus– let there be bread. The FAO, rhymes with cow or now. That’s how the Italians say it. So it’s how the FAO employees say it. So it’s how I say it. The FAO was the UN’s first independent agency, founded in Quebec City in 1945 and later headquartered in Rome.

In the 1940s and ’50s the FAO housed many individuals working with an undisguised anticolonial agenda to advocate for restoring land rights to farmers in the developing world. In 1945, many of the founding designers of programs look to postcolonial struggles in Ireland, Mexico, and India as an omen of things to come. Peasants around the world are organizing, demanding their land rights back. New institutions are coming into being, like land courts which are charged with compensating landlords, buying out their land, and redistributing the land to the peasants to create a nation of owner occupiers.

One of the believers, firm believers, in this agenda is a former nutrition expert, John Boyd Orr, recipient of the Nobel Prize, the Nobel Prize in peace, founder of the FAO. In 1953, he published his manifesto for what this movement was about, The White man’s Dilemma, in which he made strong a strong argument that Europe had incurred a moral debt to its former colonies.

He explained the FAO’s mission in part by arguing that developed nations would have to fund the development of their former colonies, and that only through the creation of broad economic opportunities could the past be repaired. The redistribution of colonized land around the world was necessary to avert an era of endless cycles of violence.

Now the collective bibliographies, the group bibliographies, by which I sketch out what’s happening at the FAO in my first– in chapters two and three underscored that Orr’s beliefs about this were not unique. Reviewing the founders and the first ranks of leaders and consultants associated with the FAO, I found the granddaughter of a Fenian radical exiled from Britain for his involvement with dynamite plots to get the land back to the Irish peasant. She was committed to postcolonial rebellion everywhere and was an architect of the Kindertransport, literally seizing Jewish children from the mouth of the Holocaust and transporting them to Canada, to safety, the best kind of settler colonialism. Best kind? Yeah.

I found other activists that included the son of a suffragette hunger striker committed to food for colonized subjects through control of their own territory. I found the economist husband of novelist, Pearl S. Buck who himself had attempted to orchestrate a New Deal for China, which forms a large part of the plot of the prize-winning novel, The Good Earth. I found early director generals touring India and explicitly meeting with postcolonial economists, committed to the idea of economic growth at the bottom of the economic pyramid through the principle of land redistribution.

The FAO is unlike many of the other branches of the United Nations that have been associated with a new cultural imperialism. The FAO then today, as when it was founded, was essentially a postcolonial institution typified by south-south advising. Today, economists from Lebanon are sent to advise Algeria about what its water and agricultural problems.

And that was a matrix of south-south, intentional south-south, advising, using the expertise of India to advise around South Asia, using Indigenous PhDs, Indigenous economic knowledge, native economic knowledge, to create a postcolonial well of expertise to push back against other kinds of expertise coming from American universities. Recovering the radicalism of the FAO’s founding, plumbing the FAO archives for their tortured correspondence with peasants and landowners on both sides of the business of land redistribution allowed me a shortcut through a multitude of highly diverse, very differentiated national disputes and, to a sense, about how international governance was intervening in a world of former empires, trying to create a new era where participatory economics might have a chance to come into play.

Let’s examine a different part of this new range of actors involved in land governance. Let’s look at one of the nonprofits that took an active role in urban land issues in the Global North.

In the UK, a think tank called the Institute of Economic Affairs was formed by Arthur Seldon. Envious of the fervor of left-leaning youth for Fabian socialism, he dreamed of making a similar movement to take– to back the market and the small state inspired by the philosophy of F.A. Hayek. The IEA rushed into action in 1965, compiling pamphlets, imagining a free market world where even public libraries would charge for their services.

After 1968, as a housing crisis began to rock London accompanied by massive student protests advocating a universal right to housing, the IEA switched its pamphlet campaign to information about what the market could do for housing. And they had an information-collecting kind of census of land use problems as part of their strategy. IEA leaders began to write letters to executives in the construction and real estate industries, asking those executives to help them compile a compendium of evidence that state restrictions on building were choking the building of housing with red tape, that NIMBYism was at the root of limiting housing.

If that was true, then they could call for the deregulation of land use, the abolition of the land use in public housing, bureaucracy. So they compiled evidence, case by case. And they began to compile this in new pamphlets about the coming regime of free market housing.

Then the IEA leaders began to reach out to recruit and groom promising new political candidates, among them a young Margaret Thatcher. Elected as prime minister in 1979, Thatcher’s– one of Thatcher’s first acts would be to sell off public housing to the highest bidder.

Now one of the ways that international actors like the FAO and nonprofits like the IEA could compete with nation states and traditional parties was through their use and orchestration of information. The FAO collected and distributed bibliographies and soil maps of the world, like this one, tools that allowed postcolonial nation states to enact relatively efficient land redistribution programs backed by international studies in soil science, agriculture, and economics. The IAEA staged letter-writing, information-collection, and pamphlet-dissemination programs to create a groundswell contesting normative ideas of land use bureaucracy as the solution for a housing crisis.

Both essentially copied the activity of nations and empires in the 19th century, instrumenting the collection and dissemination of information to promote a homogeneous space united by information flows. I theorize the term information infrastructure to investigate the many information-organization schemes launched in parallel with land-redistribution initiatives and to think about the consequences of information in the service of multiple ideologies.

But one of the features of these information infrastructures was that they served a variety of different ideologies. The ideology of information had– it had an international face with the FAO. It had a libertarian face with the IEA. It even had a more radical face among social movements at the same time as these other initiatives were being pressed forward, and this radical phase pushed in a very different direction from those visible at the level of international government or the UK nonprofits.

So we’re looking at what are known as participatory maps– maps drawn by hand– by taking into account the testimony of maybe 500 individuals. In the 1970s, British Marxist geographers had begun to experiment with new kinds of surveying suited to documenting local property rights in their diversity. Participatory maps first emerged as many-to-many maps to document the so-called hunting lines of the Beaver and Cree tribes in Canada.

And we’re seeing the hunting lines map from Hugh Brody’s Maps and Dreams, the publication in 1977. Each of these loops corresponds to one family. The idea is that these are hunting lines that constitute a nonoverlapping property right.

This is where our family hunts. Your family hunts over there in the next ridge. You can do other things with the land, but only we are allowed our hunting line. By drawing them and showing that the hunting lines were mostly nonoverlapping, the Beaver and Cree people were able to argue in court that they had an occupancy right to their territory and therefore defeat mineral and lumber interest claims to use the land as part of a public domain.

The Beaver and Cree map launches an era of participatory mapmaking in global development which is still ongoing, nowadays through GIS and handheld devices. But this is still something that we would learn about in a global development program like the ones at Cornell and Sussex.

By the 1980s, these maps had begun to spread across the developing world, creating copycat movements. For example, in the 1980s, participatory map movements occur in– are appearing in India, being used to document the occupancy rights of so-called pavement dwellers– we would call them the homeless– on the streets of Bombay. Alongside the techniques of many-to-many mapping spread the possibility of a more diverse set of property claims adjudicated not by colonial courts but by independent and decolonized national court systems on the basis of data collected by the people themselves.

Looking at information infrastructures suggests a fundamentally new model of how 20th century states differ from earlier ones. Information infrastructures, I want to suggest, differed in scale, point of organization, and ambition from those information infrastructures of 19th century empire, whether the state inspection of factories and slaughterhouses or the colonial census. It was only in the 20th century that information infrastructures, such as alternative mapping programs, could be launched outside of the nation state with participatory maps as a symbol of the power of village by village across the south, localities village by village across the south, to make their own intervention into property law.

So we get a very different picture of what maps mean in the 20th century. If we start with the abundance of different kinds of maps and actors on an international scale being used to adjudicate these land use issues, and then ask, what is the ideological meaning, how many people are involved with these maps, how is this different from the 19th century, than if we start with a theory of the map, expertise, and scale a la Foucault. In short, this is a very– this is the inverse of the picture of 20th century authority that has been given to us by writers like Timothy Mitchell.

Neither the FAO maps nor the Cree maps were imperial homogenizing forces. They were countervailing information structures leveraged in the context of a struggle for control over land by the people in the future reversing the sense of colonialism. The era of modern information infrastructure meant a new field of war over political economy where ideologues of the free market and Indian villagers actively contested the decisions of state bureaucrats by assembling their own data.

So much for conclusions about the state, theorizing the state. Let’s move on to global history. The new actors that I’ve been describing set to work to map land and lobby for a particular political approach to land management in the context of a global movement to redistribute land loosely connected by social movements and intellectual crosscurrents, which was my task to reconstruct, as a global movement initiated by peasants and workers, accompanied by intellectual and political movements that theorized alternative economic projects.

This movement dates from the late 19th century when simultaneous struggles over land ownership in Ireland and India rocked British empire and introduced drastic new measures, for example, the introduction of rent control and the state-sponsored buyout of landlords in Ireland. So the long land war began with the revolt of colonized populations. In Ireland, the National Land League staged mass marches, counted evictions, and invented the boycott.

In Mexico, peasants hid their property titles under floorboards and swarmed to form armies, revolting against the hacienda system. Their rights would be enshrined in a new system of Iquitos, protecting Indigenous rights and common village lands. In India, Gandhi and his followers led rent strikes and staged a 10-year pilgrimage in the name of voluntary land turnover from landlords to peasants.

Interconnections between local movements suggest the advantage of viewing these interconnected movements as global, recognizing a variety of commonalities between global land struggles associated with each other. In Britain, India, Mexico, the United States, across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, movements for occupancy rights struggled to define land not as a private commodity to be bought and sold but as a special kind of property– a property whose value was defined by inhabitation. Many of these movements won.

They passed legislation in Bengal, Kerala, and Mexico that defined land as a collective resource for food and housing. And these movements had in common their postcolonial origins. In each case, as in the cases of land reform movements in other parts of the world, in each of the cases listed here, postcolonial experience was informed by a series of common struggles– protesting for land redistribution, the broadening of access to housing, for control over rent, and for security against eviction and displacement.

And the movement wasn’t as limited to the Global South as this list would proclaim. Even in New York City and London, rent-control measures endorse the rights of working-class citizens to live and thrive, free from fear of eviction and displacement.

So as I’m laying it out, lumping together diverse movements, rural and urban, Global North and South, communist and capitalist disrupts, many received histories which provide the turning points for the 20th century. The reason that I’m doing this is that I believe that studying British empire provides a thread running through each of these confrontations. 1881 in Ireland was the world’s first modern land law that constituted for rent control and land reform.

India was promised land reform in 1886. And the failure of Britain to provide land reform for Bengal precipitates the fight for land reform and the struggle up to independence in 1945 when it takes a different form. The British inexperience in Ireland with consciously looked to as the pattern for land reform in Egypt.

Conversations about Indigenous land rights and reparations marked ongoing, longer struggles in Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. So the Commonwealth countries are deeply rooted in a 20th century struggle about the nature of land and its governance. Britain itself was promised land reform in 1911, including a rent control during the first World War, and promised homes fit for heroes, returning veterans. A housing crisis marked British policy from 1945, through the Thatcher years, and persists to this day.

Meanwhile, British intellectuals were deeply embedded in conversations about international land reform, especially through the FAO and the United Nations where, as we’ve seen, many of the stories of the original founders and administrators, their architecture, was composed with the expectation of a decomposing British empire in which Indian postcolonial economics was newly relevant. So we would expect that tracing British connections across this disintegrating empire would explain global patterns that might be otherwise overlooked when the emphasis is on Bretton Woods and American empire, and the narrative is about Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

We can tell that story, too. It shows up from time to time in the book. But I’m not going to take time to examine those cases here because the organizational principle that casts new light is thinking about British empire disintegrating.

To investigate the connections between these conversations, let’s look at a few cases of global interconnectivity. And let’s start with India and the US via the Indian mystic and social reformer, Vinoba Bhave. When we first encounter him, Vinoba is burning his proof of graduation, his high school diploma, in the family stove, having explained to his mother that he was going to dedicate his life to the service of humanity. He had just heard about Gandhi, and he would dedicate his life to becoming Gandhi’s major apostle and successor.

In the American context, we often think of Gandhi as the author of the Salt March in 1930, the author of nonviolent political tactics. But in India, he’s equally remembered for events a decade previous to the Salt March when he was leading rent strikes patterned off of the Irish example in the Champaran district alongside future prime ministers and presidents of India.

Land reform had been promised to Bengal in 1885, 1886, just ahead of Ireland. And it was expected with independence as one of the first fruits of the Indian Resistance Movement. At that point, in 1945, land reform was passed, but a Brahmanical supreme court struck down Indian land reform measures, referring land reform to the individual states.

At that moment of regrouping, many Indians believed that land reform was essential to a path out of poverty that would raise the many alongside the few. After Gandhi’s assassination in 1948, Vinoba Bhave became the individual who personally symbolized this hope of an egalitarian, charitable, and nonviolent reversal of the land thefts associated with British empire. Walking hundreds of miles across the continent, Vinoba asked landowners in India to consider pledging a proportion of their land to the landless families of the district.

Believing that spontaneous community self-organization was more important than any infrastructure he himself could provide, Vinoba refused to provide any accounting whatsoever of these land pledges. And one result was that 10 times as many acres were pledged as were actually turned over. His followers included a large number of European and American youth who recorded and published their experiences for Western audience.

And some of these attempt– returned home and attempted to instantiate a similar ethic around land use and land management back at home. So a primary example is the civil rights activist, Robert Swan, who joined Vinoba’s ashram, and then brought the idea of land-banking back to North America, to the American South, in an attempt to set up African-American communities in Georgia free from the threat of rising rent. And so this is an argument about the origins of the modern land trust which is of relevance to conservation movements, social movements, and movements today. This is how the land trust movement gets planted in North America.

Ideas about an economy where housing was valued above the commodification of land was re-echoed in the squatters movements of New York and London in the 1960s and 1970s. And Vinoba’s case remained a frequent referent, circulating in these communities as proof that anarchist principles of land as a human right could be enacted, anchoring the possibility of a noncapitalist relationship to land persisting within a dominant ethos of capitalism.

Some of the most compelling cases of international connections happened around the edges of Britain’s former empire, as in this case. But consider some further afield cases, as in events in New Mexico in the United States. Consider the story of Tierra Amarilla.

Here, the property rates of Indigenous and Latino majority were sacrosanct, in theory, since the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which had validated Spanish crown grants to Native peoples and Indig– and Latino peoples alike. By the 20th century, an Anglo sheriff and county administration were turning a blind eye as Anglo ranchers started moving their barbed wire fences, trespassing into Indigenous and Latino territory. The Latino community complained. The Indigenous community complained. The sheriff did nothing.

In 1963, local Indigenous and Latino leaders began to form a resistance movement, the Alianza Federal de Mercedes, led by Reies Lopez Tijerina pictured here. They started by erecting placards bearing the face of Emilio Zapata and the slogan, tierra o muerte, which many American historians have wrongly suggested was the slogan of the Mexican Liberal Party. The slogan of the Mexican Liberal Party associated with the Mexican Civil War, the Mexican Revolution, is tierra y libertad, land and liberty.

Land or death is really important. The slogan in New Mexico, in fact, echoed a contemporary Latino land movement elsewhere, the one in Peru represented by the Marxist leader, Hugo Blanco. After 1961, Blanco had orchestrated one of the most consequential Indigenous protest movements in Latin America for land rights.

He led the Quechua people to occupy the fields of local haciendas, putting up one-night houses, putting up tents, literally occupying the land and refusing to leave. They occupied the streets of Cusco in protests, claiming their ancestral rights to land. In 1963, Blanco was sentenced to death.

In the proceedings in the courtroom, he led the packed ranks of Quechua people who had showed up in his defense in the chant, tierra o muerte, tierra o muerte, land or death, until the courtroom had to be shut down in the chaos. The death penalty was dropped. The sentence was changed to 25 years in prison.

Back in Tierra Amarilla, Latinos began resisting land theft through armed confrontation. In 1967, Tijerina led one group, kidnapping the local sheriff, departing for the hills before exchanging gunfire with local troops. The events in New Mexico ran in parallel to other contemporary US identity movements that claimed land rights, including James Forman’s Black Manifesto of 1969, which called for 200 million in federal payments to reverse the loss of farmland by Blacks.

Also contemporary was the Indigenous occupation of Alcatraz and [INAUDIBLE] in upstate New York in 1969 into ’71. I think what we learn from the contemporaneity of these movements and the ties to international movements is that these are not one-off ethnic studies movements in the United States. They are deeply aware that there are Indigenous land reformations being enacted in other parts of the globe, and they want in. They just want what other people are getting.

These events kick off a counter-reaction in the US enshrined by a number of bestselling books that warned about growing population overwhelming the economy and the Earth’s carrying capacity. Of these the most consequential was William and Elizabeth Paddock’s bestselling We Don’t Know How in 1973, which explicitly denounced land reform as a fool’s errand driven by the growing demands of ethnic groups at home and abroad, dooming any economic improvement schemes whatsoever. These theories would converge in a new report at the World Bank in 1974 that essentially eradicated the FAO’s control over its own budget, denouncing land reform, and proclaiming a new era of free market politics.

Henceforth, there would be no more land ceilings, no limits on how big farms were, only land floors. This is the policy instrument that inaugurates the era of the Green Revolution and therefore reverses the successes of land reform in most of /

Meanwhile, Hugo Blanco had become a celebrity in London. His testimony and manifesto, Land or Death, was republished by activist committees. There were protests outside the Peruvian embassy. And the story of the Quechua occupations sparked the revival of student-led squats to protest the crisis of housing, demanding that the UK government take action to create a world where housing was regarded as a human right for all.

I’m going to skip the international– the transtemporal and intellectual connections because in the interest of time and head straight to what this tells us about property Traditional narratives of property have been dominated by a history of single ownership– owner proprietorship as if property were a law of nature, like gravity, that was promoted around the world by British colonialism, thus giving birth to the era of capitalism.

Thanks to decades of historical scholarship, we now know that this picture is incomplete. Scholars such as Sujit Sivasundaram and Alan Grier among many others have persuaded us that none of the spaces to which Europeans applied property law were empty, and indeed that most people had highly specific and differentiated notions of nonexclusive, overlapping property rights, sometimes holding territory in common for specific purposes. A literature on the history of Commonwealth nations has emphasized the story of land grabs, seizure, and homogenization where the European map is the instrument of dominance.

Now, despite this research for the era of European empire, histories of property rights in the 20th century have remained largely governed by the earlier model. Modernization, expertise, and commodification remain the themes of many accounts of global development. So we can read Daniel Immerwahr, Ethan Kapstein treating US land reform in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea as an instance of pacification through individual proprietorship, or Tori Olson and Amy Offner on Mexican land reform under American influence, where peasants are turned into proprietors who conceive of citizenship in terms of single owner proprietorship. The logic is usually that single owner proprietorship is an instrument of pacification and American empire of homogenization and capitalization.

And this is– there’s something to this account. But I think when we look at the larger picture of the disintegration of British empire, we get a very different portrait of the meaning of land reform. And it’s also possible that American policies were noticeably lagging behind UN policies and policies promoted in other parts of the world, a global trend. So any account focusing on American empire therefore risks losing track of the wider and longer picture.

So it’s worth considering looking at this chart of land reform movements as a whole and charting the longer– and asking what it means to chart the longer arc of time. This timeline of land reform begins with 1881, the date of the first rent control and land reform in Ireland. And it persists through the 1970s when land reform is effectively dismantled by the World Bank.

The long part of the land long land war is therefore a distinctive era of the 20th century. It extends across two world wars and the Bretton Woods conference which are standard landmarks of periodization for the American empire story.

A major feature of land reform viewed as a period, I would argue, is that it was marked by an expanding array of repertoires for understanding what property is and for conceiving of property in common. These are driven largely by postcolonial debates. But the evidence is most visible in shifts across the social sciences, including in my own field of history.

Across the social sciences, reacting to postcolonial land movements, researchers began responding to social movements by investigating the validity of traditional claims to land in ways that challenged European conventions of single owner, masculine proprietorship as the unique model for property over time. So social historians like EP Thompson argued for the significance of customs in common and peasant access to land in centuries past in Europe. Meanwhile, the economist and agricultural scientist, Esther Boserup contributed research into women’s property rights in traditional cultures in Africa, showing how those had been dismantled and challenged under European empire.

Elsewhere, at the University of Indiana, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom began a workshop on political economy that began to compile case studies from around the world, documenting the diversity of property systems, starting with the Swiss Grazing Commons and going on to document Spanish and Arabic irrigation systems that treated water like a common good, as well as fishing and timber commons around the world. Ostrom’s findings about common property systems would earn her a Nobel Prize in economics in 2009.

The work of these social scientists highlights the plausibility of multiple systems of property rights, not just of land but also of water, not merely for men but also for women. They highlight that property could be tended, maintained, even improved when had held as a collective good, administered on behalf of the many. Now, by conceiving of property as constituted by a broadening diversity of actors, we have the opportunity to compare ideological approaches in a new light.

The long 20th century can be conceived of as a moment when new social movements were galvanized around land use. And that includes single owner proprietorship versions like those in Ireland as well as certain kinds of communist policies both in Ireland and in the Chinese model of the family farm, early Chinese land reform, early Russian land reform, before forced collectivization.

Reforms center on the figure of the rent-paying peasant and their exploitation. In this sense, a longer story around British empire upends the Cold War narrative in which Russia and China are conceived of as a distinctive, fundamental break with European liberalism. In this case, they completely continuous.

The communist land redistributions then show up as having much more in common with other revolutions than previously thought. They also show up as being– I’m sorry the arrow should be pointing to Russia and China because we’re talking about that right now. The Russia and China models then show up in this account as the most effective– the most effective in terms of land redistributed until the forced collectivization and redistributions which result in massive famines. But these are not primarily linked to the initial single owner land reforms.

So it’s useful to notice what historians of China and Russia have long understood, that the communist land reforms are not singular in kind and nature but are composed of multiple stages of intervention, including the family farm movement which was extremely productive, minimally violent, and which looks very much in conception like the mirror image of Ireland. Comparing the movements in aggregate also underwrites some surprising conclusions, including the fact that the purely voluntary redistribution movements merit more notice than they have been given in political science texts that foreground aggregate comparisons between capitalist and communist models.

So what throws a wrench in that categorical, binary structure is the voluntary movement in India associated with Vinoba Bhave and the derivative campaigns like Operation Bargain in Bahar in the 1970s. Totally voluntary land reform. The state is barely involved. Landowners are just gifting land to landless peoples for the sake of a more inclusive economy.

They stand out as among the most successful of land reform movements. Voluntary land reform with two million acres distributed redistributes more than the first phase of the Mexican Revolution. It’s serious land reform.

Vinoba’s entirely voluntary land reform thus presents a corrective to histories of property rights that foreground a struggle between command and control redistribution on the model of Mao or Stalin against private property on the model of Anglo-American law. Its far more diverse. The spectrum is really important.

So where I think this drives us is this. The categories of 20th century land reform were fissile, not fixed. The moment of land reform was an era of expansive experimentation with the means of persuading individuals to part with their property or to recategorize property in the name of a wider spirit of egalitarianism. Broad, new redefinitions of property, including the possibility of legal recognition for reparations for Indigenous or collective tenure, for housing and agriculture as human rights, appear in the 20th century and expand, motivated, in part, by social science’s ongoing engagement with social movements.

These expansive definitions of property are constituted via new technologies and social practices. And these, together, constitute a major movement within government and beyond government on the international playing field.

So let me wrap up and ask, why does this matter for history? What is the big takeaway for histories of the 20th century? I believe that what emerges from an aggregate view of the struggles over property in the 20th century across various forms of governance is an inter– is a portrait of an age of land redistribution, much as we speak of an age of revolutions.

This is a very different perspective from the one in political science where there’s been a comparative approach centered around Cold War categories, the numbers of acres, and beneficiaries. It’s also very different than accounts that focus on American empire as a zone of expertise exploitation and single owner proprietorship, which characterizes the expansion of American empire as totally unprecedented but also simultaneously just repeating what British empire did in the 19th century.

What I find is that this age is generally marked by an evolving debate over what property is, about the multiplicity of types of ownership that can constitute property, and the possibility of ownership of land and water as commons. It’s marked by an expanding set of nonstate actors, including international actors, nonprofits, and social movements, many of them competing with the state and against– competing against each other through their implementation of information infrastructures. Who wins the pamphlet war wins. Who collects the– who disseminates the most maps wins in court. Who wins is not going to be determined fundamentally by the nation state but by these information infrastructures and their reach on a global level.

So these are my conclusions about the era of land reform. Thank you so much for your time. Thank you for staying through the conversation. I very much look forward to your questions. So shall we proceed to the Q&A? OK, thank you.

[PAUL PIERSON] That was really great. Thanks. I guess the question I want to start with is about the decision to think of housing and housing rights as a sort of subcategory of land reform, and I– because I tend to think of them as different. And so I was trying to think, as we were going along, about what the advantages and disadvantages of grouping them together are.

So I was just thinking, so I think of the conflicts over housing as being very closely connected to urbanization, as being a much more urban issue and much more about consumption– that housing is a consumption good, whereas land is a for production. And so I thought it was really interesting to group them together. I’d just be interested to hear a little more of you’re thinking about that.

[JO GULDI] Yeah, thanks for that question. It’s a really good question. So it’s absolutely true. If you read Matt Desmond’s, Evicted, he’s not talking about the eviction of rural families. If you take an urban studies course, you’re going to be talking about housing movements, and you’ll never mention housing– rural housing problems. It’s assumed today that rent is a nonissue in rural places.

But in order to understand the three months during which the protesting farmers shut down New Delhi last year, they were protesting laws which extended the reach of corporations into protected rural lands, resulting in rising taxes and rent. So around the Global South, these eviction land ownership and housing questions are tightly bound up with agricultural land use. I think our division of categories dates from the moment of the so-called urban crisis of America and the postwar world which, is when the first American studies programs of urban studies were constituted.

But. Interestingly, the first rent controls emerge in a rural context. So I’ve been talking about the land law of Ireland, 1881. Land law of Ireland, 1881, is the first rent control in history, and it’s a rural action. It’s a rural action because the practice of rent-racking, of raising the rent every year, has resulted in an eviction regime which is way less– there’s way less eviction than what was happening during the Irish famine when there’s a mass exodus. But it’s raised the Specter of a new famine, a new regime of evictions.

And so Irish peasants began literally counting the evictions as part of the activities of the National Land League, and then they take that to court. And then, ultimately, this new court is set into place, and the new court has the power to fix your rent. You have to apply to the courts, show up with documents, saying what you’ve done with the piece of property. And it’s very much bound up with the question of Gaelic Indigenous law against British single owner proprietorship.

And there’s been enough of a social science conversation in 19th century Britain that that becomes the issue. So the rent control is about keeping Irish peasants in their houses in the countryside. Also agricultural production. They’re also all happen to be farmers. But it’s the status of the homestead that launches these movements.

Copycat movements begin to emerge in Edinburgh and London in the decades that follow. And Ireland becomes the site for a new theory of an egalitarian politics of housing coined by Californian, Henry George, who was married to an Irish-American immigrant who we met over there in San Francisco. So that’s the in a nutshell version of the longer rural background to housing as an urban right.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I had the same question. I write about council housing. So I’m so curious. My question, then, to follow on from that is, you talk about different kinds of tenure. There’s own your own occupation. There’s collective rights of various kinds. There’s security of tenure for just one person. I mean, there’s a lot of different forms of land use, including versus land for housing, an apartment, a farm. All of those are very different.

And I think– I also think about, say, the Australian case, the Native Title that was handed down by the Australian high court in 1991 or the judgment that spawned Native Title. That kind of land reform and redistribution is very different from the New Zealand version of the Treaty of Waitangi, for example. And so I’m wondering how you sort of deal– obviously, I’ll have to read the book– how you deal with [LAUGHS] all of these different forms because I can see the movements being the same. But it feels like the goals and the forms of tenure are quite different. And how do they all work together?

[JO GULDI] Yes, yes, how the whole thing works. Well, I tried to do this in– tried to sketch out the variety of land regimes in the really big picture in the introduction. The introduction starts off with the most ancient regulations that we have on governing land use which are Daoist documents. And then very quickly it runs through Marx and picks up the recent literature on British empire and Treaty of Waitangi and settler colonialism.

But settler colonialism isn’t the only version of property seizure in British empire. There are also high taxation regimes typical of most parts of India, and the Zamindari System where we’re just going to fix the property settlements, in 1793. And so they’re extractive regimes which have the effect of eviction and limiting opportunities for growth, but they’re based in property law. They’re based in the matrix of how the land is managed.

And then there’s outright expropriation, like White people coming in and saying, now, I own this. And that’s behind the Mau Mau rebellion and many other parts of British empire. So we have these conflicts, and they’re seen as equivalent by anticolonial movements starting in the 1880s because the Irish example and the war in Bengal push to such a degree that even Americans like Henry George can’t ignore it. They’re starting to see that there’s a global connection and that theorizing the land might be the basis for some understanding of the harm done by empire.

So that’s the contemporary conclusion, that the commodification of land has constituted a kind of harm. And the plausibility of that is what encourages Aurobindo to meet with Irish rent strike leaders in London in the 1880s and 1890s which is how we think the rent strike makes it to India and how these copycat types of social movements get started moving around the world. And this story allows for alternative traditions because obviously I’m telling the story of the disintegration of British empire. But many of the events that I trace are happening in former Spanish empire, former French empire.

There are land struggles that are particular, and I stage a very particular types of landownership which are complex in all of those regions. And that’s exactly what the challenge is of telling a global transtemporal story about land reform. So for individual cases, I try to be very exact about what’s happening.

And then this is why the conclusion’s about what happens to property is essentially a diversification. And the social science literature is incredibly helpful because you can see anthropologists, sociologists starting to reckon with historians, starting to reckon with describing the multiplicity of land ownership patterns and institutions like this one starting in the 1960s and 1970s, where if you look at the dissertation title catalog, it’s literally like every single dissertation coming out of Wisconsin, Berkeley, Cornell has land somewhere in the title. It’s land in the property ownership system of the Iquitos or land in the European peasant commons, but it’s all land, all the time until about 1982.

Yeah, and then it collapses. It changes. It’s a fascinating portrait of global development as a market driver of a certain kind of theory, which is then perceived as being rural and not related to the market in an era of neoliberalism.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] This is really fascinating. So if I’m understanding this correctly, you are arguing that these anticolonial movements are not just challenging the distribution of land. But they’re also challenging the very concept of property in the colonial regime.

But at the same time, they are sometimes working through the institutions of the colonial regime. They;re using their maps or the legacy courts or whatever. So I just wanted to ask if you could kind of give us your thoughts on the tension between those two, and maybe whether different strategies have different outcomes in terms of working with the system and working against it?

[JO GULDI] Thanks. I love that question. So one of the things, fun things, about STS approaches is that the same tool can mean different things to different people. So when I was writing about the road system in 18th century Britain, the roads serve one purpose for the friends of Adam Smith who want to unite a nation and opportunities for trade. And then they’re used for very different purposes by working class members of the early trade unions, the Methodists and other radical groups, who start to organize over the roads, starting with the Wesleyan Methodists and the circuit riders. So they’re starting their own national purposes.

So I started thinking about maps in the same way. Maps showed up in my first book as just the instrument of the state for [INAUDIBLE], right? They’re used by this– [LAUGHS] the civil engineers’ maps mean taxation. And this is the story of the cadastral map as told by Roger Kain, and it’s probably mostly accurate until at least 1880.

The map, wherever you see it, the stories are all a map-maker is sent by the king into the remote hills of the Ardeche. And then he’s killed by the local peasants because they mean– they know that the surveyor’s instrument means that their tax taxes are about to go up. Yeah, so the surveyor has to die.

And that’s what resistance looks like. Resistance [LAUGHS] means literally killing the surveyor and taking away his instruments. No possibility of the map. And that’s the story of the blank spaces on the map. That’s the James C. Scott story. It’s true. It’s true until– the historian’s question is when? When is it true until?

So what’s not in this book is the prequel. The prequel. [LAUGHS] Originally The Long Land War was going to be much longer. It hit 1,000 pages. My readers were like, for god’s sake, Jo. So it got cut in half.

So forthcoming is the first half of The Long Land War in which I tell the story of Irish peasants in the 1880s, and their– what they start doing with maps and counting eviction. They start counter-mapping. They start counter-mapping in a fairly primitive way, but there are radical anticolonial surveyors associated with the movement in Ireland.

And that’s one of the reasons that this fundamentally new institution, the Land Court, can do its work, is that somebody has thought through all of the technicalities of what it needs to record. And essentially they do a labor theory of value in space. That’s what they figure out how to do.

So you can’t read that in the book now, but it’s coming. I promise. It’s really juicy. That was the motivation to start looking in the 20th century for the evolution of mapping from below.

There was a thin literature in this already. Denis Cosgrove, the great UCLA geographer, was already writing about this in the 1990s. He was thinking about participatory mapping movements in land use, in early socialism in the 1930s, where they’re going to map all– ask all of the children of Britain to map all of the best places for playgrounds. They’re going to ask unemployed people to map all of the best places to go to look for a job. And they’re going to disseminate– they’re going to re-engineer the welfare state, so it can be by the many, in the service of the money.

That was how I found my way to the archives of Sussex and the archives of participatory research in Asia, which are mind-blowing. Because from the 1970s– 1960s and 1970s, the followers of Paolo Freire, in all of these postcolonial countries, start taking airplanes to hang out with each other in the Caribbean and Yugoslavia and in India. And they start exchanging techniques for how to organi– first it’s how to organize literacy.

And then it goes through these stages– how to organize a participatory meeting, how to organize participatory research. And then they figure out the map. They figure out participatory mapping. And that’s when they perfected and turned it into a model where they can describe it in a flyer, and other people can do that.

That happens between 1972 and 1982. There are some conferences at the University of Sussex where they’re flying in postcolonial organizers. It then shows up in the Appalachians. It shows up in Thailand. It shows up in India. And John Gaventa from– who’s now running the University of Sussex, but is then at the Highlander Center in the Appalachias, conducting a rent survey of miners gets invited to Tamil Nadu to meet with Chania factory workers.

It’s so intensively global and so social, urban, rural, whatever. But it’s about this method, the counter-mapping, the potential of using technology against itself. My article version goes into this in much more detail and talks about the possibility of cooptation of the many-to-many map, which I think happened via the World Bank, again, in the 1990s.

Despite some good intentions by some people, the World Bank, they just didn’t understand the nature of participatory politics. They threw a lot of money at it. It didn’t work. Participatory mapping is now alive and well in a technological format in Silicon Valley promoted by Google’s social arms.

How to read counter-mapping strategies when they’re actually participatory in counter-mapping and when they’re not appropriated is a really interesting, knotty question. But reading those early organizers, they have a lot to say about it, so worthy of study.

[JULIA SIZEK] There’s a question from online. So I’m going to give anonymous attendee an opportunity to say some words. So this person says, thank you for this talk. Your work makes a point about the international discourse of land redistribution as part of a postcolonial movement and as a call for reparations.

I think that the agrarian underpinnings of reparations for formerly enslaved Black folks in the US and calls for 40 acres and a mule in Sherman’s Field, order number 15. Can you speak towards how Black land redistributive reparations relates to your work? And then there’s another follow-up question, which is concerning reparations. How do we deal with conflicts between the US’s theft of Indigenous lands and Black reparative calls for land redistribution when the land itself was transformed into property and stolen not from Black subjectivity but from indigeneity?

[JO GULDI] So two really good questions sort of about different things. One of them is a historical question about the chronology, as I take it, the chronology of activism for reparations for African-Americans. So the 40 acres and the mule story is really fascinating to follow through these international debates because it becomes abundantly clear that everyone else in the 1960s and 1970s has heard about this. They’ve heard about the claims for African-American reparations, and it makes sense to them.

They’re doing their own reparations to repair the sins of enslavement and land seizure and punitive taxation under colonization. Why shouldn’t the descendants of American slaves also get some form of reparations? So even in textbooks on land use published in the 1970s and 1980s by faculty at the University of Wisconsin, they are lobbying for African-American land reparations and describing this as the natural fulfillment of the land to the tiller movement that started, in their view, with Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan with an American vision of peaceful transitions to home ownership for all, instantiated by the American GI Bill and mortgages and middle class home ownership. Obviously, African-American reparations would be part of that.

So it’s so clear that the people who were part of this conversation, even in America but also overseas, see this as inevitable, just totally inevitable. The only way I– so then that raises the question, how do you make sense of it not happening and going away? James Forman writes his manifesto. If I’m right, and all the social scientists think that this makes sense– not all of them but significant social scientists are saying, this makes sense– how does it go away?

And so my explanation I gave in miniature, but it’s– the Paddocks are symptomatic of a response from a certain kind of natural scientist who believes that overpopulation and what is called then the crisis of rising expectations is at the root of ungovernability, at the root of a climate crisis, at the root of a food crisis, at the root of a housing crisis, that essentially these other people are asking for too much stuff. And they have to be stopped, or the planet itself is not going to be able to sustain this.

You hear echoes of this all the time in climate debates. And so I think it’s useful to say, ah, I have seen that before. They have data. There is other data to support family farming being a sustainable economics, being able to imagine a future. That debate has happened on this campus over the future of development as well.

There was a second part of that question. Julia, I might need you to help me.

[INAUDIBLE]

About indigeneity. OK, so this is a fascinating question. So in a settler colonial country like North America in which you had Indigenous land, and then you had enslaved people forced to farm land that had once been Indigenous, what does land reform mean? If land reform in Ireland meant turning the clock back to before the 17th century confiscations of Irish land by Cromwell’s army, what does it mean to turn the land– turn the clock back?

So I think one of the things that’s important is that, in most of the land reform movements, at least outside of communist countries, if there’s a land reform, it takes the form of an ownership transfer. And the ownership transfer is typically of a parcel of land. But the parcel of land can be converted into cash.

Sometimes this is raised as an objection to land reform isn’t the kind of social engineering that we’d hoped. We gave all of these parcels of land to Mexican peasants. And a week later, they sold them to a real estate developer and moved to the city.

So some people think, oh, so, therefore, it doesn’t work. Well, on the other hand, that’s why the Gini coefficient moved, because you had a massive transfer of wealth. So it’s possible that reparations would take the form of land transfer when land transfer is the most meaningful, symbolic value. So for example, transferring land to local, Indigenous populations whose descendants are nearby, restoring those land rights, restoring governance and the ability to police and to own.

And it’s also possible that for– reacting to structural racism and the suffering of enslaved people, reparations project would take the form of cash payments rather than land transfer. It doesn’t all have to be the same. We don’t have to eradicate our cities or transfer all of the land.

And often in the land reform movements that follow the Irish example, we see this kind of equivalency of– what needs to happen is a movement of capital, not a total reversal. So the Irish landlords are compensated. They’re paid out. They take their cash from their manor house in the West of Ireland, and they usually move someplace, like maybe California. And they invest in another industry.

So instead of investing in farming and being a landlord, collecting rents, they’re now going to invest in real estate or in a shoe factory or in a tech factory. They go elsewhere, and they do something else with the capital. And that’s one of the nice things in land reform and in capitalist models, that it can co-exist with other kinds of investment. You don’t have to correct for– repairing the sins of the past doesn’t have to take the form of an idealized land management strategy.

That’s very narrow. We have a multiplicity of demands on land. Lots of people need housing. Lots of people need factories. You can make these adjustments, and it adjusts the shape of society as a whole.

[MAROIN FOURCADE] But unfortunately, we are already passed our time. So maybe, Jo, you can answer questions separately. But that concludes the formal part of the program. Thank you so much, Jo. [INAUDIBLE]

Thank you very much again. Thank you so much for being here.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Panel

Economics and Geopolitics in US International Relations: China, Europe, and the Global South

The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have reshaped global geopolitics, trade, and security. How will these changes affect the relationship between the US and China, Europe, and the Global South? How will they impact US firms operating globally, and how might foreign leaders — and notably the Chinese leadership — respond?

Recorded on February 16, 2023, this panel discussion featured a group of distinguished scholars addressing these questions, and the possible implications for the global multilateral order established in the second half of the 20th century. The panel was held in Spieker Forum at the UC Berkeley Haas School of Business, and was co-sponsored by Social Science Matrix and the Clausen Center for International Business & Policy.

Panelists

Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar is the tenth president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A former justice of the Supreme Court of California, Justice Cuéllar served two U.S. presidents at the White House and in federal agencies, and was a faculty member at Stanford University for two decades. Before serving on California’s highest court, Justice Cuéllar was the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, and director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford. In this capacity, he oversaw programs on international security, governance and development, global health, cyber policy, migration, and climate change and food security. Previously, he co-directed the Institute’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and led its Honors Program in International Security.

James Fearon is Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor in the Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences, a professor of Political Science, and Senior Fellow in the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences (elected 2012) and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (elected 2002). Fearon’s research interests include civil and interstate war, ethnic conflict, the politics of economic development, and democratic accountability.

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas is the Economic Counsellor and the Director of Research of the International Monetary Fund. He is on leave from UC Berkeley, where he is the S.K. and Angela Chan Professor of Global Management in the Department of Economics and at the Haas School of Business and Director, Clausen Center for International Business and Policy. Professor Gourinchas was the editor-in-chief of the IMF Economic Review from its creation in 2009 to 2016, the managing editor of the Journal of International Economics between 2017 and 2019, and a co-editor of the American Economic Review between 2019 and 2022. He is on-leave from the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he was director of the International Finance and Macroeconomics program, a Research Fellow with the Center for Economic Policy Research CEPR (London) and a Fellow of the Econometric Society.

Laura Tyson is Class of 1939 Professor of Economics and Business Administration and Distinguished Professor Emerita of Economics at UC Berkeley. She is an influential scholar of economics and public policy and an expert on trade and competitiveness who has also served as a presidential adviser. She also chairs the Board of Trustees at UC Berkeley’s Blum Center for Developing Economies, which aims to develop solutions to global poverty. She is the former Faculty Director of the Berkeley Haas Institute for Business and Social Impact, which she launched in 2013. She served as Interim Dean of the Haas School from July to December 2018, and served previously as dean from 1998 to 2001.

John Zysman (moderator) is Professor Emeritus at UC Berkeley and co-founder/co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. He received his B.A at Harvard and his Ph.D. at MIT. Zysman’s ongoing work covers the implications of platforms and intelligent tools for work, entrepreneurship, and international competition; and the economic challenges and opportunities of climate change and the green economy. From these positions, Zysman has made contributions to the policy and intellectual debates, building a record of thought leadership on the global economy going back five decades.

Listen to the panel as a podcast below or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Economics and Geopolitics in US International Relations: China, Europe, and the Global South

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MATILDE BOMBARDINI] Good morning, everybody, or good afternoon. Welcome, everyone. My name is Matilde Bombardini. And I am an associate professor in the Business and Public Policy Group here at Haas. And together with Professor Maurice Obstfeld, I’m co-director of the Clausen Center for International Business and Policy. I should say caretaker, co-director. The Clausen Center together with the Social Science Matrix led by Director Professor Marion Fourcade, who is here, are happy to present our distinguished panelists.

So we have John Zysman, who is the moderator. He’s a professor emeritus at UC Berkeley and co-founder, co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Through his many contributions to policy and intellectual debates, John has built a record of thought leadership on the global economy going back five decades.

Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas is the Economic Counselor and the Director of Research of the International Monetary Fund. He is on leave from UC Berkeley, where he is the SK and Angela Chan professor of Global Management in the Department of Economics and at Haas, and Director of Clausen Center for International Business and Policy.

James Fearon is the Theodore and Frances Geballe professor in the Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences and a professor of political science, a senior fellow in the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies. He’s a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Mariano-Florentino Tino Cuellar is the 10th president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a former justice of the Supreme Court of California. Justice Cuellar served two US presidents at the White House and in federal agencies and was a faculty member at Stanford University for two decades. Before serving on California’s highest court, Justice Cuellar was the Stanley Morrison professor of law, professor by courtesy of political science, and director of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Laura Tyson is class of 1939 professor of economics and business administration and distinguished Professor Emerita of economics at UC Berkeley. Professor Tyson is well-known for his distinguished career in both academia and government services. She is a former National Economic Council advisor and past Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors. So join me in welcoming our speakers.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Before turning us over to Pierre for the first round of this, I’m going to do a brief overview of what we’re going to be talking about. The title of the session, in fact, suggests quite clearly the themes. These are volatile and uncertain times. And our effort is to try and get to come to grips with them in one way or another.

Each panelist will take seven or eight minutes maybe, give or take a little more, you never know, and lay out their basic views on this. Then we’ll do a second round in which they can have interchange with themselves or add to questions, or I may provoke some of them to some extent. And then we’ll open it to questions and answers to the group as a whole.

Pierre will, in fact, be addressing, as he begins, the extent of geoeconomic fragmentation in the scenarios that may emerge. Then James Fearon, who brings a security lens to these questions, will focus considerably on the China challenges that are before us. Tino Cuellar will, I’m hoping, be able to show us how we can reconcile these differing imperatives of security and economy, particularly in the context of climate. He’s saying he can’t, but we know that he can. But we’ll benefit from his insights. And Laura Tyson will, with a particular focus on climate, will, as she always does, provide an integrated and insightful interpretation of developments.

With that, I’m going to turn to Pierre and say, from your work at the IMF, I’m hoping you’ll give us a sense of the extent of trade and financial fragmentation and the scenarios, as I say, that might emerge. As we move into a discussion, we will all want to consider that if the multilateral consensus that has been in the past is no longer possible, what approaches actually are in order? So Pierre.

[PIERRE OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Thank you. Thank you, Chris. Well, thank you all very much for being here. I will use the seven minutes or so I was instructed to use in the first round to talk about geoeconomic fragmentation and the implications for the global economy. And this is, as you can imagine, a topic that we spend quite a bit of time thinking about at the Fund in the research department and also in other areas of the Fund.

So I would start by offering some comments on the extent of geoeconomic fragmentation that we can see already in the global economy. And then I will discuss some more speculative assessment of some scenarios that we have been working with to try to assess what might be happening if things really start unraveling.

So first, I will start by showing you some signs of geoeconomic fragmentation, what we are seeing already. And here, when I talk about geoeconomic fragmentation, I want to focus on a fragmentation that is policy-driven and might be policy-driven because of national security considerations. It might be having to do with sovereignty or autonomy. But I don’t want to have in mind something that would be due to some change in the environment or some global precautionary measures that countries would be taking.

