Matrix On Point

Mainstreaming Psychedelics

Psychedelics are steadily moving from the fringes of counterculture to the heart of mainstream society, driven by a growing body of research and shifting public perception. Once relegated to underground movements, substances like psilocybin, LSD, and MDMA are now being explored for their potential in treating mental health conditions such as depression, PTSD, and anxiety. High-profile studies at institutions like Johns Hopkins and Stanford have highlighted their therapeutic benefits, while cities like Denver and Oakland have decriminalized their use. In addition, psychedelic retreats, wellness practices, and even art and tech industries are embracing these substances as tools for creativity, self-discovery, and healing. As psychedelics shed their stigma, they are catalyzing a broader conversation about mental health, spirituality, and the boundaries of human consciousness.

Recorded on March 6, 2025, this panel featured Diana Negrin, Lecturer of Geography at UC Berkeley; David Presti, Professor of Neuroscience at UC Berkeley; Charles Hirschkind, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley; and Graham Pechenik, a patent attorney and founder of Calyx Law. Poulomi Saha, Associate Professor of English and Co-director of the Program in Critical Theory at UC Berkeley, moderated.

Matrix On Point is a discussion series promoting focused, cross-disciplinary conversations on today’s most pressing issues. Offering opportunities for scholarly exchange and interaction, each Matrix On Point features the perspectives of leading scholars and specialists from different disciplines, followed by an open conversation. These thought-provoking events are free and open to the public.

This event was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of Geography, the Program in Critical TheoryCenter for Interdisciplinary Critical Inquiry, the Center for Research on Social Change, the UC Berkeley Department of English, and the UC Berkeley Center for the Science of Psychedelics.

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to this panel as a podcast below or on Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

CORI HAYDEN: Thank you so much for coming. Usually we say, sometimes, X, such and such speaker needs no introduction. Well, clearly, the topic needs no introduction. I’m delighted to see such a crowd here. So my name is Cori Hayden. I’m delighted to welcome you here to the Matrix. I’m the interim director this semester.

I think it’s clear that the resurgence of psychedelics has completely transformed how we are thinking about all manner of things, from mental health to spirituality to the boundaries of human consciousness. And I am delighted to welcome this extraordinary panel of colleagues, scholars, practitioners with expertise in biology, anthropology, law, critical theory, neuroscience to guide us through this discussion.

Now, today’s event is co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Center for Interdisciplinary Critical Inquiry, the Center for Research on Social Change, the Center for the Science of Psychedelics, the Program in Critical Theory, and the Departments of Geography and English. And I also want to make sure to thank the Social Science Matrix’s extraordinary staff, Chuck Kapelke, Eva Seto, and Sarah Harrington. Thank you all.

So before I turn it over to the panelists, I want to briefly mention a few upcoming events here at the Social Science Matrix in this space. We have an Author Meets Critics Panel on Monday, March 17th, on Colonizing Palestine with Areej Sabbagh-Khoury. March 18th, a panel on the New Contours of Mass Incarceration.

Projects on computational analyzes. An Author Meets Critics on Native Lands with Shari Huhndorf. So anyway, please go to the website and take note of these things, and we hope to see you in this room again very soon.

Let me just briefly now– and welcome, Graham– introduce our moderator, Poulomi Saha. So Poulomi Saha is Associate Professor of English and Co-director of the Program in Critical Theory at UC Berkeley. Professor Saha works at the intersection of American Studies, psychoanalytic critique, feminist and queer theory, postcolonial studies.

And as a Flourish Fellow at the UC Berkeley Center for the Science of Psychedelics, they explore the intersections of mysticism, psychedelics, and critical theory from spiritual, psychoanalytic, and sociological perspectives. Also, might possibly be finishing a book on cults, so I heard, possibly could be true. Without further ado, let me turn it over to the panel to Poulomi, and thank you all for being here. I’m really excited.

POULOMI SAHA: Oh, I don’t have to get up, ha. Hi, everyone. I didn’t realize I was mic’d up. I’m Poulomi Saha. I’m really delighted to be moderating this afternoon’s event, which is called mainstreaming psychedelics. And we have a really extraordinary panel, and I don’t want to take up more time than is my due.

But I will say that, actually, three of us on this panel are Flourish Fellows this year. The Flourish Fellowship is an initiative that was launched by the Berkeley Center for the Study of Psychedelics in collaboration with [? CC ?] and Harvard University. And this year was the first year for the Psychedelics in Society and Culture Fellowship, which Diana, Charles, and I all received fellowships.

And there is another fellowship round coming up if you are interested, March 16th. Information is available on the website. I highly recommend you check it out. It has funded some really exciting initiatives and projects on campus this year and is sure to do so next year, including some of the work that we’re going to hear today.

Normally, I would spend much more time on introductions, but I’m told that time is short, so forgive me for giving short shrift to the extraordinary bios of our presenters. But I will very briefly introduce them and then hand it over.

Our first presenter is Diana Negrin, who is a lecturer in Geography at UC Berkeley. In addition to her research interests in identity, space, and social movements in Latin America and the United States, her current project seeks to document the impact of global theogen commodification on sacred Indigenous lands caused by agroindustrial expansion and peyote tourism, focusing on the preservation of Indigenous rights and the defense of ancestral lands against extractive practices.

Our second presenter, David Presti, is Professor of Neuroscience here at UC Berkeley. His areas of interest are human neurobiology and neurochemistry, the effects of drugs on the brain and mind, clinical treatments of addiction, and an evolving conversation between cognitive science with this philosophy, and the scientific study of the mind and consciousness.

He is the author of several books, but most recently, The Mind Beyond Brain– Buddhism, Science, and the Paranormal, and a public education course that I’d love to hear more about called Psychedelics and the Mind.

Then we have Charles Hirschkind, Professor of Anthropology here at UC Berkeley. His interests include religious practice, media technologies, and emergent forms of political community in the Middle East and Europe.

He is the author of two books, his most recent book released just a few years ago, entitled The Feeling of History– Islam