For instance, you might imagine that all we’ve seen in the aftermath of the global financial crisis that there were some measures, some macro financial measures, prudential measures that were put in place that reduced some of the cross-country exposure. But they were designed to make the system more resilient. And I wouldn’t want to consider that as part of what we’re discussing today.

So I’m showing you here on this figure two different indicators that we are starting to look at, we’re following. So first, on the left, you can see mentions of national security in our annual IMF– annual report on the exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions. And you can see that after 2015, this starts picking up. This is sort of very low and not very relevant, it starts picking up in these reports in terms of some of the motivations for some of the exchange rate arrangements that countries are taking. And even net of Ukraine, this is still going up. So it’s one first indicator here.

Another indicator is the one on the right, which is coming from data from earnings calls. And you can see there a rapid increase. That starts actually before 2022, but a rapid increase in the mentions of themes like reshoring, onshoring, friendshoring, near-shoring in these earning calls. And of course, some of it starts during the COVID crisis, because, at that time, there’s already a concern about the vulnerabilities in the global supply chains. But this is exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Now, when we’re thinking about global economic, geoeconomic fragmentation, of course, we can think about a number of channels through which this might affect the global economy. So you might think that this will reduce trade. And to the extent, that trade has been one of the vectors through which countries have been able to grow faster. And there’s a lot of evidence of that or people have been able to be pulled out of poverty, or levels of food insecurity have been decreasing over time. Then something that would basically revert the extent of globalization we’ve seen and reduced trade might actually have adverse effects on the economy.

You might also think about technology diffusion as being affected by geoeconomic fragmentation. I have something to say about that in a minute. I mean, ultimately, technology and productivity growth is the key driver of improvements in standards of living. And so if we have geoeconomic fragmentation, we could also have a growing gap in terms of levels of technological development between different parts of the world. And that means that the parts of the world with the lower levels of technology would be suffering in terms of their improvements in standards of living. That would also affect competition. That would affect the rate of innovation. So it could affect both the gap between countries but also the level at which innovation grows overall.

But there are other channels that we can think about that might be relevant when we’re thinking about geoeconomic fragmentation. So you might think about increased barriers to migration. And that would reduce efficiency. That would hinder also innovation and technological diffusion. That would worsen adverse demographic trends that we’re seeing in different parts of the world. And that could also raise international tensions. We could have a fragmentation in capital flows. That would also have an impact by, for instance, limiting the amount of remittances streams that is very relevant for some low-income countries or limiting financing choices.

You could think that it could also increase uncertainty. A world in which you have this policy decision visions is a world in which policy uncertainty is increasing. And there’s a lot of evidence indicating that policy uncertainty is actually hurting investment. It’s leading to suboptimal decisions. It’s leading to delays. It’s increasing precautionary savings, for instance. And all of that could weigh down on economic activity, not to mention the fact that in a volatile and uncertain environment, you have more room for policy mistakes.

And finally, you could imagine that geoeconomic fragmentation would be something that makes it harder to coordinate on global public goods, make it harder for countries to agree on some of the key aspects that they need to work together on, whether it’s climate and the ability to implement measures that would allow us to stay below 1.5 Celsius in terms of temperature increases, or future work on health preparedness, pandemic mitigation, or the ability to deal with a large number of countries facing debt problems, for instance.

So what I’m going to show you is I’m going to show you some estimates where we try to work out what these scenarios would imply for the global economy and for different regions. So here, what I’m showing you on this figure here is based on some analysis we’ve done in a house at the Fund, where we’re looking at a situation where we’re splitting. And of course, we have to make some assumptions. And so we’re splitting the world into two blocks. And we’re using the March 2, 2022 United Nations General Assembly motion to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to sort the countries in the different groups– the countries that voted to condemn and the countries that didn’t vote to condemn.

And then we imagine that, as a result of this fragmentation, you would have in green, what I’m showing you is what happens if you have sanctions or if you stop trade on energy and high tech, so what we call energy and high-tech decoupling. And then in red, we add to that non-trade barriers that would basically go back to a level of trade between the different blocs that would be similar to what we had in the Cold War between the West and between the Soviet Union.

And the cost are significant for the world. There are about 1.5%. A lot of it is actually coming from the trade, the energy and high-tech decoupling. There can be much higher for some regions in the world. So the Asian countries, not surprisingly, are very, very vulnerable to a decoupling of the global economy, a fragmentation of the global economy. And you can see that for them, the estimated cost would be on the order of 3%, so about twice as large.

Not surprisingly again, but when you plot the costs or the welfare losses or GDP losses against the degree of openness, you find a very strong relationship here. Small and open economies are much more vulnerable. And that’s something that characterizes a lot of emerging market and developing economies.

Now, that’s one scenario where we have this sort of energy and high-tech decoupling. But there are a bunch of other scenarios we’ve run or other researchers have been working on the WTO or elsewhere. And so here, in a recent staff discussion note that we published in mid-January, we surveyed the landscape, if you want, and we put together this figure that shows the range of estimates.

So this is a pretty large range. And it goes from something like 1.5% of GDP, as I’ve already mentioned, to something that is on the order of 7% to, for some individual countries, up to 10%, 12%. And it really depends on how deep the fragmentation scenario is if you assume that there is really no trade at all between the different regions here. Whether you have a technological decoupling or not, that matters a lot for the long-term losses. Whether you have any substitution in the short term, so that depends on what the elasticity of substitution in this modeling exercise.

And in the sense, you have in a U-shape relationship. In the short run, it’s very hard to substitute a way, so it might be very costly. Or let me restate, if it is very hard to substitute a way, it could be very costly. In the long run, you may have substituted a way, but then the technological decoupling might kick in. And so you may have high losses because you’re sort of on this different productivity growth path. And so you might have also long and elevated costs.

We find that overall emerging markets and low-income countries are the most vulnerable. And in part, because they are behind the technological frontier. And any fragmentation would make it much, much harder for them to catch up. And they’re also quite open to start with.

Now, what does this imply for policy challenges? And this is my next to last slide. So there’s been a lot of– as I’ve mentioned, there’s been a lot of discussion about reshoring. Some of the measures that have been implemented by some countries, in particular in the US, have made it a condition for being eligible for subsidies and things like that.

And one of the point that we make is that we have to be careful is if the risk is the concentration risk that, your supply chain may be very concentrated, for instance, in semiconductors that are made in Taiwan in only one plant or one factory in Taiwan, then reshoring does not necessarily reduce concentration risk. In fact, the way that trade matrix is organized already, we have a fair amount of what you might call want-to-go-home bias. And this is what this figure on the left is showing.

If you look at the domestic share of intermediates, that’s the blue bars, it’s much higher than the domestic share in production. So in other words, this is an extent to which countries are already producing a lot of their domestic intermediates as opposed to procuring them from somewhere else in the world. And so reshoring would actually aggravate this pattern.

And in a little experiment we run, that’s the figure on the right, we ask, well, what would happen if you have a shock that is similar to about a 25% contraction in labor supply in a major intermediate goods supplier comparable to China? So think of this as a pandemic that would hit a country like China. And because of the centrality of China in the number of trade relations, it, of course, has a large impact on the world economy. So we estimate, on left bar, we estimate that the cost is about 0.65% or actually the world is a little bit more than that. It’s 0.8. It’s not it’s not on this figure.

But then if you diversify your supply chains, not concentrate them, diversify THEM then you get the black squares there. So you can reduce the impact and the dependency on any one single large supplier by a lot. So the point here is that diversification of global supply chains is much more important in terms of building resilience and then reconcentration.

Now, I will end with this final slide here that is coming back to what I started with, which is evidence of geoeconomic fragmentation, but looking at it from a different perspective by looking at it from the current account balances. So the difference between savings and investment or domestic absorption and production.

And here, what you have on the left is what we call a global imbalances graph. So you have the different countries or regions of the world above zero or surplus countries or regions below 0 or deficit countries or regions, starting in 1990 to 2022. And something interesting is happening when you’re looking at this imbalances. First, you see that they are sort of growing again of late. And that, meaning that the dispersion, the surpluses, and the deficits are increasing again. And this is in large part reflecting the energy shock that the global economy suffered last year.

And so what that tells you also is that a lot of these surpluses are located in countries that are actually on the other side of the countries running the deficits. You have an increase in the deficits of the US, for instance. And you have an increase in the surplus of countries like China or Russia, Saudi Arabia, which are not necessarily countries that you would associate with countries being in the same geopolitical camp. So for all the evidence of geoeconomic fragmentation and the trade fragmentation, et cetera, the financial flows are telling you there is still a lot going on. There’s a lot of interdependence there. And it’s a point that you want to keep in mind.

But what has changed perhaps already, and we’re seeing that on the right, is the composition of this flows. So what this here I’m showing you on the right is the outflows and inflows for three countries together– China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. And notice that in the past, the black component was quite irrelevant. And that’s the effects reserves. And so there was quite a bit of reserve accumulation when these countries were running surpluses.

And this has disappeared in recent years. And what you see instead is an increase in other types of flows or errors and omissions, which means things that we can’t quite categorize. And we don’t really know where they’re going or what’s happening to them. So what this is suggesting is that there is an increased opacity in financial flows in recent years.

Now, you can imagine that this is an increased opacity, because the number of countries that are running surpluses may not want to accumulate reserves in the form of US treasuries in an environment where US treasuries might be frozen for instance as has been the case with central bank of Russia. So here, we have a displacement in terms of the composition of these flows, not necessarily a change in terms of the magnitudes of the overall balances, but certainly a lot less transparency and a lot more opacity going forward.

And I will end with this final point, which is that in the world we’re in, we used to think about the need for countries to maybe run current account surpluses, maybe for mercantilist reasons, that’s an argument that’s sometimes advanced, or maybe for the cautionary reasons precisely to build these reserves that they can then use to buffer against shocks. And in a sense, this second motive may be strengthened by the environment in which we live. The experience of what happened to Russia in 2022 illustrates how it’s difficult for sanctions to bring a surplus countries to a standstill. And so that might actually give an additional impetus to countries trying to be in a current account surplus position. I will stop here. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] James– while they’re moving the chairs around, we can get organized. James spent a year at the Department of Defense, where he contributed to the National Defense Strategy document that came out in October. So part of the question that he’s going to address is, how if the priorities then the defense priorities actually changed in recent years, to what do we attribute those changes? And I would add, to what extent does that become entangled with economics? But that we will set aside unless he wants to address it himself. So when we’re all set, I suggest the rest of us ascend. And James–

[JAMES FEARON] Should I go up here?

[JOHN ZYSMAN]Yeah. Why not?

We have some sort of order. I think you’re–

[INDITINCT CHATTER]

 

I’m going to come here until somebody moves me. It’s good.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] It’s good. We’ll get that now. Before James gets started, I would say Laura and I have back problems. So occasionally, we may stand up. That’s not because we’re going to walk out on everybody else but just try to stretch a little bit. So forgive us in advance.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks very much. And thanks for the opportunity to talk here. I should start out. Yes, John mentioned I worked last year. I was leave from Stanford and spent it fascinating year in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, working with the group that worked on the 2022 National Defense Strategy. That said, this should go without saying, but just to be 100% clear, I’m talking as in absolutely no representation or on behalf of I’m talking DOD or the US government, but as a person from Stanford.

So also, I should say, I’m not an economist. And I can really– I’m better positioned to address defense and security challenges. I look forward to trying to do some integration in the conversation we have and in answering questions.

In terms of the broad questions John raised, what’s, I think, really striking is that the US National Security community, the defense policy world has been, for a couple of years now and very much in the last year or two, preoccupied with the possibility that the PRC will, at some point, in some unclear timeline, could be next few years, next decade, could be longer than that, use force to try to change the status quo on Taiwan.

You may or may not have tracked that there’s just in every couple of weeks, there are some new set of speculation, an argument someone says something about when they think this might happen. There’s a lot of focus on timelines. And I’d be happy to address that more specifically. But I mean, no one really knows, of course, as US senior leaders generally say or pretty much always say.

But you can also say that this preoccupation, I’d say, it’s based on a quite plausible view that there is a non-trivial risk that you could see military action of some form, by the PRC, to try to reincorporate Taiwan to change the status quo using force. And that there is a non-trivial risk that could lead to a quite major war, really major war, between the US and the PRC, or US allies and partners and the PRC.

That would be a disaster. It would be terribly costly in many ways, including it would be economically or it could be economically catastrophic, both in the region and globally. So I mean, I think this would be an interesting thing to discuss. But the degree of global economic fragmentation that might follow, I think, Pierre would almost surely agree, that the degree of fragmentation that could follow from such a conflict would make the kind of changes that we’re seeing in the absence of that look pretty marginal, I suspect, quite marginal.

Yeah. I’d be interested in– I mean, I think in some of your just thinking about some of the slides you presented, I’ll throw this out as something that would be interesting to discuss. I don’t think it’s really that plausible that we’d see decoupling or fragmentation on the order of what we saw in the Cold War. I think we’ll far more likely to see a much more marginal than that the current international economic system. Even in the absence of the use and smooth functioning of the multilateral trade institutions as occurred in the past, even without that, the built-in forces in global value chains and FDI and multinationals and lobbies in many countries for maintaining trade relations are pretty strong. But not my area.

So, of course, we hope that a major conflict, military conflict is a very– I think, it is a low probability event. A lot of the stuff that the 2022 NDS is focused on, and a lot of US Defense policy thinking these days is focused on what needs to happen to keep it this a very low probability. In a slightly longer term, a slightly longer run perspective, the US Defense policy is in the process of attempting to make a hard turn away from what had been core focus for much of the last 20 years, which was counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. And In the last 10 years– well, and more than that– the war in Afghanistan.

You see this concerted effort to try to shift towards a set of challenges related to the very large scale and very focused military modernisation of the PRC and a set of plausibly interpreted policy changes in foreign policy of the PRC that are raising concerns about, for example, the independence of– well, or the continued status quo on Taiwan.

So the focus of the 2022 NDS was– kind of a top line objective was this need to, as it says, sustain and strengthen deterrence on a set of vital national interests. And these are not exclusively but mainly major concerns related to major power conflicts. Taiwan being one such scenario but not the only one. Russia was characterized in the document as an acute challenge. And as we’re seeing, that’s also another major power issue very much, very obviously in play.

So how do economic considerations play into these defense priorities and objectives? My impression is that by the Biden administration and also previous administrations are– the general worry, like the motivation for these security policies or defense policies and orientation is a worry about an economic threats in the long run, medium and long-run threats to the political and economic autonomy of major trading partners in the Pacific Rim.

So the long-run concern would be, in the sense, that PRC policies may threaten US or could threaten US ability to trade and interact with major Pacific Rim economies, that PRC economic and military leverage may be increasingly used to influence their domestic politics, for example, essentially, to make the world safe for the CCP, as they see things.

So the response to this as well having been focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency since at least since 9/11, a whole bunch of things have kind of– there’s a lot of catching up to do in terms of reinforcing, enhancing deterrence for a different set of security or military problems, particularly in the Pacific. Doing so is in itself risky and tricky. I think there’s a good deal of attention to the risk of what in the field of international relations, we talk about, is called spiral dynamics. That the US in attempting to do things to enhance deterrence would actually increase the likelihood of conflict by increasing, say, PRC perception of threat or changing military balance or things like that. So it’s a tricky thing.

I think at the same time, coming back to economics a little bit, my sense is that, at least the Biden administration leadership understands that the situation is very, very different from the Cold War conflict with the USSR. And it’s different in many ways, but it’s particularly different in terms of the economic situation or the economic relationships.

And I think that, I guess, I get the impression reading the news and public discussions that a number of the administration’s actions have been interpreted– have been are sometimes interpreted as, oh, this is a kind of Cold War kind of response. And we’re talking about decoupling and fragmentation. And I can understand why those– why one might think that.

But I think if you look closely at Biden administration foreign economic policy documents and leadership statements, or, for example, the National Security Strategy, the overarching security document that comes out of the National Security Council is not specifically or exclusively defense-related, you see, I think, a quite clear understanding that countries in the region do not want to be made to choose between the US and the PRC. And that at the same time, it’s also inevitable and not even necessarily a bad thing that countries in the region and the US will be trading a great deal with China.

Just two days ago, I listened to a Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman gave a talk at Brookings, where she made– asked these kind of questions, made these kind of points. And noting in addition that it’s not just countries in the region, but there’s a huge amount of Chinese investment in the US economy. She flagged that a prosperous Chinese middle class is in fact a good thing for US workers and for the US economy overall. So I don’t get the sense that there is a concerted– any concerted policy of economic decoupling or a notion of like, it would be a good thing to try to create economic blocs along the lines of the Cold War.

Some of the actions, I think, really should be like, say, with chips and so on, should be really interpreted as related to the defense policy challenges and the concern about Chinese military modernization and how that plays into the deterrence challenges in the Western Pacific. So I think the broad question is, how do you– for the US Defense policy as they see it is, how do you get to a situation– maybe this is more my take, how do you get to a situation of stable long-run deterrence on the security side of things as an assurance or a support for backing what the administration is always talking about or likes to call a free and open regional order, which really refers back to this kind of political and economic autonomy of countries in the region that they maintain an ability to trade with who they please, according to something like commonly observed rules of the road?

The administration released something called the Indo-Pacific economic framework. And they started talking about it in late 2021 and released the documents, I think, in early 2022. This is a set of talks oriented to, as I understand it, I don’t have deep insight into this at all, but talks on digital, on trade, including digital economy, tax policies, a set of other pillars that they are talking about with 13 countries comprising in the region, comprising something like 40% of global trade.

It’s a little unclear. I mean, the discussions are ongoing. And they say they want to have a set of results by November this year. It’ll be interesting to see. I don’t know if there are other panelists who are following this and could say something about it. It’s a different approach. And the administration’s too kind of traditional US trade policy, which traditionally, there was talk about and focused on trade agreements.

This administration, like the last one– and I’d say one of the big changes is neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party seems to want to talk about trade agreements at all. And they don’t even like to use the words. The National Security Strategy has a sentence, which I should have written down, but it’s something like we need to modernize or move past the free trade agreement approach. And they talk about fair trade and so on.

Whether this can deliver, we’ll see. I really don’t know. But it could be– well, it probably is to some degree just an acknowledgment of changes that make the institutional– set the inherited multilateral institutional trade setup which was already pretty sclerotic arguably, not that functional. But I’d be very interested to hear what other people on the panel then say. I’d stop there. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you very much, James. Now, I turn to Tino. And I say as president of the Carnegie Endowment on international Peace, you’re going to save us.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] No.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] And in fact, if these multilateral arrangements and agreements are sort of not so possible anymore, how do we go about moving forward? Or any other folk you choose.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Thank you, John. And thank you, everybody, for being here. It’s just a treat after so much pandemic isolation to be in any event where I see real people. I should tell you, one challenging thing about being on this stage right now is the view is distractingly beautiful.

[LAURA TYSON] The view is very nice.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] With one exception, and that’s that Art and Architecture Building over there, our environmental building. You have to get rid of that. But aside from that, I’m very happy to be here.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] It’s an award-winning building, which says what architects really want.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] It’s insane. That’s the one thing more insane than the state of the world we’re talking about. How many of you are students? OK, well, let me begin with an apology, because, in some sense, our generation is in the process of getting ready to give you the keys to the world. And we’re not giving you a vehicle that is in great shape. But really, what I want to do in part to eventually get to John’s request, and I don’t have a formula to solve things, but to just put things in context a little and get the conversation moving towards what will help us get through this tumultuous era of economic fragmentation and tensions between the US and China is to zoom out and look at the very big picture.

So let me start by acknowledging some things that I take as a fact. It is a fact that the US and China are in the process of a massive fragmentation. Now, there’s some subtlety and nuance here that’s important. So trade between the US and China, bilateral trade, has never been higher at this very moment. So it’s not a complete break. But the technological side is an indicator to my mind of where things are going.

If you had asked me five years ago, whether I thought it was possible that the leadership of the US government would say on the record, not privately, not in a little dinner with Chatham House Rules, but on the record that their goal was to limit China’s economic rise five or six years ago, I would have said, I doubt that level of candor or directness. And that is what’s being attempted now. Now, that’s not lost on China.

And one of the interesting intellectual and policy questions that your generation will have to deal with for the students is what the elasticity is of technological innovation to policy change that comes from knowing that a major geopolitical power is trying to stop you from developing technology. Like, how quickly do you develop your own TSMC, your own lithograph machines, your own AI algorithms like leapfrog all of that? Or conversely, is there something– I mean, do we have the courage of our convictions, something in the secret sauce of a California, a place of immigrants, a place of openness, that creates a different kind of technological innovation story? So that’s one thing I’ll just put out there.

Second, I think it’s worth recognizing that much of what is driving any policymaker at the highest levels in the US– probably in China to some extent, but I’m more familiar with the US– is a little overdetermined. So if any of you traded places with Jake Sullivan or Gina Raimondo, you might do things a little bit differently. But I doubt that you would have complete freedom to totally rewrite the story. That’s to say that even if you’ve buried the party, even if you’ve buried the personality, there’s some degree of geopolitical pressure, economic reality, domestic political reality that hems in these policymakers.

That’s the part of the news. But the other piece of context that I think is crucial here is to think about what moment we’re at in human history. Everything you see around you, including the ugly environment award-winning building over there, is created and made possible only because of the Industrial Revolution. And that has been the tiniest fraction of human history. So if I zoom out a bit, the world does look depressing, difficult, painful, certainly if you’re in Europe and think about Ukraine if you’re Ukrainian.

But let’s remember that in 1950, literacy was about 50%. Now, it’s about 90%. In 1950, life expectancy was about 46 years. Now, it’s about 76 years. That’s the trend we’re on. So my frame to you is if I zoom out a bit, to me, the questions of economic fragmentation, the war in Ukraine, the frostiness of US-China relations, the economic dislocation and fragility people feel are all about disruptions on a path that humanity can and should stay on ideally to enormous progress enormous possibility. The fragility of the planet, climate change, it’s all the question of, like, how do we back ourselves into this corner? How do we get back on this path of innovation prosperity that we can share with the world?

Now, to be clear, there are some real impediments. Let me just go into that for two minutes, and then I’ll tell you what I think might be helpful going forward. The brutal realities of the war in Ukraine are not just about the Ukrainian people, obviously, not even just about Europe. They’re about the fact that we wrote a check as a world in 1945, 1947 roughly, around the time the UN was created, negotiated right around across the bay, that there would be a system to stop. Aggressive war from happening. That was never perfectly achieved.

But the scandalous reality of having a UN Security Council member be the party engaged in aggressive war is a particularly poignant indication that we have not– we don’t have sufficient funds to catch that check to channel Martin Luther King. So that’s on all of us. And it does highlight that the problems here are not just about Ukraine, they’re really going to affect potentially billions of people. Like, what does the world do when aggressive war occurs?

That has to be counterbalanced with a really brutal political reality if your taxpayer in Western Europe or the US, which is you’re shelling out $5 to $6 billion a month collectively to keep the economy of Ukraine afloat. And that’s not even counting the amount of money for the missiles, for the drones, for the millions of rounds of ammunition. So there is a question about how long this war can continue. But I don’t think it would be wrong to conclude that on the other side of this discussion, sitting in the Kremlin, are people or is a person thinking that time is on his side. So how does that look when you’re trying to limit aggressive war?

Second, the frostiness of US-China relations are not just a problem with respect to potential decline in growth rates. They also are on the minds of people like me, because there’s just an aggregate increase in the risk of an off the equilibrium path, dramatic, staggering conflict. And even a pretty minor one between the US and China, it’s going to go way beyond what the predictions indicate about just sort of a moderate loss and growth.

And I think it’s just important for us to recognize that even though the US and China have serious and important differences, and as a former US policymaker, I look askance and with concern that a lot of things happening in China, as I’m sure China does with respect to US. I just note that question of what is the risk of that off the equilibrium path event, particularly around Taiwan, but not exclusively. That’s got to be on our minds.

Third, every institution that involves thoughtful people trying to make choices about budgets and about the use of legal authority is facing a loss of confidence around the public. So people lose some confidence in the University of California or the California Supreme Court or the IMF or all of the above. And to me, this generalizes by saying, to a first approximation, no country with a very large population knows how to govern in this era very, very effectively.

We’re all trying. We all have ideas. We all have some things that go better than others. But if we’re not talking about Denmark or Singapore, I think governing at scale is really, really difficult. And so in the US, that means we take our chances with democracy. We do our best. In places like China that have a more authoritarian tradition, that means leaning into that tradition to some extent. But I think on both sides, what you see is a real question about how with this level of technological change and social media and just disruption and loss of trust you govern.

So where do we go from here? I would say five things I’d put on the table for discussion, all of them worth plenty of back and forth. The first is I would say, the war in Ukraine, the frostiness of US-China relations and the underlying causes behind them are important. But I would not want the world to stop thinking about the big picture questions involving how to keep technological innovation going, how to keep the Global South and the people who are poorer and more economically insecure in the developed world from feeling like they just have no stake in the system, how to deal with climate, biodiversity, water, et cetera. That deserves a ton of attention of the agenda despite all the other things happening.

Second, I would advocate for somewhat greater experimentation in domestic economic policies in different countries. This is my pitch for saying that you can be a little bit more flexible with the rules of trade and not necessarily get just autarky everywhere. I’m not in favor of big tariffs, to be clear. I think that global trade has been a big boon for human progress.

But we are a lot in each other’s businesses now. And I felt that a lot as a domestic policy White House official. Back in the day, when working on public health, transnational crime, tobacco policy, food safety, civil and criminal justice, almost nothing that I did that didn’t have a meeting with USTR attached to it. And I thought that was really telling and interesting. And I just wonder if the system might be sort of made more viable if we ask a little bit less of it to some degree. And I can say more about what that means.

Three, I think the multilateral development banks should have about twice as much capital to spend on infrastructure change in the developing world for climate and energy reasons. Fourth, I think the stuff happening around the eye is really interesting and exciting but requires careful attention. And I’m not sure that any one actor has all the right incentives, certainly not the private sector that’s developing most of the technology, even though they are potentially in a position to do some good things with it. And I suspect, by the way, that getting the governance and regulatory framework right, there would be a potential boon for billions of people who can benefit from the technology to deal with medical, educational needs.

Last but not least, I think all the geopolitical problems we’re talking about should be leveraged in some way. So on the domestic US side, concerns about geopolitics or driving interest in domestic investments in technological innovation, maybe starting to percolate into discussions about how to rethink our immigration policy. I think maybe a US-China degree of competition might also develop greater interest in both countries about how to appeal to the developing world and help them through the energy transition. I’ll stop there. [APPLAUSE]

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you for really actually providing real insight on some possible directions. Laura.

[LAURA TYSON] So I think I’ll just throw a few things out there. I have been working with John. We did do a paper for Omidyar thinking about looking forward, thinking about the big structural drivers and uncertainties of the global system. And I will play off of my comments with John there.

But let me just start with something that occurred to me as I was listening to my other panelists. And that is the past dependency of where we are with China today in the United States. I don’t think people recognize, but I clearly recognize it, because I was involved in this part of the transition to the Bush administration in 2000. If you had talked to Condoleezza Rice at that time, what she would have said is that the major foreign policy challenge for the United States was China, was China.

And because we weren’t yet thinking about what was going to happen in the Middle East and insurgency and how we were going to totally flip, and we were simply going to focus on that, there is a growing– and it does grow over time, it was there in 2000, and it’s bigger now– a growing group of maybe different interest groups that really would like to reduce as much as possible US-China interdependence or would like to put as much pressure as possible on China to be like us.

There are religious groups. There are human rights groups. There are ethnic groups. For a long time, the business community was in the United States the major, I would say, voice for the importance of growing economic interdependence with China. But think about that, the incorporation of the United States, which made billions of dollars by labor arbitrage in China, by essentially producing their products at very low cost in China, using low-cost labor, selling it around the world, collecting the surplus, and giving it to their shareholders, giving it to their owners, not giving it too much to their workers.

So from over the course of, say 2000 to ’22, today, much of middle America and certainly the medical American workforce have seen the growing interconnectedness with China as a negative. It has hurt their wages. It has hurt their jobs it has hurt their communities. It has taken products that could have been produced in the United States and move them abroad. Those removed by the way by the companies, by the companies, not by nation states. The US didn’t move this stuff. China made it attractive place to do things, and US companies went there.

US companies started to get less supportive of the regime with China somewhere around the mid-2000s, really– I would say, no, more like around 2015, 2016. It was like, OK, they’re stealing our intellectual property. We knew that. They were always stealing our intellectual property. We used to get a better deal we used to get higher returns from the trade-off for us, the company I’m speaking now is that will let them steal the intellectual property. But boy, do we make a ton of money through our interdependence with China. We love it.

They became less and less convinced that the balance of returns worked for them. So a major, perhaps the major voice for easing US-China tensions, the business community in the United States, that voice has been lowered. That voice is no longer dominant in those discussions. And indeed, some of the companies are actually now on the other side. The national security companies are certainly on the other side. There’s this saying, OK, yeah, we can’t really depend upon having so much of the supply chain of semiconductors in Asia.

We put it there, by the way. The companies put it there. The companies put it there and say, probably, not a good idea anymore. Let’s bring some back. And the US government says, here’s a whole bunch of subsidies. Here’s a whole bunch of tax credits. Here’s a whole bunch of things that will help you bring it back, will help you bring it back.

So I just wanted to start there, because I think the history of all this matters. And I also will say what has been mentioned here is that the increasing frictions between the US and China, you cannot underplay the sort of change in the policy environment that President Xi himself has introduced. There is a change on the Chinese side as well. And I think you cannot and whenever I hear about Hong Kong, I’m reminded of that a lot of people look at what happened in Hong Kong and say, see, China’s got to do this. It’s just a matter of when they’re going to do it and how they’re going to do it. They did it in Hong Kong, and we let them do it. We let them do it. I thought I wanted to start with that view.

Let me talk a little bit about a phrase I’d like to be defined by this panel. How do you measure technological decoupling? What does that even mean? If everybody is working on the same AI technologies, the same digital technologies, the same nuclear fusion technologies, how are we– are we just going to do the same thing, but we’re not going to talk to each other about it? I really want to know what technological decoupling means.

That brings me to climate, where there at least is a recognition throughout this entire period of time of deteriorating US-China relations. There has been a sense that one area where we can work with them, and we should work with them, is on climate, because it’s a shared interest, completely shared interest, because we have moved from the biggest emitter in the United States to China being the biggest emitter in the world. So basically, we have the same problem. If we’re worried about the world carbon situation, we the big emitters have to figure out what to do about it. So shared interest, shared challenge because of the size of the emissions.

China has been doing some really, really interesting domestic policy, including its own carbon trading market on carbon. But here’s an area where it would seem to me that technological cooperation to deal with a shared challenge would make the most sense. And at the meetings, the last COP meetings, there was– the former Secretary of State John Kerry is now the special envoy on basically global relations on climate change, trying to work with other countries on common strategies and common technologies.

And he was very pleased that in his meetings with his counterparts in China leading up to the COP meeting, the Chinese were willing to be there with him, were willing to talk with him about it, were willing to be a presence in that meeting. So I think that we might look to the possibility of climate collaboration.

The National Security Council document mentioned at the beginning, a climate change is one of the recognized by the NSA as one of the major national security risks in the United States. So it’s not as if this is separate from national security consideration. This is a national security consideration. So that seems to me is another reason why we might be able to bring together the agencies on some kind of collaboration with China on this issue.

However, and now I’m going to go to the competition part of climate and green and talk about technologies. So part of the US switch in policy to attract production back to the United States, and employment back to the United States, and investment back to the United States through subsidies and tax credits, a motivation for that is basically job creation in the United States. It’s production in the United States. It’s investment in the United States. It’s not climate change per se. It’s not relations with China and national security risks of trading with China. No. If we want to have more good jobs here. And you hear President Biden saying that all the time. That is the way he couches a lot of these policies.

Well, if you do that, if you do that, you set off some kind of, I would say, tit for tat. Let’s say the positive side would be a tit-for-tat subsidy raise. We throw it a bunch of subsidies, and we are, if you look at the IRA. The Europeans who are talking about this throughout the Davos meetings look at the size and go, oh, my god, we’ve got to do that, too. We’ve got to throw a whole bunch of subsidies, because we need the green technology produced here. We need the technological breakthroughs in green produced here. We need the production of the green technologies produced here. We need the employment of deploying the green technologies produced here.

And so the countries, I think, the perspectives of the US, of China certainly, of Europe in the area of cooperation on a shared challenge of climate change, that cooperation is going to be hinged by or not hindered by but interface with competitive concerns. We want the technology produced here. So the competitive nature of the Industrial policies that regions of the world are putting together in a good cause to promote the production and services that lead to addressing climate change, that’s a good, good cause.

But there can be conflict in this. There can be trade conflict. There can be foreign direct investment conflict. The IRA, that piece of legislation that we are so proud of here, is discriminatory. It is absolutely discriminatory. It says if you produce it here, come on, welcome. We won’t discriminate in terms of ownership of production if you’re a German farmer, who wants to do it or a Taiwanese farmer, who wants to do it, Korean farmer, anybody, except Chinese. We do say except Chinese right now because of the national security risk. But it is discriminatory in the sense of location. And some of the IRA is actually in violation of the current WTO rules.

So the question then becomes, do we need a new set of international rules on trade and on investment? Maybe the simplest way to do it is to think about trying to divide rules for a particular kind of trade and investment. So let’s say, green. So there was a sector– there is a sectoral trade agreement in IT. It goes back to I think 1996, 1997. About 87% of the World Trade in IT is covered by that agreement. Maybe we need a write an agreement, which is not a whole new WTO, but an agreement on in the green space. That might be a possibility.

Some other places where I think there’s a possibility of collaboration or of international rulemaking in the green space, one would be disclosure, disclosure of carbon emissions. So now, there is a new international standard setting body that has been set up by COP, set up by the UN. And at the end of the day, what this is supposed to do is to insist on standardized credible information about carbon emissions at every point in the planet, at every point in the planet. So that basically then an investor or a company, investor in a company, who says I’m on net-zero, can say, yeah, well, you’re not really on net-zero. You say you are, but your emissions are nowhere near it.

So an international agreement and standards possibility, I mean, the standard body does exist. And it is putting together these standards. Right now, it’s totally voluntary. So the question is, could that become regulatory at some point and a global agreement? Another area where one might have at least a global agreement possibility or at least among some countries would be out a carbon tariff, a carbon import price protection. That is a possibility. So I will stop there.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] You don’t have to stop abruptly, but–

[LAURA TYSON] No, no, no. But that’s good. I think that’s pretty much where I was going to stop anyway.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Wonderful. [APPLAUSE] And Laura raises a very direct question, which is, if you will, that the coalitions and arrangements about technology in a technological autonomy and what we often call sovereignty in Europe, in fact, conflict with the kinds of coalitions that are needed to try and deal with the problems of climate.

And part of the question, are there ways around it? Obviously, you raised the issue of doubling the investment in multilateral investment institutions has one strand of that. So I’d love to get the reactions from the rest of you to some of the issues that are out on the table. Maybe we do a very quick go around, Pierre, James, Tino, and then try and open this up to conversation.

[PIERRE OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Well, thank you. I thought this was absolutely enlightening and fascinating. Let me just offer a few reactions to some of the things the other panelists have mentioned. So James was asked– was making the point, which I fully agree with that if we were to get in a situation of military conflict between the US and China would be in a very different environment than the kind of economic decoupling of fragmentation scenarios that I showed you. And of course, this is absolutely true.

And while there might not be a concerted effort at economic decoupling, I think a number of the panelists have pointed out whether– Tino talks about of equilibrium, and Laura talks about path dependency. I mean, the danger here is what we at the Fund call runaway fragmentation that you do something because you have some narrow objective in mind, maybe it’s about targeting some advanced semiconductors and trying to curtail progress that one country is doing in that direction. And this is on the grounds of national security.

But the world doesn’t stop there. It’s very unlikely that other countries would just not respond at some point or another. And then you get into another round. And then shocks happen. And then things can take a turn for the worse. So I think this notion that we are in a more fragile world is important to keep in mind.

Related to that, the question I’d like to ask James is when we’re thinking about the China-US rivalry, I mean, I think we have to– I mean, Laura talks about dependency. But really, this is the emergence of this multipolar world. It’s the rise of a major power on the economic and global scene that we’re seeing. And it proceeds in fits and starts a little bit like plate tectonics, that nothing moves for a while and then you get one of the plates moving as we’ve been reminded in a horrific way recently with Turkey and Syria.

So I think this is the dynamics that we’re seeing here. And if we’re thinking about that emergence of this multipolar world, it’s a challenge. It’s a challenge, because, I mean, if I channel or if I think about my colleagues who are more international political economist than myself, does the world need a hegemon or not? That’s sort of the question that is in the background.

And you could make the world more stable by having blocs. You could have blocs within which there is a local hegemon. And that’s a stable world in a sense in some dimensions. Or you can try to have a more integrated world in which you don’t. And that means that the rules need to be defined, and so the engagement needs to be defined. And so that’s I guess the question is what kind of world do we want to build?

And here, at the Fund, we’re sort of facing this reality. We’re seeing that there is this push away from multilateral rules, whether we’re looking at the WTO and trade issues or whether we’re saying, the very fact that there is in a major war on the European continent right now. And we have to think about, how do we engage? How do we try to maintain and make progress on the multilateral agenda?

And our approach is to try to be very pragmatic. It’s try to realize that in the current environment where the wind is– we’re facing significant headwinds, we can’t really push on all these things at the same time. So we have to maybe be nimble and adjust. And I think that goes in the direction of what Laura was highlighting in terms of maybe sectoral agreements, where you try to push on something that is about green technology, or maybe try to have multilateral agreements on common goods where everyone agrees. And you might put climate in that bucket. You might put some other things.

On some other issues where some countries might agree but not everyone, you can go to your lateral way. You could try to have some agreement that are open and non-discriminatory where countries can join, and you try to build a coalition that way. And then the hardest part is on situations where you are head-to-head and countries don’t are really on very different paths and are not willing to make progress.

And here, of course, countries will motivate what they’re doing by national security and sovereignty. But I think we can still have a conversation about at least doing a spillover analysis, trying to think about what decisions individually might– how they might impact the rest of the world. What was quite striking I think in the context of the IRA is the extent to which these were a number of measures that were taken, in part, as Laura described, to try to satisfy some domestic objectives but without really necessarily taking into account the way it would impact some of the US allies, the European firms, et cetera, that came later.

And so doing this kind of analysis upfront, being cognizant about the spillovers is something that maybe can help put some guardrails. You might think that, for instance, for things like food exports or access to medicine, if you think about a pandemic, those are things where we want to have safety corridors. Even for national security reasons, maybe we wouldn’t want to put restrictions on this. Let me stop here.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Thank you. Before we turn to James and to Tino, I want to remark that we are holding the conversation as Americans in California. If we were holding this conversation in Berlin or in Paris or in Copenhagen or in Finland, the concern about technological risk and technological domination would only partly be about China. It would be about American big tech companies. And part of the question would be, how do we in fact establish our own autonomy and sovereignty in the face of this? And how do we handle this conflict going on between the United States and China without getting squeezed in between?

Now, I don’t think today we’re going to be able to really engage with that issue, because we have a whole range of other topics on the floor. But I think it’s absolutely a critical one that in a different context, perhaps all of the four of us and others can, in fact, take up. I see one of my friends from Denmark nodding away at that very, very assertively. But I don’t want to distract you from what you might have wanted to say, James, but I did want to make that point on my behalf.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks. Well, I’m interested by the idea, Pierre-Olivier, of this runaway fragmentation. And I’d be curious to hear and read more about that, not to dismiss it at all. I mean, I’m obviously in zero place to do that. I guess, I do wonder about it. I mean, what I know from the IR, IPE side is a lot of our thinking is really driven by kind of the Specter of the 1930s and the fear of a collapse, a real shutdown of trade.

And you guys are expert on this kind of thing. But I wonder the nature of– many things have changed from the 1930s in the trade sector and the depth and global value chains and the effects of these. I wonder– it’s kind of a question, have you thought through how would we see runaway fragmentation currently? Do you have evidence from the– I’m sure you guys have been studying the economic impacts of the war in Ukraine.

I mean, I think a big conflict in the Western Pacific would be an entirely different thing. But nonetheless, it would be– I’d be very interested to know, I mean, how– obviously, the word Ukraine has been– the costs are stunning at the level of human life, injury, refugees, dislocation in both Russia and Ukraine. But on the economic side of things, how big are the kind of hits to GDP that we’re looking at there? And how is it affecting trade patterns in terms of some of the issues, you’re talking about resilience and substitution?

The other thing I’d say is ignorant to speak to Laura’s– or what Laura particularly but others raised in terms of the climate issue, this is a real– you definitely see– I think if you look at their documents and how they’re talking, the Biden administration understands that this is a tough circle to square or square the circle. How does it go? I don’t know, but on the one hand, I want to say, this is not– climate is not something we can make progress on without high levels of international cooperation. And they say– which I think just is the right thing to do– we are ready and want to talk about cooperating, and the door is open.

But at the same time, they’re saying, we also– the phrases go like, the PRC is the only country with the means and intent to revise the global rules based order and want to mobilize and focus on competition. And a not uncommon response by Chinese diplomats is, you can’t do both. They want to say, OK, you want help on climate, and I don’t know. I’m not quoting here. But effectively, it would be adopt our position on Taiwan.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] So with that, I’m going to ask a question. Are we absolutely obliged to stop at 1:30? Or can we take 10 extra minutes? We can. We have– so–

Can’t we straight to the questions–

Yeah. I think–

Go ahead. Do you want to make–

No. Just go straight–

So let’s open this to question. You can go to the mic–

[LAURA TYSON] There’s a microphone on either side.

Hey, Henry. It’s Henry.

There’s a microphone on your side.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Please also say who you are, where you’re from even if I already know.

Yes.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I’m Henry Farrell. I’m at Johns Hopkins University. I’ve got a question for Jim, which picks up on something that Tino said. So Tino said that it was incredible to see the United States effectively announcing that it wanted to close China down or something. I understood what you were saying, it seemed actually a little bit different from that. You seem to be arguing that from the US perspective, this is not about trying to keep China down. But these are technologies with specific military applications, which the US is trying to sort of prevent China having similar access to.

But I guess the question I have is, to what extent is Tino’s comment controlling here. In other words, if you’re China, and you read Jake Sullivan’s speech back in September, where he more or less said that the US wants to keep China as far back on what he called foundational technologies as it could, China is going to read this obviously in very different ways.

And are there ways in which the United States, if what you’re saying is correct, can credibly communicate and can create some kind of a modus vivendi with China that China is prepared to accept? Or alternatively, do we face the kinds of dangers of spiraling that you talked about briefly in the presentation because of fears of a more general desire to just keep China from achieving what it wants and believes that it is entitled to achieve?

Now, as chair, I’m going to say we did not use a timekeeper. We didn’t cut people off, but I’m going to insist that we keep responses at this point short and direct, so that we can get as many questions in as possible.

[JAMES FEARON] Thanks, Henry. It’s a great set of questions. My impression– I think, Laura said something which resonated in either this or related context. It’s not like– I think if you could look into the views of high level Biden administration foreign policy officials, you’d get a spectrum. And I think that the Jake Sullivan thing you’re referring to and some of that language on technology, it’s not so much like– well, I’d like to think, and I think some people would say, it’s not about keeping China down.

It’s that we have come to the realization that this was a one way street. And that they were admitted to the WTO and then exploited the rules of the game and haven’t played by the rules. And so we’re looking for reciprocity, not maintaining hegemony. That might be a take there.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Laura and I’ve held some conversations with some of these people. Do you want to comment on it at the–

[LAURA TYSON] There’s a spectrum of views and there’s a very, very serious split. I mean, it’s not just a spectrum of views. But I mean, if you talk to people from the National Security Council about the semiconductor policy, it is essentially war with China on semiconductors. Period. What Jake said exactly reflects that view.

If you talk to people in the Commerce Department, they’re talking about the need to build, rebuild the semiconductor fabrication capabilities in the United States, because we need to have a more competitive supply chain. And I think that’s a valid goal. So I think there’s just loggerheads right now in terms of the administration’s views on this. And I don’t think the National Security Council is weighing the economic consequences. That’s not their thing. OK. National Security is their thing. We’re not worried about the economic consequences.

Tino.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Just super briefly, I cut my teeth as an assistant professor working quite a bit on how the legal system struggled and generally did not do a really good job of ring fencing the concept of national security. And if that’s true in the legal system, its way true in technology. I think, we’re in a world where with advanced semiconductors and AI, at least, maybe even on the bio side, I think everything pretty much is dual use, and I think it’s the core of the problem you’re raising.

[LAURA TYSON] Yeah. Great.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Do you want to add anything to that? Let’s turn to another question while we still have time for that. Sir, your name and where you’re from.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you very much. This has been a very tremendous panel. My name is Haikun. I’m currently a senior studying economics.

I just wanted to I guess question the rhetoric of the panel a little bit. I’m wondering why is there almost a sense of inherent antagonistic perspective when it comes to talking about the role of China. Like, why is it a perspective of competition rather than collaboration? And then also the same sense of antagonism when it comes to the private sector. Because isn’t the goal about global integration, like your talk yesterday?

[JOHN ZYSMAN] What I’m going to do is take all three of these questions very briefly so that we get one round of responses. We get an extra five minutes, but we still need to do it that way.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Great. Thanks. My name is Ping. I’m a first year MBA student. My question might be a little long, so I wrote it down. So I thank these panelists. You guys mentioned the importance of technology, innovation, as well as like climate cooperation. But I’ve never seen a higher rate of progress other than the Cold War. So like a controlling environment of competition can be helpful in this situation.

But, as we can see, the war in Ukraine, there has been a tremendous amount of humanitarian crisis, environmental crisis, as well as economic disruption. So how does the both parties in this situation– China and the US– in a such volatile environment, both politically and socially, how do the policymakers keep the tension under the boiling point? And if there’s anything the policymakers can do to control the tension.

All right.

Thank you.

Sir.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. My name is Anchu Jin. I’m originally from India, but I’m an MBA student here at Berkeley Haas. And my question is sort of opposite of the previous question.

So I wanted to ask, basically, there’s this theory which was popularized by Professor Graham Allison of Harvard. It speaks of the Thucydides’s Trap, which is that there’s a dominant power, which is the US, and that there’s an emerging power, which is China. There’s always sort of a position of conflict between the two. And that conflict, there might be a flashpoint, which is maybe Taiwan or Hong Kong, but there is a natural tendency for conflict.

So how much do you ascribe to that view? And if you ascribe to that view, do you think that the US should take actions early and be more aggressive in combating China?

[JOHN ZYSMAN] If I understood– and there’s one last question behind you, so let’s take the question. But I was going to say, if I understood, you’re asking about basically Graham Allison’s view of the matter. And the answer is carefully. Carefully. I mean, that’s what the basic position he takes. Ma’am, to the microphone so we can hear you, please.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. My name is Charlotte. I study economics here. I’m wondering if the United States and China might– how we might be able to navigate the conflicting needs for collaboration over climate and tech decoupling at the same time in terms of developing fusion technology.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] I’m going to give a quick answer to a couple of these and then turn it– the fusion technology issue is really an open-ended one, where the question is it’s basic research– how do we structure collaborative basic research. And it’s quite a different problem from the semiconductor or other kinds of things. There may be some hope in that.

But a number of us, in fact, were involved in one way or another in the WTO– entry of China into the WTO. And I can assure you that the conversations held at the time and the outcomes were quite radically different, which is I think part of what has sparked some of the concerns. But with that, let’s– we have– we’re being granted a 5-minute access here.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] So I’ll jump in really quickly.

I can’t answer all of them. But just very briefly on the Thucydides’s Trap, I think Professor Allison has some neat ideas there. I would read Thucydides’s work actually a little differently and suggest that there are ways to avoid certainly the worst conflicts. But I think he’s right to note that this is a period of remarkable peril potentially and concern, which leads me to answering the first question.

And I would just note, look, the kind of world that I think we all want to live in is one where there’s plenty of room for the US to prosper, for China to prosper, while we recognize that they disagree about some basic things. My own view is that I try to take the world as it is, not as I’d like it to be. So if you look at that first meeting between Jake Sullivan, Antony Blinken, and their counterparts at the very beginning of the Biden administration, there’s no way to describe it other than it’s contentious.

[LAURA TYSON] Yes, contentious.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] And then briefly on the private sector, I think the private sector helps the world thrive, but I think there need to be some rules of the road. And what they should be and how to get them to the right place without squelching innovation is really the key question.

Well, I–

[PIERRE-OLIVIER GOURINCHAS] Very briefly.

Very, very briefly. I mean, I think obviously on the first question, I think a place like the fund is, of course, trying to foster engagement and multilateralism, and we’re trying to be a place where exchanges can take place. And that helps to address the second question as well, which is how to avoid getting to the boiling point. I think you keep working together. You try to engage and gauge where you can rebuild trust.

Since I have– I’m also going to use my 30 seconds to get back to James and Laura on two questions that we’re asking and were directed to me. So Laura was asking, well, technological decoupling, how should we think about this? Well, I think technological diffusion doesn’t happen in a vacuum. It requires institutions. It requires researchers, universities. It requires funding.

And if you start starving some of these things, making them harder, then you can see over time some of this decoupling happening. If you go back to the Cold War, there was very clearly technological decoupling between the Soviet Union and the West even if you had some technologies that could go through that membrane.

And James was asking, well, what kind of evidence for fragmentation do we have from the Russia-Ukraine War? I mean, there are multiple dimensions. But one I would point out is in the energy sector. If you look at the energy flows, they have been massively and more or less permanently rerouted by the war. And I think this is one area where you can very clearly see that things can happen– sometimes things can happen quickly.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] Tino, do you want to add anything else before I turn it to– Laura.

[LAURA TYSON] On the view that this panel focused or had an antagonistic tone, I just want to make it clear that actually I am very concerned about the antagonistic tone about the US in its relations with China. And I don’t think that we were describing something here. I don’t think we were taking a position. Actually, if you asked each of us, we probably take maybe different positions. But mine certainly would not be antagonistic. I questioned the United States on that.

On the issue of business, so one of the things we didn’t talk about here is the notion of all of the– globalization, deglobalization, technological decoupling, all this stuff, there are winners and there are losers. There are winners and losers.

And so part of what the movement against trade agreements in the United States and four more antagonistic relations with China was because the losers in the United States were able to have their voices heard. They were real losers. Communities were destroyed. Plants were destroyed. Jobs were lost. Companies made profits. This was something that worked for them.

So I just want to say that, in all of this, we have to think about winners and losers. And that brings me I guess to the last point of a little bit of optimism here. When Biden met with Xi, the meeting took much longer than anybody anticipated. There were a number of breaks. I think in the breaks there were sort of jockeying for the hard line versus the soft line.

And out of that meeting, there was a real sense that the Biden administration was going to try to strengthen areas of cooperation and collaboration. And then, unfortunately, the balloon. And what I don’t know– and this is just a question for all of you people who are foreign policy or defense policy experts– did the president of China know about that balloon? I don’t know. I don’t know.

There’s national security there. But, apparently, their balloons’ all over the place on all– everybody’s doing this. But the only point I want to raise there is there was a moment, and I think it will not go away. I think today– I think that we will see a Blinken visit to China. And I think that meeting between Xi and Biden was very important. Because Biden has worked with Xi for many years and he knows him personally. So that’s a point of optimism on US-Chine relations going forward.

[JOHN ZYSMAN] I would simply conclude this one more remark on the fusion question. We’ve established now that fusion is logically possible as a source of energy. We are God knows how far away from even being able to identify the pathway that would lead to a practical implementation, let alone a commercializable version of it. So, at this point, collaboration may be possible, whether that will then quickly break down once the possibility becomes– if it does become real is another question.

But I want to thank all of you. It’s been great, and thank you very much.

[LAURA TYSON] Thank you. Great moderating.

Yes. Thank you for moderating.

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: Myths and Misinformation

Part of the Matrix on Point event series

Misinformation and conspiracy theories have become a central feature of modern life, but they have a long history that have served to justify surveillance and prosecution of marginalized groups. In this Matrix on Point panel, recorded on March 15, 2023, a group of scholars who study these histories discussed how misinformation circulates, and the effects of such myths and stories on society.

The panel was co-sponsored by UC Berkeley’s Center for Race and Gender (CRG), the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion, and the Othering and Belonging Institute.

The panel featured Timothy R. Tangherlini, Professor in the Scandinavian Department and Director of the Graduate Program in Folklore at UC Berkeley; Robert Braun, Assistant Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley; and Poulomi Saha, Associate Professor of English at UC Berkeley and affiliated faculty in the Programs for Critical Theory and for Gender and Women’s Studies, the Center for Race and Gender, the Institute for South Asia Studies, the LGBTQ Citizenship Cluster, and the Department of Department of South and South East Asian Studies. The panel was moderated by Elena Conis, Professor in the UC Berkeley School of Journalism.

Listen to the presentation as a podcast below or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

Matrix on Point: Myths and Misinformation

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello, everyone. I’m Julia Sizek. I’m a postdoctoral scholar here at the Social Science Matrix. And I will be introducing our event today in lieu of Marion Fourcade who is our director who is unfortunately out of town, but I understand online watching all of us right now, which is perhaps fitting because today our topic is on– is myths and misinformation, which critically addresses contemporary challenges of myths and misinformation through a historical and humanistic lens and is ever more present in our online lives.

Today’s event is part of our matrix on point series, which addresses hot button issues in our world. this particular event, we’d also like to thank our co-sponsors, which are the Center for Race and Gender, the Othering and Belonging Institute, and the Berkeley Center for the Study of Religion. Before we get started for actual event, I just have a couple of brief announcements. So this includes our upcoming events at Matrix.

Next week, we will be having Phil Gorski presenting on his book, The Flag and the Cross: White Christian Nationalism and the Threat to American Democracy. On April 3rd, we will be having another Matrix on point panel on wealth and taxes about how the wealthy evade taxes and tax havens around the world. On April 20th, we will be having a Matrix on point panel featuring work from graduate students across the social sciences about borders and migration. And then finally on May 1st to wrap up our semester, we will be having Orlando Patterson giving a Matrix distinguished lecture on his work.

So we have a lot of exciting upcoming events happening. We hope to see you either in person or online at these upcoming events. And now onto the most boring part, which is how to join if you are online and having challenges. So if you want to ask questions online through the Q&A feature, put your questions in the Q&A box. Do not put them in the chat. The chat is for if you are having AB problems.

And then finally, if something sort of like goes wrong and either someone in the room urgently needs to leave or if you need to urgently leave the Zoom room, we are recording this event, and it will be posted online as well. So yeah, that’s all of our housekeeping. And then the run of show of our event today is after our brief introductions. Then each of our speakers will be presenting. After that, there will be an open Q&A for everyone.

So now as we get started, I’m going to introduce Elena Connis who is our moderator and a professor in the UC Berkeley School of Journalism. She is a writer historian of Medicine Public Health in the Environment, the author of How to sell a Poison: The Rise, Fall, and Toxic Return of DDT, Vaccine Nation: America’s Changing Relationship with Immunization, and with Aimee Medeiros and Sandra Eder, Pink and Blue: Gender, Culture, and the Health of Children.

Conis’s research focuses on scientific controversies, science denial in the public understanding of science and has been supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Institutes of Health, and the Science History institute. She is an affiliate of Berkeley’s history department in the Center for Science Technology, Medicine, and Society and the Department of Anthropology, History, and Social Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco. Previously, she was a professor of History and a Mellon fellow in Health and Humanities at Emory University and an award winning health columnist for The Los Angeles Times. So Thank you so much Elena for moderating.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Julia, for that introduction. And I thank all of you for being here on what feels like the first sunny day in a century. So thank you again for being inside on this lunch hour. And thanks to all of those who are attending online. We’re looking forward to a rich conversation after the comments from our panelists among all of you, whether you’re here in person or watching virtually. It’s my real pleasure to be moderating today’s event on myths and misinformation.

Something that has become deeply woven into the fabric of our everyday existence in the 2020s that seems to be not just buzzwords anymore, although they certainly have become common buzzwords, but real political, deeply challenging problems that we confront across so many sectors. Today’s panelists represent views of these issues from the humanities. And humanists, in my view, don’t generally have as much opportunity as others to chime in on these particular challenges. So I’m delighted to be able to introduce our three panelists. And before I invite them, I’m going to tell you a little bit about who all of them are.

I’m going to start with Tim Tangherlini in the middle there, who is a folklorist and ethnographer, and professor in the Department of Scandinavian where he focuses on computational approaches to problems in the study of folklore, literature, and culture. He’s the author of Danish folktales, legends, and other stories talking trauma and interpreting legend. And his papers have been published in journals ranging from Western folklore and the Journal of American Folklore to PLOS One and Computer. He’s a Co-Pi on a project called ISEBEL, and I hope I’m pronouncing that one right, the intelligent search engine for belief legends.

And he has also been co-directing a three-year long program at the NSF’s Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics to advance the field of cultural analytics. He has also led the NEH’s Institute for Advanced Topics in Digital Humanities on Network Analysis for the Humanities. And in collaboration with colleagues at UCLA and Stanford respectively, he is developing automated methods for detecting conspiracy theories on social media and a search engine for dance movement in k-pop using deep learning methods, and maybe we’ll have a chance to learn a little bit more about that.

Robert Braun to Tim’s right is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology. His research focuses on civil society and intergroup relationships in times of social upheaval. And he is the author of Protectors of Pluralism: Christian Protection of Jews in the Low Countries During the Holocaust, which is an examination of communities who stepped up to protect victims of mass persecution, while others refrained from doing so. It was published by Cambridge University Press in 2019, receive the Gregory Liebert best Book Award from the American Political Science Association and, I believe, a total of six different best book awards from the American Sociology Association, which might set some sort of record. I’m not sure if it’s for the association or for you.

His similarly well recognized articles have been published in the American Journal of Sociology, American Political Science Review Social Forces and the Journal of Conflict Resolution among others. And he came to Berkeley in 2018 after teaching in the Departments of Sociology and Political Science at Northwestern. Fascinatingly, his next book project, Boogeymen, will trace the evolution of fear in Central Europe throughout the 19th and 20th century by studying the spread of frightful figures in children’s stories.

And finally, Poulomi Saha at the end of our table here is associate professor in the Department of English and affiliated faculty in the program on critical theory and the Departments of Gender and Women’s Studies in South and Southeast Asian– Southeast studies. Their book An Empire of Touch: Women’s Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal was published by Columbia University Press in 2019 and awarded the Harry Levin prize for outstanding first book by the American Comparative Literature Association in 2020, as well as the Helen Carter first book subvention prize.

They’re currently at work on two new projects, Fascination: America’s Hindu which considers the allure and scandal of so-called Hindu cults in America from the transcendentalists to the countercultural 1960s, and Bengal to Berkeley, which looks at conspiracy as a legal philosophical and political concept to understand the rise of surveillance of racial and sexual subjects in World War I America.

Saha teaches and writes at the intersections of psychoanalytic critique feminist and queer theory, postcolonial studies, and ethnic American literature, and is broadly interested in shared histories of racialization, governance, and regulation of gender, sexuality, and politics of resistance. So please join me in welcoming our panelists. And I’d like to invite Tim to come on up and join us here.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] Thank you so much for that introduction. So I work in folklore. I’m going to blast through these slides at an alarming rate because I have– what is it five minutes? Is that what we’re thinking? 10 minutes? 10 minutes, 10 to 15 minutes and something like 40 slides. So my students are used to this.

I work with rumor legend storytelling at internet scale. And I look at how these stories, and these partial stories are part of this negotiation of belief and how that feeds into the formation of a cultural ideology, which is the consists of norms, beliefs, and values, where we have some expectations of how we want people to behave and how we want the outcomes to align with our hopes.

So stories on social media are noisy. They’re partial, and they’re– which means they’re incomplete. And they’re based on knowledge of the ongoing conversation. So the implication there is that if you just sort jump into a conversation on social media, you might not actually know what’s going on.

And so one of our goals is to estimate the parameters driving any of these conversations on social media so that we can understand the boundaries of the discussion, so what can you say within this discussion area, the structure of the conversation and its elements, and then the role of narrative and storytelling in these conversations, so to what extent do people rely often on personal experience narrative as a way– as a kind of a rhetorical device to convince others to be aligned with their perspectives.

And this leads to the emergence of what we see as narrative communities in which there is an alignment of beliefs within the community based on the storytelling that circulates there. And then we’re very interested in the robustness or the resilience of these narrative frameworks, which we model as graphs.

So how do you do this? This is part of this whole project of computational folkloristics where folklore is seen as vernacular or informal culture circulating on and across social networks. So we’re interested in the social networks. We’re also interested in this vernacular expressive forms and how they’re negotiated dynamically in these networks.

And you can see, this becomes a perfect opportunity for this question of misinformation, because in times where you don’t have access to trustworthy information sources or where you don’t trust your information sources, we turn to each other. And this is part of that process of negotiating belief in the group. And so this becomes an opportunity for the rise of misinformation and/or disinformation as well.

So if we look at what we’re looking at and why we can build this theoretical framework, we have a tradition context. This is where people recognize that you can have these types of conversations. And the structure of a genre is embedded at that very low level. At the mesoscale, we have an information knowledge area in which the framework is anchored. So if we’re discussing, for example, vaccination, we’re in a vaccination domain. If we’re discussing politics, we might be in a politics, but we would be in a politics domain by definition. And if we’re talking about witchcraft and we’re Danish farmers from the 19th century, we’re in that witchcraft domain.

So this is the information knowledge area in which a framework is anchored, and the narrative framework is based on the underlying structure. We relax Algirdas Greimas’s ideas of acting to interact– well, act and then interaction model to allow us to find in this very noisy data that I mentioned before, the different accents and the relationships that they have to each other.

And of course, performance, which is what we’re very interested in folklore on social media really exists at those things that we can observe. So that’s the post-level. And so we can observe the posts. Everything else is part of this hidden latent model. So stories we see as instantiation of some underlying framework, which in whole or in part, and it includes evaluation.

I can’t believe he said that. It would be an evaluation of something. And it also includes some sort of framing. Let me tell you what happened to Robert the last time I saw him. And so that’s kind part of this whole framing project. We use NLP methods to extract these act interaction networks from the noisy social media. And then we turn it to different domains where we’re trying to understand what is structuring these conversations.

So our first interventions were with a conspiracy theory Pizzagate, which was circulating broadly on the internet. And we were very fortunate. Although the people of New Jersey were not fortunate that at the same time, there was an actual conspiracy where people had conspired to shut down the George Washington Bridge, which caused a week long traffic chaos.

So we have on the, one hand, data telling us about an actual conspiracy. And on the other hand, we have a conspiracy theory that’s circulating broadly on the internet. And so the question is, can we discern some fundamental differences in the narrative frameworks between a conspiracy theory, which has a wall of crazy? You’re all familiar with walls of crazy. We were all in the pandemic binge watching every single detective show and every single detective show out there as a wall of crazy.

And so this is what we were able to extract for Pizzagate. This is the wall of crazy for Pizzagate. And we thought, Oh my God, that’s a real mess. And then we did the same type of extraction for news sources reporting on the George Washington Bridge. And we got that as our wall of crazy. And so it made us wonder if real life is perhaps messier than fiction.

And so this drove some of our work where we were trying to understand the relationships in all of the discussions of Pizzagate that really was boosted by the release of Wikileaks. And we found that there were these different types of things that you could have discussions about. And with the release of Wikileaks, the interpretation of Wikileaks, people were able to find connections between things that we generally might be loosely connected, weakly connected, or perhaps not connected at all.

So we found that there was Democratic politics, which is weakly connected to the Podesta brothers who also enjoyed pizza and casual dining. So you get this sort of weak link to casual dining. And then you get this whole other area called satanism where you traffic in children in underground tunnels that we usually don’t associate with casual dining. But through Wikileaks, we can make that association. And you see in the aggregate when we project all of these connections, we get what’s called a single giant connected component.

When we take out Wikileaks, you can see here at the bottom all of those domains fall apart into of independent connected components. So one of the problems, of course, then we realize is that, well, the conspiracy theory really exists only a narrative where it’s very easy to bring these links back in. So this becomes a structural feature of the conspiracy theory. While it’s not robust to deletion, we can make it fall apart very easily. It’s also incredibly resilient.

So conspiracy theories seem to be fragile. They’re not robust, and there’s a small separating set that allows one to attack the conspiracies theories narrative framework graph. Unfortunately, it’s like Terminator 2. It’s very easy to make it fall apart. But then again, it’s very easy because it exists in narrative to put those deleted edges and nodes back into the narrative at the next retelling. And so that’s an interesting phenomena that we see borne out again and again in that narrative space of social media forms.

One of the interesting things we find in these narratives spaces is that it’s often a threat narrative that really relies heavily on the construction of an inside group you or us. And then there’s always some form of threat or disruption coming from the outside. And so it’s very interesting to be able to map which group considers itself as an us and what they see as threatening outsiders– disruptive outsider, and then also being able to understand what those threats and disruptions might be.

Because the next thing that you do in narrative is you come up with strategies. It’s Ghostbusters all over again. You come up with strategies for dealing with that threat. When ghosts appear in the neighborhood, who are you going to call? The answer to that question is ideological. And it tells us an awful lot about the insiders.

Of course, we had a lot of time on our hands during the pandemic. And so we started harvesting all of the discussions about the pandemic. Our earliest work had been on vaccine hesitation looking at mommy blogs. So we use some of the same methods to look at the Reddit’s. And we discovered early on there were many different narrative communities coming into play, and they created highly separated narrative communities. So we could estimate what the actions and relationships are in each of those discussions.

As the pandemic went on and QAnon became more and more of a factor, it started bringing these separated communities together. So by a year and a half into COVID, we had one giant connected component that was redolent of the Pizzagate conspiracy theory. It’s almost like Pizzagate was a dress rehearsal for QAnon, which is a very greedy conspiracy theory.

So then we also wanted to know how this works in something like where the insiders see themselves as the true Patriots, the outsiders would be then the Dems and the deep state. The threat is a stolen election. The strategy is take over the Capitol. Can we discover this in the noisy forums in places like Parler? And so that’s current research we’re doing right now.

We also have some other challenges that are highly contextualized. Who does the author of a social media post side with? Who do they oppose? That gives us the insider outsider and it’s highly contextually-based. So here’s something about vaccines. I think tech will kill me with vaccines. People like Bill Gates are developing this for the money. And you can see my friend Sarah, who’s a doctor, told me not to get the vaccine because, of course, weirdly in this case, it causes smallpox.

And so we’re trying to understand who’s the insider, here coded in blue, who are the outsiders. It can change very quickly, depending on some very small shifts in language. And so we’re able now to do this automatically understand the stance of a person in a post based on some linguistic, very small linguistic cues. And so the shifts– inside outsider can shift.

A lot of future projects and challenges. How is the debate shaped? Fake news, polarizing debates, feedback between news and social media. Do virtual communities influence real life decisions? Yes, they do. We were told early on in our vaccine work that no, they don’t. And that is not– clearly, it’s highly correlated at least.

And then our current work is actually integrating some of these decomposition of very noisy data with something like ChatGPT 3.5. So we find these highly ranked nodes in one part of the decomposition of these very complex networks. And we just give ChatGPT 3.5 machine ballot case fraud. That’s the prompt. And this is what it tells us, which is kind of alarming and goes to the heart of today’s matter misinformation. So thank you so much.

[ROBERT BRAUN] Thanks, Tim. So I am going to– since I’ve only have 10 minutes, I’m going to jump straight into the question. And the question is a question that I hope all of you are interested in. And that is, how do xenophobic myths spread throughout space? Now obviously, xenophobic myths are of interest to lots of people because they’ve led to the destruction of groups, they’ve led to the destruction of countries, and they have resulted in the mass murder of many people. They’ve been voting. They’re highly important.

So it’s not surprising that many people have tried to formulate an answer to this question. These questions generally come in two flavors. The first flavor focuses on political dynamics and suggests that xenophobic myths are often instigated by political elites who can somehow benefit from creating an ethnic outsider.

On the economic side of the spectrum, the second flavor, it’s often argued that xenophobic myths tend to spread to places that somehow suffer from socio-economic problems. Ethnic outsiders in that case are scapegoats for the problems that people face in their local communities. Specific subform of this type of explanation formulated a long time ago in this very building argues that xenophobic myths, particularly spreads to groups and places where people are losing social status.

Now, what these approaches often do is that they use space as little containers with variables and try to analyze the spreads throughout different spaces. I’m going to do that today as well, but I’m also going to do something else. I’m also going to argue that space in and of itself shapes the spread of xenophobic myths. In particular, I’m going to argue that’s– and I’m just going to show the central argument.

I’m going to argue that National Border crossings act a spatial focal points for xenophobic myths. And that this is particularly true when the nation state comes under pressure. And this is particularly true for communities that are losing social status. I’m going to make this argument, I’m going to develop this argument by looking at National Border crossings, the lower middle classes and anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic.

There are two mechanisms that in my view link border crossings, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. The first is what I call a perception mechanism. Border crossings often make international influences visible. They provide a lens through which local vulnerable groups look at the social problems that they are face. And subsequently, these vulnerable groups then are more likely to link their social problems to international forces.

The second mechanism is what I call the attraction mechanism. Not only do border crossings shape the view of people who are there, they also shape who actually goes there. Border crossings often become symbols for international threats, and therefore attract mobilization by sometimes aggressive nationalist groups who want to defend the nation from outside influence. And these nationalists often frame outsiders as a problem that needs to be addressed. And it’s the conversion of these two mechanisms that produces xenophobia in border regions.

So first of all, there’s a group that’s losing social status. This group, because it’s closer to a border crossing, is more likely to link its problems to international influences. Subsequently, radical nationalists come in who frame ethnic outsiders as the problem. And this frame resonates because there’s already groups on the ground who link their problems to the internet issue. As I said, I’m going to do this by talking a little bit about Weimar Germany. Let me give you a very brief background of the historical case.

So with the end of World War I and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, one era gave way to another. Whereas the establishment of the Weimar Republic finally formalized the end of the empire and the establishment of the German nation state. The end of the war unleashed three destabilizing mechanisms and forces that would undermine the newly established nation state for decades to come. The Weimar Republic suffered in a geopolitical domain. It suffered in the economic domain. And it also faced a lot of internal turmoil.

Now the differences of these three domains, the economic, the geopolitical, and the internal domestic politics. The differences between these domains notwithstanding, Jews are blamed for all three. Because of their prominent role in international finance, the financial crisis were often associated with Jews. Because of the fact that some prominent leaders of the Communist movement were Jews, internal left wing radicalisation was also often associated with Jews. And these two misperceptions to a certain extent culminated in something that was called the stab in the back myth or Jews were blamed for losing the war.

Now I could give you an institutional history of how borders changed in Weimar Germany, but instead, I’m just going to show you three pictures. These are the pictures of the border crossing at the Dutch-German border called Bad Nieuweschans. This is what the border looked like before the outbreak of World War I, a common street. During World War I, heavily militarized, even though the Netherlands was not a war Germany. And then after World War I, the border crossing became a clear demarcated entry point, where you could see that you were passing from one nation state to the other.

Now it might be tempting to conclude that temporarily border crossings and anti-Semitism are somehow related, but it’s also important to analyze this at a subnational level. And in order to do this, you need good subnational data on anti-Semitic myths. Existing scholars often look at pogroms or votes to analyze this problem. And each of these has serious shortcomings because they both assume that mobilization and anti-Semitism are somehow inherently intertwined.

On top of that, often when you would look at pogroms, you would also assume that a Jew needs to be there in order for anti-Semitism to be there. And we know from research that is not always the case. So instead, I make use of a different source. Instead, I will call it boogeymen in children’s stories. And in particular, I will make use of a folkloristic tradition called Kinderschreck. What’s Kinderschreck? Allow me to briefly illustrate this based on an example from my own life.

When I was a little Robert, I used to run too far away from the house. And my parents wanted me back in time for dinner. And they didn’t want me to stray too far from the house. So they would tell me the story about the guy with the bow tie. If I would pass a certain street, the guy with the bow tie would pick me up and throw me in a well.

Now you should not underestimate the incredible impact that this story has had on my life. Not so much here. But sometimes I have to visit East Coast Universities or conferences at the American Political Science Association, especially the political scientists, and people there wear bow ties. And although I’ve at this point acquired the abstract reasoning skills to know that bow ties don’t make people bad, there’s always this little primitive response inside me that’s like, yikes, I need to watch out.

When I looked around in the audience, the first thing I did is I scanned for bow ties. And rest assured, we are safe today. For those of you who know this sociology department, they also know that I avoid the area around the restrooms because of the presence of a certain bow tie person. Now all joking aside, the guy with the bow tie in these stories isn’t always the guy with the bow tie. Sometimes it’s the dirty gypsy. Sometimes it’s the big Black men. And sometimes it’s the wandering Jew.

So what I’ve done for this project is I use the work of folklorists. The most famous folklorist is sitting over there. But apart from Tim, other famous folklorists would be the Grimm brothers. And they trained many students to collect data on both material and oral traditions in Germany. One of these gentlemen was Wilhelm Monfort. And he was the first person who would conduct expert surveys with local community leaders to figure out which boogeymen showed up in children’s stories.

This culminated in– this approach culminated in something that’s called the Atlas Der Deutschen Volkskunde, a gigantic project which tended to collect information on folkloristic traditions in tons of German localities. According to their own claims, they tried to cover every geographical area in Germany. And this project, this gigantic research project was interrupted because of the rise of the Nazis and World War II, at least the serious part of this project. However, they are housed still. The questionnaires are still available and analyzable hard copy in the archives of the University of Bonn.

So basically, I spend a couple of Summers collecting the data from these questionnaires, which lots of them have been left unanalyzed. And I looked up at the questions about Kinderschreck, boogeymen. And based on this, I was able to figure out where Jewish boogeymen showed up in children’s stories. And for the approximately 20,000 localities, I found that in 5% of them, they were located– they actually had bogeymen that were of Jewish nature, so the Wandering Jew.

The spread of these boogeyman looks as follows. So this is how it’s spread out over Germany, where each light gray dot denotes a village for which we have an answer. And it’s green dot denotes a Jewish boogeyman. As you can see, we see clustering near the border with Denmark, border with the Netherlands, Belgium, France, then here, Switzerland. Surprisingly, it skips all– not so surprisingly, it skips Austria, picks up again at the border with the Czech Republic– at Czechoslovakia, sorry, and Poland over there at least. So at first, there seems to be something going on there.

Now you might wonder this might just be the places where Jews were living. So that’s why there were Jewish boogeymen. It doesn’t really seem to be the case because lots of Jews in Germany were living inland. So in order to analyze this more systematically, I link this data with road networks in Germany to demarcate where border crossings are, and I correlate the proximity to border crossings to the presence of Jewish bogeymen while controlling for lots of factors and statistical signals.

And this is what the results look like. This is the relationship between proximity to the border crossing and the prevalence of Jewish bogeymen in children’s stories. So when you’re really close to the border, about 9% of the towns have a Jewish bogeyman. But this declines when you move further away from the border crossing, and this negative effect levels off around 60 kilometers. So I’m going to probably have to conclude right now. How much time do I have? Two more minutes.

So one more thing that I’m just– then I’m just going to conclude. I have some other data as well that I wanted to show you. But for the sake of time, I will skip that and we’ll just go to the conclusion. So existing approaches that look at the spread of xenophobic myths as I said, have looked at political threats, economic problems, elite instigation, social class. And my argument in essence is that whether these things activate the spread of anti-Semitism is conditional on the space within the nation. Thanks for your time.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Robert.

[POULOMI SAHA] I was a little worried as I was thinking about what to present that I would be off topic, as I tend to be. But the lovely thing about Tim inaugurating us into a kind of conspiratorial thinking is in conspiracy, anything can be connected. So I’m going to try and make good on Tim’s theory. So at the core of the question of misinformation is, of course, the question of belief. That is not just what one believes, but what are the ways in which something comes to be believable? What are the social, psychic, , philosophical, and political forces that say– oh gosh, sorry. See, disaster.

What are the technological forces also that might shape and govern the terms of believability? And how does a set of narratives or an idea come to move between the designation of the believable and the unbelievable? How do we go from the fabulous to the factual, from the given to the gimmick? My current book project Fascination: America’s Indian Cults takes up the question of belief and faith through an examination of America’s captivation with communities and philosophies that claim Indian origins. Fascination is the condition of a kind of rapt unbelief.

Common narratives of the abiding interest in foreign spirituality often begin with things like the great guru boom coincidental to the wave of South Asian immigration posts the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965, or from the 1893, World Parliament of Religions in which Monk Swami Vivekananda claimed to introduce Hinduism to America, or even from Henry David Thoreau who in 1844 swam at Walden Pond and quote, “bathed his intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal philosophy of the Bhagvat Geeta.” But the seeds of contact actually go much further back still.

And one of the things that I want to argue is that the obsession with Indic concepts and ideas and forms of epic actually lie at the heart of the founding of the American Republic. This idea of a foreign spirituality in particularly Indian spirituality is a long experiment in American self-invention. The concept of Indian spirituality is the foil against which the dramas of a modern secular American self are continually played out and the proving ground of the problem of too much belief.

That is that the American idea of Indian spirituality is designed to test the limits of what an American can be if she seeks transcendence, a form of spiritual belief in which you wish to lose yourself as a singular contained individual. Losing yourself in this kind of enthronement as both anathema, to the idea of individualism and rationalism that claim to govern America, and at the same time, a tantalizing possibility. This is why so many communities and philosophies that cite Indian origins and espouse Vedic transcendentalism so often come to bear the ignominious designation of cult.

Cults as we know from pop culture, which are everywhere now, are groups that threaten to disappear the individual, to brainwash them, to kidnap them, to remove them from their families, to turn them into something else. Within a cult, people act and want what appears to be fundamentally incompatible with mainstream society. This is their draw. Maybe one of the most famous examples of the cult is the horror Christianist who in the 1970s and ’80s were infamous for their public singing and chanting on street corners, distributing pamphlets and flowers in airports.

Largely young, White, middle class and college educated, the people who joined the International Society for Krishna Consciousness expressed a particular American spiritual hunger, the desire to be fully immersed in the experience of ecstasy to lose oneself in devotion and in turn to be found as part of a limitless Union. So ISKCON actually develops techniques of collective enthronement, which in their public performance and in their cultural reception disrupt a social compact in which we are expected to perform containment.

This is what actually invites the claims of cultishness. And it’s true that the horror Christianist get tied up in all kinds of scandals, claims of kidnapping, brainwashing, sexual abuse, murder, financial impropriety. All of these would warrant the term cult. But I actually think that cult is a kind of sheath of meaning that we give to forms of public shared enchantment that only contingently relate to the abuses of power and violence that follow. Cult is the kind of useful connection. The danger and draw of this collective enchantment though, is originary to what makes America.

In 1814 before Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson turned to Hindu scripture to write the poetry of transcendentalism, John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson that he had become fixated on oriental history and the Hindu religion. These letters, the first that broke their 12 year silence following the 1,800 election, range a various– a variety of topics, but have a special investment in philosophy and spirituality. Themselves deists and therefore unbound from more Orthodox Christian beliefs, Adams and Jefferson were voraciously curious about faith, about what people could believe in.

But because these men who’d never actually traveled to India had to rely on the text available to them, they were reading the works of American scholars of religion who themselves also never traveled to India and themselves could not read Sanskrit. So Adams and Jefferson are actually reading third-hand accounts in American translations of books that circulated through the British empire and through orientalist traditions.

It is the circulation across the British empire that I think partly produces this idea of kinship for Jefferson and Adams, that there’s a relationship fundamentally between the American colonies and Indian philosophy. It’s an interesting thing to have happen in this moment in which the American ideal of the individual is being established as the building block of the state. So the sovereign individual fully contained identifiable and self-governing.

This is what gives us that old familiar motto of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Happiness, which in the 18th century term means property, is inextricable from the person who can acquire that property, the White free male individual who vows the whims of no other being, who acts only through his own will. So at the same time that the American ideal of the individual is taking root as a part of political and social life, we also have some of the most prominent figures of political America entranced by a philosophical vision of a self that is completely opposite.

What is it that makes John Adams write to Thomas Jefferson that he had read the voyages and travels and everything he could collect? It’s not interest in India the place. It’s not even an interest in Hinduism, the religion. It’s actually a fascination with this concept that underpins Vedic philosophy. A truth that is one, it is the idea of a self that is pure consciousness, that is utterly one with the universal Brahman. It is a self that is uncontainable and infinite. In this philosophical vision, any conception of being an individual is an illusion. It’s a misapprehension of your true being. So the singular figure of American political life is impossible to actually reconcile with the goal of Vedic imagination.

So here’s the dilemma, the philosophical ideal is totally alluring and the material reality is totally destabilizing, especially to these men who helped to shape laws and institutions designed to individuate and segregate, free, sovereign, landowning White men on one side, slaves, free Blacks, women, native people on the other, private religion on one side, public secularism on the other. So then maybe it’s not surprising that when they discuss the place of religion in law or what we now call the separation of church and state, this is what they come to, a look eastward.

And this is what Adams writes to Jefferson, “I dare not look beyond my nose into futurity. Our money, our commerce, our religion, our national and state constitutions, even our arts and sciences, are so many seed plots of division, faction, sedition and rebellion. Everything is transmuted into an instrument of electioneering. Election is the grand Brahma, the immortal Lama, I had almost said, the juggernaut, for wives are almost ready to burn upon the pile and children to be thrown under the wheel.”

Two former presidents drafters of the Declaration of Independence. Now both old men fretting about the future of the country they helped to come see into being. And the terms of their fear, they articulate in the language of the rituals and rites of a Vedic imagination. Its promise of liberation supplies the terms of their vision of tyranny. These days, we can see how American elections continue to play out Adams’s prophecy of sowing division, faction, sedition, and rebellion. The sedition borne out of elections that Adams fears isn’t quite what we saw on January 6, but it’s actually not that far off.

So here we’ve arrived at the problem of too much belief for the American political subject. Elections, the living practice of democracy, are for Adams the all powerful like Brahma, and potentially catastrophic. The rolling juggernaut seen here is in fact, the anglicization of the word juggernaut, meaning the lord of the universe, the name given to Brahma. Colonial administrators were obsessed and horrified by the annual Ratha Yatra, which involves the pulling of a chariot of juggernaut through towns. That bodies might be crushed under those wheels while the masses that are pulling and watching are too lost in a kind of religious fervor, to loss an all encompassing moment was proof for the British of the savagery of Indian religion.

So when Adams describes a potential threat of electoral politics as a rolling juggernaut or the widow burning upon the pyre with her dead husband, he’s recognizing that there’s an enormous danger to a self that can be disappeared, whether in a group, another person, or that limitless Brahma. The same Vedic imagination that produces transcendence also appears to produce in India through the eyes of British colonialism the crushing uncontrollable force of mass psychosis.

This paradox of enthronement with a philosophical ideal and disavowal of a material expression becomes a repeating narrative for a long encounter between American society and its awesome fantasy of transcendental Vedic philosophy. The Indian ascension that America seeks is always a self-construction. American culture has produced from within itself a racialized foreign other on whom to hang a variety of desires, whether it be for transcendence or collectivization, a variety of terrors, and a variety of radical possibilities.

Of course, today, when we think about cultish belief or over belief in the realm of politics, we think about things like QAnon and MAGA. But the terms of the anxiety that they evoke that this idea of a collective hypnosis that will leave the purportedly private realm of spirituality and enter into the public space of governance is not new. I’m going to offer one other tangential link that I think actually might help us understand it, which is that the racialized other that Adams and Jefferson fear has also moved into the mainstream.

Practice by 40 million Americans, yoga and its industry of studios, clothing, and equipment is valued at over $110 billion this year. Central to its marketability as a health and lifestyle practice is that while its roots lie in Vedic philosophy, it can be practiced and consumed entirely desacralized. Yoga has been made a kind of mass market of a practice for the individual tailor made for an American public, but it has to do so by cauterizing the influence of it from the sphere of the public. Thanks.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you, Poulomi. And I’ll invite Tim and Robert back up to the front. You’ve given us some really, widely varied and rich examples to start thinking about our topic for today myth and misinformation. Poulomi, I loved your introductory comment that in conspiracy, anything can be connected. And I think that your three presentations really have shown that. We’ve investigated the questions of how something becomes believable, how certain kinds of myths, especially xenophobic ones can spread across space, and how to pull many things from Tim’s presentation, we can identify the fragile points and conspiracy.

So I want to invite all of you to share any questions that you might have at this point. I know that we also have folks who are online as well. But I’ll turn to our in-person audience first. Any questions for our panelists or the panel as a whole? Yeah, let me first find out if there are questions online from our online viewers.

[JULIA SIZEK] We have two quick questions from online or one is very quick, which is someone was just curious about this ISEBEL project that Tim runs. So you can briefly answer that.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] To answer that you can just go to search ISEBEL.EU. And that gives you access to belief legends from Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, and hopefully very soon Norway and Sweden.

[JULIA SIZEK] And then the other question that we have from online is, who judges conspiracy theories? And is there an assumption or bias that certain theories are fake and why? And how do we determine that something is a conspiracy theory or could be dismissed?

[ELENA CONIS] It’s a great question. How do we define conspiracy to begin with or maybe even more broadly myth to begin with?

[TIM TANGHERLINI] If you take a stab at conspiracy and conspiracy theory, both have that feature that there is some group of malign actors who are sort of outsiders working against your best interest. In conspiracy theory, we often find that your strategies for dealing with malign actor group one is blocked because the people that you hope to help or who you’re going to call turns out to actually also be linked to malign actor group one through group. And so everywhere you turn your potential strategies are blocked.

We weren’t so much saying this is a conspiracy theory, this is a conspiracy, but rather here are two groups of text. And do we see any kind of topological differences in the narrative frameworks? And so we found both topological differences and aspects of development. So with Pizzagate and other narratives like that, we found that there was a separating set, very small that if we delete it, all of these different domains of discourse are contained and coherent. And the linking was a narrative, an element of narrative.

When we looked at a conspiracy theory, not only did it not stabilize as quickly as conspiracy theory did. So conspiracy doesn’t stabilize. It takes many years, actually, for the actors and the actants and the interactions to come out. It comes out in drips and drabs. And it’s robust to deletion. In fact, we could delete all of the actants from Bridgegate and all of their relationships. And New Jersey politics seemed to just continue without a hiccup.

So in some ways, conspiracy tends to hide within the thicket of a single domain. Conspiracy theory tends to at least topologically jump between domains. And it relies on these links that the theorist is able to discover linking domains. Now there are certainly cases where the conspiracy turns out to– conspiracy theory actually turns out to have uncovered conspiracy. And that’s I think is a difficult area.

[ELENA CONIS] Yeah. Poulomi?

[POULOMI SAHA] I mean, the thing about conspiracy that is so interesting, the very basis of it, the word co-inspired is about its shared breath. It is about a gathering of people. One that is both intimate to share a breath, but also that it is necessarily somewhere hidden. It is the breath that you’re interested in, the thing that actually you cannot give form to. So on the one hand, you have this idea that you have to be looking for it everywhere. Hence, the inauguration of conspiratorial thinking.

A conspiracy theorist, I think, is a person who thinks in a particular kind of way. And they are able to think in that way because they have– there’s this, I think, a kind of sense of a cipher. Everything is out there. There are things that are connected. And in order to see the connections, you have to have some sort of cipher that unlocks a way of seeing the world. And the minute that happens, it’s like the diagram you had for us. Suddenly, what appears to be just scatter plots had these lines between them, but not everyone can see them.

There’s something about conspiracy theory for us to not invite everyone into it. If everyone believed it, it would lose some of its power it has to remain a kind of a gift or a thing that actually binds people together. And I think I’ve been thinking a lot about how it allows– it offers a kind of structure of compensation for paranoia. There’s that amazing moment of Nixon saying, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not out to get you. And I think about it.

Because a lot of conspiracy theory is like you may think that I am crazy, and I think that I see these connections, and I know the Illuminati. The reality is if that person’s life is impacted by material forces that they believe are related to the Illuminati, it doesn’t matter whether or not they’re crazy. There’s a kind of relation of psychic compensation where their way of seeing the world is made sense of, and the bad things that happen to them actually have a logic, rather than the general logic of life.

That’s what we’ve also been looking at is how conspiracy theory emerges in narrative. And it is about belief and not necessarily some external truth. And so it’s– I can partly create this community that you’re talking about. We have a community then of belief where this could be a community that feels threatened. And this is one of the ways that we can structure the worldview and negotiate this cultural ideology where these things make sense.

[ELENA CONIS] I see we have a question from the audience. And then I imagine, Robert, you may have some thoughts to add to that ongoing conversation. But let’s turn to the audience for a moment.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I was very interested in all of your presentations, but the economic factor and conspiracy is very interesting. I wanted to ask you, why does Wikileaks join all these– the Pizzagate conspiracy to remove Wikileaks? What is Wikileaks? I don’t actually know.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] It was a dump– we just use that as shorthand. It was a dump of hacked emails and communications in the Democratic National Committee. So it actually had weird resonances with the Watergate burglary. And then this dump of emails was sort of put out there and people started to piece through them. And this is where you got the narrative material for those hidden connections where people then could share these hidden connections, which could then reinforce this idea of, aha, that’s what we thought was going on. And that brings you into the tunnels underneath Washington, DC, which are being used to traffic children for cannibalistic pedophilia in this model. And it spills over into real world action.

Edgar Wells jumps into his pickup truck one night in North Carolina, drives through the night to Washington D.C. and barges into Comet Ping Pong and asks to be led into the tunnels. And it’s built on concrete slab. There are no tunnels under Comet Ping Pong. But there are all sorts of things with that event that relate to this idea of these– they’re hidden, they’re hidden in tunnels. All of this idea of hidden connections couldn’t have been articulated more in a better way than the idea of hidden tunnels underneath casual dining establishments in Washington D.C. controlled by Democrats. Yeah, perfect.

[ELENA CONIS] I know we have another audience question. Go ahead, sir.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thanks. I cannot say that I’m here in this room, we’re used to having a lot of Pol SCI related talks. And I wanted to connect the atmosphere of this room to something you were saying about ciphers and versions of habits of mind. I’m saying that what given– we’d like to hear from– I’d like to hear from all of you about, what are the implications for a proactive or pedagogical ways in which we might counter issues of misinformation or the spread of myths given the nature of the conclusions that you’re coming to from your work?

Again, I’m over on the same side of campus. And we have a lot to talk about from data science. And we have a lot to talk about here from Pol Sci. But I wanted to hear if I have an opportunity to have these sort of sociology and humanities takes on what are good ways to counter the spread of misinformation, and what are bad ways to counter the spread of information given what you’ve been doing.

[ELENA CONIS] You’ve all been invited to answer. I wonder, Robert, would you like to start?

[ROBERT BRAUN] I like to start, but the thing is that my approach probably doesn’t differ in any shape, or form from those of political scientists. So if the idea is to forge a connection between the humanities and social sciences, I’m perhaps the least qualified to speak to this.

[POULOMI SAHA] I may have an unpopular opinion, which is I’m not that interested in training my students in how to be skeptical about misinformation. The reason I say this is because of narrative. So part of being in the humanities– I teach these very large classes. I’m teaching a class on cults this semester. And we have to start sort of by talking about empiricism and the way in which empiricist reason structured particular kinds of ways of understanding the world, religion, belief, communities. And the thing that over the course of the semester becomes very clear to them I think, is that there’s nothing more real than belief.

So somewhere, misinformation and when someone believes it so powerfully that it materially structures and sometimes all parts of their reality. Not the way that– actually, if we think about it, reason doesn’t structure all parts of our reality. But somebody who is fully say committed to a belief in the Illuminati, that’s like one of those strong conspiracy theories, it structures every single part of their life.

So the narrative that gets produced out of that, I want my students to be able to understand the logic of it, the effects of it, why it is so compelling, how it translates, how someone makes sense of it. But I guess, I leave the question of teaching them how to counter it to other people. Partly because I’m interested in how belief becomes reality making, which I don’t know that I’m the best person to help think through misinformation. I think all information is incredibly real and productive. And often, the things that are factually untrue are the ones that have the richest life.

[ELENA CONIS] Tim, did you want to chime in on this question?

[TIM TANGHERLINI] As a folklorist, I’m really interested in the storytelling and the negotiation of belief and also recognize. And our work has shown that, look, once a group starts holding beliefs, that’s very hard to– and there’s a great questions about whether or not ethically, this is something that you want to quote and intervene in. That said, there are some features of social media that are both based on amplification and speed or velocity. So I can target groups– if I’m a malign actor, I can target groups very easily, and I can amplify the signal. And then I’ve primed a group to a certain type of belief.

And Robert was kind of gesturing at that with this idea of extreme nationalists taking advantage of these border areas as a place where people are primed for certain types of belief. And so one can with the affordances of social media do this kind of amplification and targeting much better than we can do in low level, face-to-face interaction, which is what I study in the 19th century because there were weirdly no iPhones back then. And so there were social breaks.

So if I went to the pub and started talking about the Illuminati, my friends wouldn’t invite me to the pub anymore. But on social media, I have these opportunities to amplify and target. I don’t actually have a great deal of optimism. I mean, my darkest moments, I just think we’re all doomed. But are there interventions? I’m more interested right now in understanding the dynamics of these systems.

[ELENA CONIS] I think, Robert’s going to chime on this too. And then we’ll come to the next audience question.

[ROBERT BRAUN] Sorry about that. So I’m going to give you, I guess, the more boring social sciency answer that you’ve already heard from. But if I would look at my project and if I would have to formulate ways to counter the spread of these myths, I think there’s– this perhaps didn’t come out as much in this particular talk, but there’s two things I’ve done that might help us out. So the first thing that I’ve done is I didn’t only look at border crossings activating xenophobia, I also looked at which border crossings are more likely to activate xenophobia than others.

And if you compare among border crossings, you find that it’s border crossings that are symbolic threats. And it’s places where there is contentions or contention between the two groups, where the two groups meet. And what is where this doesn’t happen is actually where there are strong interconnections across the border and there’s cooperation across the border that actually lowers the emergence of these symbolic markers.

So the fact of– so one of the things I showed you is that the borders with Austria don’t seem to have these myths. And this is because– this is the case because there you have cross national, cultural, economic cooperation efforts that produce contacts across these borders that don’t activate this fault line and this tension, which in turn makes the likelihood that such a myth resonates with these people a much less likely.

Now there’s other thing– so that would suggest that we need to figure out what are the places where two opposite groups meet, and how at those places can we facilitate coordination and cooperation. That would be a way to deal with this. And this goes beyond space. The story I told here is purely about physical space, two nations meet at a border crossing and where they meet thinks there’s these symbols that emerge which makes xenophobic myths resonates. But I think it’s a little bit more than that.

So in other work, I’ve also looked at different types of myths, myths about giant killer animals that attack people, or myths about witches that basically don’t wish you well and do harm to the community. And here you see that these myths don’t tend to cluster near physical borders. They actually cluster near spaces where different types of communities meet. So the killer animals, that myth tends to emerge in places where the forest meets the urban, so the intersection of the forest and the urban.

With witches, witches tend to emerge in places where progressive communities with high female employment rates are adjacent to places where there are more– have more conservative values about the family. So here it’s not only a physical border, it’s also a social border. And social borders– the intersections of social borders, those are the places where, according to my research, you would see these damaging myths emerging, and those are the areas that you need to focus your attention on and you need to somehow create coordination that transcends those borders, which is a defense of pluralism message but another way, it’s defense.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. I know you’ve been waiting. Go ahead.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] First of all, thank you for coming here. I have a question for you, professor. You mentioned that some conspiracy theories do uncover conspiracies, real conspiracies. So I want to ask about how past incidences can exacerbate conspiracy theories or denial of real factual past conspiracies can inflame the conspiracy theorists. So I think there are two things mentioned, elections and vaccine hesitancy.

So we know that before groups, especially from Berkeley went to the South, my family’s from the South, in the ’60s, the Democratic State party has had one party state. The Blacks decided one day, hey, we’re going to go vote there, or riot, or the house would get burnt down, especially in places like Florida and [INAUDIBLE], the North, these cities. These political machines did have election irregularities to say the least.

And so now when– of course, that was some decades ago. But when people say, hey, there might be election fraud, of course, I don’t believe in most of those things personally. It’s the sham. But what I feel is that a lot of people downplay fear of election fraud. When this whole– for much of the history of the United States, there has been nothing but election fraud against Blacks, who are denied the constitutional right to vote for 100 years. And so I’m wondering if kind of denying that the possibility of election fraud can also inflame these fake conspiracy theories.

And the part about vaccine hesitancy. So I work for the Discovery– [INAUDIBLE] Discovery Grant 26 years ago. We got funding from biotech chip industry to fund this PIs. And we know what happened with opioids. The Sackler family pumping money into universities, top universities to Tel Aviv University even. Now it’s almost as if to say, hey, don’t do research on us, or don’t be the ally of the oppressed people. So anyways, they are cases. And so for people now– and then the FDA, they have been thoroughly infiltrated by this.

[ELENA CONIS] So yeah, it takes us back to our first question in some ways.

[TIM TANGHERLINI] Yeah. So I think one of the elements of the interrelationship between conspiracy, the way we’re using it, and conspiracy theory is one that’s a feedback loop. And so they’re interdependent. The fact that there have been conspiracies in the past gives you a good strong narrative basis to work on your conspiracy theory. The conspiracy theories that we’re mostly looking at are ones that cross domains and cross multiple domains.

It’s often that– the Ali genre of legend is really the type of story where you’ve got some outside threat, and then your insight group, the us, comes up with a strategy to deal with that outside threat, whether it’s a witch in Denmark, it was either you would turn to the minister, you would turn to the folk healer, and particularly in cases where we had a great deal of debate over the direction of the Danish Lutheran Church, in those areas would get a lot of these stories because it was an ideological decision.

With conspiracy theory, we often find that they’re sort of monolithic in their worldview. And so you start to add in more groups and you do these sort of narrative kind of network paths. So you get this maximal spanning tree of this remarkably broad network. And that helps you understand the world as it is. The threat of election fraud is absolutely real. And you can have different types of stories about that.

What we’ve discovered in our research is that in the case of conspiracies, they come out in drips and drabs because they’re deliberately hidden and they tend to remain within a single domain. So election fraud is within the domain of politics. Conspiracy theory might link that also to big pharmaceutical, which might be involved in some other kind of conspiracy and also link it to international banking. And with international banking were immediately in the realm of the Illuminati. And it’s only one step to Satan. And so that’s how this narrative of world develops.

And I’m fascinated by that because it reflects belief in ideology and that negotiation. I’m also really interested in actual conspiracies that usually come out through historical work, investigative journalism, and a lot of digging into the relationships within a single domain. So that whole idea of do your research, well, yes, but are you able to actually do research? So I mean, as an investigative journalist, you might really have a focus on politics, and you can actually do that type of research. But the type of do your research that’s being referenced, for example, in the chem trails, no, contrails conspiracy theory is not really what we would recognize, I think, as actual research.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. We have literally 30 seconds left. And I’m wondering Poulomi or Robert if you had one final thought you wanted to share.

Yeah, I’m– go ahead.

OK, we will take one more question from the audience. Thank you.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you. Just very quick, but to import two important question. I would like to have Timothy. Do you have any suggestion for responding to the problems of misinformation based on your research? I know it’s a very large question, but just few ideas. I don’t know. Are you also working about the question of the solution or just–

[TIM TANGHERLINI] I think we have to understand stories and context, understand the groups and understand their worldviews. And at that point, we can start to build ideas about how we can address the circulation of misinformation, how that impacts people’s worldviews.

[ELENA CONIS] Thank you for that. Any final comments or thoughts?

[POULOMI SAHA] I was just going to say that I think that we would be wrong to think of conspiracy theory and misinformation as a site of pure falsehood. It is never a pure falsehood. That’s what makes it so compelling and so rich. There’s always something that is true there. If there wasn’t, we would be talking about mass delusion. That’s not really what we’re talking about.

We’re talking about enough truth that leads to confirmation bias that allows further the kinds of grand narratives that you’re tracking. And I think that we have a kind of desire to always look at what seems outlandish or extreme and think of it as just like pure falsehood. And I think that’s part of what creates these impossibilities of understanding what’s actually driving and causing these narratives to flourish.

[ELENA CONIS] Yeah. Final thought, Robert? No pressure. If not, that’s OK. We can leave on that thought of the element of truth in all myths and misinformation. So thank you to the panelists for their comments today. Thank you all for being here and for your questions. And to those of you who are online, thank you for participating as well. Have a good afternoon.

Authors Meet Critics

To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua

Presented as part of the Authors Meet Critics event series

Recorded on March 7, 2023, this Authors Meet Critics panel focused on To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua, by Courtney Desiree Morris, Assistant Professor and Vice Chair of Research in Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley. Morris was joined in conversation by Tianna Paschel, Associate Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of African American Studies. The panel was moderated by Lok Siu, Chair of the Asian American Research Center and Professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley.

The panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of African American StudiesCenter for Latin American Studies, and Department of Gender & Women’s Studies.

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

About the Book

To Defend this Sunrise examines how Black women on the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua engage in regional, national, and transnational modes of activism to remap the nation’s racial order under conditions of increasing economic precarity and autocracy. The book considers how, since the 19th century, Black women activists have resisted historical and contemporary patterns of racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression. Specifically, it explores how the new Sandinista state under Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has utilized multicultural rhetoric as a mode of political, economic, and territorial dispossession. In the face of the Sandinista state’s co-optation of multicultural discourse and growing authoritarianism, Black communities have had to recalibrate their activist strategies and modes of critique to resist these new forms of “multicultural dispossession.” This concept describes the ways that state actors and institutions drain multiculturalism of its radical, transformative potential by espousing the rhetoric of democratic recognition while simultaneously supporting illiberal practices and policies that undermine Black political demands and weaken the legal frameworks that provide the basis for the claims of these activists against the state.

About the Panelists

Courtney MorrisCourtney Desiree Morris is a visual/conceptual artist and an assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley. She teaches courses on critical race theory, feminist theory, black social movements in the Americas, women’s social movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as race and environmental politics in the African Diaspora. She is a social anthropologist and is currently developing a new project on the racial politics of energy production and dispossession in the US Gulf South and South Africa. Her work has been published in American Anthropologist, the Bulletin of Latin American Research, the Journal of Women, Gender, and Families of Colormake/shift: feminisms in motion, and Asterix. To see her art work, visit www.courtneydesireemorris.com.

Tianna PaschelTianna Paschel is an Associate Professor in the Department of African American Studies at UC Berkeley. She is interested in the intersection of racial ideology, politics, and globalization in Latin America. Her work can be found in the American Journal of Sociology, the Du Bois ReviewSOULS: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture and Society, and Ethnic and Racial Studies and various edited volumes. She is also the author of Becoming Black Political Subjects, which draws on ethnographic and archival methods to explore the shift in the 1990s from ideas of unmarked universal citizenship to multicultural citizenship regimes and the recognition of specific rights for black populations by Latin American states. It is the winner of numerous awards including the Herbert Jacob Book Award of the Law and Society Association and the Barrington Moore Book Award of the American Sociological Association (ASA). Professor Paschel is also the co-editor – along with Petra Rivera-Rideau and Jennifer Jones – of Afro-Latin@s in Movement, an interdisciplinary volume that explores transnationalism and blackness in the Americas. Professor Paschel is a Ford Fellow, member of the American Political Science Association Task Force on Race and Class Inequality, the Council of the Law Section of ASA, and the Steering Committee of the Network of Anti-Racist Action and Research (RAIAR).

Lok SiuLok Siu (moderator) is Chair of the Asian American Research Center and Professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley. She is also an affiliated faculty in Anthropology, the Center for Race and Gender, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Berkeley Food Institute. Her books include Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama (2005) and co-edited volumes Asian Diasporas: New Formations, New Conceptions (2007), Gendered Citizenships: Transnational Perspectives on knowledge Production, Political Activism, and Culture (2009), and Chinese Diaspora: Its Development in Global Perspective (2021).  Her latest manuscript, Worlding Chino Latino: Cultural Intimacies in Food, Art, and Politics, is forthcoming with Duke University Press.

 

Transcript

To Defend This Sunrise: Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua

[MARION FOURCADE] Hello, everybody. My name is Marion Fourcade. I am the director of Social Science Matrix. And it’s a great pleasure to welcome you today in our space for this wonderful event about Courtney Morris’s new book To Defend This Sunrise.

This is a book that was published by Rutgers University Press. And it’s a book that considers how Black women activists in Nicaragua have resisted historical and contemporary racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression.

In the book, Morris also examines how multiculturalism rhetoric under the Sandinista state has been used to continue practices of dispossession. And of course, also how Black communities have pushed against these critics.

Now, today’s event is part of matrix’s Author Meet Critics series, which features critically engaged discussions about recent books by faculty and alumni at UC Berkeley’s Social Science Division. And the event is also co-sponsored by the Department of African-American Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies.

Without further ado, I will now introduce our moderator, Lok Siu. Lok Siu is the chair of the Asian-American Research Center and professor of Ethnic Studies and Asian-American/Asian Diaspora Studies at UC Berkeley. She’s also an affiliated faculty in anthropology, the Center for Race and Gender, the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies, and the Berkeley Food Institute. That’s a lot of affiliation. And I commend you for them.

Her books include Memories of a Future Home– Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama and three co-edited volumes on the topics of Asian diasporas, Chinese diaspora, and gender and citizenship.

Her latest manuscript Worlding Chino Latino– Cultural Intimacies in Food, Art, and Politics is forthcoming with Duke University Press. So now, I leave it up to Lok to introduce the rest of the panel. Thank you.

It doesn’t matter. I’ll just turn up the mic.

[LOK SIU] Just want to make sure. OK. There you go. Well, welcome everyone. It’s a pleasure for me to moderate this panel and to hear Courtney speak a little bit about her book and also Tianna’s comments. I’m going to go ahead and introduce each of the presenters. And then we will go ahead and begin the discussion with Courtney introducing her book.

Courtney Desiree Morris is a visual and conceptual artist and assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies here at Berkeley. She’s also the vice chair of research in the Department of Women and Gender Studies as well. She teaches courses on critical race study, feminist theory, Black social movements in the Americas, women’s social movements in Latin America and Caribbean, as well as race and environmental politics in the African diaspora.

She is a social anthropologist and the author of the book we’ll be discussing today In Defense Of This Sunrise– Black women’s activism and the geography of race in Nicaragua, which examines how Black women activists have resisted historical and contemporary patterns of racialized state violence, economic exclusion, historical dispossession, and political repression from the 19th century to the present.

And I’ll just say that I had the immense honor to have sat on the dissertation when Courtney was at UT Austin. And I will say that her book is just as stunning as her dissertation then. But it is incredibly– I mean, the update of what she brought in is just incredible. And I so appreciate this work.

I think this is one of the few books, if not the only book, on looking at the intersections of race and gender and focusing on Black women feminist struggles in Nicaragua. So thank you for this important work. And we’ll look forward to hearing more in just a bit.

I’m just going to turn around– turn ahead, turn to Tianna Paschel and introduce her as well. She is the commentator for this panel. And she is the associate professor in the Department of African-American Studies at the University of Berkeley here. She is interested in the intersection of racial ideology, politics, and globalization in Latin America.

She’s also the author of Becoming Black Political Subjects, which draws on ethnographic and archival methods to explore the shift in the 1990s from the ideas of unmarked universal citizenship to multicultural citizenship regimes and the recognition of specific rights for Black populations by Latin American states.

It is the winner of numerous awards, including the Herbert Jacob Book Award, excuse me, of the Law and Society Association and the Barrington Moore Book Award of the American Sociological Association.

Professor Pachel is also the co-editor along with Petra Rivera-Rideau and Jennifer Jones of Afro-Latin@s– I’m not quite how to pronounce that. But it’s written the at sign– in Movement, an interdisciplinary volume that explores transnationalism and blackness in the Americas. It is so rare to have a panel of specialists on Latin America and Caribbean looking at race. So this is such an incredible opportunity for us to turn our attention to this.

So with no further ado, let me go ahead and have Courtney discuss her book.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Wow! Thank you all for being here. It feels very surreal that the book is done. It’s taken up the better part of my adult life, 20 years working on it. I think I went to Nicaragua for the first time when I was 20. And I’ll be 40 in June. So it’s been a very long relationship with this field site and with this particular political struggle.

And it feels really great to be able to share the work with you, to share with the people that I worked with in Bluefields, many of whom are no longer living there. Because as political conditions in Nicaragua continue to deteriorate, many of the folks that really taught me everything that I know about Nicaraguan politics have had to flee the country because conditions there are untenable.

So this book, there are a lot of people that I would like to thank. And if you’ve had a chance to look at the book or when you look at it later, you’ll notice in the acknowledgments that I’m not really able to name people by name who have been my greatest teachers, which was really heartbreaking. But that was a choice that I had to make to protect them.

And so I’ve tried really with this book to offer something that would be analytically useful for those of us who are interested in thinking about the complexities of anti-Black racism and Latin American statecraft. But that would also be politically useful for people who are trying to make sense of what’s happening there now.

And that maybe this can be something that can offer blueprints for people for trying to think about the nature of struggle as people continue to try to figure out how to survive under this authoritarian turn in Nicaragua.

So before I get started, I just want to thank all the folks in the Social Sciences Matrix for hosting this gathering. It’s been a really long journey to get here. I’m really glad to be able to share it with my community here at Cal who were the last folks to help like midwife this book into the world. So thank you.

I especially want to thank Julia for your work organizing this event. And give extra special thanks to my whole department, Gender and Women’s Studies. And to Af-Am which is very quickly I’ll write out there. And give thanks to Af-Am who co-sponsored the event and has also become a home away from home on the sixth floor.

So honored to have Lok moderating today. It just feels so right that you were here at the beginning of the journey. And now, you’re here at the end. So thank you so much for being here.

And extra special shouts to Tianna for being here. I think you only graduated maybe like a year or two ahead of me. But I always felt like when I was in grad school, you were already like a star. And we all really like Tianna is amazing! And this was like together.

Yeah. But you were already such a formidable scholar of Afro-Latin American politics. And so I’m just really delighted to have you serve as the discussant today. So thank you for being here.

And unfortunately, our colleague, Jovan Scott Lewis, could not be here because he’s in Sacramento trying to get reparations for Black people. So I think it’s totally allowed. He’s fighting the good fight and doing the work. So he is greatly missed, but very apologetic that he could not be here.

And then I also wanted to, before I start this talk, I want to thank my partner who’s here in the room. And I’d like to acknowledge him. You can clap for him. It’s very rad. You can clap for him.

But I just want to thank you for supporting me through this process. You met me right at the beginning of it. And it really never would have been– I don’t think this book would be in the world without you supporting me through this. So thank you so much for being here. I love you.

So with that, I’ll go ahead and get started. And this is the cover of the book. The artwork is by an Afro-Nicaraguan painter named Karen Spencer who when I saw this painting, I knew immediately that I wanted it to be the cover of the book. But I was really afraid to ask her to let me do it because I was afraid of political retaliation.

And she was insistent that this had to be the cover of the book. And that was going to be her small contribution to resisting state violence aesthetically. And so I’m very grateful to her for allowing me to use this image.

And so, what I wanted to do today is instead of just reading directly from the book, I’ve pieced together sections of the book to provide a general overview of what the work is doing and the conceptual offerings that I’m making with the work. And trying to think a little bit more about the work that I see Black women activists doing in response to these conditions of deepening political repression in Nicaragua.

And so, To Defend this Sunrise is really at its core, a historically grounded ethnography of Black women’s political activism against the authoritarian turn under the administration of Daniel Ortega. In this work, I map a genealogy of Black women’s struggles against the Nicaraguan state from the 19th century to the present.

And examining this genealogy reveals the forms of authoritarian violence that are currently operating in Nicaraguan politics that they’re not an aberration from model of liberal democracy. But rather, they are and have historically been a keystone of mestizo nationalisms in all of its ideological iterations that both requires and reproduces Black and Indigenous exclusion.

And so, these forms of violence have underwritten the project of mestizo nationalism in foundational ways that are reflected across the political spectrum from the right to what I term in the book the nominal left. And if you want to ask me about that in the Q&A what I mean by that, I’m happy to talk about it

In a deeper sense, I’ve come to think of the work as an indictment on the broader logics of liberalism in both its conservative and revolutionary iterations and the ways that particular modes of insurgent Black politics expose the racist underpinnings of these fraternal ideologies. And of course, I came to this realization like after I finished writing the book.

But I think it’s true. And so based on my time working in Nicaragua over the past two decades, I’ve come to argue that Black women activists have historically been at the forefront of these insurgent social movements against the state that reject the empty promises of liberal inclusion and instead identify it as a project of political containment executed under the guise of multicultural recognition.

Now, this was really not the book that I set out to write as Lok will tell you because she was there. My dissertation was a sprawling 300-page meditation on Creole women’s cultural politics with a vague but largely unstructured spatial analysis of Black women’s practices of placemaking and communal land activism.

But I realized very quickly, when I got my first postdoc and when I sat down to begin revising the dissertation into the book manuscript, that a radical shift was unfolding in Nicaraguan politics that I needed to pay close attention to.

In 2017, after years of struggling with how to narrate the authoritarian turn and its impact on Black and Indigenous communities, I returned to Bluefields to understand how regional activists were responding to these developments. What I learned led me to rethink my entire project.

Residents shared their anxieties about the administration’s anti-democratic tendencies and their fears about the erosion of communal property rights as Daniel Ortega and his party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front or the FSLN in Spanish, have intervened in regional and communal governments to advance its own centralized development agenda.

They pointed with alarm to the wave of mestizo settler colonial violence against Indigenous Miskito communities in the neighboring North Coast Autonomous Region. The place where I worked was the South Coast Autonomous Region, which are two separate political entities. And I’ll describe that, I’ll explain that more further along.

People also shared their concerns about this placement after the administration approved the use of eminent domain under the auspices of an interoceanic canal mega development project. And as I listened to them, I knew that I needed to write a different book. One that would help people both inside and outside of Nicaragua to understand the slow process of authoritarian drift that has led to the current political crisis.

And so let’s talk a little bit about that crisis now. In April 2018, Nicaragua was shaken by a wave of popular protest against the administration of President Daniel Ortega and his wife and Vice President, Rosario Murillo. Yes, you heard that right.

In the weeks and months that followed, hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans from university students, retirees, environmentalists, feminists, religious leaders, Black and Indigenous communities, journalists, and left wing and right wing opposition groups flooded the nation’s streets calling for Ortega’s resignation and early elections.

The unfolding crisis took many, including the government by surprise. Yet the conditions for the uprising had been in the making for more than a decade and revealed a deepening crisis of legitimacy for the Ortega administration.

In April– and the crisis was precipitated when Ortega issued an executive order instituting a series of reforms to the Nicaraguan Social Security Institute. The reforms would increase the amount that employees and employers would have to pay into the system while cutting benefits to elderly retirees by 5%. And it’s worth noting that this was actually an austerity measure that was recommended by the IMF in the negotiations with Nicaragua to provide aid to the country in the form of loans aid.

The public outcry to this shift was swift and furious. Retirees began protesting outside the offices of the INSS. They were quickly joined by university students from the Central American University or the UCA and the Polytechnic University of Nicaragua, UPOLI.

The government’s reaction rapidly escalated into violent repression. It shut down television stations broadcasting live coverage of the protests, ordered anti-riot police forces to disperse the demonstrations by firing live rounds into crowds of protesters, engineered the mass arrests of student activists, and attacked universities where students were mobilized.

Pro-Sandinista gangs known in Nicaragua as turbas and members of the Sandinista youth organization also attacked demonstrators with mortars and other arms as the national police stood by and refused to intervene.

By the end of the first week of protest, the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights, CENIDH, confirmed 43 deaths. Among the dead– I’m sorry. I got pictures of all that I totally forgot about. But these are some images from the protests in 2018. Ortega is a murderer. Ortega is [SPEAKING SPANISH] There we go. And so that’s Angel Gahona.

So among the dead in that first week of protest was Angel Gahona, a journalist who was shot and killed while live streaming coverage of the protests in the Caribbean coastal city of Bluefields where most of my research was conducted.

During this time, the Ortega administration went on the offensive claiming that the protests were being infiltrated and manipulated by narco traffickers, gang members, and juvenile delinquents committed to promoting quote “destruction and destabilization” unquote.

In a televised speech on April 21st, Ortega claimed that the protesters were receiving arms, funding, and tactical support from domestic right wing elites in collusion with the United States to stage a coup and overthrow the government.

And of course, given Nicaragua’s particularly fraught relationship with the United States, it’s not unreasonable that that kind of narrative would have a lot of political resonance for people on the ground, even though it turned out to be largely untrue.

So protesters retaliated by shutting the country down with weekly marches, building tranques or roadblocks to keep police and paramilitary forces out of communities sympathetic to the protesters and using social media to counter the administration’s narrative.

As the protests continued to escalate, calls for peace and calm came from the powerful Superior Council of Private Enterprise or COSEP and the Catholic Church. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops convened a national dialogue and served as a mediator between the protest movement and the administration.

Representatives of various sectors of Nicaraguan civil society, including labor unions, the feminist and women’s movements, national human rights organizations, student activists, the Campesino Movement, and costeño representatives or people from the coast, as well as religious leaders agreed to participate. But the talks collapsed within days when the government refused to enter into negotiations and demanded that the removal of the tranques was basically a precondition for negotiations.

Following the collapse of the talks, in July, the Ortega administration launched quote “the cleanup operation” to forcibly remove the tranques and crack down on its political opponents. FSLN lawmakers then passed sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that expanded the definition of terrorism to include a broad range of activities that resulted in death, injury, or property damage when the intent was quote “to intimidate a population, alter the constitutional order, or compel a government or an international organization to perform an act or abstain from doing so.” So basically, so vague as to be meaningless. I’m sorry. I feel like there’s a little bit of reverb in my face.

From July to December, some 500 people in the country were arrested under charges of terrorism. The government quickly declared the cleanup operation a success. And that effort came at a very high cost. The United Nations, the Organization of American States, and Amnesty International reported that the protests of more than 300 confirmed dead.

National human rights organizations placed that number closer to 500. Approximately 2,000 people wounded and more than 400 political prisoners. By the year’s end, an estimated 40,000 Nicaraguans had fled to Costa Rica, fear of reprisal for their participation in the protest. I think at this point now we’re looking at about 100,000 people who’ve already fled the country since 2018.

And after the cleanup operation, the government then escalated its repression of civil society, stripping away the legal status of dissident NGOs, harassing journalists, and arbitrarily detaining human rights defenders across the country.

So as I said, a number of people I know have left the country. And all of the people that I know who were running NGOs on the coast or in Managua have had their NGOs stripped off their legal status and shut down in the last five years.

So now, let’s take a look at the view of the protest from Bluefields. The civic rebellion, however, came as little surprise to Black and Indigenous activists on the Caribbean coast who took a radically different view of the origins and implications of the protest movement.

Bluefields is the capital city. There’s the map. You can see Bluefields right there on the Caribbean coast, on the east side, on the East Coast of the country. Bluefields is the capital city of the South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region of Nicaragua, and is home to a multiracial population of Afro descendant Creoles, Afro Indigenous Garifuna, mestizos, and Indigenous Miskito, Rama, and Mayangna peoples.

In 1987, Nicaragua formally approved the creation of the autonomous regions as part of a cluster of multicultural citizenship reforms that formally redefine Nicaragua as a polyethnic, multicultural nation state. These reforms– as kind of will speak to in her own work.

These reforms recognized the collective rights of Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples to govern themselves under their own traditional forms of customary law, granted them access to bilingual education, communal land title, and gave them the rights to manage the use and exploitation of the region’s natural resources.

The law also established the formation of two autonomous regions with their own political institutions. The transition from the state’s historical embrace of mestizo nationalism, which defined Nicaraguan national identity as the product of racial mixing between Spanish colonizers and Indigenous Native peoples was a watershed moment in the struggle for Black and Indigenous rights in Nicaragua and Latin America more broadly.

The approval of these reforms marked the beginning of the multicultural turn in Latin America and signaled a radical shift in the relationship between the multiracial Caribbean coast and the mestizo Nicaraguan nation state.

Despite these reforms, in the years following the approval of regional autonomy, the Nicaraguan state under multiple administrations whose ideological orientations ranged from revolutionary to reactionary continue to undermine the political claims of Black and Indigenous people for territory, resources, and political autonomy.

Black and Indigenous communities have resisted the state’s effort to grant concessions to national and multinational corporations to the region’s fishing, mining, and lumber resources and to construct an interoceanic canal that will cut their communal land claims in half.

These communities have also condemned the state for failing to address the mass migration of landless mestizo settlers into the region occupying and trafficking in Black and Indigenous communal lands.

Although these reforms did not transform the unequal relationship between Black and Indigenous communities and the state, they did facilitate the emergence of new forms of political subjectivity and new modalities of political mobilization that have transformed racial justice movements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Black women in Nicaragua, as in other Latin American countries, have emerged as key leaders in these political formations leading struggles against police abuse, gentrification, mega development schemes, a regional land grab, and territorial displacement.

When the protests erupted in April of 2018, Black women quickly mobilized to organize demonstrations in Bluefields. Costeño participation in the uprising increased dramatically after the national police arrested two young Black men, Glen Slate and Brandon Lovo, for the murder of Angel Gahona, the journalist that I showed you earlier, despite eyewitness accounts from Gahona’s friends and family members that the journalist was murdered by local police.

In addition to hosting marches, activists discussed the case on local radio which they livestream to be on Facebook for costeños living outside the country and circulated memes in social media posts in which they identified these two young men as political prisoners countering official government narratives of them as juvenile delinquents.

Lovo’s and Slate’s arrests and subsequent convictions that were later overturned under appeal powerfully demonstrate the racialized dimensions of Nicaraguan state violence under the authoritarian turn, which were largely overlooked by the civic movement.

This exclusion was made evident, for example, when the hastily formed civic alliance initially neglected to invite Black and Indigenous community leaders to participate in the national dialogue with the government in May of 2018.

Dolene Miller who is a colleague that I worked with for the last 20 years. Dolene Miller, a longtime Creole land activist and representative in the Bluefields Black Creole Indigenous government, argued that the civic movement has tended to ignore the specific political demands of Black and Indigenous communities on the coast, even though these communities were among the earliest and most vocal critics of the authoritarian turn. And by early, I mean people were telling me in 2009 that Daniel Ortega is a dictator. And I was like, no. And they were right.

The failure of the civic movement to engage with the political concerns of Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations reveals as Shakira Simmons, a Bluefields based Black feminist activist argues, quote “the geocentric vision” end quote of mestizo nationalisms which has historically minimized the place of the coast and broader struggles for state power, nationalist modernization projects, and official development schemes.

Costeño activists argue that the state of Nicaragua under a series of ideologically divergent political regimes has historically treated the Caribbean coast as an internal colony quote, “an annex territory open to exploitation” end quote.

Addressing this historical legacy of regional exploitation will mean going far beyond replacing an individual political figure, even one as enduring and powerful as Daniel Ortega, to envision a different kind of political future for the country.

So To Defend This Sunrise– Black Women’s Activism and the Authoritarian Turn in Nicaragua intervenes in this debate by examining the genealogy of Black women’s activism in Bluefields and these women’s historic and contemporary struggles against authoritarian state violence.

I demonstrate how Black women have engaged in regional, national, and transnational modes of activism to reimagine the nation’s racial order. And the book is based on fieldwork conducted from my first time going to Nicaragua in 2004.

I basically went every year between 2004 and 2009 for a couple of months. And then conducted fieldwork from 2009 to 2010. And then went back for subsequent trips from 2012 until 2017. And I have not been back since 2017 because I’ve been told by friends and loved ones who live there that I shouldn’t because it’s not safe for me to go back. So I haven’t.

And so, I conducted this fieldwork primarily in Bluefields. But I also conducted research in rural Black communities in the Pearl Lagoon basin. I can show you the map. So there’s Bluefields. And just above that, you see this kind of body of water. I don’t know if there’s a pointer here.

You can see a kind of bay there. That’s the Pearl Lagoon basin. And I also conducted research in the capital city of Managua and Puerto Cabezas in the north, which is a largely Indigenous urban community with large settlements of Miskito folks who have also been involved in extensive struggles for communal land rights and multicultural recognition.

And then I also conducted research in the US with Creole women who have left Nicaragua and who are now living with varying citizenship status in the United States. And so the study combines ethnography, archival research, oral history, and discursive analysis.

And through using this kind of interdisciplinary methodology, I argue that Black women’s contemporary activism is rooted in a genealogy of struggle against racialized state violence, economic exclusion, territorial dispossession, and political repression.

And so rather than reading the contemporary authoritarian turn as a state of exception, Black women activists highlight quote, “the tragic continuities following Saidiya Hartman between different racialized regimes of governance whose collective results have been the ongoing dispossession, displacement, and disappearance of Black communities.”

And so, despite its seemingly inclusive rather exclusive tenor, the rhetoric of multiculturalism has largely failed to unsettle mestizo hegemony and Nicaraguan nationalist discourse. As the political scientist, Juliet Hooker, argues multicultural discourse has been absorbed into the historical project of mestizo nationalism in ways that reproduce the idea of quote “Nicaraguan national identity as pre-eminently mestizo” end quote.

Under this logic, multiculturalism is reconstituted as an extension of earlier mestizo nationalist political projects. Hooker argues that mestizo multiculturalism is thus a disciplinary discourse that polices and inhibits the assertion of critical racial subjectivities that challenge the ideological and material bases of mestizo nationalism and the project of centralized state development that requires Black and Indigenous resources and territory.

Those political subjects who fail modernity’s tests and refuse the imposition of neoliberal development projects have become the targets of state led efforts to discredit disparage and delegitimize Black and Indigenous social movements.

Since I began working in Nicaragua in 2004, I’ve seen the phenomenon of repression and state violence intensify in the region and witness the growing assault on Black and Indigenous human rights activists throughout the hemisphere.

Yet these spectacular forms of state violence, however, can also eclipse the more mundane systemic and structural forms of violence that the masses of Black people encounter in their everyday negotiations with and struggles against the state.

These structurally violent conditions are as well, Vargas argues, a normalized feature of Black social life throughout the Americas. He argues that official multicultural discourse throughout Latin America tends to quote “obscure the economies of Black suffering that sustain it” end quote.

In Nicaragua, Black activists have responded to this erasure by declaring that the Nicaraguan state is and has historically been engaged in a campaign of everyday genocide against Black communities on the coast. They argue that rather than disrupting this genocidal campaign, multiculturalism as a discursive project in public policy has provided new cover for the violence that Latin American states enact against Black communities.

The United Nations defines genocide as any intent to– as quote “any intent to destroy in whole or in part a national racial or religious group.” Excuse me. It can include, but is not limited to quote, “killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” end quote.

Since the approval of the UN Convention on genocide in 1948, Black activists and scholars throughout the Americas have used the term to describe the various legal, economic, social, and cultural means by which the modern state produces premature Black death in whole or in part.

In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress led a delegation to the United Nations charging the United States with genocide. William Patterson, then the organization’s national executive secretary, compiled and edited the group’s findings in a collection titled, We Charge Genocide, the historic petition to the United Nations for relief from a crime of the United States government against the Negro people.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Afro-Brazilian scholar and activist, Abdias do Nascimento, argued that the myth of racial democracy obscured a systematic regime of genocidal anti-black racism that was reflected in the lack of access to housing, employment, and education and to disproportionate levels of police abuse and violence against Black people.

Yet scholars of genocide studies have largely been reluctant to classify Afro-descendant people’s historical experiences in state violence as a form of genocide. This stems in part from the tendency to define genocide as a historically specific term rooted in the Holocaust of European Jews during World War II.

Genocide scholars have expressed concern that the term might be inappropriately applied to social groups who– although they may have experienced brutal forms of discrimination– have not by definition undergone genocide.

Yet, as far as my reading can tell, the definition provided by the UN suggests a much more capacious understanding of the phenomenon than the scholarship suggests. As well, Vargas argues the concern over vandalisation quote “prevents the possibility that the definition of genocide may be applicable especially to specific, quantifiable, and recurring social processes in the African diaspora whose results are the disproportionate victimization of Black people” end quote.

Christine Smith extends this argument and suggests that scholars of anti-black state violence should theorize genocide not as quote “an historically determined, location specific occurrence” end quote, but as an assemblage.

In so doing, we can quote, “not only take into account it’s gendered, racialized, sexualized, and class contours but also how it is tied to other similar iterations of violence across space and time” unquote. As always, it’s controversial to some to suggest that the Nicaraguan state is engaged in a campaign of anti-Black genocide.

Such claims fly in the face of long established discourses of Latin American racial exceptionalism and newer narratives of harmonious multiculturalism that states have historically deployed to buffer themselves from such critiques.

Yet, this is precisely what Black activists have argued, that the Nicaraguan state in both its democratic and authoritarian iterations has and continues to enact genocide against Black communities through a structure campaign of dispossession and exclusion.

So in this book, following the insights of Black activists, I make two conceptual offerings. First, I argue that since the end of the Revolutionary Period in 1990, the Nicaraguan state– and this includes both the neo conservative free market liberal administrations that followed the revolution and the return of the nominally leftist Sandinista administration– have enacted a longstanding historical project of Black death through what I term multicultural dispossession.

Multicultural dispossession describes the many ways in which state actors and institutions drain multiculturalism of its radical transformative potential by espousing the rhetoric of democratic recognition while simultaneously supporting illiberal practices and policies that undermine Black political demands and weaken the legal frameworks that support their claims against the state.

These forms of dispossession comprise the very heart of the state’s genocidal assault on Afro-descendant communities. And this is violence that was not produced solely by the Ortega administration. And this is something that activists are very clear on.

Rather, it is the product of the violent economic effects of multiple conservative administrations of the 1990s and early 2000s that initially adopted the kinds of neoliberal economic reforms that left Black and Indigenous communities increasingly impoverished. And that has hollowed out regional autonomy as a tool for Black political self-determination.

I further argue that these political formations have produced new political subjectivities and modes of activist engagement among Black women activists that can be instructive for all of us, I think, doing this work in the hemisphere.

In response to the racialized underpinnings of the authoritarian turn, they’ve developed a global analysis of anti-Black racism that directly informs their critics of local and national racial formations. These new modes of activists engagement in the transnational public sphere also reveal how Black women are responding to contemporary state violence by cultivating a politics of what I term diasporic locality.

And so the term for me really describes how Black women engage in multi scalar forms of activism and advocacy that link local struggles to broader racial justice movements unfolding throughout the Americas. These activists offer a radical critique of the excesses and abuses of the authoritarian turn and link them to a hemispheric legacy of anti-Black racism and discrimination.

Now, I’ll conclude with this part. Now, given the growing visibility of Black women activists as transnational political actors, it’s tempting to read this shift as a new phenomenon. But given the kind of historically grounded nature of the research that I’ve done, I would argue that this is actually to borrow from Audre Lorde, a difference only of scale rather than of kind.

My research on Black women’s activism on the Caribbean coast suggests that these modes of political engagement are not new, but rather have been expanded by Black women’s increased access to digital communication technologies, the development of transnational political networks and organizations, and the development of international political institutions, including philanthropic organizations, human rights governing agencies, and the international human rights legal system that they have made extensive use of, that have allowed Black women to advocate for the rights of their communities to a much larger public audience.

But if we look to Black women’s engagement with earlier diasporic political currents, including organizations like the Universal Negro Improvement Association or Rastafari civil rights movement, and Black feminists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the degree to which transnational diasporic discourses of race, nation, and resistance shape and are mutually informed by these local struggles for racial justice becomes apparent.

Through a careful review of the limited archive of Creole women’s historic activism, I offer a genealogy of these women’s struggles against the mestizo nation state, which forms the foundation for their contemporary struggles against authoritarian state violence.

Yet, even as Black women activists sharpen their critique of the state’s historic and ongoing project of Black genocide, they also narrate their activism as a reproductive politics through which they fight to create the social, political, and economic conditions to sustain Black life. Thank you.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] OK. I’ll jump right in. That was beautiful and amazing.

Thank you.

I first wanted to thank, Julia, for all of your work in making this happen, the millions of emails, the wrangling of people. And to Marion for so beautifully heading the matrix and really helping us come together across disciplines. Thank you to Lok for moderating this. And thank you to Courtney for your work.

We run in the same circles. If people are at all familiar with my work, we’ve just been like together but not ever in a formal engagement. And so this– I’m really thankful for this conversation because it is the first time that I get to deeply engage with her work and not just hear about you as I made my circuit through Central America and South America around the same time that you were doing your work.

I want to just say apologies to you because I have a neck injury. And so I’m going to be looking like really stilted and formal. But it’s all love and all warmth in your direction.

I feel it.

And then one just caveat because probably I didn’t send Julia my bio or anything. You have to get it from the internet. I am a professor in African-American Studies and in the Department of Sociology. I want to say that in part because my colleague is here too. And I didn’t want anyone to feel like I wasn’t claiming both of my departments.

So there is so much that I can say about this book. I think one of the amazing things is that if I close my eyes, at times, so much of what you’re describing in the context of Nicaragua sounds like the context of Colombia. Right? The dispossession, the co-optation, the state violence, the ways that activists are engaging in all kinds of trickery in order to confront this.

But I will say that the analysis itself is so much richer, so much sharper, so much more layered, and so much more feminist than anything that has been written on multiculturalism in this region and focus on blackness especially, right?

So I just wanted to say you wrote the book that you needed to write. It came at the time it needed to come.

Yeah.

So the first gem I want to talk about– there are many gems in this book– is the way that you talk about and develop your practice of Black feminist activist anthropology, and the way that you center your body, the body and your body, and as it’s interpolated through your many experiences in Nicaragua.

Your body is crucial to developing your understanding of what’s going on there, socially and politically. And it’s also central to how Black women come to their own political praxis. There’s a line in the, I think, intro of the book where you say, being a Black woman in Nicaragua is hard. And it’s italicized and full stop. Like that already is saying so much.

And then you say, I came to learn that that fact in and through my body and my embodied experiences navigating the complex social terrain of Nicaragua’s multiple racial geographies in an era of authoritarianism.

The racial topography and the containment of blackness as over there on the Caribbean coast as not quite Nicaragua is so clear from the minute you arrive, your first time there, when everyone already knows where you’re going, and where you belong, and where you don’t belong.

I’ve had these similar experiences when I lived in Costa Rica for a year. Also when I went to Nicaragua as a 20-year-old tourist and everyone always already assumed that I was from Bluefields. And in Colombia, a place that I visit often and work in often.

But your book made me– gave me a new language for understanding how I was navigating these spatial political terrains and new ways of thinking about how my body and how people engage with my body make visible these racial geographies. So I really appreciated that.

Another gem is your idea of diasporic locality. It’s very helpful because, of course, it cuts up against this idea that when Black folks in Latin America, the Caribbean, or in the Spanish Caribbean articulate a racial politics, they are actually responding to US impositions of racialized understandings, right?

This idea that gets reproduced in the English literature and the Spanish literature, but also a charge that activists often face as a sort of silencing tool. We don’t have race here. That’s some US stuff you’re importing. You’re importing concepts of race and racism from elsewhere.

So your concept of diasporic locality puts that to bed in a really skillful way. But it also couches and puts into context these more contemporary regional activisms and transnational activisms in this kind of long deray. And it complicates in many ways taken for granted politics and geographies.

So in To Defend The Sunrise, we see that from the vantage point of Managua, the Atlantic coast is this place. It’s a place of some contradictions. It’s marginal and yet strategic. It’s outside of the nation but also a place that must be recolonized, reintegrated, and controlled. A place that is undervalued and also extremely valuable in economic and geopolitical terms.

And in this way, the Atlantic comes to embody all the discourses associated with Black people, and all of those kind of contradictions about the Black body actually within the national politic– assimilation and integration, needing to be managed, needing to be surveilled.

But what I think is so powerful about this book is that it refuses to see Bluefields and the Atlantic coast from that vantage point, from that centralist, colonial, mestizo national, Spanish-speaking vantage point.

Instead, what you do is give us a view of Nicaragua and really of the world from the vantage point of Black women in Bluefields and, of course, other parts of the Southern Atlantic coast.

Rather than a provincial outpost, we see a cosmopolitan place that is made through these constant circulations of people and products, and also through complex layers of coloniality, and also through this rich creation circulation and taking up of political ideology from Garveyism to feminism to liberation theology.

It is from this vantage point one centers the– you center the lives, practices, and relationalities of Black women, their political philosophies. And from there, we see Nicaraguan state formation and nation building in all of its failings.

It is from this vantage point this place– so it’s from this place both in terms of the positionality of Black and Creole women vis a vis this masculinist, centralist state project, and the positionality in place of the Atlantic that those contradictions come to be seen.

And you’ve talked so much already about the Hispanicized cultural project in your opening remarks. I want to talk a little bit also about the authoritarian and autocratic one that you also talked about.

So the view from Bluefields shows quite clearly that these authoritarian underpinnings and strongmen compulsions of the Nicaraguan state even as the country goes through all these different political formations and upheavals. It’s one of a story of continuity and not discontinuity.

You, like the women at the center of this book, forced us to put Ortega in his proper historical context as one of many men from the Pacific of a country from the seat of Hispanic-owned colonial power to edge towards authoritarianism and more and more dispossession despite promises, despite revolutionary ideals, and despite treaties.

Thus, rather than see him as this drift as this aberration you show very powerfully that he’s part of this longer legacy of state formation in Nicaragua. In this way, the Atlantic coast becomes this kind of miner’s canary to use critical race theory as Lani Guinier’s term, not just a siren that feels and sees and lives the racial underpinnings of Nicaragua’s social and political order, but also a region of people who see the first signs of the authoritarian creep.

We see time and time again how the coast plays this role because of the anti-blackness that underwrite state policy over time. But also because the coast is this place where the central state tries and attempts to perfect its authoritarian practices precisely because the place that it holds within the national project.

So your book reminded me a lot of the colloquial expression that goes something like, “we are all Blacks now.” This idea that the kinds of dispossession, the kinds of austerity that we experience at the point at which they become more fully democratizing universal is when people start to notice that there’s a problem. But there are things that we live before.

So where Black and Indigenous activists here were the first one in the context of– we see this in the context of other countries. And I’ll just speak a little bit about Colombia and Brazil, the countries I’m most familiar with.

So where we see Black and Indigenous activists, for example, being the first ones attacked by Alvaro Uribe’s policies, and that specific idea of constructing human rights activists as terrorists. That becomes universalized, starts out with attacks of both Black and Indigenous activists. And in a way, you can think about Uribe actually practiced perfecting his brand of parapolítica through those engagements with those communities.

Or even the way that the contemporary Bolsonaro right movement in Brazil with all of its idiosyncrasies and all of its incoherences tried out its discourse and actually its political sort of repertoires when it came together first against affirmative action and against land rights for quilombola communities.

Ultimately, it’s from these margins that we’re able to see the center of these politics in these places that we’re able to understand also the nature of power, even though mainstream political accounts in and outside of the academia hardly ever mention Black people.

And I was struck by I think it’s in the preface where you talk about there being this important edited volume on authoritarian turn in Nicaragua with not one mention of the coast. And that happens in the context of Brazil to like no mention of race at all, even though it’s hard to see how that’s possible.

In addition to revealing the contradictions and desires of the Nicaraguan state project, the view from the coast also gives us so much to think about and to theorize around the nature of racial spatial orders, the meanings of autonomy, sovereignty, and freedom, and the relationship between the politics of sovereignty and sexual politics.

I found this last point to be one of the most unmistakable contributions of this book. I thought your chapter on chamba and the cruise ships was fascinating, especially because you read these experiences of Black women within this broader context of neoliberal state policies and development projects that never quite materialize.

Chamba emerges in the space between the promise and the reality of hegemonic development projects and in the promise and reality of multicultural rights that end up dispossessing more than they allow for the guarantee of rights.

This actually reminded me a lot of Jovan’s work on Jamaica. The ways that people carve out some kind of life. They strive. They make sense of their realities in that gap.

In your account, though, it’s mostly women and not men who are engaging in these practices. That despite their structural origins become yet another site of a culture of poverty kind of ideas of moral panic and of the policing of Black women around motherhood and sex.

Beyond the theoretical contributions this book makes, there are some key contributions to historiography. I was struck by two things here. First is that you tell these life stories of Black women who are involved in the taking down of Somoza and the early years of the Sandinista revolution.

I found it really interesting as someone who in my previous life working at international institutions around multicultural rights, I guess, have met Dorothea Wilson actually, and always in these super professionalized international women’s NGO spaces. And I did not know her history, like going to the mountain and all the things related to being involved in the Sandinista struggle, very interesting.

So your book really reminded me of the importance of telling these stories, of approaching it from an oral history, long deray kind of perspective. Another gem in terms of the historiography is kind of embarrassing. But I’m going to tell the story because I have this opportunity to. And it has to do with setting the record straight about Maymie de Mena, like her origins.

So I co-edited a book which you referred to that’s called Afro-Latin@s in Movement. And we have a chapter that’s all about Maymie de Mena, who was like a right-hand woman to Marcus Garvey, and a person in her own right, who really shaped the way that the UNIA actually functioned in that whole pan-African movement like the Spanish, like pages of the Negro world, and all of that.

So we have a chapter that’s about her and the symbolic politics of her, what it meant for her to be writing on a horse in Harlem down in these parades and representing Garvey when he was traveling.

And all of it was in the context of this book, Afro-Latin@s in Movement, thinking about this Afro-Nicaraguan woman– you know what I mean– was so important to the United Negro Improvement Association.

And I remember, right when we were going to press, Juliet Hooker, she was going to–

[INAUDIBLE]

Yes, exactly. She wrote like a foreword. And she said, I know it’s already going to press. It’s fine. But I just want to let you know that Courtney Morris has uncovered that Maymie de Mena is not Afro-Nicaraguan.

She claims that identity for herself. But she actually was born in Louisiana. And I was like, oh no! And it will forever be in print with my name on it, this chapter that’s just about this Afro-Nicaraguan woman, right?

So thank you for setting the record straight and finding all of those archives to say that. So I’m just going to close with some questions. I actually think we– because of time– should open it up more broadly. But I’ll say my questions. And then maybe you can take them together. I don’t know. I’ll leave that to the discretion of Lok, of course.

So my first question has to do with the racial order or orders in Bluefields. So I found a depiction of racial formation in the Atlantic Coast starting in the 19th century and through the 20th as super interesting and depicted as very opposed to or different from the way that we might think about racial formation in the rest of the country.

On the one hand, we see on the Pacific this mestizo dominated hispanophone place with this discourse of mestizaje and then later multiculturalism. But one where there’s deep seated anti-blackness and even anti-indigeneity in different ways.

On the other, we see in your book this place on the Atlantic where Black Creole people are integral to the political, economic, and social life of the place where there seems to be a lot of race mixture and conviviality. I couldn’t help but think that maybe Bluefields sounded a little more like what mestizaje was supposed to be but wasn’t.

Even so, there are these little peeks where there’s little cracks in the veneer that I wanted you to maybe talk more about. We see them when you talk about class and color cleavages that happen when the UNIA has two chapters and not one. We see that with the resectability politics that emerge and re-emerge with different Black women political figures that you talk about.

I’m curious about what, if anything, that has to do with questions of not just class and color, but even like origin and what generation folks are there– Creoles, migrants from Jamaica, how to think about that.

But more generally, I’m interested in if you could say more about what racial formation in Mosquitia was like historically and in the present. My second question has to do with this idea of diasporic locality and how you make senses of change over time.

So you actually set the quote that I was going to say, which is the quote around these being practices that have a long history, these transnational practices that Black women have, and this idea that you use Audre Lorde to say, which is that “it’s a difference of scale and not kind.”

And I guess actually, I’m curious if it’s not a difference of kind and scale. Because in these more contemporary moments, we see Black women throughout your book making appeals to institutions like the United Nation, who don’t have completely clean hands in terms of putting forward these more symbolic versions of multiculturalism and not the more deep versions of actual rights that have all these performative things like the decade of Afro-descendants but are sort of constantly developing these things alongside the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, and all of them.

And so I was curious what we are to make about these trans nationalisms over time? And if we might think about them as not just a difference of scale? That the UNIA and the UN are not the same, and so how are we to make sense of that?

Related to this last question, I was really fascinated by the encounter between the Junes in your book. It was a really sweet moment where Courtney narrates this encounter between June Beer, a Black Nicaraguan painter and poet, and our June Jordan, also a poet and philosopher and somebody I feel indebted to as a Black woman professor on this campus but in the Department also of African-American Studies.

At first, I thought you were curating a conversation. We all are like I’m going to put June Jordan in every– I’m going to put her in conversation with this person or this person. And then I realized that you meant there was an actual encounter between these two Junes. And it made me–

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] That really happened.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] It really happened. It wasn’t just like I’m going to think about how June talks to this June. It was really– it was sweet to see that they actually met. And it made me wonder more about how you think about these encounters between people who are so differentially situated within the African diaspora. It comes up so much within your book.

You show beautifully how Central America informs how Marcus Garvey thinks about his political project. It informs Maymie de Mena so much that she takes on the identity of a Black Nicaraguan. And then we have June Jordan going. And I can imagine many, many other kinds of exchanges.

And at the same time, because of US centrism, because of neocolonial relationships, because of differences in resources, and also just the ubiquity of US Black struggles, there’s often a presumption about the directionality of those exchanges.

And so, my question for you is, what do we learn? What did June Jordan, what did Maymie de Mena, what did Marcus Garvey learn from the struggles in Nicaragua and Bluefields in particular? What might those struggles tell us about freedom, about autonomy, about power? And I’ll end there. Thank you so much.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Oh my gosh! That was incredible. Thank you.

Thank you so much.

[LOK SIU] So, Courtney, you should do some– so, Courtney, why don’t you take a few minutes to respond. And then we’ll open it up. It would be a missed opportunity if we didn’t do that.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. I mean, there’s so much to speak to in your comments. I mean, I think this question’s around kind of thinking about this overlapping, sort of specialized racial formations, and how race is constructed and developed on the coast versus how it’s constructed and sort of imagined in the Pacific.

So I do think one thing that’s sort of worth talking about for people who haven’t had a chance to read the book yet is that one of the things that is the kind of history of Afro Central America, the Caribbean coast in all of these countries has always had a kind of fraught relationship to the state.

And so, in the case of Nicaragua specifically, one of the things that makes working there so interesting is that for many years, that whole part of the country was basically its own semi-autonomous, semi-sovereign state. It existed in the interstices of the colonial scramble and the sort of bids for land and territory and resources.

And so while the kind of Western half, the Western central half of the country was governed by the Spanish and operated under Spanish colonial rule until the 1820s when Nicaragua became an independent republic in 1823, the Caribbean coast had a kind of quasi colonial relationship with the British Empire and was considered a quote unquote “protectorate of the British Empire” and had its own kind of formal governing structure that interacted directly with representatives of the British crown.

So that whole part of the country was referred to historically as the Mosquitia. So that was the term that Tianna was using in reference to the Indigenous Miskito peoples who historically have lived in that region. And the Mosquitia had its own king.

A Mosquitia king that was educated in Jamaica, answer to the governor of Jamaica, was considered a sovereign, was the head of state, essentially. And they could enter into treaties. They entered into multiple treaties with different European nations.

They entered into treaties with the Nicaraguan government to determine what the nature of the relationship would be with the central government. And also in an attempt to kind of contain and mitigate Spanish efforts to colonize that part of the country and claim sovereignty over the entirety of the territory.

And they were able to maintain that semi-sovereign status until 1893 when Jose Santos Zelaya, who was then President at the time, launched a campaign to reincorporate, so you’re talking about this sort of symbolytic projects, but to reincorporate the region into Nicaragua, even though it had never actually formally been a part– you can’t reincorporate what you didn’t ever actually own. But that was the language.

And so it’s like that kind of historical cleavage between these two geographies has always structured the relationship between these two spaces and the ways that people think about their relationship to Nicaraguan national identity, culture, politics, citizenship, all of it.

And it’s really interesting because even now, there was a study that I cite in the book that was carried out by one of the UN offices that was housed in Nicaragua where they asked costeños, people living on the coast, like do you feel as Nicaraguan as you feel costeño? Do you feel more Nicaraguan? Or do you feel less?

And overwhelmingly, people were like, at best maybe I feel as Nicaraguan as I do costeño or Black or Indigenous. But just as often people would say, I feel less Nicaraguan than I feel costeño, than I feel Creole, than I feel Miskito.

So there’s a way in which how people identify and where they imagine their political loyalties to lie in spatial as well as racial and cultural terms. It’s not with the Nicaraguan state at all. And then, for their part, mestizos in the Pacific are wildly uneducated about the coast.

So I talked about in the book where one of the things that Black people would often say is yeah, I leave Bluefields and I go to Managua to study. And I’m in school. And people are asking me like, do I need to take out my passport so I can travel to Bluefields to go visit the coast? Or is it true you all live in trees? I mean, does everybody there practice witchcraft?

There are sort of narratives about the kind of radical space of racial difference that the coast represents. It’s still a very salient part of just like everyday racial common sense in ways that have not been mitigated at all by advent of these multicultural citizenship reforms.

So I wanted to talk about it in a way that would treat that phenomenon as a kind of like transhistorical phenomenon. But that would lay out the continuities and discourse and how even as new ways of thinking about Nicaraguan national identity emerge.

These older patterns and the palimpsest, I guess, of Nicaraguan anti-blackness and anti-indigeneity is constantly being rearticulated and reconstituted even in the face of these gestures towards a more inclusive way of thinking or imagining the nation. It’s really pernicious.

So anyway, that’s something that I think is in terms of the question of Mosquitian racial formations. I think that’s how I would think about that. And then yeah. I mean, I will say really briefly, and then I’ll kick it to the audience that it was really sweet writing that piece about the two Junes meeting.

Because I also have this idea– I think when I started this project initially as an undergrad. I was like, I guess I was like 20 when I went down there. And I was like, I’m going to go find the Black feminist.

I think I really struggled at that point because the literature was so limited on Black women’s political engagement in Latin America, as you know. We basically had to write it and work with other people in the region who were also writing and translating and trying to make the work available.

But it was for me this kind of watershed moment like realizing that that encounter had actually happened, and then thinking about having the evidence of how that encounter really expanded to Jordan’s political imagination.

She goes to Nicaragua. And then she comes back. And she publishes in 1984 an essay at Essence magazine back when Essence was still about it about why she had to go to Nicaragua and why Black people should support the Sandinista revolution. That was the argument. And I was like, wow, this is so incredible.

And this is the same time that June Jordan is going to Palestine. She’s going to Lebanon. That she’s really engaged in these sort of modes of Black internationalism that have a long enriched tradition. And that Black women have really been key protagonists in that project of Black internationalism, even though we’re largely or often written out of that history in favor of the great man narrative.

But I think that for me really demonstrated how or maybe in a way I appreciated it because I also felt like– and I didn’t have space to talk about it in the book. But my own political imagination has been radically refashioned by my encounters with Afro Latin American women who have really helped me to rethink what I imagine constitutes a feminist politics or who is the ideal subject of feminist politics or what do we imagine in terms of what is politically possible, like thinking about how in the space of the United States, our demands for political recognition or repair are very limited in some ways.

And you go to Latin America, and they’re like claiming territories. And it happens. It’s not an easy or an uncomplicated process. But the demand is there and it’s viable. And people believe in it.

And so I just think that there’s something about the way that Black activists use these infrastructures that are not created for our own political dreams, our freedom dreams. Whether it’s the infrastructure of American empire or the infrastructure of international human right spaces or spaces of cultural exchange, and then take that infrastructure to make connections that then enable the development of more expansive modes of political imagination, and what we think we have a right to as Black people.

And I think that it’s important to really dissenter the US and say oh Black people in the US don’t have the monopoly on offering those kind of insights. But that we can look to the Global South, I think, to maybe free ourselves from the limitations that we have imposed on us in Global North context.

So anyway, that feels like a very rambling, meandering answer.

[TIANNA PASCHEL] It’s beautiful.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

[LOK SIU] Anyway, comments? Questions?

[JULIA SIZEK] OK. Well, we do have two questions from online. So I will start with those while people in the room are thinking about your questions. And we’ll get over to you. So a question from Garrett Brown is, do people on the coast view the 1987 autonomy agreement as something that could work if there was the political will in Managua? Or are there changes that need to be made in the approach or content of the autonomy agreement itself?

And then, I think actually this next question is potentially related, so I’m just going to tack it on. From Laura Enriquez who says that she would like to hear more about any ways in which exploitation and repression of the Atlantic coast may have differed between the conservative and left governments in the post-1990 period.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. Absolutely. So I think, when I was working, I remember the first time going to Bluefields and people talking about regional autonomy and the 1987 autonomy law. I think at that point, the levels of disillusionment were so deep. Because it had become so apparent that the state actually had no interest at all in activating its own policies to provide the forms of repair that the law was created to address.

And so the feeling always that I got from people was that they were like yeah, autonomy could work. But the reason why it won’t work is because of the depth of political corruption in the country, the lack of political will, and the fact that there’s– as I talk a lot about in the book– that the state across these different political administrations has used these tools of political co-optation, tokenization to separate Black leaders from their communities, and to keep them from advocating for their communities in the ways that might make the law meaningful and real.

But ultimately, the biggest single factor is that the state doesn’t want to do this. They pass the law, but they never actually had any intention of realizing it. And I think that it’s such a profound source of bitterness and disappointment and heartbreak. That’s kind of hard to communicate in words, but I tried.

And then in terms of the second question, what are the differences between this sort of– one of the arguments I make is that multicultural dispossession isn’t something that just emerges under the Sandinistas, but it is a defining feature of Nicaraguan governance in the post-revolutionary period.

So all of the administrations do it. So Violeta Chamorro in chapter 3, I talked a lot about how she has no concept of what regional autonomy is. She thinks it’s– she doesn’t know what it is. And her son-in-law who’s her chief of staff like wild nepotism. That’s how government works down there. He just thought it was a ridiculous idea. He says it. And he wrote a memoir in 2006 where he was like yeah, we didn’t really get it. We just thought it was kind of a crazy idea.

A project that took years and years, like people spent years developing regional autonomy, hosting gatherings all over the Caribbean coast, going to every single Black and Indigenous community like rural communities on the middle of nowhere, to ask people what they wanted. And then to consolidate all of that into a coherent government policy that could be instituted, that could be enacted through the law.

And the next administration just comes in and is like yeah. We think that’s a pipe dream. We’re not going to do that. So those forms of dispossession happen immediately. It’s like the ink is barely dry. And the state immediately starts going about hollowing it out and whittling it out.

So I don’t know that there are– I would say that the major difference is I think under Ortega has been the return of explicit forms of political repression. I think the intensification of government intervention into the spaces of everyday life. And Black and Indigenous sites of political mobilization is really unique.

But I also think that the Sandinistas are really clever. Their use of multicultural rhetoric is really different than– the neo cons have no use for multiculturalism. They don’t care. The Sandinistas actually say, well, we created multiculturalism. It happened on our watch. And not only did we create it, but we’re the only ones who can execute it effectively.

And so the repression or the forms of authoritarianism that are being enacted can be justified by saying, but we’re the only government that actually has ever cared about Black and Indigenous people. Look, we passed this law. So they have really, I think, been very strategic in their mobilization of multicultural rhetoric in a way that is fascinating.

And in some ways, I think also articulates with these sort of similar modes of neoliberal multicultural discourse in the United States that are really problematic. And that I think we can learn from. So I would say those are the biggest differences.

It’s working?

Hi, Andres.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much for this wonderful talk. My question is, I mean, first you mention an anti-Black historical violence encompassing both the reactionary and revolutionary governments has been produced like they caused as a space of dispossession and repression, as you already mentioned.

And my question is, what other like [INAUDIBLE] of practices like about the land, the coast, from their life, knowledge, and political practices of Black women emerge? Or what kind of– if there is another notion of coastal geographies or coastal ecologies from these political coalitions of Black women in Nicaragua?

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Yeah. I mean, I remember while writing the dissertation like Katherine McKittrick’s Demonic Grounds. It just came out. And that book was just like a bomb in my world. And I was like, oh, what are these Black women’s geographies that I should be paying closer attention to? And I think they showed up in a lot of places in the book.

I talked a lot about the fact that regional struggles for land rights have been led almost entirely by Black women. They are the ones who– so the autonomy law when it was passed, one of the holes in the legislation was that it gave Black people the right to communal land rights. But it didn’t actually establish a process for delivering on that.

So then another law was passed in 2003 called the Law 445 that provides a step-by-step process for demarcating and titling Black communal land claims like in blocks. And Black women were the first people. There were a lot of folks when that law passed they’re like that’s never going to happen.

And Black women were like, it is going to happen because we’re going to make it happen. We’re going to take that law. And we’re going to run with it. And one of the activists that I worked with is a woman named Nora Newball.

That’s Nora talking at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with Dolene next to her. But Nora had an encounter with the president of Nicaragua at that time, Enrique Bolaños. And she was like, well, what are you going to do? We got this law and what are you going to do for us?

And he said to her [SPEAKING SPANISH] And she was like, I will. That’s exactly what I’m going to do. He’s like, yeah, take up the law. You got it. Now, do something with the law. She’s like, I am going to do something with that law. And she did.

I mean, they ended up doing this massive project to demarcate the land, doing ethnographic research, mapping out the territory, meeting with all the residents, passing and voting on it, coming up with a proposal, pushing that through to the state. And that was the proposal that they ultimately presented to the state for the land claim.

But then there are– so that’s one of the formal ways that I see Black women’s geographies or Black women attempting to reshape space through practice. But there’s also these more informal strategies like the stories that people tell about places.

Like the state will come in and change the names of places. And Black folks are like, no, that’s not Punta Fria. The name of that neighborhood is cotton tree. That’s where we live. And that’s some stuff that somebody made up.

So there’s a chapter in the book where I talked about walking through the neighborhoods, these traditional Black neighborhoods in Bluefields. And my friends, homegirls, who would be like, that was a Garvey house. That was where the UNIAs used to meet. And over there, that was a Black church. And that was the Crowdell Hotel where Anna Crowdell used to organize people and led all these rebellions against the state.

So even though the landscape of the city had changed radically, people’s memories of what had happened there was really strong. And they kept it alive through these narrative practices that I’m like, oh, you wouldn’t know that unless you talk to people.

But the memory of the land lives in their bodies in a way. And that you could experience it through walking through the space. And I was always really struck by that. So that’s just like some examples of the ways that I saw it playing out in the space of daily life and political practice.

I just want to call attention to the time. It’s 2:00. I think we can have a conversation for so much longer. I just want to– and we would love to have an informal conversation afterwards. But I need to, I think, formally close this panel.

[LOK SIU] I just want to say thank you so much, Courtney, for this amazing book. So necessary at this moment as well in terms of what’s going on in Latin America, what’s happening in the US as well. I think there are lessons to be learned.

And thank you, Tianna, for your amazing comments. They were so incredibly rich and generative making us think at different directions as well. And thank you to Marion and Julia for hosting this, for sponsoring it, and bringing this on campus, and to sharing it with everyone. So thank you very much. And thanks to our audience.

[COURTNEY DESIREE MORRIS] Thank you.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Authors Meet Critics

Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of US Military Bases in World War II Latin America

Part of the Authors Meet Critics event series

Recorded on March 6, 2023, this Authors Meet Critics book panel focused on Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of US Military Bases in World War II Latin America, by Rebecca Herman, Assistant Professor of History at UC Berkeley.

Professor Herman was joined in conversation by Julio Moreno, Professor of History at the University of San Francisco, and José Juan Pérez Meléndez, Assistant Professor in Latin American and Caribbean History at UC Davis, and a Bridging the Divides Fellow at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in Hunter College. Elena Schneider, Associate Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of History, moderated. (Please note that Professor Meléndez is not included in the video, per his request.)

This panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of History.

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

About the Book

During the Second World War, the United States built over two hundred defense installations on sovereign soil in Latin America in the name of cooperation in hemisphere defense. Predictably, it proved to be a fraught affair. Despite widespread acclaim for Pan-American unity with the Allied cause, defense construction incited local conflicts that belied the wartime rhetoric of fraternity and equality.

Cooperating with the Colossus reconstructs the history of US basing in World War II Latin America, from the elegant chambers of the American foreign ministries to the cantinas, courtrooms, plazas, and brothels surrounding US defense sites. Foregrounding the wartime experiences of Brazil, Cuba, and Panama, the book considers how Latin American leaders and diplomats used basing rights as bargaining chips to advance their nation-building agendas with US resources, while limiting overreach by the “Colossus of the North” as best they could.

Yet conflicts on the ground over labor rights, discrimination, sex, and criminal jurisdiction routinely threatened the peace. Steeped in conflict, the story of wartime basing certainly departs from the celebratory triumphalism commonly associated with this period in US-Latin American relations, but this book does not wholly upend the conventional account of wartime cooperation. Rather, the history of basing distills a central tension that has infused regional affairs since a wave of independence movements first transformed the Americas into a society of nations: national sovereignty and international cooperation may seem like harmonious concepts in principle, but they are difficult to reconcile in practice.

Drawing on archival research in five countries, Cooperating with the Colossus is a revealing history told at the local, national, and international levels of how World War II transformed power and politics in the Americas in enduring ways.

About the Panelists

Rebecca HermanRebecca Herman is an Assistant Professor in UC Berkeley’s Department of History. Her work explores twentieth-century Latin American social and political history in a global context, probing the intersections between grand narratives and local history. Her book, Cooperating with the Colossus, reconstructs a contentious U.S. military basing project advanced in Latin America during World War II under the banner of inter-American cooperation in hemisphere defense.

Julio MorenoJulio Moreno is a Professor of History at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Yankee Don’t go Home! Mexican Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950. His other publications are on U.S.-Latin American relations during the Cold War. His research and publications center on the intersection of U.S. business and diplomacy through the subfields of diplomatic, business, and cultural history. He is currently writing a book on the history of Coca-Cola in Latin America.

JJosé Juan Pérez Meléndezosé Juan Pérez Meléndez is an Assistant Professor in Latin American and Caribbean history at the University of California, Davis, and a Bridging the Divides Fellow at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in Hunter College. His work is concerned with nineteenth-century colonization dynamics in Brazil in global perspective, and with the international dilemmas of decolonization in the twentieth-century Caribbean. His forthcoming book, Peopling for Profit, charts the co-production of migrations and regulatory powers in the Brazilian Empire with a special focus on the driving force of oligarchic business dynamics.

Elena SchneiderElena Schneider (moderator) is Associate Professor of History at UC Berkeley. She is a a historian of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic World. Her research focuses on Cuba and the Caribbean, comparative colonialism and slavery, and the Black Atlantic. Methodologically, she seeks to write history that moves across regional, imperial, and national boundaries, integrating diverse stories normally told separately. She is also committed to the practice of writing history “from below” and the challenging archival work that makes reconstructing the experiences of historically marginalized peoples possible. Her book, The Occupation of Havana, is a longue durée history of the causes, central dynamics, and enduring consequences of a crucial incident of imperial warfare, the British invasion, occupation, and return of Havana (1762-3) during the final stages of the Seven Years’ War.

 

Transcript

Authors Meet Critics: “Cooperating with the Colossus,” by Rebecca Herman

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello, everyone. Hi. My name is Julia Sizek. And I am a postdoc here at Social Science Matrix. And I am here to welcome you to our exciting book panel here today.

Today, we’re going to be discussing Rebecca Herman’s new book Cooperating with the Colossus, which is an examination of US military bases built in Latin America during World War II. She examines the tensions of United States empire in the project of cooperating for hemispheric defense. And she does this not only through looking at diplomatic projects but through conflicts over discrimination, labor rights, and criminal jurisdiction on the ground.

Today’s event is part of our Author Meets Critic series which features critically engaged discussions about recent books by faculty and alumni in the UC Berkeley Social Sciences division. We would like to thank UC Berkeley’s Department of History for co-sponsoring this event.

I will be introducing our moderator Elena Schneider. Elena Schneider is a historian of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Atlantic world and an associate professor in the UC Berkeley History Department. Her research focuses on Cuba and the Caribbean, comparative colonialism and slavery in the Black Atlantic.

Methodologically, she seeks to write history that moves across regional, imperial, and national boundaries, integrating diverse stories that are normally told separately. She is also committed to the practice of writing history from below and challenging archival work that makes reconstructing the experiences of historically marginalized peoples possible. Her book, The Occupation of Havana, is a longue durée history of the causes, central dynamics, and enduring consequences of a crucial incident of imperial warfare– the British invasion, occupation, and return to Havana during the final stages of the Seven Years’ War.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Sure. Thank you, Julia. We’re going to do a little AV Stand up. Hi. Thanks so much for coming to those of you who are here in person. And thank you also to those of us who are here on Zoom. We really appreciate you all joining us today. This is a real pleasure, a chance to talk about my colleague, Rebecca Herman’s book.

So as was mentioned, I’m an associate professor in the history department working in the Latin American and Caribbean field along with Rebecca Herman. And so my job is just to introduce our panelists individually. And then, I’ll be moderating and fielding questions. We also have a microphone. And Julia will circulate to gather your questions during the Q&A period. We’ll also be fielding questions from Zoom.

So Rebecca Herman is an assistant professor in UC Berkeley’s Department of History. Her work explores 20th century Latin American social and political history in a global context, probing the intersections between grand narratives and local history. Her book, Cooperating with the Colossus, reconstructs a contentious US military basing project, advancing Latin America during World War II under the banner of inter-American cooperation and hemispheric defense. And also, would you like to say a word, maybe mention your next project when you get a chance?

Mhm.

Your bio was too short.

[LAUGHTER]

Our next panelist, critic number one, is Julio Moreno. He is a professor of history at the University of San Francisco. He is the author of Yankee Don’t Go Home!– Mexican Nationalism American, Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico from 1920 to 1950. His other publications are on US-Latin American relations during the Cold War.

His research and publications center on the intersection of US business and diplomacy through the subfields of diplomatic, business, and cultural history. He’s currently writing a book on the history of Coca-Cola in Latin America.

[INAUDIBLE]

So thank you. I’ll turn the microphone over first to Rebecca.

[REBECCA HERMAN] All right. Thanks, everyone, for being here. And, Julia, thanks so much for all of your work organizing this chuck for the technical support and my critics, my wonderful critics. Thank you for joining. We’ll see if I’m still smiling at the end of the session.

[LAUGHTER]

So I think my role on the panel is really just to orient those of you. Probably the majority of you have not read this book. And so I want to help to contextualize a little bit so that the comments from José Juan and Julio do make sense and tell you a little bit about it. And then I’m going to turn the mic over so we can hear some of the comments and questions from our guests.

So you may not have read the book. But you’ve read the title, which really gives a lot of way. It’s a book about US military bases in World War II Latin America. The focus is most heavily and is really anchored in the experiences of communities in three countries– Brazil, Cuba, and Panama. And I can talk more about that during the Q&A if you want to geek out around methodology and that sort of thing. But I wanted to mention that now in case that proves relevant in the comments.

And the book examines both the high politics of basing and also the social histories of the bases themselves. So it moves between different registers. It moves between the international, national, and local spheres in which this history of wartime basing unfolded.

Through the history of these bases, it tries to contemplate the nature of cooperation between unequal partners. So for those of you who aren’t that familiar with the region’s history, Colossus of the North is a nickname that the United States has had in Latin America that really speaks to the kind of preponderance of US power and the US tendency towards interventionism in the region. So cooperating with the Colossus is intended to highlight the fact that this book is really thinking about how folks in Latin America have tried to engage US power while grappling with the consequences of these asymmetries in their relationships.

Because of the overwhelming history of US interventionism in the region, cooperation is really not the first word that comes to mind when you think about the history of US-Latin American relations. But I think that actually, Latin Americans’ frustrated efforts to find ways to effectively cooperate with the Colossus has been a constant and really underscrutinized through line in the history of the region. And the scholarship on US-Latin American relations in recent years has really moved in a direction that I think sets us up well to examine those efforts in a nuanced and responsible way.

There’s been a push in recent years led by Julio Moreno and others to take more seriously Latin American agency in histories of US-Latin American relations without diminishing the asymmetries of power that structure relationships in the hemisphere. So that’s a balancing act that I try to engage in this book.

To give you some context about the bases and explain how I use those bases as a vehicle for thinking about these broader themes, here’s a map that we had drawn up for the book. During the Second World War, the US established over 200 defense sites on sovereign soil in Latin America. So they made me break it into two maps because I really wanted one map. But they said it was too cluttered. [INAUDIBLE] on a single book page. It just doesn’t turn out to be very legible.

The US at this point already occupied the naval base in Guantanamo Bay and already had established the Panama Canal Zone. But most of the other defense sites on this map were new to the war period. And World War II is really a key moment in the growth of the United States global basing empire.

So today, it’s sort taken for granted, that the United States has this global military footprint that’s an important part of its national defense and thinking about national security. But before World War II, the US only had around 14 bases outside of US continental borders. Today, that count is somewhere around 750. So over the intervening years, that number has expanded and contracted. But World War II was really an important moment in the outward push of US national defense.

What makes it interesting in terms of thinking about the history of these bases is they were created. And how these stories played out on the ground is that there’s really not much by way of precedent at this moment. So there’s this real make it up as you go along part of the story that I found in the archives as I was trying to understand the history of these places.

So why did the United States want bases in Latin America during World War II? Because you don’t think of Latin America typically when you think of the Second World War unless you’re a Latin American [INAUDIBLE]. Elena, do you mind passing me the water? Thanks so much.

So well before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was an overwhelming concern among US defense strategists that German forces could cross the South Atlantic from West Africa to the Northeast of Brazil. So I put this generic world map up here so that you can just get a sense spatially of how close that proximity really is. So it’s only about 1,600 miles to cross the South Atlantic.

This is a moment when thinking about defense strategy is changing because of advances in aviation technology. So airplanes really shrink the distance between places and make US defense planners feel the nation is much more vulnerable than it’s ever been before. And so there was this scenario that was envisioned where German forces might cross the South Atlantic. There might be this fifth column of Nazi sympathizers already living throughout the region who would then receive them and help them in their pursuit, either of an attack on the Panama Canal, which is really important strategic asset for the US, or invade the United States.

And so defense planners called for the development of strategic airfields at really close intervals because aviation has advanced but still not that far. Planes still can’t fly that far. So that means you need a lot of airfields. And the objective was to be in a position to unilaterally defend the Americas from any kind of extra hemispheric aggression.

Now, the usual story about the US and Latin America in World War II is that it was this atypical moment of harmony in the Americas, this real high point. This is a poster from the war period produced by a US government agency that was circulated throughout the region. It’s the image that’s on my book cover. I believe I have the Spanish version on the book cover. This one’s in Portuguese. It was circulated throughout the region.

The first three decades of the 20th century had been a period marked by repeated US military intervention in the region. And these military interventions had fomented all kinds of anti-US sentiment. It well beyond the places in the Americas that experienced that intervention firsthand.

And during the early 1930s, for reasons that maybe I can’t fit into 15-minute spiel, but the US government pulls back from that interventionist tendency and reinvents US policy towards Latin America under the banner of the Good Neighbor Policy. The name of the policy is felt self-explanatory. But the basic premise is we’re not going to intervene in Latin American affairs anymore.

This was a development that Latin American jurists and diplomats had been seeking for decades through various different strategies. And so when the United States finally conceded to a principle of non-intervention in the region, it was seen as this huge boost to inter-American affairs. And that boost and the goodwill that it generated became really important in the late 1930s because there was this concern about Axis’ sympathies in the Americas. There was a sense that goodwill was now a national security imperative. They needed to push back against the anti-US imperialism that had become really baked into nationalism in different parts of the region during this era.

So ultimately, this– so this is all to contextualize why this moment of Pan American unity during World War II was seen as a departure. And ultimately, the American republics do band together in support of the Allied cause. Even the holdouts that wait until later in the war end up breaking ties with the Axis powers. Brazil and Mexico, both send soldiers to fight in the war. Many of the American republics that don’t send soldiers do declare war.

And so Pan American unity in the war is often described as a crowning achievement of the Good Neighbor Policy and one that is fatefully discarded when the Cold War brings new security concerns to the United States and then the US returns to interventionism. So that’s the typical narrative.

And so World War II with the exception of some key aspects of that story doesn’t get tons and tons of attention in the literature on US-Latin American relations, in part maybe because it’s atypical in a broader story that’s more organized around intervention. But in my book, I suggest that we’ve aired in taking more time cooperation at face value and also in dismissing postwar cooperation as a charade and that we might instead think about cooperation critically as a vital and dynamic field of contest in the Americas.

So I use basic to do that. And it works pretty well in my opinion because it was the most contentious form of cooperation. So there’s this whole menu of ways that the American Republics cooperate during the war. Hosting US bases is by far the most politically unpalatable.

And so the way that I found when I got into the archives, folks in the diplomatic sphere trying to navigate this difficult proposition, and then people on the ground who encounter US soldiers in their communities where US bases are hosted presented a lot of opportunities for thinking about the inherent tensions between national sovereignty and international cooperation between unequal partners.

So let me just tell you quickly about the book’s structure. I think I mentioned in the beginning that the book moves between scales. And this is in part because when I was in the archives and I was beginning to reconstruct these stories about the different spheres in which I saw conflicts over sovereignty playing out, it wasn’t just in diplomatic negotiations over basic. It was also in navigating newly won labor rights on defense construction sites.

It was in the nature of race relations in places where workforces were segregated. It was in how US-based authorities took it upon themselves to regulate prostitution in the communities surrounding basing sometimes in violation of local law and in fights over criminal jurisdiction and this question of, do Latin American authorities have retained the right to police the behavior of US personnel on their own soil? And if not, is that an infringement on sovereignty that’s unacceptable that’s at odds with the Good Neighbor Policy?

So the chapters in the book take an hourglass shape in terms of the scale that they’re operating at. I begin at the regional level, where I talk about the history of basing in the Americas and the problem of basing from the perspective of its various constituents. In chapter 2, I move into the bilateral realm, consider how Latin American heads of state and their foreign ministers negotiated the terms of US basing. Typically, they managed those appeals for basing rights by leveraging them, using them as bargaining chips to solicit all kinds of quid pro quo, economic and military aid that would help them to advance some of their own nation-building objectives during this period.

Latin American leaders were especially reluctant to accept any terms around basing that would openly diminish their nation’s territorial integrity or the principle of territorial sovereignty. So questions around jurisdiction were especially complicated. And remember, this is the beginning of the US basing establishing bases on sovereign peer nations.

So previously, the US had bases typically in colonial territories or places where the United States didn’t profess to respect the territorial sovereignty of that place. So the fact of the Good Neighbor rhetoric surrounding territorial sovereignty created a host of issues around how do we actually operate these bases and who’s in charge.

So what that meant in effect, particularly in the context of war, things are moving quickly. They’re trying to advance this defense construction without creating all kinds of backlash. The terms around governance were usually really vague in formal agreements and were often worked out on the ground.

So that’s where the subsequent four chapters go. They go to the ground. And they look at how these ad hoc governance systems were improvised at different places and built in the context that would best be most effective in each space.

For me, these middle chapters are really the heart of the book. While US and Latin American leaders managed to strike mutually beneficial agreements in the high political realm, problems on the ground, noise from below really routinely threaten that peace.

I’ve already described some of those conflicts– US defense contractors failing to observe newly won labor laws; race and nation-based segregation at defense sites; US soldiers violating local social norms or upsetting existing social practices, particularly in their engagements with local women; US-based authorities regulating prostitution; and then police and courts lacking the authority to police the behavior of US personnel.

So sometimes these conflicts were settled locally. But often, they required some kind of state intervention. A lot of times, you see people on the ground appealing to their own national leaders or directly to Franklin Roosevelt saying, this is really at odds with the Good Neighbor Policy, and using that language of the war to advocate for the ends that they sought.

The various resolutions that US and Latin American allies devise to resolve these conflicts tell us something about a problematic relationship between international and domestic politics that cooperation wrought. And this consequence for domestic politics that these international relationships precipitates is something that I’m really interested in.

You start to see a little bit of a pattern emerge over these chapters. With labor law, prostitution policy, and criminal jurisdiction, you see Latin American leaders who profess a nationalist defense of territorial sovereignty surrender jurisdiction in practice, even if they refuse to do it in principle. And so you see typically covert means by which, for example, labor laws can be suspended or imperfectly applied in ways that benefit US interests.

So then finally, in chapter 7, I zoom back out. I consider the fate of these wartime bases. Popular protests at the war’s end ultimately forced the evacuation of most of them. And I think a little bit about the legacy of wartime cooperation in the postwar era and moving into the Cold War.

I had a few notes about how this fits in the scholarship. But I think I might be pushing it on time. So I might save that for our discussion–

[INAUDIBLE]

Oh, great. All right, well, maybe I’ll just say this a few words about where this fits in the scholarship. So I think I hinted at this when I first began speaking.

But with this book, I’m really building on a broader intellectual project that’s been underway for some time to restore Latin American agency to histories of US-Latin American relations, to push back against the idea that the United States is this all-powerful puppet master in the region that’s pulling the strings of dictators and the like but doing so in a way that doesn’t diminish the really great power asymmetries that shape relations in the region.

This is manifested in the scholarship in a number of ways that I think really lend themselves to a more nuanced consideration of cooperation as an analytic theme in the region’s past. One trend has been scholarship that recognizes Latin American dictators and other powerful elites as complex historical figures with their own agendas and interests and motivations in enlisting US power.

Another has been to look at the work of Latin American diplomats and jurists and intellectuals as architects of international governance. And then, there’s other scholarship that’s more focused on social and cultural histories and tends to be grounded in more of a bottom-up framework. Folks who have found that close encounters is one of the phrases from a leading book in this field with US power on the ground in Latin America to be an effective means for understanding the agency of less powerful people. So not just looking at diplomats and dictators but also folks who might disappear if you zoom out too much.

Resistance remains a popular analytic theme in those ground level accounts. But even that portrait of resistance often includes the ingenuity of ordinary people at channeling foreign resources to advance their own ends. So you see both with elites or people on the high political stage and folks on the ground these efforts to cooperate with the Colossus. So that’s why I have that kind of hokey title because this is something that I really am seeing in the work of others as well.

So in all of these distinct narratives, there’s this common pattern– Latin American actors trying to make the most of a partnership with powerful and well-resourced counterparts from the United States while also confronting and trying to mitigate the inequality that structures their relationships. So in regards to how my project fits, how the Good Neighbor era fits into this broader story, I believe that rather than mark a brief era bookended by periods of interventionism, World War II is better understood as an important pivot point in this longer story.

There’s a certain political economy of security cooperation that’s forged during the war that lives on as a really important legacy of the war in inter-American relations during the Cold War period and beyond. For US officials, security cooperation remains a more discreet mode of intervention, one that’s really born in this period that’s conventionally known for its non-interventionism.

So in other words, the book endeavors to rethink how the Good Neighbor era fits into the longer history of US-Latin American relations, not merely by demonstrating as others have that the period itself was riddled with intervention after all, though it was, or that the US simply innovated new tools for sustaining hegemony during this period, though it did, but by taking a wider angle lens to the history of the region that views intervention as one feature of this broader dynamic contest over US power and resources in the Americas.

Considering cooperation allows us to see how cooperation, which was envisioned by some in Latin America as this avenue for collapsing international hierarchy, also helps in practice to preserve that hierarchy. All right, I’ll stop there. Thank you. [APPLAUSE]

[JULIO MORENO] Well, first and foremost, thank you for the invitation. And it’s truly an honor to have the opportunity to comment on your book. I don’t like to think of myself as a critic because I really, really enjoy reading the book. And it’s one of those books that you read consciously read slowly. And you really don’t want it to end. Because the way the different stories unfold throughout the book, it’s just amazing, very engaging.

So I had a hard time thinking about what can I say that would really highlight where the field is, how Rebecca really contributes to that field, and what are some of the questions, some long-term questions that I think we should consider as we look at this type of accounts that you provide for us. So I want to do that by highlighting the structure of the book, the way in which, Becca, you contribute at different points as literally in each chapter make significant contributions to the book.

And then I’m going to highlight at least three areas where I feel are– well, I have some questions that I would love to have you elaborate on, but also some questions that I think will be important for us in the audience to grapple with as we think about where the field of US-Latin American relations is and what we make of those encounters between Latin Americans and the United States.

So what you see here, it’s basically my way to sketch out what the book does. So if you could picture yourself to a two-parallel process, on the one hand, you have World War II and the Good Neighbor Policy and the US interests to make things work and get Latin Americans to cooperate mainly because of the urgency that World War II represents.

So if that’s on my right hand, that’s one parallel process that Becca brings in from literally the early 20th century to the 1940s. But on the other hand is the Latin American process, which is embedded within these calls for social reform, which is often expressed in popular protest and in pressure for social reform and this nationalist rhetoric and those domestic politics as well as the Good Neighbor Policy.

Those are the two pillars that are shaping how US diplomats, how Latin American political leaders behave, but most importantly, how people on the ground behave. And the contribution that you make has really engaged the way in which people at the very high level as well as on the ground, how they engage. They begin to use this language that is embedded within Latin America. But it’s also very keenly aware that the US government and different US government agencies have an interest in getting the cooperation of Latin Americans.

So stay with me for a minute because we have this parallel process that we bring all the way up to the 1940s. And that is what you see at the high level, if you look at the chart– at the top chart there. And then, you look at the two middle bubbles, so to speak.

You have the way in which Becca really engages the reader on how labor tensions on the ground are mitigated. And she does an amazing job looking at the way in which those conflicts often are resolved just in a variety of ways. But if you look at the way in which Latin American, especially Cuban workers engage, you have the display of that nationalist rhetoric, that display of labor reform without pressure to comply with labor policies that benefit the Cuban workers.

She knows there’s a disconnect between a progressive Cuban labor law, for example, in the late 1937, 1940s and the US labor policies that are applied at the basis. As workers navigate through that, they end up not only using just the Cuban judicial system, but even the US judicial system as well. So it’s an excellent contribution to the way we do transnational history. And she does an excellent job dissecting the different layers of that transnational system, including those judicial processes across countries, which is, again, very, very impressive.

But it’s not just progressive labor reform or the pressure to adopt progressive labor reform that is pushing for addressing these labor conditions at the military bases, the construction of military bases in Cuba in different parts of Latin America. It’s also race or better yet racism that in the case of Panama really is the driving force of labor tensions. She does an excellent job looking at the way– explaining the way in which people on the ground in Panama are really beginning to use US racist attitudes as a leverage to push for reforms at various levels.

So, again, stay with me for a minute. We have, again, the pressures in Latin America driven by calls for social reform, nationalism. We have the rhetoric of the Good Neighbor Policy and the urgency of the Cold War as those two pillars. Then you have labor tensions driven by social conditions, by labor legislation in Cuba. And in Brazil, for example, you have labor tensions driven by racial tensions, of racial issues in Panama.

So I’d like you to just stay with me here and go to the second two bubbles here. Because then, what Becca does is she looks at the way in which in the context of those two pillars that I just mentioned, what are the tensions that surface on the ground. And she looks at the way in which prostitution and the behavior of US servicemen in those military bases, why it serves as a source of conflict and how those conflicts are mediated.

And it’s a fascinating, fascinating story that really gets at those conflicts. On the other hand, the– and I lost [INAUDIBLE]. On this section here, she also looks at the way in which the jurisdiction over the crimes committed by those servicemen on the ground, how that gets worked out within Latin American systems.

Let me keep track of my time here. And as these conflicts unfold, one thing becomes clear. And that is that people on the ground resort to this notion that when it comes to the behavior or this, quote unquote, “disrespectful behavior” of your servicemen towards local culture, local traditions that often gets used and gets appropriate and then used by people on the ground to push for policies or very specific demands that they have.

Same thing when it comes to issues over jurisdiction over who should have– questions of who should have jurisdiction over the crimes that US servicemen commit on the ground.

I do want to move on– I’m keeping track of my time here. So I’m going to have to move on to the second part. The last bubble here is dealing with after World War II, what are the limits to both US and Latin Americans, what the limits in terms of pushing their agendas. And she highlights that there are a number of limits on both ends.

But I want to move on to– I was a critic. So some of the issues that I think I would love to hear more about or what I think is important for us to discuss. And one is that as scholars, when we want to bring out the agency of local people on the ground, it does require an incredible amount of pressure to balance, what happens on a number of factors.

And at least in my judgment, I felt that the book strikes for that balance, in most cases reaches a balance. But in some cases, it leaves some questions open. And I divided this into different sections.

The first one is the question of dealing with the weight we give to different actors on the ground. Becca does an outstanding job looking at how people on the ground in Latin America exercise that agency as they negotiate with the United States. I would have loved to hear a bit more on the German side.

We know that during World War II, there’s no doubt that Germany is scolding Latin Americans. And I think at different points, those questions become pretty relevant. For example, in the book, one of the issues that raised that question for me at least is that these arms agreement or sales that is happening between Brazil and Germany from 1938 to 1942.

And at different points, you note in the book that the United States held back in signing an arms agreement with the United States. And it begs that question. If the urgency that the US feels on the ground but the fear of German influence on the ground is so big, why would the US hold back in moving forward with an arms agreement with Brazil during this period? And I would love to hear more, Becca, on that section.

So balancing the role that different actors play on the ground, I think that is important. And to Becca’s credit, this is an extremely, extremely, extremely challenging task for those of us doing US-Latin American relations and looking at the nature of that encounter between people on the ground, people in high politics and how they negotiate with the United States.

The second item that I think when I comment the need to strike for that balance, it’s really that intersection, that intersection between what happens in the sociopolitical sphere within that broader cultural context. And there is– you do an amazing job highlighting the type of sources you use. Just fascinating. Very, very well researched.

You make an extremely compelling argument at the diplomatic side. By the sociopolitical– you make no secret this is a sociopolitical history. Yet, the question that surfaced as I was reading this account is the following– what about those stories?

What about if Latin Americans are using nationalism and this call for social reform to mobilize and pressure the US government as they are at the negotiating table, what about those Latin Americans who buy into the US our way of life, the American way of life in consumer culture? How much pressure do they provide? Or how much do politicians who are negotiating with the United States, how much attention do they put to those sectors of Latin American society that buy into the American way of life?

Again, it’s a question of balance and how much of that balance we bring into the narratives that we build as we focus specifically, as we zero in on the sociopolitical sphere. In other words, what is the intersection of the sociopolitical sphere with the cultural sphere As we write the history of those encounters? And for me, I think, at least this question– and I have to be honest– is partly driven by some of the very own research issues that surface for me. And let me just very quickly put this in perspective for you.

So you have this picture– and I know this is a few years later– a picture of Fidel Castro in 1959 delightfully sipping on Coca-Cola as he’s pushing for this revolutionary movement. And you can– these nationalist chants in the background. Do I focus in sociopolitical sphere? If so, what do I make of Castro buying into, again, the seductive nature of the American way of life in consumer culture?

So I do think for us as scholars looking at US-Latin American relations, that intersection, dissecting that intersection between the social and the political sphere and the broader cultural context, I think, is important. And I would love to, again, to center part of the conversation on that.

And last but not least, as I wrapping this up here, is the question of balance or how much agency we give to Latin Americans and US diplomats before or the period up to 1945 and the period after 1945. And, Becca, you do an excellent job at different parts of the book leaving an open-ended, which I think is critical.

I think it is important for those of us who are focused on looking at agency. And the extent to which Latin Americans are attempting to shape conditions, it is important to keep it open-ended. And you make no secret that the different points of the book we leave it open-ended.

Here are some of the conclusions or some of the questions that surface as we’re going through the book with the following– if Latin Americans and US diplomats were so clever, a play in the diplomatic game up to 1945, and if we have this urgency by 1947, especially when some of the US military bases up close, if they’re so clever negotiating and making things work, even using national political leaders– as you go through the book, you’ll see the Latin American political leaders, they use popular protests and nationalism as a tool to get the US to gain more from the United States.

So they were so clever in negotiating. Why did they lose that diplomatic mojo that they had before 1945? What changed? And I think this is a fascinating question. And it really opening a new lines of– new lines of research inquiries as we look at the 1940s.

And I do think it is important. Because when we come full circle, if we look at the nature of US-Latin American relations from the late 1900s to the 1940s, the questions of Pan Americanism and the creation of the OAS, I think there’s a lot there that we could uncover. But I did have some of those questions. And I’m going to stop there because I believe my time is up. But thank you for the invitation. And I look forward to the conversation. [APPLAUSE]

[REBECCA HERMAN] –for so long. And you think all along the way, will anyone read this [INAUDIBLE]? So it’s really good to have you to come to this book fresh, not having read them before and really connect with it. And–

Yeah. So I mean, I just– what a moment. I’m so thrilled to have had you both read so carefully and to really connect with the work. I’m very grateful. And really grateful for all of those really provocative questions. I hope we can continue the conversation after because I only want to take a couple of minutes so that folks have time to ask questions.

But gosh. So where do you even begin? I mean, you both picked up on this question of the transition to the postwar period. So maybe I’ll just say something about that, which is, Julio, to your question about, well, if they were so savvy, what changed? Or why didn’t they carry that clever use of these techniques into the postwar period?

And a big thing is what changed was the context they were operating in. And so you do see these strategies persist into the postwar period. They’re just not as effective because of a couple of things. One, the US doesn’t care as much about Latin America for a period of time as it did during the war.

So this belief that actively cultivating goodwill in the region is important to the United States’ best interest, that context goes away. And so a lot of the leverage goes away. But you still see folks using the same language of US security concerns to advance their requests and to try to say, no, you should really invest in these development projects. Or you should really invest in this or that thing because it’s going to be good for your interests.

It’s just not as compelling when the United States is now focused on Europe and Asia and Latin America doesn’t regain that super important place in US strategic thinking until really the Cuban Revolution. And the other thing that changes the nature of the threat that defense strategists are obsessed with, it’s no longer an extra hemispheric invasion that would require this kind of infrastructural investment when the shift is really more about counterinsurgency and the fear of Communist infiltration.

The nature of military aid changes the nature of that particular threat changes what US resources are available. So I think one of the three lines that I see when I look at other periods and I’m thinking about this idea of cooperation with the United States is something worth taking seriously is people playing the best hand that they can with the cards they’ve been dealt. And those cards change.

So I think that’s part of the story. This question about sovereignty, I think, is so important. When I was thinking about where to focus my attention is also thinking about the meaningful differences between how Cuba and Panama experience this or people there did compared to Brazil, which didn’t have that experience of US occupation and intervention.

You’re right that– so Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone are always a little bit present. And for US defense strategists, the British colonies in the Caribbean, all these places are super important because the way that they can advance their interests there are different because of this question of sovereignty. So I tried to– I mean, Guantanamo is this kind of like shadow cast over the entire undertaking.

So much of what has to happen is for people to show this isn’t just the proliferation of Guantanamos across the region. And so it’s present in that way. But I wonder if I had said, OK, I’m going to take Roosevelt Roads as one of my case studies if that could have been a really interesting opportunity for thinking even more about what sovereignty really means and what international hierarchy looks like in this period.

And I think that’s certainly something worth thinking about. There was a summer where a handful of folks working on US basing in different parts of the world were being convened by Paul Kramer to have these Zoom seminars where we would swap work. And it was really interesting because there are people who are working on US basing in Okinawa, in Japan, in Germany. Totally different context.

And seeing how these sets of challenges around governance manifested in different places was really rewarding. But I think probably certainly would have pushed my own limits and pushed me beyond the limits of my capabilities. I’ll sit down, and I invite questions.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Thank you for those fantastic comments and a great response and [INAUDIBLE], Rebecca. Do we have any questions in the room? And also, on Zoom, if you have a question. I’m seeing [INAUDIBLE].

Zoom, if you have a question.

Oh, was it that thing?

Yeah.

People on Zoom, if you have a question, please feel free to submit it.

[INDISTINCT CONVERSATION]

–for the Q&A.

[INAUDIBLE]

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Go ahead. Thank you. Thank you so much for this wonderful presentation of the book. I haven’t read it. So the question has to do with the negotiations by the political elite. So on the upper level but how did they use their negotiations with you as Americans for their national politics? So it’s in between the local level and the high–

Yeah, yeah.

[INDISTINCT CONVERSATION]

[REBECCA HERMAN] Yeah, thank you. How’s that? Is that good? Yeah, so I think the chapter titles like high politics and horse trading– and there is a lot of really quid pro quo, not as cynical as that sounds like legitimately, for example, the Brazilian government saying, well, if you really want us to be equal partners in defense, we need modern weapons. And modernization of security forces is a really important nation building objective at this moment.

And so this question about– there’s some really great scholarship. Brazil is one area in Latin America that has had a really sizable amount written on this period in part because Julio Vargas did this really amazing job of playing the global context to his advantage. So he negotiated arms deals with Germany that really alarmed folks in the US.

So then, the US government stepped forward and said, no, no, no, maybe we can help you get the things that you need. But part of the problem wasn’t the will. It was the practical ability to do it, figuring out how to do it legally, where the weapons would come from. Eventually, the Lend-Lease Act enables a lot more movement of those kinds of materials.

But at one point, I think the best they could do was prevent German shipments from being stopped. So military aid was one of the examples. Then the investment in various parts of industry. So Volta Redonda, which was this really important symbol of economic nationalism in Brazil, a steel mill, was built with financing from the US investment in the revitalization of the rubber industry in Brazil because this is valuable to the United States’ strategic interest rate– the need for rubber during World War II.

And then there were all kinds of ways that were coming from the United States but then could be channeled towards areas of interest. So, for example, the US invested in public health infrastructure and thought of this as advantageous on a couple of levels. One was to protect the health of US servicemen. Another was to protect the health of rubber workers so that they didn’t get sick and stop being productive. And then another was on this goodwill level. If the United States is contributing to aid Brazil in the development of public health capabilities, then that was a positive thing.

So I mean, I have a three-year-old and a six-year-old. And we’re still trying to brainwash them to the idea that cooperation is just a family value and a social good. But I think cooperation is really an effective way to get what you want. And so you see that on both sides of these negotiations, trying to find places where security interests dovetail with nation-building objectives.

And if I may– I mean, the evidence you provide for that quid pro quo is just very impressive. You definitely dive into providing that evidence for those type of– that type of interaction.

Thanks, yeah. And in the Brazilian case, I really relied on the work of Frank McCann. I mean, there are some great folks who are really interested in military history who have done a lot of the heavy lifting there. But then in some cases, it was really digging into those diplomatic archives and that sort of thing. Yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Becca, thank you– is this on? OK, I’m wondering if you could talk a little bit more about your chapter on prostitution regulation and policy. Because when I think about– when I teach on US imperial policy in Puerto Rico and I’m thinking about Laura Briggs’s work and that kind of adaptation of British, I guess, prostitution regulation policies and then how that changes in 1917, I’m wondering how your chapter might help me speak to that and also reframe it and bring it towards World War II. Like, how would you connect those histories for an undergraduate audience?

[REBECCA HERMAN] Thanks, that’s a great question, Bernadette. So that chapter became a broad umbrella sex chapter, where the second half is really devoted to prostitution and the first half is looking more at gender relations and changing social customs and the establishment of USO clubs, which were new, and conflicts that those created particularly in Brazil where US officials were eager to encourage US servicemen to have wholesome recreation options where they could engage with women from elite families who were perceived to be less likely to carry disease and keep them away from red light districts. And that created all kinds of tensions.

The section on prostitution thinks about– well, this overwhelming concern about military readiness and venereal disease led to, on the one hand, creation of wholesome recreation options, on the other hand, efforts to sanitize prostitution. And the way that this connects back to this threat of sovereignty is that this is a period where Latin American nations– well, nations around the world are still trying to think like, what is the most effective, most modern way to deal with sex work?

Do you try to have a policy of suppression and abolition? Do you criminalize it? Do you not prohibit it but decriminalize it? And so all of those questions are ongoing in each of the places that I’m looking at. And the war department’s official policy is suppression– keep US soldiers away from prostitutes. But ultimately, at each place, there’s these really tailored to the local contacts based on what the red light districts look like, policies for managing sex work and US soldiers access to sex workers.

And so I think it intersects a little bit with that earlier scholarship and that it’s not an imperial context. But it is grappling with how US officials do or don’t respond to the reality of local jurisdictions. I don’t know.

I’d be curious to talk to you about this after. Maybe I can send you the chapter and just that section. We can think about how they connect. Yeah, that’s a good question. And it goes back to this question of when you’re the sovereign versus non-sovereign space and how the story looks different.

Yeah. No, that’s a great question. I mean, I think there’s more on this, the environmental history of US military bases during the Cold War period. And it’s possible that my next book will have a chapter that thinks about this. Well, we’ll talk after. But [INAUDIBLE] is one of the places that would be an obvious place to think through these problems.

But in terms of the environmental consequences of this moment, I didn’t dedicate any space in the book to it. There’s some about in terms of the afterlives of the bases of what happens to these airfields. Most of them become national airports or national military bases. One of them was one of the airfields that the aerial support for the Bay of Pigs Invasion was supposed to bomb. It was supposed to be one of their aerial targets.

But I guess the short answer is not with this project. Maybe the future project. John Lindsay-Poland has a book about it in Panama specifically. Also, when it comes to testing weapons and the environmental fallout of that. But just in terms of paving the airfields, I didn’t see a lot of discussion of the environmental harm that that would cause. That’s a good question.

[ELENA SCHNEIDER] Well, thank you, everyone. This has been a really fascinating conversation. Thank you, Rebecca, for writing this fantastic book. Thank you, Julio and José Juan for those wonderful comments and all of you for being present and engaging. Thank you. Thank you.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Matrix Lecture

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar: Reimagining Global Integration

A Matrix Distinguished Lecture

On February 15, 2023, Social Science Matrix was honored to host Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar for a Matrix Distinguished Lecture entitled “Reimagining Global Integration.” Watch the video of the lecture above, or listen as a podcast below or on Google Podcasts or Apple Podcasts.

Abstract

Whether they live in vast cities or rural villages, people in virtually every corner of the world have experienced enormous growth in cross-border economic, political, and social connections since World War II. This latest chapter in the story of transnational activity has coincided with enormous changes in the well-being of billions of people. As China gained access to global markets and its share of worldwide trade increased eight-fold in a single generation, for example, the percentage of its population living in extreme poverty plunged from 72 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 2010. Global life expectancy has risen from less than 47 years in 1950 to 71 years in 2021, and the male-female gap in primary and secondary schooling globally has almost disappeared.

But increased cross-border trade, migration, flows of information, and political ties have also engendered an intense backlash to “globalization” and related concepts. Today, at a time of major geopolitical upheaval and technological change, policymakers and the public are vigorously debating the merits of domestic policies suitable for an interconnected world. They are exploring new trade and migration rules, reviving strategies for national industrial and technological development, and reflecting on the lessons of 1990s-style globalization for international law and institutions substantially influenced by the United States. Discussions of “reshoring” supply chains and United States-China economic “decoupling” are just two examples of rising concerns in Washington about cross-border ties.

Yet global cooperation remains vital to solving many of humanity’s most urgent challenges: mitigating and adapting to climate change, harnessing technology for the benefit of humanity while taming its risks, reducing poverty, and preventing violent conflict. By better understanding the long-simmering conflicts over global cooperation and integration, policymakers and civil society can further develop the ideas, institutions, and coalitions necessary to create a stable foundation for a more reflective version of global integration: one that addresses the connections between economic well-being and security, and better aligns domestic realities with international norms to tackle the pressing issues of our time.

About the Speaker

A former justice of the Supreme Court of California, Justice Cuéllar served two U.S. presidents at the White House and in federal agencies, and was a faculty member at Stanford University for two decades. Before serving on California’s highest court, Justice Cuéllar was the Stanley Morrison Professor of Law, Professor (by courtesy) of Political Science, and director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford. In this capacity, he oversaw programs on international security, governance and development, global health, cyber policy, migration, and climate change and food security. Previously, he co-directed the Institute’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and led its Honors Program in International Security.

While serving in the Obama White House as the president’s special assistant for justice and regulatory policy, he led the Domestic Policy Council teams responsible for civil and criminal justice reform, public health, immigration, transnational regulatory issues, and supporting the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. He then co-chaired the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity and Excellence Commission, and was a presidential appointee to the Council of the Administrative Conference of the United States. As a California Supreme Court justice, he oversaw reforms of the California court system’s operations to better meet the needs of millions of limited-English speakers.

A fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cuéllar is the author of Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies (2013) and has published widely on American institutions, international affairs, and technology’s impact on law and government. Cuéllar co-authored the first ever report on the use of artificial intelligence across federal agencies. He has served on the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Social and Ethical Implications of Computing Research and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Commission on Accelerating Climate Action.

He chairs the board of the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation and is a member of the Harvard Corporation. He currently serves on the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board. Earlier, he chaired the boards of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and the Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, and co-chaired the Obama Biden Presidential Transition Task Force on Immigration.

Born in Matamoros, Mexico, he grew up primarily in communities along the U.S.-Mexico border. He graduated from Harvard College and Yale Law School, and received a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. He began his career at the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Podcast Transcript

Reimagining Global Integration: A Lecture by Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MARION FOURCADE] Hello, everybody. My name is Marion Fourcade. I am the Director of Social Science Matrix. And I am delighted to welcome you to today’s distinguished Matrix lecture. When I first heard Mariano-Florentino Cuellar speak at an event organized by the Center for Human Compatible Artificial Intelligence five years ago, I secretly hoped that someday I would get a chance to invite him, too. And so today, I could not be more delighted to introduce him as our distinguished Matrix lecturer.

Tino Cuellar is an extraordinary scholar and public servant. We can actually start with an inspiring life story, born on the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border, Justice Cuellar went to public schools in Texas and California and then on to Harvard College and Yale Law School. In 2000, he completed a PhD in political science from Stanford University.

He served for two US presidents at the White House and in federal agencies and was on the California Supreme Court from 2015 to 2021. Before that appointment, Justice Cuellar was Stanley Morrison professor of law, professor by courtesy of political science, and director of the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford.

In this capacity, he oversaw programs on international security, governance and development, global health, cyber policy, migration, and climate change and food security. Just among a few other things. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Justice Cuellar has published widely on American institutions and public law, international affairs, political economy, and technology’s impact on law and government.

He is the author of the 2001 book, Governing Security– The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. And he’s now the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And it is from this vantage point that he will speak to us on reimagining global integration. And also, I want you to note, please that in addition to today’s lecture Tino Cuellar will participate in the joint Matrix Clausen Center panel on economics and geopolitics in US international relations tomorrow at noon at the Spieker Forum at the Haas Business School, alongside four other distinguished panelists.

So we are so very fortunate to welcome you to Berkeley two days in a row. Thank you for being here. And we greatly look forward to your lecture.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Thank you very much. Thank you, Marion. And thank you all of you for being here in a world where attention is scarce and time has all kinds of competing demands. And a blissful escape is just one screen away that you have in your pocket. It’s probably the rarest of privileges that I have an audience of really thoughtful people to just be with me for some time.

I also want to tell you that it’s special privilege to me, because I really find this campus to be remarkable and special. Years and years ago– and David knows this because I mentioned it to him, David [INAUDIBLE]– I was an undergraduate research fellow at the School of Education here between my first and second year in college. And I just fell in love with the place. I fell in love with Caffe Strada. To this day, I think Berkeley is the best social science university in the world, because when I compare it to Stanford, we have Starbucks, and you have Caffe Strada. So that encapsulates in some ways the differences between these institutions.

For about seven years, I had the great privilege of serving you, the people of California and those of you watching online who are Californians, on the Supreme Court. And I thought that job was an incredible privilege. I did start to wonder, what do I have to do to be invited to give a talk at Berkeley? So that’s not the only reason why I switched jobs.

But I did find that, day in, day out, the work on the court was incredibly fulfilling, very engaging. And I can talk more about it. But in ways big and small, I would notice that these questions we would deal with about water policy, about criminal justice, about technology, about privacy, about contract law, about pharmaceuticals had not only a national overlay but a global overlay.

And at every corner, if I squinted, and sometimes I didn’t even just squint, there was this sort of massive set of forces at play in shaping things happening inside California. And then, of course, sometimes California’s shaping what was happening outside. So in some respects, maybe it’s not entirely surprising that I don’t think my work today at Carnegie is that different from the work I was doing on the California Supreme Court.

In one case, I was in a job with a set of constraints and interpreting a set of texts. In the other, I’m trying to help with colleagues the world upholds some of its greatest ideals. But in both cases, you’re dealing with reconciling ideals with practice. And if there’s one theme that connects everything I want to share with you, it’s essentially that. It’s about what is the intellectual work, the practical work, the creative work, the coalition building work that comes into not allowing the practical to displace ideals but at the same time being pretty grounded in the here and now.

So let’s go back to November of 2022. In many ways, a totally ordinary month for the world. And what it means for a month to be ordinary in the world is its own question, but not so different from the one before the one after. But in other ways, another little reminder of how complicated the global picture had grown.

So this is a month where the Chinese military claimed that a US-guided missile cruiser had, quote, “illegally entered” the waters near China’s Nansha islands and reefs without the approval of the Chinese government. This is in the South China Sea. The move according to China shows that the US is, quote, “the true producer of security risks in the South China Sea.” For its part, the US Navy, not to be undone, claimed that the American vessel was operating, quote, “in accordance with international law” and then was continuing to conduct operations in waters where high seas freedoms apply.

And what’s more? The US added, all nations large and small should be secure in their sovereignty, free from coercion, and able to pursue economic growth consistent with accepted international rules and norms. No one can evoke the South China Sea in this conversation, not only because the region’s importance is growing, not only because it’s a microcosm of the world, not only with respect to religion and demographics and economics, but many, many other things.

But it’s also that if you see that little vignette in the right light, maybe reflected through a little intellectual prism, it gives off all this interesting light on a whole bunch of questions that go way beyond naval risk management. One could ask, what meaning the South China Sea has in regional history for China, for the United States, for Vietnam? Why the United States embraced a passion for freedom of navigation? How capital cities for that matter build around them societies that come to feel cohesive one nation?

These deeper questions, I hope, were always going to be at least at the edge of our awareness as we go through the topics. But keeping our eye on the practical, I also recognize that we come back to the present and see challenges aplenty involving just risk management, how to avoid escalation and conflict, how to avoid war.

Weeks before the South China Sea stand up, the US had activated plans to choke off the supply of advanced chips and chipmaking equipment to China, all consistent with the new US national security strategy, which is understandable, not only given our domestic politics perhaps, but how American policymakers view China. That simultaneously paints a picture of rising geopolitical tensions on the one hand with China and the US, and yet also a world pointedly in need of collective solutions, particularly on climate and pandemics, but a thousand other things you can imagine.

So these dueling narratives are going to be a part of our daily life for decades in all likelihood– more simmering tensions, more decoupling, more contradictory goals. They reflect geopolitical change but also longstanding difficulties that come from tensions over territory and political control, all against the backdrop of domestic political audiences in many countries asking hard questions about how the concept of global integration, the degree of global interrelationships around trade, around financial flows, around security partnerships have affected their lives, and what that means for them, and what that means for their kids.

That fraying ties and tensions often cut against cross-border integration or cooperation projects, even among nominal allies like European countries is more than just a modern political reality. It’s more than just a reaction to geopolitical change. Here, I have to make the obligatory mention of Max Weber, because, how can I be here and not mention Max Weber?

So he was on to something, I would argue, when he sketched out this pervasive conflict between modernity, born of economic and technological change, steam engines, communications, telegraphs, integrated national economies, and the familiar embrace of smaller communities, thicker social relationships, the familiar, as harbingers of new practices that complicate social and institutional convention, modernity, and cross-border flows are joined at the hip. That makes talk of global cooperation and integration inherently fraught, perpetually daunting.

But I would argue that only the most inveterate and speculative techno-optimist, who thinks that machines will cure all the world’s ills, or maybe the most irredeemably pessimistic adherent to structural realism would play down the enormous importance of some set of concepts to deal with cross-border cooperation and some degree of relationship building to manage the world’s shared dramas. The climate crisis is no less urgent, because it’s pretty familiar to most educated people now, even if the details of how it’ll affect food supplies, even if we stop carbon emissions right now, in the developing world, are less clear, a little more blurry in people’s minds.

And then, of course, lurking in the background are other risks beyond climate– international conflict, the distinctive threats posed by nuclear weapons, the vast global disparities in wealth and access to energy across countries and within them, the machines that will increasingly offer an implicit and alluring bargain of convenience in exchange for decision-making power.

These images which, I’m asking you to imagine in your mind in lieu of a PowerPoint presentation– I hope that’s OK with you– they rightly send many in search of materials to assemble the scaffolding for sturdy and reliable kinds of cooperation and integration, forms of cooperation that can mitigate the risks while taking seriously the interests of billions of people in poorer countries who want to join the middle class and so many parents in the developed world who want their kids to stay in it. And for those among the would-be architects of the scaffolding inclined toward Weber’s ethic of moral conviction and not just an ethic of practical politics, the expectation likely persists that these cross-border ties are going to do more than just solve problems and reduce risks, that they’ll also move the world closer to maybe realizing certain ideals that are for many of us hard to ignore, like how to ensure that the world leverage is integration to grow incomes but also to shrink the risks of war and to reduce cruelty?

My hope is not to deliver a formula that can meet such an ambitious threshold for coherence. I’m not sure anyone can. But I want to do something else instead. I want to put on the table some modest ideas about how that scaffolding might be assembled to help us reimagine the possibilities of global cooperation. Sometimes, this means doing little more than reframing pretty familiar ideas, some of which come from people in this room literally. I can see you. But in some cases, I’m likely drawing on distinctive experiences that are a little different from folks who find their way as I have to the world of more diplomacy and global policy.

As somebody who spent time in the weeds on migration, on cross-border, anti-money laundering policy, transnational regulation, the court system, I will confess that I’m skeptical of too much economic or ideological orthodoxy. I’m sensitive to how massive movements of money or ideas or people across borders tend to affect communities far removed from national capitals. Rather than working from first principles, I’m often drawn to delving into specific problems and then working up towards broader insights.

That said, I’m also proceeding with the idea that a little bit of conceptual thinking might possibly be useful to shed light on some of these almost impossibly complex problems. And what you’re going to get from me is probably a little quirky, hoping that it can also be in service of some surfacing some hidden difficulties and possibilities.

The crux of my argument is that– because at Carnegie, we always put the bottom line up front– sane, pragmatic, and ambitious global integration and cooperation depends on making the world safer for a kind of plucky experimentation and learning that has allowed many countries from Western European countries after World War II to South Korea and Malaysia more recently to rebuild or develop economically. And that has helped the world learn, however, imperfectly to gradually improve how it deals with some discrete issues, where global coordination has made material contributions to human well-being, such as how the world patrols the vast oceans that cover 70% of the planet.

Learning on a massive scale will be crucial to fashioning carbon border adjustment mechanisms, harmonizing industrial policies in Europe, in the US, and getting the salt to put– to be part of a global framework that is going to work for more people around the world. But cooperation founded on important if somewhat thinner rules governing trade, for example, and allowing for greater experimentation with industrial policy, creative cross-border institutions must be embedded in domestic political realities while taking account of broader geopolitical constraints.

This kind of embedded experimentalism is necessarily creature, not only of national policymakers, but also dense connections and civil society and even subnational regions. And it will also benefit from some attention to difficult issues that have yet to receive the attention that they deserve, such as assuaging the disruptions of globalization and technology in the developed world and attending to the pressures for greater technology transfer and migration opportunities for countries in the Global South.

Taking the discussion in this general direction begs many, many questions, of course, which is why I will spend the bulk of my time delving into six of them that I consider particularly difficult and important. And that I hope to enlist all of you in helping to answer. But before we get to those questions, I owe you some clarity about certain presumptions I consider useful in the conversation. Maybe not everything that follows is completely earthquake-proof on the Hayward Fault, but the seismological instincts of a pragmatist perceive this as solid enough ground to start the conversation. Let me start with the point about countries mattering in specific ways.

I don’t know about you, but I think that the nation state is a core unit of political life in international relations. And it’s going to be with us for the foreseeable future. Non-state actors ranging from multinational corporations to subnational jurisdictions to criminal networks can have profound real-world consequences for people. But nation states nonetheless control the lion’s share of fiscal resources and aspire to Weber’s positive monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Though in practice, people have a variety of overlapping attachments. And even the most powerful nation states are honeycombed with limitations. Global cooperation and integration has to be built on a foundation of plausible nation state activity and relationships.

Channeling a version of classical realism, I would add, countries compete, they cooperate, they change in a largely anarchic system, but in ways that reflect not only coherent interests but the influence of history, of domestic politics, of ideas. All of which helps us make sense, for example, of the new industrial policies developing in the United States and Europe.

I would then add that of all the countries in the world, the United States is special. It’s a unique global power with unique influence with an unusual history of outsized power on the frameworks for global cooperation and integration, institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, the UN, bear the unmistakable stamp of American policymaking, American judgment, and to some extent American values.

It was the principal architect, the US, of the so-called rules based international order that epitomized John Ruggles embedded liberalism. And it spends more on its military than the next nine countries combined, of course, including China. But I would add growth in China’s wealth and geopolitical influence is also among the major storylines of our time. Obviously, it’s an overlay over much of what I will discuss. It’s not just China’s eight-fold increase in its share of global exports in a generation or the reduction in the poverty rate from nearly 3/4 to less than 15% in 20 years that has created a new world. It’s also the scale of China’s internal changes and its more assertive external posture. All of that countries matter in specific ways.

Second, the future is, as Professor Jonathan Kirchner, would put it largely unwritten. For starters, macroeconomic analysis to my mind is beset by uncertainty and imperfect knowledge. It may not be as one of my colleagues at Stanford once called it a voodoo science, because I think we do benefit from credible insights from macroeconomists. And I appreciate all of those that are in the room right now. But I would say I’m with the economist Paul Romer on this one when he decried the mix of unrealistic assumptions limited relevance of much macro scholarly endeavors at the moment.

And just to be an equal opportunity critic, I can’t say I have much confidence in the grand paradigms to organize thinking about international relations coming from political science. As I suspect many of you do, I find fault with hyperrationalism, even if I recognize that leaders can have plenty of pressures on them to be instrumental at times. And I can’t say that structural realism exalting the importance of relative power in the international system gives very convincing explanations for, say, Britain’s appeasement of Hitler’s Germany or the Vietnam War.

To me, there’s a little bit more utility in the kind of classical realism that has room for history, ideology, uncertainty, all variables that help explain industrialization in Asia and Latin America, for example. But even with all of this, better to work up to a tentative sense of what countries realistically do, what pressures are on them than deposit with conviction that simple principles solve global problems.

What we can say with confidence, or at least I think I can based on some work I’ve tried to do over the years, is that institutions learn and adapt over time, including global ones. They do so in a manner that reflects both their inherent fragility but also their capacity to achieve a degree of autonomy even in fraught political environments. Semi-autonomous evolution to my mind is evident in how the UN High Commissioner for Refugees operates, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the International Monetary Fund, among others.

Finally, global interconnections are unavoidable and imply a shared fate. Between the climate crisis, water and biodiversity challenges, pandemics, cross-border security, and rule of law challenges, some global cooperation and integration is probably unavoidable to manage what has become an outsized set of cross-border impacts on the world. Governing the remarkable fast-evolving technologies that are a part of our lives will also have to be part of the story.

And the global record of managing collective action problems is, of course, decidedly mixed. It’s not ideal. It’s better on oceans and hydrofluorocarbons and climate generally or collective security. That reality to me underscores both the challenges and the possibilities.

I would add that from my perspective, growing, though, unequal global prosperity has depended on a considerable amount of cross-border economic activity in the last three or four generations, however flawed the details have been. From extreme poverty to women’s education, some degree of global integration facilitating the movement of goods, capital, knowledge, and people has catalyzed higher living standards, greater health, more openness to new ideas, and more inclusion of certain previously marginalized groups.

None of this is to deny that cross-border flows have also had a darker side evident in financial crises, human trafficking, environmental degradation. And, as David [INAUDIBLE] has pointed out among others, the rules and convergence standards facilitating cooperation from the dollar to the English language are path-dependent and far from equally advantageous around the world.

I would add that economic change matters in part because well-being and security are connected in multiple ways, as Keynes understood in American policymakers in the post-World War II era believed as well. Earlier, still, of course, Kant and Montesquieu laid the groundwork for appreciating how the economic fates of some countries matter to global peace even if we put aside ethical considerations or the goal of merely achieving a larger economic pie to tackle shared challenges.

Finally, it’s worth bearing in mind that enforcing border controls, which is part of how countries manage their sovereignty, is costly, can have a variety of undesirable consequences for the public from raising prices and scarcity for some goods to empowering organizations engaged in illicit trade, to allowing, in some cases, corruption and inefficiency to linger when shielded from broader competition. Even if some constraints on the movement of goods, money, and people are understandable responses to the primacy of the nation state, the returns to enforcement diminish at some point under almost any circumstances, will be it to any policymaker who assumes she can simply impose constraints on cross-border activity with little or no cost and that they will succeed as intended.

Before I turn to the six questions, that if answered right, I think can help us, let’s reflect on certain implications that arguably follow from these premises. Policymakers should bear in mind that particular countries may be fragile, the power of the nation state may come under increasing pressure as the decades turn into centuries. But with [INAUDIBLE] of borders and citizenship, their flags, and, for some, their militaries for most. Nation states have proven resilient in the face of predictions. The range of actors from multinational corporations to tech-enabled activists would limit their power in significant ways.

The developed world, leading nation states wield fiscal and monetary powers still largely dwarf the unfettered leeway of even the most wealthy individuals. The serious differences that therefore separate the US and China, along with many other states, are the crux of a politics of reality. The world won’t be switching to Esperanto anytime soon.

Meanwhile, a great many gaps in our knowledge persist about matters such as the interplay between social cohesion and endogenous growth, the future of technology, human cognition, viable pathways for success on climate. Yet it’s also clear that countries have overcome serious obstacles to growth. By learning, by adapting that civil society and subnational actors are exploring new modes of economic organization. And that even major diplomatic and collective action problems have not eliminated possibilities for reorienting international and domestic institutions.

But if we are to experience the benefits of existing progress and some possibilities on the horizon, we’ll need to navigate a few difficult questions. And this is where I switch from trying to give direction to mostly framing problems and hoping that I can engage you in getting to the right answers. The first is managing the US-China relationship with the whole world in mind. One elephant in the room involves the painstaking and principled work that will be needed in the months and years ahead to curb risks associated with the US-China relationship without succumbing to a naive temptation to airbrush out of the picture their fundamental disagreements, including the very principled and strong concerns that many US policymakers have about American interests and China’s impact on them.

Any major security conflict between the United States and China has the potential to devastate or at least starkly diminish global well-being in ways that even few policymakers fully recognize. The United States has understandable concerns about Chinese goals. It’s limiting Beijing’s access to semiconductors and other sophisticated machinery and software. And China’s own strategies will no doubt bake in a response to explicit American efforts to limit its technological progress. These realities are worth recognizing, not only because they highlight the importance of sensible frameworks for cross-border relations in general during this difficult stretch of history, but because they also serve to remind us of the constraints likely to frustrate any grand project to remake global integration.

Multiple power centers deliver many democratic benefits in a system like the American system but impede unified responses. China’s leadership may be more cohesive, but the country’s intricate internal challenges and internal disparities also make for a complicated story. Suffice to say that both countries benefit from the existence of room for the two to disagree vigorously without calling into question the desire of each for a peaceful, if ambiguous, status quo. Hence, the risk of too much movement to offset American strategic ambiguity on Taiwan security and the value of making some room for persistent and prudent expression of US human rights concerns.

Over time, some of the American moves to decouple from China technologically will likely limit American leverage over Beijing, as the country races however imperfectly to enhance its own capabilities. Given these ruptures, ideas exchanged by civil society, by students, by scholars will likely assume greater importance over time, as may areas of common interest, such as the safety of AI systems. But even if these issues merit plenty of serious attention, they should not detract too much from a range of other tensions between richer and poorer countries, including one some that have grown closer in the last few years, like the United States and India on a range of technology and environmental issues affecting development.

Second, how do foster laboratories of development without mass autarky? Increasingly, policymakers and developed economies, leaders of countries in the Global South, scholars agree about one thing, that trade and external investment may often benefit countries in their residence. But fixing what it takes for countries to grow and share prosperity is an intricate process and often fits poorly with an overly rigid orthodoxy about trade and industrial policy.

When the term Washington Consensus was coined a generation ago by the Peterson Institute’s John Williamson, he played up some nuances that have become blurrier over time he insisted that the concept reached more than a particular orthodoxy of unencumbered trade and financial flows, low taxation and privatization. It also encompassed the value of shifting spending towards education and health, for instance, and of helping the poor laboring in the informal sector acquire property interests in their businesses. But beyond the general reasons for skepticism of too much orthodoxy, even Williamson came to believe that some elements that came to be seen as part of the consensus, such as liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, did not even command a consensus in Washington at the time that he was writing. And he admitted that he may have overstated the convergence and thought about trade and certain related elements of international economic policy.

It’s now familiar that the pandemic and the financial crisis have pushed Europe and the US away from any such consensus orthodoxy in their own policies. And of course, as scholars like Alice Amsden and Peter Evans have persuasively argued from my perspective, for many countries, the path to development was through state-led export growth and fits awkwardly or not at all with the early 1980s DC consensus. From South Korea to Malaysia, to Turkey, once developing countries achieved economic growth in the post-war era by building up domestic industries and boosting exports, American policymakers were open to these arrangements, particularly before the 1980s.

They were often supportive even when they occasionally involved asymmetrical trade relationships because of geopolitical imperatives. Though, of course, eventually, Congress created USTR and sought to rein in the State Department’s tendency to treat trade primarily as a matter of diplomatic rather than economic statecraft. Today’s more familiar trade regime is one of intricate rules on matters, such as non-tariff barriers.

Here, Daniel [? Roderick’s ?] insights are particularly helpful to an extent. Fewer more targeted rules can help preserve greater space for sovereignty and democracy. For the moment, the US has embarked on a course of massively scaled up industrial policy without yet signaling what it will support or at least tolerate in a reciprocal fashion from other countries.

Europe, the United States are in the process of working out in a sense how to live with each other’s green industrial policies, including production subsidies, carbon border adjustment mechanisms for steel and eventually other commodities, and mechanisms for restoring or reshoring supply chains. One way to think about this is that once they reach agreement it’ll be one version of a basis for a broader framework, as with the gap during the mid 20th century for a former reinterpret the WTO’s requirements.

More generally, a return, I would argue, to tolerating somewhat more heterodox economic policies would benefit the United States and its allies, resulting in thinner but reliable trade rules and an eye towards more equitable global development. The resulting laboratories of development framework might carry a measure of justification similar to that of federalism in the domestic context, particularly at a time of major economic and political distinctions in countries that would find it difficult to tolerate sweeping incursions into their domestic spheres.

Three, how to responsibly recalibrate expectations and capabilities of global institutions? The devastation of World War II gave way to enormous interest in economic renewal and rebuilding, spurred by the United States keen to reign in colonialism in favor of more open trade, rebuild the economies of allies to forestall the spread of Soviet influence, and extend the country’s political and economic influence. That led to the creation of now familiar institutions and legal arrangements heavily, but not exclusively influenced, by American priorities and negotiated by diplomats like the indefatigable Ralph Bunche, particularly of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institution’s basic human rights protections, and a core military alliance connecting the US and Europe. Ralph Bunche didn’t do that all by himself, but I’m just noting he’s an example of people who did not shy away from that challenge and spent the career doing it.

But most of these institutions now face enormous difficulties. The UN is hamstrung by the structural original sin in a sense of the way the Security Council veto is structured. The World Bank is undercapitalized relative to the need for it to catalyze infrastructure in the developing world. And the WTO’s reach and scope seems poorly calibrated to the subsidy policies many countries, including the US, are now actively pursuing.

I start from the premise that markets generally deliver value to the public. But they require at least some degree of governance. Some convergence and ideas about practices considered morally reprehensible and acceptable and some degree of security. Climate crisis, cross-border illicit financial and corruption activity, the return of aggressive war, the pandemic, and other challenges have served as stark reminders of how these institutions have struggled to live up to their ambitious mandates at times.

As the lessons of the mid-20th century have been arguably fading a bit, several related trends cause friction and problems. Even as trouble brewed with global institutions meant to provide a modicum of help with governing shared problems, articulating human rights norms, providing security, the ambition of the trade-focused project raced ahead, one could say. Under the rubric of limiting non-tariff barriers, the WTO framework became increasingly enmeshed in domestic policy questions.

Now, of course, no set of institutional reforms which garner anything close to pervasive support. But the situation may ironically call for a recognition that we may be expecting too much from international law and too little from international institutions. In some sense, existing institutions like the UN, the World Health Organization, the World Bank requires some reform and renewal, even if it’s unrealistic to ever achieve routine consensus or to expect that they will simply be able to recur to legal arrangements for perfect enforcement. By the same token, institutions with less formal legal powers or identity as multilateral bodies will likely be crucial to provide a reliable information and analysis allowing for accountability on climate issues and governance of technology.

Four, how to democratize access to technology? Though a challenging subject for understandable practical reasons, transferring technology and know-how to the developing world can fill the void not likely to be addressed through loss and damage payments on the climate side. If you think about it, subject to understandable security caveats, security and skills transfer can spur innovation, particularly among countries where some shared values, can grow incomes, can broaden opportunity. It was key to the development of countries like South Korea and is understandably core to the agenda in countries like India today.

Although countries need to reconcile their economic policies with legitimate shorter-term security concerns, as I said, the need to leverage technology to shrink fissures and disparities that drive medium and longer-term conflict seems pretty crucial at this juncture in history. The massive changes afoot in access to advanced artificial intelligence just in the last few months merits appropriate efforts to engage the world not merely to make the technology available as a package.

The trips waiver for COVID-19 vaccines reflects a measure of movement on this issue and is maybe a reminder that the dimensions of it are not only about statecraft but also to some extent about morality and ethics. But most of the story of sensible compromise on how, when, and where to share technology remains to be written. And maybe some of it will be written right here at Berkeley. How to make these agreements more feasible, how to make them incentive compatible, how to scale them for greater practical impact, to me, is a microcosm of the whole conversation about global cooperation.

Four, how to incorporate greater attention to long-neglected dimensions of global integration? For one, the value of global integration and exchange is a matter of human progress and dignity, not just conventionally measured economic growth. Getting even beyond the UN Sustainable Development Goals to define evaluate and make policy responsive to broader measures of well-being, different time horizons can make a difference. The dignity piece of the conversation will remain contentious, where human rights fit into this entire story, and calls for careful thinking not only about the role of countries but also non-state actors like private military contractors and organizations involved in illicit activity.

Some greater attention to migration is also called for, a particularly contentious and challenging topic in the current system we have. Beginning perhaps with regional migration agreements that show promise to address the concerns of developing countries and create pathways for exchanges of information, ideas, and culture. And then there is the role, of course, of civil society, this university and its peers, catalyzing the spread of knowledge across borders, curating global talent, and ultimately creating the kinds of linkages that allow for unofficial diplomacy to deal with a particularly unruly and challenging world. Such connections will grow more important, not only to spread knowledge, but to maintain relationships as more conventional diplomatic ties bring.

Finally, how to reconcile global integration and domestic prosperity? Keynes may not have figured out every technical detail of how to reconcile domestic well-being and international peace. But he was right to identify the challenge as fundamental to the future of democracy and arguably to the future of the planet. In some respects, the post-1980s era of globalization, even if it delivered benefits to certain populations in the developing world, contains certain seeds of its own risk and maybe demise by destabilizing this kind of embedded liberalism compromise that shielded key populations in the West from a full measure of financial uncertainty and by heightening the risk of financial instability more generally.

Domestic adjustment in practice at the level of administrative law, how to actually structure the programs and reshape budgets, is wickedly challenging as a matter of implementation, regional adjustment, individuals own realities. Here, again, Weber’s insights about modernity come into play, because we’re not just talking about incomes, we’re talking about people’s sense of purpose and meaning. Future navigation of this space will require more nuanced approaches that reflect distinctions, for example, in the educational opportunities suitable for people at different points in the life course.

A challenge for policymakers is to leverage interest in the most advanced large economies, meet the needs of that domestic population while continuing to lift the fortunes of the developing world. Among other sources, one can imagine interests coming from coalitions concerned about climate, about global security and peace, about geopolitical competition. Interests can be reflected, too, in reform of international institutions, new approaches to development, and ultimately ways of building coalitions that will connect the middle class and the developed world to the billions of people who want to join the middle class in the Global South.

Even a cautious optimist like Ralph Bunche would readily admit, if you were here, I suspect, that the course I had for global integration, cooperation, is going to get rougher before it gets easier, not only because of geopolitical tensions. But because reconciling the needs of billions of people whose political lives are playing out separately is incredibly daunting. That’s true even if all the technical answers about climate or pandemics or macroeconomic policy or tech governance were easily discernible. And of course, they’re not.

If there is a saving grace in this realm, it’s that we’re not starting from scratch. We can deploy some of what we’ve learned over the past 60, 70 years about domestic politics, about respect and complexity, about setting slightly less ambitious global rules as goals in some domains and clearer ones in other domains. Consider how the elusive search for viable climate solutions is playing out, just to take one issue that’s recurred during this talk and during our lifetimes. How that depends on Weber’s slow, boring of hard boards on time and again, reaching for the nearly impossible, not to mention staggering feats of diplomacy, precision crafting of carbon adjustment mechanisms, reshaping the way the private sector sees its roles, legal codes.

Experiments and development suitably bounded by guardrails need warm nurturing from the harsh winds of geopolitics and interest group machinations. The machine learning model soon to colonize most institutions need intricate multilingual curation. The scale of the problem is as daunting as it is exhilarating, like navigating the 1.4 million square miles of the South China Sea on a small but sturdy skiff under rumbling clouds with just enough supplies and domestic goodwill to call it all the ports on the schedule.

Everything one might see along the way– the naval craft directed by faraway bureaucracies, the artificial islands, the drones occasionally flying overhead, the containers being loaded onto ships at Saigon port, the wooden fishing boats crossing borders– would have been familiar enough to the author of politics vocation. Among these are textual reminders of the tensions between modernity and responsibility, between an ethic of moral conviction and an ethic of politics, between loss and promise, and above all, between passion and a sense of proportion.

As global integration is far more about a set of discrete but interconnected problems replete with such tensions than about any single destination, we should plan to be on the water for quite a while. Thank you. [APPLAUSE]

It has been years since I spoke for that long. So I’m sorry. I’m sure I could have edited it a little bit. So questions, comments, reaction, or do you want to moderate? Yeah.

Maybe we can sit.

Yeah. Good, good. Sitting is good.

[MARION FOURCADE] Thank you so much for a pragmatic and inspiring talk. And I really appreciate also all the references to Max Weber, as a sociologist. So we will begin– actually, I have questions also online. So the online audience, and just a reminder, you can ask your questions in the Q&A. And then we can also begin with questions in the room.

Great.

Daniel.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you so much. The topic was really, really wide-ranging and compelling talk. The question I would like to ask you, I’m a historian, so I have to think about the precedents and what we learn from them. So after the Second World War, the United States builds a hegemonic or imperial order sort of without precedent in world history. And all other imperial systems, resources flow from the periphery to the metropole. The American order works according to a very different logic. Resources flow from the center to the periphery and support development elsewhere.

The US also provides and underwrites military security for allies throughout the developing and Western world and thereby, enables the postwar order to flourish. But it does so in the context of a bipolar Cold War with the Soviet Union. And I think in the end, if you want to answer the question, what animates the United States to build and underwrite and subsidize a world order? The answer is the Soviet peril and the fear and the trepidation that parallel inspires in Washington.

So the question that I would like you to answer is, do you think that world order requires an enemy? And if so, is the China rivalry perhaps not an obstacle to the rehabilitation of international order but a possible invitation?

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] It’s a great question. Thank you. And I’m actually reminded not only of Max Weber but of William James, the moral equivalent war, where he’s struggling with this question about why it takes war to motivate societies in ways that one would like to do for any number of other goals.

I think your reading is pretty much right, in that it’s hard for me to tell any of the story I’ve told without acknowledging that not only did the US mobilize enormous internal resources for the world, but also for the kind of public investment that we’re only now beginning to see again. But also, I mean, you probably caught this, but this little riff I had in there about how– and this here, I’m indebted very much to the work of Alan Simpson, among others– how the US approached its global economic relations in a more tolerant way for decades after World War II, including the asymmetrical trade policies, I think, can only really be explained with the notion of a Cold War.

So two quick thoughts on implications. The first is it is worth being honest about that reality and recognizing there are many different ways of building a competitive and strategic posture for the country now. And that means that if– to the extent one takes even say, half of the framing of the National Security Strategy, and I’m willing to accept 90% of it, let’s say, that means that there’s still some hard choices about what it means to be thoughtful as a competitor. So this is sort of like the Tony Blinken line about, well, we’ll compete where we can, cooperate where we must or– whatever. I’m getting the order wrong.

But what he’s getting at, I think, is just a recognition that there’s room for the US to set different courses. Now, all of that has to then be balanced against another reality, which is it’s really strong medicine to motivate a country with an external enemy. And I would just be mindful of both the domestic implications, how that impacts very large segment of our population that is sort of demographically at some level connected to that region or viewed as such, and also how risky it may be to impose a set of boundaries that might give countries, like the ones I mentioned in Southeast Asia, since that they absolutely have to choose between one country or the other.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Just a follow-up on that question. With the Cold War, it seems as the previous commentator pointed out, the US was able to create a hegemonic system, a system that could unite something called the free world. It seems that with this battle with China when the US has denied its semiconductor technology, it doesn’t seem to make anyone think that this is for a larger good except for US interests.

So there seems to be a difference in the ability to achieve any kind of hegemony here. It seems like there’s a complete collapse of any hegemonic project, even if China were to become the enemy. At the same time saying that, I really like the discussion of the dangers of the thin rules, articulating a very thin set of rules that would unify the world.

And I’m thinking, as you pointed out several times, maybe with the trips exception but also with industrial policy running against any kind of global set of rules because of subsidies or tariffs or that kind of protection. Maybe that in defense of what you were saying when it comes to the Green Revolution, all these breaking with this global thin order or this global order of thin rules, might be a good thing because that might be the best way to advance the green technology and we are, to an extent, technological determinists, the only way to solve this climate problem is to actually put the technology in place that can solve it.

Perhaps we do need this break with a project of thin rules, a hegemonic global order of thin rules so we can compete with China. We can openly compete with them. We’re going to get there first before you. We’re going to break with some rules of the global order to do it, but that might be the highest form of global cooperation ultimately I guess would be my way of maybe extending what I think you were saying.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Yeah, that’s really interesting. Let me start with your point about the semiconductors and the efforts to restrict access to technology for China. Look, I think if one were to try to paint the US approach in the most positive light one would say two things.

First, that even leaving aside domestic political pressures, if the US has a principled set of disagreements with China, both in terms of how it governs and how it projects its influence, it’s not an irresponsible thing to do to at least try to assemble a coalition. And like any coalition, it’s a bit of a negotiation. So if you want the Dutch on board, if you want the Germans on board, you have to do some give and take.

Now, one constraint the US has, which is sort of implicit in what I shared, is that we’re not in the business of making big market access deals right now. So to the extent that in the past that was an important element of geopolitical agreement and binding, that’s not exactly on the table. Joining the Indo-Pacific economic framework is not exactly a carrot in that respect. But I do recognize that for American policymakers it feels risky not to try.

The second point they might make is look at the coalition that’s been assembled on Russia and Ukraine, and is that operating in a way different from the way many folks might have predicted, particularly given the extent of European energy dependence on Russia. And the answer is yes. And so their position might be it’s a little too early to tell, like, let’s wait three or four years out.

But I would add one thing that maybe the administration needs to focus a little bit more on. And here my colleague Jon Bateman at Carnegie is really the person who’s written literally the book about this– and that is decoupling has this weird structure because it does mean that whatever influence you’re getting in the short term is likely to diminish your influence in the longer term. I mean, it depends really on what assumptions you make about the progress of Chinese technological development, but it’s not clear that that end game piece has been thought out like what is the equilibrium you ultimately get to.

Now, briefly, that gets me to your point about the Green Revolution and trade rules. I think for those of us who believe that global trade has been in some ways good and in some ways complicated with respect to social welfare, there’s a real burden now to figure out what the framework should be to make it not only compatible with domestic politics but with the imperative on the climate side.

And just to pick one example, there was such an understandable emphasis on reducing tariffs, and yet if you think about how carbon adjustment has to work at the border, it’s almost impossible to imagine it working without some incentive to decarbonize that would involve the imposition of some costs or trade. So how to rebuild that regime in a way that’s compatible with the present is going to take some effort and time, but I think we’re already beginning to see the outlines of that.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. I’m Daniel Aldana Cohen, and I’m a sociologist. I work on the political economy of climate. So thank you very much for this wide-ranging and pragmatic talk for center on climate. And this question follows up on where the conversation is moving. The basic question involves how we can mobilize a lot more green investment. So you’re looking at necessity in order of like $3 to $9 trillion a year.

I think the high-end is realistic. If you look at adaptation that’s almost entirely public sector right now and it’s low. So we not only have to decarbonize but adapt to extreme weather and to tens to hundreds of millions of people moving, and most of those people even within their own borders like borders to slums.

So it seems right now that it’s pretty hard to get green investment going in the US, but we have some success. Countries in the Global South many of them the interest rate is extremely high. They are extremely burdened by debt. And then the developmental states that they used to have were, to a large degree, undermined if not destroyed by the forces that you talked about a little bit earlier.

So my provocation is what can we do to foster green developmental states elsewhere, and what other strategies are there to leverage a significant increase in green investment that will land in communities in ways that help build cohesion and adapt and decarbonize all at the same time?

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Thank you. My short answer is massively capitalized multilateral development banks. And I think that’s– so from an administrative law perspective, those are the institutions that have some mix of the know-how and the capability of the mission to actually mobilize the capital quickly, which is no small thing. Even if we had the resources, getting it out the door and getting it to roughly the right places is a big part of the equation.

Of course, that then begs the question, which is sort of representing which is how do you create these coalitions where somebody who is in the fragile middle class somewhere in Fresno, California thinks she has some remote interest in making sure that India can decarbonize. That is a hard sell politically, let’s just be perfectly honest.

But I want to believe that that is possible. And maybe it evokes a little bit back the Cold War question earlier because if you unpack Kennedy’s inaugural address, it is a brilliant piece of rhetoric. But it works as rhetoric because it’s backed by some political reality.

He’s talking about student exchanges, he’s talking about the Peace Corps, he’s talking about food progress, he’s talking about the huts and villages around the world and it has the ring of being not totally cheap talk in the game theoretic sense because the US was in that struggle.

I would hate to think that the path to mobilize that capital is to say, look if we don’t do it, who’s going to do it? But I do think that finding a way to leverage the reality that both countries feel like they’re in some competitive pressure and we have a big set of equities, then this climate thing is going to have to be part of the solution.

So I would say the political little p, not partisan political but the coalition building homework for all of us, is to take that and articulate it to the point that you could imagine somebody running for Congress in the Central Valley of California saying, I’m for the farmers, I’m for the water, and I’m for making sure that those people around the world don’t blow up and therefore your family and mine will be better off. Yeah.

I want to start with–

Wait, hold the mic.

[JOHN SYZMAN] Oh, sorry. I’m John Size. I would like to start with the semiconductors story, which I’ve been following since the days of the old US-Japan trade wars when Japan thought if it dominated semiconductors they could dominate the world. That was quite explicit at the time. The big difference now, of course, is that the story isn’t just about semiconductors, it’s about AI, and heavily about military technology.

But really what become– and it’s driven in this country by the National Security community as you know. But the point is is that China is not simply a strategic rival, it’s an economic rival in a way that didn’t exist– Japan never really was, never really became an economic rival in quite the same way.

So all of those outflows that Daniel was emphasizing from the US, the asymmetric trade relations which you’ve mentioned which were strategic instruments of great importance, they aren’t available in quite the same way anymore, which complicates trying to accomplish these broader public goods, whether we agreed with them back then or whether we agree now that we really need that kind of public action.

So that leaves me in a pessimistic position. What do we do with a diminished American capacity in the face of a quite different strategic problem?

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] I embrace intellectual honesty and I appreciate pessimism when it’s called for.

Thank you.

There is a part of this story to me that goes again back to what happened in the US in World War II. And I don’t think this is a perfect answer to your question. I think it’s a very good question and I think we’re in a tough spot. I mean, in a nutshell, the big headline is we have to develop ways of being credible as a partner to parts of the world that don’t simply have the American security umbrella.

Say they’re part of NATO, they know they’re pretty much in with us for the long haul. And even then, of course, their economic interests might diverge in part because of the security guarantee. And we have some negotiating to do with so many of the others. That’s why I keep coming back to Southeast Asia because it’s so interesting.

It’s not Latin America. It’s a place of contestation by great powers, but also a place of incredible agency for 700 to 800 million people. And when we go to the Indonesias of the world, what are we bringing if it’s not market access?

Now I think we can still bring some things that are valuable and important. So we bring access to a desirable society in some ways to the best universities in the world to the hub of global media and culture to a place that has historically been perhaps the most generative place for innovation. And this is why migration feels like it’s important as a part of the story at least, because if we’re not offering access to goods, finding the right way to engage the right people from the right countries and what we’re doing here.

Often with the expectation that they may go back. They may build businesses that span both countries. If we don’t think that through and leverage that carefully it seems like a waste to me. This is the point I wanted to make about World War II.

So when I was thinking about the articles I’ve written that would vaguely make me feel like I have any right to talk about these subjects, particularly with an audience like this one, in many respects, I think to myself this room has more knowledge about these subjects than I do in many respects, but there is a piece I wrote that captured really my imagination. It was about the transformation of American public law during World War II.

And it was interesting to me because it upended a lot of my own assumptions. I went into it thinking about how this was going to be about the impact of the New Deal on geopolitics, sort of via how a reconfigured American economy and legal system put the country in a better place to go into World War II. Instead, I found that the New Deal was pretty small potatoes relative to the changes in public law that happened around World War II, which reinforces the Cold War point in a way.

So that’s when the White House began to develop the actual capacity to oversee regulatory policy pretty directly. It’s the first time the US developed a national federal agency with the capability to regulate economic transactions happening at the local level, the Price Administration. It’s when the US developed a mass taxation system that took the mass taxation based from 20% to 70% and never goes down after that.

But over and over again the theme that kept on emerging as I looked at these memos of how the government was being reconfigured, what Roosevelt was trying to do, how he re-architected these agencies, was the desire to create and maintain a vibrant domestic consumer economy in the face of war.

And I would argue that that was an incredible American innovation to some degree– the ability to fight wars while your consumer economy not only didn’t collapse but thrived to a certain point. And it feels to me like we have to bring that into the discussion a bit. What does it take for that consumer economy to thrive while we still serve our security goals? So that’s part of our homework, and I’m happy to work on them.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas. I’m an economist, currently working at the IMF [? Andalus ?] IFIs. I was very impressed by your speech, and I must say that I think I would fully agree with the premises that you started with, the importance of nation-state, the future being unwritten. I would even subscribe to the fact that we have limited knowledge even as economists into what might be happening.

We keep talking about a world where we hit by shock upon shocks and they come from different quadrants than we’re used to. And also on the really important role that integration played in achieving global prosperity over the last 50 years, that has to be acknowledged. So that certainly our starting point as well.

So I would like to make basically two comments. One is from our vantage point. It’s very clear and that something that has been mentioned some of the questions and in your remarks as well that IFI stand in a very vulnerable position.

I mean, we could be going back to a world in which we have blocks and then we have designated enemies. But then international organizations, how do they survive in a world like this? Are they becoming the international organizations of one of the blocks and not the others, or how do they straddle the divide? And I think that’s something that we’re grappling with.

We’re especially concerned because some of the measures that are taken might be taken on perfectly legitimate national security grounds, which are explicitly carved out in terms of all the international agreements that we have, things that you want to do on national security reasons. That’s your Joker card. You can do it.

But then you can get into this path of what we call runaway fragmentation that it leads to retaliation, leads to tit for tat, leads to an unraveling of the global order and that’s something that we’re concerned about. And so I’m going to make these two comments.

The first one is when we think about the political economy, the pushback against integration that we’re witnessing, it’s very, very strong in advanced economies. It’s strong in the US, it’s strong in Europe. I think it’s stronger than it is in emerging market and developing economies, which have been in many, many respects benefited. Even the lower end of the income distribution, countries have benefited, hundreds of millions lifted out of poverty or food insecurity.

So where is this pushback coming from in advanced economies? One is in some sense is the fact that the way the discourse has been structured around the benefits from integration has ignored the distributional consequences and it has ignored them in order to make progress.

We understand perfectly well from economic theory that they can be what we call winners and losers from economic integration, whether trade or financial. But we always follow that statement by saying, well, it increases the size of the pie so we can always find a way to compensate the losers, except we never do. And so over time, we’ve built these domestic coalitions of people who have been left on the side in relative terms, maybe not in absolute terms.

And I think that should cause us to rethink the way we engage on the political economy of structural reform. And let me mention one area where this is likely to be important is when we think about the green transition. Obviously, we need to do the green transition. It’s imperative in order to deal with rising climate and all the calamities that come with it, but it’s going to have huge distributional consequences as well.

And distributional consequences even in advanced economies, either we tax carbon or we try to move workers from some industries to others, the brown industries, the green industries, there are going to be distortions and dislocations associated with that and we don’t talk that much about them.

I’m coming from a country of France, where as soon as they tried to put in place a carbon tax, we had the Yellow Vests movement that was basically brought everything to a standstill. And it’s the same kind of fears that people were facing compared to global integration and things like that. So I think this fear of a technocratic discourse doesn’t recognize the complexities of distributional impacts is going to be a key in being able to make progress on the economic side.

Now, in terms of the role of the IFIs, it’s been very instructive for me sitting at the International Monetary Fund for the last year. We have been able to function. We have been able to engage in a number of programs, develop new instruments, whether it’s to deal with the food crisis, with a food shock window, whether it’s emergency financing, whether it’s emergency financing for Ukraine or for other countries despite the fact that we have Russia sitting on our board. We’re representing 190 countries.

So in a sense, this is the optimistic side in me, which is that there is a way to build those bridges, there is a way to be very pragmatic in the way we’re dealing with the challenges we’re facing by trying to make progress where we can make progress, not trying to make progress on all the fronts.

And I think I was very pleased to hear you mentioned a few times pragmatism because that seems to me the only way we can progress. And pragmatism is a way also in making progress on maybe smaller issues. It’s a way to rebuild the global trust, it’s a way to rebuild and re-engage further down the road maybe on broader agendas. So the scope has been reduced but it’s not been eliminated and we have to rebuild from where we are.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] I agree with everything you shared. I will simply add that the level of attention, concern, and focus on these questions of compensating the losers– and I’m looking for even a different word from loser because– as a technical meaning, but it will not be heard right. Compensating the people who are affected adversely by global economic relations feels to me almost as important as any number of technology restrictions that are in the National Security Strategy.

If I start from the premise that the well-being of let’s just say the United States, although I can make the argument of other countries, depends on its ability to engage in the world, and that in turn depends on building a political coalition that supports that and yet, it is too often viewed as I think a bit of an afterthought, both the economic investment necessary but also the really intricate questions I was gesturing towards.

If it’s going to be spending on education, what kind of education? What role for community colleges? And then ultimately, apropos of the ILRS point, how do we deal with the reality that people don’t just want the paycheck? They want to feel they matter. So building an economy where people who are displaced or affected adversely by global relations can thrive and feel like they still have a role feels pretty central to the whole discussion.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] I had just one. It’s a small point, but your reference to World War II and the focus on building a strong consumer economy reminds me now, today, 2023, we have come to learn that that consumer economy with disposable the increase in waste actually has climate impact, whether it’s production of food and food waste but textiles, which is something I’m deeply interested in. So consumer economy but climate impact, how does that square?

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Yeah, great. So let’s just say there were many, many sequels and darker sides to what was in many sense is an achievement of the US mobilization– the US able to stop and push back on tyranny, and to build the world order, if we want to call it that. In many ways, it was more benign than what came before, and yet, right? Obviously, I mentioned it contained the seeds of its own destabilization given the lack of attention to some of the issues raised by the previous question.

And it all was part of an episode in history where there had been for decades already. As I understand it from my friends who were climate scientists, some scientific evidence that this amount of carbon going into the atmosphere is going to likely have an effect very long term.

Now, for those of us interested in artificial intelligence, one interesting question sometimes is AI comes in many shapes and sizes. But if we think about it as a set of systems that are increasingly burrowing into our lives and that have some coherence, what’s the right analogy to think about the upsides and downsides? Is it the internet? Is it the carbon economy?

Because if it’s the carbon economy, I just think about how much would have turned out differently in the world if sometime circa the ’50s and ’60s we’d found a way to link concerns about climate and about waste to the Cold War imperatives that were driving our geopolitics and driving, to some extent, our economic priorities, too.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Great. So my name is Ryan Brutger. And I study domestic politics of international negotiations, so I love this talk that you gave. But I’d love to hear your thoughts when we start with this premise of the nation-state as the core unit and we’re seeing more industrial policy and you talked about the domestic challenges of global integration, so given that background, how do you think we get to democratization of the access to technology? And I’d just love to hear if you have any preliminary ideas on what can be pushing us towards that outcome that you prioritize.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] This is the part that I’ve fleshed out the least. And I think you put it– as I would expect from a good Berkeley audience you found the Achilles heel. Because, look, how could I sit here and say that there’s no value to protecting intellectual property? I’m not going to say that.

I’m also not going to leave aside the security concerns because so much of this is tool to use. But let’s try to channel our historians. And here again, I’ll note Alice Amsden is probably among the best on this, but there are others too who tell the story.

You watch these countries go from being dirt poor like as poor as you can get, which was the situation in the Korea that my parents-in-law grew up in, to being industrial powerhouses giving aid to the developing world in about one and a half generations, and it’s not because of comparative advantage selling whatever Korea was able to produce in 1950, it was because knowledge is being grabbed and pulled in.

And one can certainly point out that in the Korea context, some of that was encouraged even by some geopolitical imperatives the US had, whereas in the China context maybe it was a kind of theft. But let’s not forget that there is a social process involved in taking technology and making it more accessible to more people.

And then two sets of questions follow, one which is very familiar to the American business side of the discussion, which is like how does that affect incentives, how does that affect our economic position, how does that affect the jobs of people who work at these companies, which is a fair and important question but one that I think– here I’m going to show a little bit my Silicon Valley roots– there is a thing around open source, which suggests to me that there’s some room between give it all the way with no constraints and on the other hand, leverage trade secrets and that sort of thing and non-competes as much as you can.

And the goal is to avoid a neocolonial relationship where if you can you just sell the finished product or actually provide a subscription to it. And if you have to set up a factory somewhere you tightly guard it Foxconn style and make sure that no technology leaks out.

But the other piece which I will channel from my days thinking more about illicit non-state actors, it’s like all this stuff is not only dual use in the sense that governments can use it for the military but in the sense that non-state actors can use it to do all kinds of disinformation, harm, and to move corrupt money, and to potentially disrupt the rule of law and all that. And I would just note that I think those are real problems.

I don’t think we will solve them by trying to just cut off access to the technology. They will require a deft form of organizational change among the folks who are on that side of the house. But, I mean, I’ll end with this because I think in a way I’m just restating why I think this is important. I’m not telling you how to solve the problem, but maybe I’m getting a little closer to it now.

Let’s say we’re in 2045– not even. Let’s say we’re in 2040. So just a little less than 20 years from now. And mostly the conversation we’re having is about how the world averted the worst disasters that seemed on the horizon of climate. We kept warming to something like a little bit under 2 degrees somehow, and that in the course of doing that, by the way, incomes grew, and the US is in a fairly secure position geopolitically vis a vis China or anyone else.

If I’m telling that story and you ask me then what the story has been with tech, it’s hard for me to tell that story and not think that some substantial amount of technological development has not happened, at least among countries that we want to be close to geopolitically. I’ll just use India as an example of a country that is not a treaty ally but is pretty central to any vision the US has for its own security.

And if you go to India and you talk to their government, they will ask why and how are we not getting access to this technology and what can we do, like how can we enable that linkage, particularly given that the top end India has this vibrant and interesting startup sector. So I think there needs to be a deal with this broker that takes seriously the equities of American innovation but also of a geopolitical imperative that requires the rest of the world be brought along.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] So thank you so much for this brilliant and engaging talk. So I wanted to ask you about a different Weber work that you didn’t mention, which is on bureaucracy.

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Oh, good.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] And so to give, again, to give the–

[MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] I’m playing Weber bingo, so I’ve just filled that one.

So again, to give the question up front, it’s something along the lines of this– so are we at the mercy of a new democratic deficit insofar as many aspects of the US-China relationship which contour everything from climate to growth and inequality, you name it. We’ll be at the mercy of bureaucratic logic that exceeds democratic control.

And I think last week we saw perhaps a silly or microcosmic example of this, where it was widely reported that President Biden gave the order to decommission the infamous balloon on a Wednesday but it was actually shot down on a Friday.

And you wonder about other similar perhaps more dramatic cases, to what extent does this relationship exist within a democratic framework? Just on the American side of the ledger that we’re at the end of the day dealing with massive bureaucracies, be they NATO or the Pentagon or the People’s Liberation Army, or even Apple computer.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Yeah, great question. I like it because it has both policy implications but real intellectual meat on it as it were. It’s not difficult to see why we sometimes slip into a shorthand of saying, well, they’re democracies and they’re authoritarian regimes. So the first intellectual move I’d like to make is to recognize that I think democracies are special. I believe in them. I think the world is going to be better off with more democracy and more democracies.

But even inside democracy, there are different forms of administration of power and organization. So one observer of Harvard University once pointed out that Harvard runs a little bit like– well, any private university, let’s say, it doesn’t have to be Harvard, but they run a little bit in the Byzantine way of some regimes that are not completely transparent and have to manage a set of competing equities through these interlocking boards and all that.

And it feels to me once we acknowledge that, the question becomes for those of us working in the democratic system what’s a good way to deploy bureaucracy to get the benefit of its value and not its constraints. And here one part of the question for me is easy to answer but one is harder.

What’s easy to answer for me is that I don’t believe that bureaucracy is inherently undemocratic. It can be. But it can also be quite democratically responsive. And depending on how one defines democracy, it can be responsive to a broader range of democratic concerns.

And so here I would point to the work of Daniel Carpenter that strikes me as just really thoughtful and observing how bureaucratic leaders in a democracy can fashion a degree of autonomy but even that autonomy is not undemocratic necessarily. It’s a different way of channeling democratic pressures.

I think the harder question to answer is if we’re better off or worse off with more hyper-responsive bureaucracies when it comes to things like shooting down the balloon. Here, you just got to remember you get different kinds of presidents. Some have the cushion built in, some have the cushion at the White House, some have either the cushion built in or at the White House, and suddenly they’re giving orders left and right.

And ideally, I think we want a layer of governance that can be a shock absorber but still be pretty responsive. And for what it’s worth, I think that was the engineering that was happening governmentally at the White House in the 1940s, early ’40s when the modern administrative state was actually being built in the US.

[MARION FOURCADE] OK, unfortunately, I think we are out of time. And I apologize to people who posted questions online but we had to give priority to the questions in the room. We’ll send them to you.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Please do. Yeah. I would love it.

[MARION FOURCADE] So thank you so much.

[MARIANO FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR] Thank you. Thank you so much to you, to all of you here in the room, and all of you watching. I’m very grateful.

[MARION FOURCADE] I also want to acknowledge the Matrix staff.

Thank you.

Eva Seto, who really is working wonders and helping organize this visit, and then Chuck Kapelke, who’s behind in the back doing our video, and Julia Sizek right there in the back. Thank you very much, everybody.

Thank you very much.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

 

Lecture

Citrin Award Lecture: “Does Political Propaganda Work,” Donald P. Green

 

Recorded on February 10, 2023, this video features the 2022 Citrin Award Lecture, presented by Donald P. Green, J.W. Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. Professor Green’s lecture, “Does Political Propaganda Work?”, was presented by the Jack Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research at UC Berkeley. Professor Green was introduced by David Broockman, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

The Citrin Award Lecture is an annual event. The Citrin Award recognizes the career of an individual who has made significant contributions to the study and understanding of public opinion. The 2022 Citrin Award honors the career of Donald P. Green, whose pioneering work has advanced knowledge of the formation and change in public opinion in a variety of significant areas. Earlier Award Lecturers were Donald Kinder (2018), Peter Hart (2019), Robert Putnam (2020), and Diana Mutz (2021).

About the Speaker

Donald P. Green is the John William Burgess Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Before that, he was a member of the Yale Political Science Department from 1989 to 2011 and served as the Director of Yale’s Institution for Social and Policy Studies from 1996 to 2011. Professor Green received his B.A. from UCLA and his Ph.D. from UC Berkeley. He is the author of five books: Social Science Experiments: A Hands-on Introduction (2022), Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation (2012), Get Out The Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout (2004), Partisan Hearts and Minds, Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters (2002), and Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (1994). He has also published more than 100 articles and essays on a wide array of topics including voting behavior, partisanship, media effects, campaign finance, hate crime, and research methods. He has pioneered the use of field experimentation in political science, and much of his current work uses this method to study the ways political campaigns mobilize and persuade voters. Professor Green was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003 and was awarded the Heinz I. Eulau Award for the best article published in the American Political Science Review during 2009. In 2010, he founded the experimental research section of the American Political Science Association and served as its first president.

About the Citrin Center

The Jack Citrin Center for Public Opinion Research was created in May 2017 through donations from friends, family, colleagues and former students to honor the career and legacy of Professor Jack Citrin’s 47 years on the faculty. It is housed administratively in the the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science. The Citrin Center conducts original polling, engages in other cutting-edge research on public opinion, organizes conferences and lectures to bring together top scholars, supports research conducted by affiliated faculty members and graduate students, and engages in other activities connected to public opinion research. The Center publicizes its research findings to create a broader awareness of the study of public opinion — defined broadly to refer to political culture and political identity as studied through multiple methods.

Authors Meet Critics

Dylan Riley, “Microverses: Observations from a Shattered Present”

Part of the Social Science Matrix Authors Meet Critics series

 

 

On February 1, 2023, Social Science Matrix presented an Authors Meet Critics panel on Microverses: Observations from a Shattered Present, a book by Dylan Riley, Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley.

Professor Riley was joined by two discussants: Colleen Lye, Associate Professor of English at UC Berkeley, affiliated with the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory, and Donna Jones, Associate Professor of English at UC Berkeley and Core Faculty for the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory and the Science, Technology and Society Center. The panel was moderated by Alexei Yurchak, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, and was co-sponsored by the Townsend Center for the Humanities.

As described by its publisher, Microverses comprises over a hundred short essays inviting us to think about society—and social theory—in new ways. It analyses the intellectual situation, the political crisis of Trump’s last months in office, and love and illness in a period when both were fraught with the public emergency of the coronavirus, drawing on Weber and Durkheim, Parsons and Dubois, Gramsci and Lukács, MacKinnon and Fraser.

“It is really a marvelous little volume that takes on a wide range of questions in a short-essay format,” said Marion Fourcade, Director of Social Science Matrix, in her opening remarks. “It beautifully blends the deadly serious with the very important mundane. There are reflections about the weight of history, the usefulness of concepts, the potency of classical music, and last but not least, how to think sociologically about our tumultuous times.”

Alexei Yurchak noted that the book is a “collection of 110 very interesting, sometimes very intense, analytical, sometimes very light, but insightful comments and analysis and thoughts on the current situation.”

In his remarks, Riley explained that Microverses “was really a response to a triple set of crises: one global, one more national, and one very personal.” The global crisis was the COVID pandemic, and “especially the early months of that experience, which were incredibly disorienting for all of us in in various ways — a feeling of suspension, suspension of time, and this fundamental rupture of normal routine that we all experienced.”

The second crisis, he said, was the final months of the Trump administration, “which was a very, very bizarre period politically,” culminating in the January 6 Insurrection.

And the third crisis was Riley’s wife’s terminal illness, which was diagnosed in late August 2020. “These three things came together for me to create a profound feeling of disruption, and a kind of hiatus,” he said. “I was, in a sense, forced to continue being active to write in a different way. And for me, that was essentially pen and paper and notebooks. A lot of these notes were composed in waiting rooms, in parking lots, or in a cafe, because I was just didn’t have access to normal routine…. I had to learn how to write in a way that was more direct than I’m used to.”

Riley explained that the essays in the book have three main foci: politics and political culture, with a running “friendly” critique of the contemporary left in America; a more personal set of notes, focused on illness and related issues; and a constant meditation on sociology and Marxism.

“The idea that I was after,” he explained, “was to try to link the personal to the theoretical, in some kind of fairly direct and unmediated way, and in a way that was not burdened with an overly technical or specialized language — and that could in a sense turn social theory into a tool for mastering, to some extent, life.”

To hear the responses from Professor Lye and Professor Jones, watch the video above or listen to the podcast.

Transcript

Authors Meet Critics: Dylan Riley, “Microverses: Observations from a Shattered Present”

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[MARION FOURCADE] Hello, everybody. Welcome to Social Science Matrix. I’m Marion Fourcade. I’m the director of this wonderful institution. And I want to welcome you to a new semester here.

So today, I’m very excited because we are featuring the work of my very dear colleague, Dylan Riley, who’s a professor in the Sociology Department here at Berkeley. The book’s title, as you can see, is Microverses– Observations from a Shattered Present. And it is really a marvelous little volume that you can see here that takes on a wide range of questions in a short essay format. And it beautifully blends, I think, the deadly serious with the mundane and very important mundane.

There are reflections about the weight of history, the usefulness of concepts, the potency of classical music, and last but not least, how to think sociologically about our tumultuous times. Today’s event is part of Matrix’s Author Meets Critic series. And it is co-sponsored by the Townsend Center for the Humanities. I’m very happy because this is our second collaboration. And there will be more in the future.

As always, I will mention a few upcoming events. On February 15, our Matrix distinguished lecture will feature Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar. His lecture is entitled Reimagining Global Integration. On the following day at noon, we will host a related panel titled Economics and Geopolitics in US International Relations– China, Europe, and the Global South. And in that panel, in addition to Justice Cuéllar, we’ll have James Fearon, a political scientist from Stanford, and two Berkeley economists– Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas– and Laura Tyson.

And then, let me also mention two more Author Meets Critics events in March. On March 6, we will have a discussion of Cooperating With Colossus, a new book by Rebecca Herman. And on March 7, we will discuss Courtney Morris’s book, To Defend This Sunrise. And then, we have many more exciting events that I encourage you to look up on the Matrix website.

So now, without further ado, let me introduce our moderator, Alexei Yurchak. Alexei is a professor of anthropology here at Berkeley and is affiliated with the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures and with a designated emphasis in critical theory. He is the author of Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More– The Last Soviet Generation published by Princeton University Press in 2006.

That book won the Wayne Vucinic Award for the Best Book of the Year from the American Society of Slavic, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies. The extended Russian edition of the book won the 2015 Enlightener Award for the Best Nonfiction Book of the Year in Russia. He is currently finishing a book on the political, scientific, and aesthetic histories of Lenin’s body that has been maintained and displayed for a century in the mausoleum in Moscow.

So without further ado, I now turn it over to Alexei. Thank you.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Thank you very much, Marion, for the introduction. And I will introduce our panelists today. And the first author, speaker, Dylan Riley. Dylan is a professor of sociology at Berkeley. He studies capitalism, socialism, democracy, authoritarianism, and knowledge regimes in broad, comparative, and historical sociological perspective.

He has authored or co-authored five books, including the Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe– Italy, Spain, and Romania 1870-1945, which came out in 2010 at Johns Hopkins University Press and then, again, in 2019 was published by Verso. He has also published the Antecedents of Census– From Medieval to Nation States, Palgrave, 2016; Changes in the Censuses– From Imperialism to Welfare States, also Palgrave, 2016; and How Everyday Forms of Racial Categorization Survived Imperialist Censuses in Puerto Rico, Palgrave, 2021.

He has published in many sociological, historical, and social theory journals, including Journal of Sociology, American Physiological Review, New Left Review on whose editorial board he sits, and also Theory in Society and many others. Dylan’s most recent work focuses on the relationship between democracy and capitalism, particularly in its current phase. For example, recently he published with Robert Brenner an important piece in the New Left Review last year called “Seven Theses on American Politics.”

To get a sense of Dylan’s views, you may consult recent profiles that appeared in The Nation and the New Statesman as well as podcast conversations with Daniel Denvir in The Dig and Alex Hochuli in Aufhebunga Bunga. His memoir entitled [INAUDIBLE] will be coming out next year in Verso. He is also at work on two larger book projects right now, a collection of essays provisionally titled Science Ideology and Method and the comparative historical analysis of democratization in Germany, Italy, Japan, France, the UK, and the US from 1200 to 1950, which is provisionally titled Special Paths.

And today, we’ll be discussing Dylan’s most recent book Microverses, which you see published in 2022 by Verso, which is a collection of 110 very interesting, sometimes very intense analytical, sometimes very, as Marion was saying, light but insightful comments and analysis, thoughts on the current situation.

Our discussants will be Colleen Lye and Donna Jones. And I will introduce both of them. Colleen Lye is an associate professor in the Department of English and core faculty for the designated emphasis in critical theory. She is the author of America’s Asia– Racial Form and American Literature, 1893-1945, which was published by Princeton in 2005. The book received the Cultural Studies Book Award from the Association of Asian-American Studies.

Recently, Professor Lye edited a volume which is very relevant to the discussion of the Marx literature theory and value in the 21st century published by Cambridge last year. And she is currently working on a new book on Asian-American identity and global Maoism.

Professor Donna Jones is associate professor in the Department of English at UC Berkeley and also core faculty in designated emphasis in critical theory. Looks like all of us are.

[INAUDIBLE]

And in the Center for Science Technology and Society as well. She is also affiliated with the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies. Professor Jones is the author of Racial Discourse of Life Philosophy– Negritude, Vitalism, and Modernity published by Columbia in 2010.

That book won the Jeanne and Aldo Scaglione prize from Modern Languages Association. And Professor Jones has also a forthcoming book, The Ambiguous Promise of Decline– Race and Historical Pessimism in the Interwar Years, 1914-1945. She’s also working on a different new book project, The Tribunal of Life– Reflections on Vitalism, Race, and Biopolitics.

And now, after the introduction, I would like to invite Dylan to say a few words. After that, we will have both commentators comment. And I will say a couple of things. And then, we will open the floor for questions and answers from the live audience and from the Zoom audience as well.

[DYLAN RILEY] So first of all, I just want to thank you guys. Thank you, Alexei, for that beautiful introduction. And thanks to Colleen and Donna for agreeing to do this. And thanks above all to Marion for organizing this and for the Matrix for allowing me to talk about this kind of interesting or funny little book that I’ve produced. And I appreciate people taking it seriously.

I want to talk a little bit about the method of composition, essentially how I did this and why I did this. I want to talk a little bit then after that just about the main foci of the different mini essays that the book is composed of. And then, I want to talk about my stance in them.

So I guess I’ll just proceed in that order. First of all, just the context and the procedure of writing. So Microverses was really a response to a triple set of crises, two of them global– or I would say one global, one more national, one very personal.

The global crisis was the one that we all went through, which is, obviously, the COVID pandemic and especially the early months of that experience, which were incredibly disorienting, I think, for all of us in various ways– feeling of suspension of time and this fundamental rupture of normal routine that we all experienced. The second of these, I guess, just moving from the more global to the more national was the final months of the Trump administration, which was a very bizarre period politically. And it’s culminates in the January 6 insurrection or uprising or whatever we want to call that moment.

And the final one and probably the most significant one for me was my wife’s– what proved to be her terminal illness. She was diagnosed in August, late August of 2020. So about, what? About 3 or 4 months into the pandemic. And so these three things came together for me, essentially, to create a profound feeling of disruption and a kind of hiatus as I’m sure many of you also felt having gone through these things. But somehow, it was more acute because I think this intersection of the global, the national, and the personal really came together for me in that period.

And so, especially as I was dealing with taking care of Emanuela, the whole set of conditions of existence that we all have grown used to of academic life with its libraries and its access to colleagues and all of that, that was all suspended really. And I was in a sense forced to continue being active to write in a different way. And for me, that was essentially pen and paper and notebooks.

So a lot of these notes were composed in waiting rooms or parking lots or just sometimes in a cafe because I was just knocked out of. I just didn’t have access to a normal routine. It just meant that I had to learn how to write in a way that was more direct than I’m used to the claims that are made in a sense– I mean, I would be very– in a sense they make me uncomfortable.

They’re not supported with the normal pillars of citation and quotation and stuff. It’s just OK, what do I really think? And then also, what’s going on? So these are the two ways in which they happen. So the method of composition is really dictated by this triple suspension.

So shifting a little bit to just the foci of the essays, they’re just how I think about them linked together. I’d say there are three main foci. One is politics and political culture. And particularly, I’d say a distinctive feature of them is there is certainly a running critique, not a hostile one– I hope a friendly one– but a running critique of the contemporary left that I personally see– and I’m speaking, obviously, as an American and talking mostly about the American left– personally see is suffused with a legalism and moralism, which I see as politically debilitating.

There’s a couple of examples of that. And so I think maybe the best way in a sense to get into that is just to read one of the notes. I think I’ll start really with– there’s a brief one on justice. And give you a sense of what I’m doing here.

“Certain arguments in Marx and Hayek bear an uncanny resemblance, in spite of their diametrically opposed politics. Both were fascinated with the blind character of social cooperation under capitalism– a society of all-round interdependence mediated by private decisions. Whereas this contradiction inspired Hayek to compose quasi-Burkean hosannas to ignorance, Marx identified it as the fundamental weakness of capitalism.

Both also rejected the application of the category of justice to the social process– for Hayek because the extended order was a natural development, and so expecting justice from it would be akin to expecting justice from a tree or a mountain, for Marx because justice applies to the distribution of currently available resources, but offers no guide to the division of the social product between current consumption and investment. There is in a sense no socially just structure of accumulation, or rather there may be many, some of which are more desirable than others but for reasons that have nothing to do with justice.

Noting these common points brings out with great sharpness the real differences. All of Hayek’s arguments are based ultimately on the idea of the social as a manifestation of the sublime, leaving the analyst in a state of dumb credulity. Marx’s arguments derive from precisely the opposite impulse– that society is a creation of the human species, and potentially controllable by its rationality. Justice itself, being a human creation, cannot be allowed to become a fetish– as if the meaning of human history could be decided through a judicial procedure, as if there were a meta court standing outside of history.

There’s no just society in general, and every society that has laws presumably in some sense a just society. The point is not justice but rationality– which is to say, freedom.”

The second set of notes is more personal. And it basically has to do very much with, I would say, Emanuela’s illness, which is this running background theme in this. And I’ll just read one note that exemplifies this kind of writing. It’s called “Soma.”

“Can health care be a commodity? In the United States, every ‘service’ has its price. Conceptually, the provision of health care in this system is thought of in the same way that the cafeteria restaurants that used to be popular in the 1970s priced and delivered food. I still remember fondly the slightly pasty taste of ‘Blue Boar’ mashed potatoes, whose flavor could never be reproduced at home with an actual tuber.

In any case the doctor is conceptually a ‘server’ who offers the ‘client’ a particular item. The sovereign patient/consumer can then choose among the options. Would you like to have a side of nursing with your chemotherapy? It’s always nice to round out your treatment with an extra helping of nutritionist’s advice.

We have two different courses of treatment that you can follow– and you are free to choose, just as you are free to choose the chicken steak or fish of the cafeteria. But, of course, the commodity form is entirely inappropriate to the ‘service’ on offer– health. Why is this so?

The first problem is that the ‘patient/consumer’ is fundamentally ignorant and stands in a relationship of layperson to expert in the context of health care. This is all obscured by the falsely demotic language of ’empowerment’ that enjoins the patient to ‘take charge’ of her own care. But the entire reason that the patient seeks care is that doctors, nurses, and specialists are experts– they’re not offering ‘services.’ Instead, they are presumably in a position to determine which ‘services’ have an actual use for the patient.

But the commodity form undermines the expert/patient relationship by establishing the false sovereignty of the patient. Inevitably, this is reinforced by the ubiquitous customer satisfaction survey. ‘Did you enjoy your surgical experience?’ The sprawling apparatus of US health care is premised on the fiction of the patient as a sovereign consumer– the reality is anxiety and bewilderment.

The second problem posed by the commodity form is that the health ‘services’ violate the concept of marginal utility. There’s no reason to think that the ‘utility’ of an additional unit of health care will eventually decline as the total number of units of health care consumed increases. This is because ‘utility’ here is not a quantitative accumulation but a qualitative state– health. This state cannot be reduced to any series of fungible units, which is why, by the way, the saying that ‘health is wealth’ is absolutely false.

The third problem is that health care provision cannot be described by an indifference curve in which one commodity can be swapped out for another– two open-heart surgeries and an appendectomy cannot be substituted with a kidney transplant and cataract removal. The reason is that health care makes sense only in relation to a specific illness and is meant to return its recipient to a specific state.”

So if I’ll just try your patience for one more brief reading, the third foci or the third theme in the essay is really about the constant meditation on sociology and Marxism. And here, I’ll just give you one example of the kind of thing I’m doing here.

I’ll read note 35 entitled “Pseudo-antitheory.” “The self-hating sociologist is as familiar a figure of the current intellectual landscape as her close cousin, the self-hating philosopher. The target of this type is inevitably ‘theory,’ disparaged as a body of antiquated and irrelevant text at one time that may have been useful magazine of ‘hypotheses,’ but which now clutters intellectual space like a collection of unloved family heirlooms that no one has the courage to take to the dump.

But what is to replace them? Here the antitheorist inevitably suggests the following three claims. First, everyday explanations have just as much, if not more, analytic power as the specialized languages and categories of the classics. Second, significant social relationships are immediately apparent, especially now that we are awash in such a massive sea of data that even the tools of statistical inference, especially sampling, are no longer relevant. Third, and finally, scientific progress is most clearly indicated when scientists forget the history of their own fields of inquiry.

The paradox of the antitheorist’s position is that each of these claims is eminently theoretical. The first says that science is transparent to its members; the second, that causal connections are directly intuitable; and the third, that history of science is linear and progressive. What wild and unsupported metaphysical claims are these?

They reveal that the antitheorist is always in fact a pseudo-antitheorist, whose metaphysical body must be extracted from the misleading positivist shell in which she shrouds herself. Only then can the quivering fragility of the metaphysics be examined in the cold light of reason and evidence.”

So those are just some examples taken from these three themes within the book that I thought you might be interested in hearing. I mean, let me talk just very briefly about, I would say, my stance on each of these things.

The idea that I was after, I would say, was just to try to link the personal to the theoretical in some kind of fairly direct and unmediated way and in a way that was not burdened with an overly technical or specialized language. And that could in sense turns social theory into a tool for mastering to some extent life. That’s all I really have to say about it. So thanks.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] So now, I think it’s up to you. You can sit here, if you want. So the first commentator will be Colleen Lye, professor of English.

[COLLEEN LYE] Serendipitously, I’ve been enjoying this book, Marx’s Literary Style, a work published in 1975 by the Venezuelan poet and theorist Ludovico Silva but only published just this year in English translation. When I was asked to respond to Dylan’s book, referencing a line from Marx, that the poet is one who perceives what he thinks and thinks what he feels, Silva suggests that this might be true of Marxist style in general.

For Marx, Silva says, “Thinking is something that can be plastically perceived. The conceptual has a perceptual value.” Marxist metaphors help us to perceive the properly scientific or theoretical content of his propositions. Moreover, through an appropriate expenditure of energy on each page, utilizing a principle of linguistic economy, Silva says, Marx was able to be the ideal class that he was. That is, a breaker of ideas. His literary style had few equals when it came to, quote, “implacably stigmatizing ideas and personages while preserving a serenity of reasoning,” end quote.

To this point, Dylan Wiley’s Microverses represents a stylistic departure from such works as the civic foundations of fascism in Europe. Perhaps it could already be said of civic foundations that it implacably stigmatized ideas and personages while preserving a serenity of reasoning. But if so, not quite so economically as Microverses, which is perhaps to say figuratively.

So here are some examples, quote, from Microverses. “And who is the social theorists who develop the logic of the spreadsheet into a full-blown social theory? Pierre Bourdieu.” Or on Goran Therborn. Therborn’s influence, quote, “has now clearly taken on a reactionary or chloroforming significance. The thesis functions as what could be termed either ‘consolation prize Marxism’ or ‘subaltern Fukuyamism.’ The function is to integrate scholars who would otherwise produce more hard hitting and critical work, but who are now bogged down in an indefensible position.”

Not just with the use of metaphor to stigmatize ideas and personages but a metaphoric redeployment of a formula, an eye-opening metaphoric deployment– pardon the pun. For example, quote, “The circuit of simple commodity production illustrated by the formula C-M-C describes not just a type of economy but more importantly, a way of experiencing capitalist society. The democratic socialist left’s critique of capitalism with petit bourgeois ideology, an immediate point of view that sees capitalism through the spectacles of C-M-C.”

Speaking of democratic socialism, he also says, quote, “A rather ironic tone hangs over the products of the DSA intelligentsia. Jacobin’s colorful images, self-deprecating responses to social media attacks, and tongue-in-cheek section heads, ‘Means of Deduction,’ ‘Cultural Capital,’ they exemplify a cultural style that could be called ‘postmodern Kautskyism’ or ‘Kautskyism in an ironic mode.’ Like its forebear, it is characterized by the tendency to cover up and slaughter over theoretical and political difficulties; but unlike the original, this is all done with a nod and a wink,” end quote.

In a manner reminiscent of what Ludovico Silva refers to as the rounded style of many of Marx’s sentences wherein Marx formulates a phrase and then follows it with another using the same words with inverted syntax, here’s this one from Microverses.

Quote, “Intellectually, we live in the age of ‘adjectival capitalism’ Why is this the case? It might be connected with a new phase of capitalism, what I’ve termed ‘political capitalism’– another adjectival form. It might be the case that the political supports of surplus extraction are now so obvious that the critique of capitalism necessarily takes on a naive quasi-enlightenment form. But it might also be the case that the new adjectival capitalism talk is simply an occult demand for a capitalism without adjectives,” end quote.

At their best, metaphors clarify quite difficult abstract concepts without simplifying them as when Riley is trying to figure out how to explain the distinction and relationship between productive and reproductive labor. Quote, “Productive labor always leads to accumulation in some form; there is always at the end of the process ‘stuff’ that was not there before. There is always also a ‘mess’– this last requires reproductive labor to clean up.

The second difference to be noted concerns the differing orientations to time that flow from the two forms. The time of productive labor is teleological. It unfolds in relation to a purpose or end state. More generally, life, from the perspective of productive labor, is a project. The time of reproductive labor is, in contrast, cyclical. It unfolds not in relation to a given that it seeks to transcend, but to one it aims to conserve.”

Note 70 earmarked ‘Slow learner’ I think gets to the heart of why this form of writing, why Microverses. Quote, “I’m learning many lessons, but the most important ones concern time. The whole organization of time under capitalism discounts and ignores the now; everything is organized in relation to an ever receding past and a projected future.

The present becomes a mere means of linking the two voids. This relationship to time is always violent and irrational. But in my current circumstances it is pathological as well. One careens from painful nostalgia to despair without realizing what is happening now, which is precisely everything.” That’s it.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Thank you, Colleen. The next commentator is Professor Donna Jones also from the Department of English.

[DONNA JONES] Hi. OK, thank you. Yes, well, again, thank you for inviting me. And so yes, well, I must say it’s difficult, nonetheless, to put into words how for me this academic occasion differs from every other gathering to discuss a colleague’s work. Dylan is a colleague and a friend. And I’ve spoken about the work colleagues and friends before.

Yet Microverses not only presents an opportunity to think through and observe new thinking of a colleague and a friend. It also allows one, myself particularly, to think through a shared experience– the crises of COVID, the psychological and political torment of the Trump years, and for you Dylan, a crisis of which I witnessed and was unthinkable– the loss of Emanuela.

As I’m here on the social scientists’ turf, I will find safe haven in my comfort zone or what the kids refer to as my real house– the literary. Part of the thrill of reading Microverses is observing Dylan’s remarkable facility with sociological fundamentals. For literary scholar, the names Otto Hintze, Weber, Durkheim and Parsons are positively exotic.

Microverses are, undoubtedly, a meditation on critical sociology, a work of classic– to quote Dylan, “a work of classical social analysis written in the fashion of C. Wright Mills.” By critical, Dylan means critique as it is understood through Marx. Each note presumes a social totality. That totality may be a concept, a sociological or political concept, class, the state, or an example of the everyday– of everyday life– online teaching, music, class.

Each of these totality are understood through critique. That is, as Riley described so eloquently– I’m going to switch back and forth between Dylan and Riley. I’m just going to settle on Riley. Thank you. It’s like, yeah, what we do.

That is, as Riley described so eloquently, an elucidation and condition of possibility for something to exist. In his note on of critique, it is precisely this mode of critique that is mobilized, page 23. Read this.

“Critique. What does sociology lack– why does sociology lack a culture of critique? Undoubtedly, the sociology of knowledge, especially in its Bourdieusian form, bears a heavy responsibility. The basic task of the critic is to deal with the text before him or her.

The piece must be treated in the first instance as a self-standing structure, like a built object, although it must also be subsequently contextualized historically. It should not be dissolved in the acid bath of ‘positionality’ or alternately treated as the expression of a stance in the field. One effect of approaching culture from the perspective of reduction to biography or of stance-taking is that it becomes impossible to treat ideas seriously; and as a result, critique also becomes impossible, or rather a suspect activity.

The critic, after all, also has a position in the field, an agenda, et cetera, so why bother with what he or she says? Reviews, in this context, become more or less sincere advertisements.”

“The piece must be treated in the first instance as a self-standing object.” In treating the piece as a self-standing objects, curiously, this describes the orientation the critic should maintain towards the object in order to conduct a critique. One must hold the concepts and hold the concept scenario at length and provisionally lend it the autonomy of separation from its surrounding, although to historicize– although to historicize allows one to think the object through a context.

This describes the method of critique. But as a literary scholar trained to observe the form of an object, Riley also presents a rationale for the notes, for the necessity of short prose, aphoristic in moments, impressionistic in others, critical in most, and while I would say all. As the title suggests, Microverses, each note is an instance of critique in itself, a collection of self-standing objects, each an instance of critical sociology.

In my limited time, I would like to remark on the work of Microverses– excuse me, on the work of Microverses. It is an untimely work. That is, while we see examples of short prose everywhere– I mean, we can think of this in Twitter, for example, which is writing directed by and appealing to the algorithmic superego– I would say that we rarely see so decidedly a critical approach to the short form, one which brings us back to the philosophical aspirations and radical traditions of note and aphoristic writing.

So bear with me for a moment with my reckless positioning. But I have a fond memory of our intense walk once, Dylan. And it was muddy and in twilight. And you mentioned that you were writing this book, this collection of short works, I remember you saying. And I remember– or maybe I said this outline. I’m not quite sure. But I remember saying something to the effect of, isn’t that positively 19th century of you? [LAUGHS]

But let’s talk a little bit more about the short form. So the short form is fitting for a critical account of social concepts in a time of crisis, which I understand as a period of suspense much like the Roman usage, which analogizes social crisis with that of the body. A crisis marks a moment in an illness when the body was at a cusp of recovery or decline. The height of a fever, for example.

A work, which, I think– I don’t know if we spoke about together. But I remember thinking about when I read Microverses is by the cultural critic Eric Cazdyn, whose intellectual memoir, already dead, refers to crisis as an extended period to fight against late capitalism’s dissimulation– excuse me, dissimulated crisis imagined as catastrophe.

Cazdyn writes, “Crisis is not what happens when we go wrong but what happens when things go as they should.” And it’s an interesting work too because Cazdyn– actually, this is a work that was written on the occasion of him moving to a new job in Canada and having been diagnosed with leukemia. So he comes up with an idea of the chronic, which was all about his engagement with the health care system in Canada and how health care was not about cure but about maintenance. And so your note on “Soma” really made me think hard about Cazdyn’s idea about chronic as being the temporality of late capitalism. Be interesting to see what you think about it.

So as you all know, there’s a long history of the short work and aphoristic writing and the radical tradition, which most of you know. I won’t rehearse here. But there are some features of this history, which I think Riley’s project explores and expands upon. First is that aphoristic writing short works are structurally positioned to engage with the here and now.

This frequently take– this frequently involves the short work’s uncanny ability to interject critical worldviews into subject matters that are considered light or mundane that comes from, I guess, a kind of politics [INAUDIBLE] tone, for example. I mean, pushing the radicals to the culture page in our newspaper post the 18 Brumaire. But it also, we see this in political– we see that political engagement with the mundane throughout. Jakob Norberg writes famously about Adorno’s Minima Moralia, that it resembles an advice column.

So in another way to you, another thing about aphorisms and aphoristic writings is that it has a relentless engagement with the present and an understanding of the present as a state of suspension. And Colleen, you spoke to this. But I won’t– because I’m running out short of time, I won’t speak to that. And we see this a great deal in some of the more beautiful segments, for example, the note on walking, which speaks that absolutely gorgeous line, “The absent-minded solitary walker is nowhere to be found.”

So in the perambulatory aspects of the aphorism or aphoristic writing. Again, in and through critique, we see how it is engaged with this present, what is walking look like in our present moment. And our present moment, it is about the biosociality of recognizing that we are all disease vectors. And so that sense of freedom that we get from walking is not quite there. But there is a moment of social recognition, of social truth that we get to evolve from that.

And then the last point, I would say, is that aphorisms percent themselves as a world unto themselves as totality is. Andrew Hui argues that the aphorism oscillates between fragments and systems. Or as Schiller views, a fragment should be isolated like a little work of art and complete in itself like a hedgehog. In collection, red ensemble, we argues that a collection of aphorisms morphs into a multitude of cunning foxes.

And I would say that that relationship between parts and whole, the beautiful metonymy of your work, which is incredibly Marxian, Marx in what I would say is the grand formal innovator of metonymy of parts and wholes. We begin with linen. And we end with the grand conceptual universe of exchange value.

But I think your expression of that metonymy, of the importance of the metonymy in the note and in understanding our social world comes in a beautiful note on granny quilts. And I think– granny squares. And I think I’ll just end with that actually because it was precisely that everyday aspect that critique as it looks at the ordinary, the mundane.

So “Blankets. In crochet, there is a technique called ‘granny squares’ in which the maker produces a number of small multicolored squares of yarn. These are subsequently assembled to form a blanket. The technique is often deployed to use up odds and ends of yarns accumulated as leftovers from previous projects.

Emanuela recently completed a very beautiful such blanket. These notes are also ‘granny squares.’ They are scraps of thought worked up into little tiles. But whether they will form a striking mosaic will depend on how they are arranged and put together.”

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Thank you, Donna, very much and Colleen. And now, maybe Dylan can respond. And then we’ll have questions and answers.

[DYLAN RILEY] First of all, I’d just like to say, really sincere thanks to both Colleen and Donna for these comments and just the care with which they thought about Microverses. I would just say that what I have learned from these comments but I don’t think I really understood before is the way in which the stylistic move that I’ve made in producing this book, I think it does very much have its roots in my particular understanding of social theory and of Marxism. I just wasn’t really aware of that before.

So I don’t know what to say about that other than thank you for bringing that. Thank you for bringing that point to the fore. And it gives me a lot to think about and to work with. And I hope that this is the beginning of maybe a very serious conversation that really links social sciences and humanities together on this campus. I say, thank you for that.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK]OK, great. Thank you. So we have this half an hour for questions, discussions, comments. These folks who are on Zoom, you can put your questions in the Q&A section. Or you can also put them into the chat. I see both windows. And maybe we can start with the audience here. I understand that not everyone probably had seen and read the book yet. Question them.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Thank you very much. I much enjoyed reading your book. And I just have a couple of queries about a couple of your entries that you could maybe reflect upon. One is where you talk about Trump. And you say that there’s perhaps been too much obsession with his capacity for deceit and not enough on what you refer to as his extraordinary ability to speak, quote unquote, “spectacular truth.” I wonder if you could talk a little bit about that.

Second, you have a couple of entries that speak about racial capitals. And it seems to me you’re querying or troubling that in some way. One seemed to be in relationship to American historiography and the origins of American capitalism, where it seems to me that you question whether, for example, the American slave plantation should be construed as capitalist. That’s, obviously, part of a long-standing debate, as you know.

But it seems to me you are also something in there– this is what I’d like you to reflect upon– some other type of implicit questioning of the category of racial capitalism that turns on the threat of class that runs through your book. I wondered if you could reflect upon that I have another question about your decolonizing sociology. But should I ask that too?

Sure.

So you say– OK, so sociology is in the middle of a decolonizing moment. And then you say something like– I’m ventriloquizing. I’m probably misreading what you have to say.

But you say something like, well, that’s all well and good because it raises questions about the relationship between knowledge and empire. But that taken to its logical conclusion will produce something– you end that quote– you end that entry by saying something like it will simply end up with nothing more than “annotated bibliography,” quote unquote. I wondered if you could opine on that one too.

[LAUGHTER]

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Should we take a number of questions?

Yeah, maybe we– but you already have a number. You have three. So maybe–

Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah.

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi. Thank you for this. I just started reading the book. Really look forward to finishing it. I was curious about the concept of– the Durkheimian concept of collective effervescence of questions of– I’m a humanist, trained in humanities.

And so thinking about transcendence, presence, immanence, feeling, soul, could I say? But collective effervescence and wondering where in the book, if at all, you might engage with these questions. And it would seem to me that given these three major traumatic events in your life– and some of them that we experience– that perhaps some of that would emerge, so.

[DYLAN RILEY] Well, great. Thanks for these questions. So I guess I’ll just go in order, the question. So the question about Trump. So it was, obviously, media on why was the Trump was this unprecedented liar. I think The Washington Post even had a tracker that had some– sorry, I’m failing in my duties to use this microphone correctly.

There was a tracker of all the lies that he told. But I was just unsatisfied with that. As a way of understanding his particular form of charisma, of course, he said absurd things all the time. But what I always found so interesting about him was that the times that he’s told the truth– and I’m thinking particularly– I think I mentioned it in the note– it’s that South Carolina Republican primary, where he’s up here on the stage with these candidates.

And they’re talking about the Gulf War. He’s just like, oh, this is a total disaster. And you people are responsible for it. Absolutely right. And, of course, no Democratic candidate would ever dare to say something like that. Or the other time when– I think this was after the election, where he says, well, Schumer and Pelosi, they’re just creatures of finance capital. Who could argue with that?

So I mean, there were just these moments in which I thought that– and just more generally, there was this, obviously, part of his appeal was that he was revealing the feeling that the game is rigged. This is the way things really worked. And, obviously, I’m just as corrupt as these people. But at least, I’m openly corrupt. And I’m openly lying to you.

So I just think that was an important thing to understand. And I thought that this wasn’t captured very well by the sententious moralizing of the liberal center as it went on and on pointing out how many lies Trump told. So I guess that’s what I was trying to pull out from that idea.

On the question of racial capitalism, I mean, I think that the question of race and capitalism is absolutely central. And I don’t think it’s well posed in the concept of racial capitalism, as I understand it primarily from Cedric Robinson’s book Black Marxism. So my position on that, I guess, in some ways, is a kind of fairly orthodox one.

I do think, obviously, that if we want to understand the dynamics of the American political economy, we, obviously, have to understand racialized commodity-oriented slavery. I do not think– in my view, I don’t think that the right way to pose this issue is to say, oh, American capitalism somehow wouldn’t have gotten off the ground if it hadn’t been for racialized slavery.

I don’t think that’s the case. I actually think that from an economic point of view, the American South was an enormous drag on the American economy. And I think that if you actually look carefully at the historiography, it basically says that in the decades leading up to the Civil War, you see a process of economic decoupling between the North and the South. And that’s actually in some ways an important driver of that whole period, that what was really driving American capitalist growth was the East-West exchange and not the North-South one.

So I think there are some important questions about this notion. And I also think that what I find surprising about the recent readdition of it– this is the complex literature. And people are talking about it in different ways.

But the basic idea of racial capitalism, I still think, relies on a fundamentally unfair trade model of exploitation and essentially says that what allowed for capital accumulation in the North, now speaking broadly, the core European lands and Northern parts of the United States was that there was a class of primitive accumulation based on this unpaid transfer of labor. I wouldn’t say that there wasn’t an unpaid transfer of labor. I would just very much question its centrality to the origins dynamic of capitalism in its core zone.

So it’s just an empirical point. And I believe that– I mean, I offer a different way of thinking about the relationship between race and capitalism that’s really premised on the existence of uneven development is the key issue. But we can talk about that maybe separately.

On decolonizing the syllabus, I mean, I guess my point about this is simple. I don’t want to be Mr.– this idea that the syllabus is an untouchable thing, I think, is absurd. I will say that right off the bat.

And I think one of the things that’s good about this moment that sociology is going through is that it’s examining and thinking about its core, its foundation. Having said that, I just don’t– in sociology, this movement has not produced what I see as an actually particularly hard-hitting critique and reconstruction of the core thinkers. It’s essentially become an additive process, in which what we say is that, oh, well, we have these people. And here’s this other person, who was writing at the same time. So they should go in.

So this is just a weak– it’s just intellectually not yet solidified is what I would say in sociology. And that’s what I was pointing out. I do think that what it has done most importantly is to emphasize the concept of empire and theories of imperialism as a central topic. So I think that is important.

On Durkheim, I don’t talk too much about collective effervescence. But I have enormous respect for Durkheim. And I’m actually– one of the notes that I’m very proud of is my Durkheimian discussion of Robert Brenner’s theory of the origins of capitalism called sticking together.

So I do think that Durkheim is of fundamental importance. I actually think– well, I have peculiar views about Durkheim. I think that Durkheim’s substantive social theory, especially in the division of labor in society, is virtually identical to Hegel’s theory in the philosophy of right and that the two can be read all– the books are so similar that one can almost be read as a French translation of the other or German trends. Anyway, I think they– and I also think that Durkheim– I mean, his commitment to totalizing explanation and all of that, I have great appreciation for that.

[INAUDIBLE]

Yeah.

[COLLEEN LYE] Just, if I may jump in on the first set of questions, just to supplement your response to the question about decolonizing the syllabus and racial capitalism debates. I’ll try to be really pithy. But my take on what you had to say in Microverses or at least what I got out of Microverses starting with the racial capitalism question was that I was struck– it seemed to me that certainly in this text, you were not going to be able to or you were not interested in making a full-fledged argument that could get into the weeds as to whether plantation slavery in the South in the 19th century could be proven to show a declining rate of profit nor whether or not it counted as productive labor that was creating surplus value at the level of value and accumulation or the level of profit.

Rather, what I got from what you had to say was that there was– so it wasn’t an economic argument you were making here or capable of making here. The one pithy thing I got from it was that you were distinguishing between the economic maneuver at the heart of racial capitalism, which was centering on the concept of the rip-off. Off. And that’s the term you used on page 99 to 100 in note 88– versus what Marxian’s critique of wage labor within capitalism, which is the core insight.

There’s a labor power, was free and paid at its value. The point is that it’s not wage theft that’s happening at the level of labor power as a commodity so that you’re making a kind of distinction here between the rip-off versus being paid at value. Therefore, there’s two different kinds of arguments being made.

So I think that’s interesting. I don’t know if that’s [INAUDIBLE] to make that decision. I just wanted to point that out. And then on the decolonizing the syllabus thing, I thought what was super interesting coming from the perspective of literature, of course, canon war is something we’ve been having since the 1980s. So–

[DYLAN RILEY] Sociology is slow.

[INAUDIBLE]. [COLLEEN LYE] So what I thought was super interesting in light of your account of the state of the discourse there is that in literary studies, the left Bourdieusian position is contra the decolonial position. They’re on opposite sides of that. And I don’t need to get into all of this. We could say like it’s John Guillory versus ethnic studies or critical ethnic studies.

So what I found very interesting from your perspective was that you were drawing a set of dots between a left Bourdieusian perspective and a decolonial perspective, which had something to do with there being a kind of dialectical relation, it seemed to me, between the dissolution of positions within what you call– dissolution of ideas within the acid bath of positionality, on the one hand, and the logic of the power of the spreadsheet, which was fascinating to me.

So what is annotated– creating more extensive annotated bibliographies have to do with the spreadsheet. Like, is there a connection between those forms of sociology, critical sociology? So that sparked some questions for me. I thought it was interesting.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] So let’s take one question from the audience. And then maybe we can answer all of them.

Oh, thank you. Yeah, I just had two questions. One is, what social actor is able to affect a shift in the terms of debate from justice to rationality? In other words, who most urgently needs to take off the spectacles of C-M-C? And what spectacles do they need to put on? The second question is, what is the method by which social theory can be turned into a tool for mastering life?

[LAUGHTER]

[INAUDIBLE]

[DYLAN RILEY] OK, let me– so I guess I’m going to– I’m going to respond first to Colleen and then to William. I’ll respond to your question. It’s just really interesting what you’re saying because I think it would be right to say– I mean, Marion, it would be interesting to see what you think about this. But I think it’d be right to say that the movement toward a post-colonial or decolonizing sociology, the movement, it is generally– I’d say it’s driven by people who would consider themselves left Bourdieusians in some way.

So that’s just a very interesting observation. I had not thought about that particular opposition. And I do think– I guess what I’m saying, yeah, the idea of– one of the ideas behind it is, of course, this notion of positionality that we have this canon that is constituted by these middle class white guys. And we have to get different perspectives.

So that’s where it’s coming from. Or that’s the particular theoretical impetus behind that. I mean, the other, I think, major theorist, of course, is Foucault. I mean, that’s the other person that’s really important for, I guess, sociology. I mean, at least– or at least there’s this invocation of the notion of an episteme as structuring things.

So I just have to think more about exactly why– I mean, these questions of– yeah, I mean, I suppose in some ways– I mean, in some ways, this is a very disciplinary book, even though it’s also not supposed to be really an academic book. But it’s very, obviously, rooted in a particular intellectual perspective in that way. And I don’t know what to say exactly about that. I’d be really interested to hear more about or just think more about this conflict that you’re talking about between the left Bourdieusians and the decolonials in literary studies.

So William, yeah, your two impossibly hard questions. So let’s see what to say about that. So the basic– so I would say that the– I think that– here is my bottom line about this.

I do believe that the contemporary intellectual left is in a very difficult set of circumstances because I think in some ways– so I think in some ways, it’s not an accident that the flagship journal of the American left is called Jacobin. Because I think, basically, we’re basically back before the French Revolution in certain respects and that, basically, the task of the left is to re-establish the bourgeois state, which is not– it’s an odd position to be in. And so basically, what you have is the idea– what are the things, the animating– what are the animating ideas? It, obviously, monopoly power, unfairness, rip-off economy, reinstituting legality struggle against corruption.

So I don’t know whether I’m– what I would say is that in some ways, I’m offering a critique of this as saying, well, these things are not– they’re not exactly what we had thought about in the classical Marxist tradition, which was about creating a new form of society. But it’s also understandable why those things are the kind of horizon of political possibilities at this point in time.

So I guess that’s the tension that runs through a lot of these notes in a way. And on the other one, in terms of– I think you asked something about how social theory could be made relevant to life. I don’t know. I mean, my glib answer would just be to say, well, just read Microverses [INAUDIBLE]. I mean, it’s basically– the idea is just that you can– it’s the idea that there’s something therapeutic about being able to position oneself in a historical moment and in the social structure, that that itself is somehow a relevant exercise to life.

Yes.

[DONNA JONES] Yeah, no, Dylan, actually, I was going to ask a question of the task of the left, which is to kind of reestablish, really, a state in some ways or elements of it. And it’s in the neoliberal nightmare, where you talk about the state of basically politics, and socialism and politics. Actually, that’s a lovely– truly a– I’m just going to read them.

Yeah.

I think it’s actually really fascinating note. Hold on a second. There we go. “Neoliberal nightmares, Hayek’s greatest fear and the thing that set it apart so clearly from his classical forebearers like Smith, was that socialism might be the default condition of humanity.” And I love that for this. Exactly, the state of nature, of course. Obviously right.

“So it is this gnawing sensation that drove his obsessive defense of the price mechanism and its various moral and institutional supports was right. Perhaps, the massive historicizing apparatus of Marxism has misled to some extent.” I’ll let you go.

“For crises, social and personal, reveal an extensive network of reciprocity resting just under the surface of capitalist society. The proof of its existence lies simply in the fact that hundreds of millions of people have not been thrown into the streets. The social mechanism still works. How is this at all possible?”

“Socialism is already here. It needs only a crisis to reveal it. Or perhaps, this is just the idle dream that emerges every time the humanized society recedes beyond the horizon of the attainable. Anarchists and opportunists are forever forgetting politics. They are most appealing when politics itself seems hopeless.” This is fascinating.

[DYLAN RILEY] Yeah. I mean, that note created a lot of friction, I will say.

Right.

So what’s being said in that note, am I saying– I mean, I’m trying to say that I understand the appeal. I understand the appeal of this idea of a kind of– I guess the millenarian hopes without politics. But I think at the end of what I’m saying there– is that’s probably an illusion. It’s probably an illusion to think that ultimately, politics is completely unavoidable and obviously not necessarily just electoral.

In fact, necessarily not electoral politics alone, but that that is– I guess there’s a kind of barbarian idea of slow boring of hard boards or whatever that has to happen in order to carry forward one’s project. So I think ultimately, I’m trying to distance myself from these things. But also to understand the appeal and to understand this idea that, well, maybe there was this– because that was also trying to understand this moment of the coronavirus as sort of like, wow, it’s quite amazing that, in fact, how connected everyone is I found.

[DONNA JONES] Well, I mean, yeah. No, I completely– and also, again, looking at this structure informally, what I see in the argument is a way in which, again, the critique enables us to look through certain dissimulating aspects of capitalism. Capitalism wants to prevent catastrophe in a particular way. That without politics, it is just zombie apocalypse [INAUDIBLE].

And so I think the fact– I mean, again, that in this crisis, what, and if we put this crisis that is being presented to us in terms of apostrophe that we look behind that and that there is a nonetheless a kind of social structure of care that is borne out of necessity that isn’t Hayek’s world as nature.

[DYLAN RILEY] Well, yeah. I mean, what I find so fascinating about Hayek, and I think Hayek– what I find fascinating about Hayek is that he sees cooperation as the default conditions. This I find very interesting. And his point is not that capitalism is natural, but that it must be created through this process of socialization and norm creation that must break the naturally solidaristic sort of tendencies of humanity.

I just think that’s amazing, actually, that particular idea. And in a sense, it’s an even stronger statement. It’s not socialism is hardwired into human nature. But the problem is you won’t get growth. I think that this aspect– I just think Hayek is actually very interesting thinker to think of– in relationship to these things.

And as I’m saying, in a way, he turns Marx completely around in that way. Because for Hayek, socialism is the starting point. But for Marx, it’s the endpoint. So that’s kind of interesting. I don’t know. Anyway, I don’t know if that answers your question.

No, it on this topic exactly right. [INAUDIBLE]

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] I wanted to ask if there are any more questions because we–

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

Carry on.

[MARION FOURCADE] Thanks, this is a wonderful exchange. First, there’s a question online that I have to post. It say something like, I’ve heard that Dylan Riley is the best sociologist in the world. Is that true? And second–

[INAUDIBLE]

Yeah, exactly.

I wanted to ask you, I enormously admire the form, and we’ve been talking about the form of this book. And I’m wondering how do you go back after this? How do you go back to professional academic sociology? And how do you envision going back or not?

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Are there any more questions? Let’s take three, and then–

OK.

–we’ll go to the–

[AUDIENCE MEMBER] Hi, just a remark. Like that there was this micro verse about health, and you made this beautiful metaphor about cafeteria and about– we all hear that. But what I was thinking after like hearing that, it’s actually the idea that with health, maybe it’s not necessary only to get into the point where we are OK, like we are treated, we are cured.

But there was always– and it still is and it’s a growing– the idea that we might be more. So it’s not only curing. It’s like upgrading.

Yeah.

Thank you.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] Dylan, if you don’t mind, I will ask a question as well.

Yes.

I quickly make it a third one. So in many places in the book, you talk about this problem with the kind of politics, which critiques corruption or which focuses on redistribution, in a way, Democratic Socialists, the left today in the United States. And the examples of Brazil, Italy, the rest of Europe maybe, United States, of course, and I’m just curious, would that argument work in every context?

I’m thinking in particular today about the other place, which you have been thinking about deeply in the last year, Putin’s regime in Russia, where the left oppositional politics is simply impossible. I mean, it exists outside of the place. And there is this movement around Navalny, who I think you know Alexei Navalny, who is this liberal oppositional figure who focuses precisely on the corruption of the elites.

And yet, that movement has been very much in– well, one can argue at least, it has been used by a lot of the left as a kind of a vehicle through which to organize. And in the process of the interaction, it has itself been mutating. So the arguments, which these politicians, liberal politicians in the opposition, are making are now being influenced by the left. Is this very different context? And this is why maybe you’ll say something else about it, or can something like this be also relevant to the US?

[DYLAN RILEY] OK, so I’ll just say– OK, so I know one answer. I’m definitely not the best sociologist in the world. I’m not even sure I’m a particularly good sociologist. Anyway, that’s–

The best.

It appeared that was the first question.

Yeah. What I will say about your question, about how do you return to– I mean, I think the conditions of existence for the production of these were somewhat particular but I do think it will have lasting effects on the style of work I do going forward. Having said that, like I respect very much, actually, just the craft of sociology. So I think it’s a very serious enterprise. And I hope to continue to contribute to that enterprise in the way that we do. We’ll see if I’m successful or not.

Now, OK, who am I missing here? Was there another question after Marion’s question, but before Alexei’s question?

About the health.

The health question. That’s right. Yeah, no, that’s a great– yeah, so what I wanted to say, I think, in the health one is simply this idea– yeah, I guess I don’t mean to say that health is necessarily a minimal state, but it is some kind of state or a practice. And I think that what I was sort of playing with was the idea that it might be very difficult to treat a state of being in that way through the lens of commodities, where particular pieces of it are hived off.

And when you’re going through something like what Manuela and I went through, you see this very clearly. And there’s one way in which you see it very clearly that I didn’t write about it in the notes but I will tell you now, which is at the end of the time when it was obvious that she was dying, that was never communicated. Because the way that the health care system saw her was through a series of metrics and numbers.

So even weeks before she was dying, they were saying, well, this blood works fine so we’ll continue. But I was like– what I wanted to say is like, I can see her. I know this person, and she’s dying. And that’s another way in which there is just this cognitive disconnect between an overall state and the form, the commodity form, and there’s delivery of the health care happens.

And I don’t mean to– I mean, the people who cared for Manuela were amazing. But there is this enormous– obviously, there are these institutional pressures and there are even technological pressures to look at things through what are essentially disconnected metrics and never retotalized them, and, well, there’s a person here that you need to look at this person who’s in front of you.

In fact, because of COVID, she was visited only one time by a physician in person, I should say that, too, which is remarkable. And on what Alexei’s last question, I’ve been thinking about this for– I mean, you anticipated it, so I’ve been thinking about–

So the first thing I would say is that my critique of these various anti-corruption movements is not to dismiss them. I mean, even in the West, and there’s a real reason for Lava Jato. There’s a real reason for manipulating. There’s a real reason for the enthusiasm around Navalny. I think they’re probably– I think they’re probably species of a genre or however you put that.

But I think it is very difficult for the left to engage in a serious way. I think anti-corruption can be a real difficult nettle. And the reason is because to point out that the state is corrupt can have exactly the opposite effect of one intends. It can basically reinforce the idea, well, if the state is corrupt, why are we paying taxes? If the state is corrupt, why do we engage in any social enterprise?

So obviously, in the Russian case at this moment, the role of Navalny is unquestionably progressive, and it’s completely obvious that he should have the support of the left. And I think Bourdieusians and others have been making that point very clearly, and that’s right. But I think there will be limits, I mean, to that sort of politics.

And it would probably be worthwhile to really– I mean, I think for the Russian left, as well, to think about, particularly, the Brazilian case and the Italian case and what happened to these very substantial anti-corruption movements and the way that they immediately, almost immediately, became hijacked by the right. There’s some structural relationship between anti-corruption as a platform and a kind of anti-statism. And that’s just a difficult thing to I think overcome.

[ALEXEI YURCHAK] OK, I think we– unless there is another urgent question– we are coming to the conclusion of this event. Thank you very much, everyone.

[DYLAN RILEY] Thank you all. Thank you very much. [INAUDIBLE].

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Authors Meet Critics

Authors Meet Critics: How the Clinic Made Gender

Part of the Matrix Authors Meet Critics event series.

Today, a world without “gender” is hard to imagine. Gender is at the center of contentious political and social debates, shapes policy decisions, and informs our everyday lives. Its formulation, however, is lesser known: gender was first used in clinical practice.

On November 9, 2022, Social Science Matrix hosted an Authors Meet Critics panel discussion on How the Clinic Made Gender: The Medical History of a Transformative Idea, by Sandra Eder, Associate Professor of History at UC Berkeley.

Eder was joined in conversation by Laura Nelson, Associate Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at UC Berkeley, and Danya Lagos, Assistant Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology. The panel was moderated by Catherine Ceniza Choy, Professor of Ethnic Studies and Associate Dean of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, Justice, and Belonging in the UC Berkeley Division of Computing, Data Science, and Society.

The panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of History, Department of Gender and Women’s Studies, Center for Race and Gender, and Center for Science, Technology, Medicine and Society (CSTMS).

In How the Clinic Made Gender, Eder tells the story of the invention of gender in American medicine, detailing how it was shaped by mid-20th-century American notions of culture, personality, and social engineering. The book shows how the concept of gender transformed from a pragmatic tool in the sex assignment of children with intersex traits in the 1950s to an essential category in clinics for transgender individuals in the 1960s.

“As often, this book started from an intriguing question, or rather what seemed a paradox to me,” Eder explained in her presentation. “I started the project to understand how clinicians in the 1950s formulated the idea of a learned gender role, and yet at the same time, the very same people devised normalizing treatment protocols for children with intersex traits involving non-consensual genital surgery, which have been widely criticized since the late 1980s.”

The book “shows the intrinsic links between these two stories by examining the shifting landscapes of discussion about sex and gender and sexuality in these cases,” Eder said. “Above all, the book is a story about how gender was made, the intricate way in which ideas were put into practice, and practices informed ideas…. While novel in its formulation is sex gender binary, it was rather a consolidation of several currents in the social sciences, psychology, and psychiatry, with medical practices and social norms.”

“Gender was and is a dynamic category,” she said. “Different groups use the term gender to delineate various relationships between nature and nurture, biology and culture. So these meanings change over time and through practices.”

In commenting on the book, Danya Lagos said that she “really liked the book” and was “interested in the insight it gives us into the logic of how gender was shifting with all of these imperatives of economic, national, and political interests.”

“The most interesting part of the book for me was the context of the World War II social engineering,” Lagos said. “It’s very different from kind of the laissez faire neoliberalism after the 1980s. One question I had was, what are the norms towards which society is being engineered?  There’s the concern for the parents, but there’s also this handling of someone who really does not fit the mold that society would have set out for them.”

She pointed to the example of how doctors were concerned that a woman, Carol, who was born with male sex traits would not be able to marry and so “might be hard pressed to support herself,” and thus determined that male sex assignment would be a practical solution. “There’s this dialogue between the social sciences and the active social engineering going on,” Lagos said. “It’s never considered that we would allow someone like Carol to live life as a masculine woman. It was, if this person is unmanageable, let’s put them to work and have them at least be able to take care of herself, or themselves, as a man….”

Laura Nelson also said that she found the book thought-provoking. “The concreteness of the research and the storytelling was really helpful in understanding how this particular choreography of the analytic — taking [gender] apart and putting together, taking apart and putting together — happened over time,” Nelson said. “The presumed goal throughout the book is that binary is goal. So what drew me in was the irony of the missed opportunity to take the growing medical and social recognition of the imperfection of a binary sex gender as a call to complexify and recognize variation as normal, and normativities as unrealistic.”

Nelson noted that doctors were too often trapped by societal norms, and so “defined variation as pathology, thereby reinforcing ideas of a normal, even when the variations continue to be confounding of simple binary sorting. Over and over again, you get people wrestling with this binary and saying that that’s pathological, rather than saying that is normative. It’s a story about finding real and profound discoveries of medical and biological operations, and binding them to conservative ideas and practices, rather than allowing discovery to lead to transformation.”

Matrix On Point

Matrix on Point: The Court and the People

In the wake of recent decisions on abortion, First Amendment rights, gun rights, Miranda rights, and jurisdiction over Native American reservations, the Supreme Court today seems particularly out of sync with the American people.

On October 20, Social Science Matrix hosted a “Matrix on Point” panel featuring UC Berkeley experts discussing what these decisions and the conservative turn in the Supreme Court mean for the relationship between the Court and the people.

The panel featured Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean, Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law at Berkeley Law; Thomas Biolsi, Professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies and Native American Studies in the Department of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley; and Khiara M. Bridges, Professor of Law at UC Berkeley School of Law. The panel was moderated by Ronit Stahl, Associate Professor in the UC Berkeley Department of History. This event was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley School of Law.

We have assembled a stellar group of Berkeley faculty,” said Marion Fourcade, Professor of Sociology and Director of Social Science Matrix. “As scholars, they can offer us historical grounding and insights that move us beyond the headlines. And we are really thrilled to have them here to discuss this enormously consequential ideological shift, or series of ideological shifts.”

Ronit Stahl agreed that “it has been a really transformative several years at the Supreme Court with new justices, and quite a few decisions that have shifted the landscape of American law in a range of domains.”

In his remarks, Dean Chemerinsky provided a concise summary of some of the recent Supreme Court cases and their broader implications. “I don’t think it’s hyperbole to say that the last year in the Supreme Court was the most dramatic term in my lifetime,” he said. “It was a year in which the Supreme Court changed the law not incrementally, but dramatically. It was a year in which the Supreme Court dealt not with minor or technical issues, but with enormously important questions that affect all of us, often in the most important, most intimate aspects of our lives.”

Chemerinsky provided an overview of “how we got here,” including the partisan appointments of conservative justices by Republican presidents. “Between 1960 and 2020, Republican presidents picked 15 justices of the Supreme Court, and Democratic presidents picked only eight justices,” he said. “That’s an almost two-to-one difference. President Donald Trump picked three justices in his four years in the White House. The prior three Democratic presidents, who spent combined 20 years in the White House, picked only four Supreme Court justices.”

The Berkeley Law dean highlighted select recent decisions, including Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which overturned Roe v. Wade and ruled that abortion is not a constitutional right. “It is rare in all of American history that the Supreme Court has taken a right away from people,” Chemerinsky said, “That’s exactly what the Supreme Court did, putting many people’s lives in jeopardy, putting many people’s health in jeopardy, and making abortion what is going to be the dominant issue in our political and legal process for years to come.”

Chemerinsky talked through other recent decisions on issues such as religion and gun rights, and noted that the conservative trend is sure to continue in the near- and long-term future. “This term again, the Supreme Court has cases that are likely to dramatically change the law and push it much further to the right,” he said. “I don’t think anyone, liberal or conservative, has much doubt what the Supreme Court is going to overrule 44 years of precedent and eliminate affirmative action. What a devastating effect that’s gonna have on diversity in higher education. What will it mean to have a court that’s come down so solidly on one side of that political divide? What will it mean for our society to have a Court that so lost its legitimacy?”

In his remarks, Thomas Biolsi focused on recent Supreme Court cases related to Native American territories, including McGirt v. Oklahoma, a 2020 case with a majority opinion written by Neil Gorsuch. “What this decision did was to basically declare that most of eastern Oklahoma is still what’s technically called, in Federal law, ‘Indian country,’ and that the reservations that had been established there in the 19th century were still legal in the territory, in which tribal governments have very expansive rights of self-government. And the state of Oklahoma has very limited intrusion into that.”

The decision was described as the “Indian law bombshell,” Biolsi said, because “what it did was to change the jurisdictional map, literally, of Oklahoma. So tribal governments have jurisdiction over Native people throughout these reservations. And more importantly, the state of Oklahoma does not have criminal jurisdiction.”

This finding, however, was “quickly counterbalanced” by another case, Oklahoma vs. Castro-Huerta, which “declared that the state of Oklahoma has concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the federal government over any non-Indian who commits a crime against an Indian person.”

Biolsi noted that this case “is perceived in Indian country as a great loss for tribal sovereignty,” as it held that “the state has jurisdiction over non-Indian people on the reservation…. The principle from the tribes’ point of view should be a government-to-government relationship, in which the state does not try to enter the territory of the tribe.”

In her remarks, Professor Khiara M. Bridges provided an overview of the history of Dobbs decision, including an explanation of how abortion laws have evolved since Roe v. Wade. The court’s decision in that 1973 case was remarkable, Bridges said, in part because “several of the justices in the majority were appointed by Republican presidents,” and the issue of abortion was “much less partisan.”

Still, she said, the decision was “derided and criticized from the moment that it was handed down, and anti-abortion activists and advocates immediately began brainstorming ways to limit Roe. And the end goal, of course, was to overturn it.”

Bridges traced the history through subsequent cases, including Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which “said that a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.”

The decision did, however, “replace the trimester framework with the undue burden standard,” which allowed states to impose regulations throughout the entirety of pregnancy. “The states were permitted under the undue burden standard to promote fetal life throughout pregnancy, and states could do that through the informed consent process by telling pregnant folks that their abortion will kill the life of a separate unique living human being, which is what North Dakota and South Dakota required physicians to tell pregnant folks before terminating a pregnancy,” Bridges explained. “The undue burden standard allowed states to erect obstacles in front of abortion care, and many of those obstacles would be surmountable by people with privilege…, but were insurmountable by folks without privilege, people who are poor, people who lived in rural areas, people who had disabilities, people who were young, or people who were undocumented.”

Bridges explained that everything changed with the Dobbs decision, as Justice Alito “argued that Roe was egregiously wrong, and as such the court was not bound… to respect it as precedent.” Alito’s decision “interpreted the 14th Amendment due process clause to protect a right to terminate a pre-viability pregnancy,” Bridges said. “According to the majority, because the clause only protects the rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’.”

“Alito canvassed3 abortion regulations in and around 1868, and concluded that abortion rights are not part of the nation’s history and tradition,” Bridges said. “The painfully obvious point is that folks capable of pregnancy were not part of the body politic during the period of the nation’s history that the majority believes is decisive of the constitutional inquiry…. As Justice Breyer explains, in his dissent, people did not ratify the 14th Amendment, men did. So it is perhaps not so surprising that the ratifiers were not perfectly attuned to the importance of reproductive rights for women’s liberty, or for their capacity to participate as equal members of our nation.”

Bridges also noted that the choice of 1868 was a selective history, as the social movement to criminalize abortion only began in the 19th century, as it was led by “white obstetrician male gynecologist interested in taking the fields of obstetrics and gynecology away from those who had been deemed experts in that field before: midwives.”

She also pointed out that the selection of 1868 as a benchmark for modern laws “does not bode well for the persistence of other fundamental rights that earlier iterations of the court have found in the due process clause,” such as the right to obtain contraception or to marry or have consensual sex with an adult of the same sex.

“The methodology of constitutional interpretation that the majority deploys to return the question of abortion’s legality to the states could be just as easily be deployed to do the same with regard to the legality of contraception, the legality of same-sex sex, and the legality of same-sex marriage. And as a reproductive justice scholar, I want to point out that I can make the same point about the right to be free from coerced sterilization.”

Authors Meet Critics

Voices in the Code: A Story About People, Their Values, and the Algorithm They Made

Recorded on October 10, 2022, this “Authors Meet Critics” panel focused on the book Voices in the Code: A Story About People, Their Values, and the Algorithm They Made, by David Robinson, a visiting scholar at Social Science Matrix and a member of the faculty at Apple University. Robinson was joined in conversation by Iason Gabriel, a Staff Research Scientist at DeepMind, and Deirdre Mulligan, Professor in the UC Berkeley School of Information.

The panel was co-sponsored by the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, and the Algorithmic Fairness and Opacity Group (AFOG).

About the Book

Algorithms – rules written into software – shape key moments in our lives: from who gets hired or admitted to a top public school, to who should go to jail or receive scarce public benefits. Today, high stakes software is rarely open to scrutiny, but its code navigates moral questions: Which of a person’s traits are fair to consider as part of a job application? Who deserves priority in accessing scarce public resources, whether those are school seats, housing, or medicine? When someone first appears in a courtroom, how should their freedom be weighed against the risks they might pose to others?

Policymakers and the public often find algorithms to be complex, opaque and intimidating—and it can be tempting to pretend that hard moral questions have simple technological answers. But that approach leaves technical experts holding the moral microphone, and it stops people who lack technical expertise from making their voices heard. Today, policymakers and scholars are seeking better ways to share the moral decisionmaking within high stakes software — exploring ideas like public participation, transparency, forecasting, and algorithmic audits. But there are few real examples of those techniques in use.

In Voices in the Code, scholar David G. Robinson tells the story of how one community built a life-and-death algorithm in a relatively inclusive, accountable way. Between 2004 and 2014, a diverse group of patients, surgeons, clinicians, data scientists, public officials and advocates collaborated and compromised to build a new transplant matching algorithm – a system to offer donated kidneys to particular patients from the U.S. national waiting list.

Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders, unpublished archives, and a wide scholarly literature, Robinson shows how this new Kidney Allocation System emerged and evolved over time, as participants gradually built a shared understanding both of what was possible, and of what would be fair. Robinson finds much to criticize, but also much to admire, in this story. It ultimately illustrates both the promise and the limits of participation, transparency, forecasting and auditing of high stakes software. The book’s final chapter draws out lessons for the broader struggle to build technology in a democratic and accountable way.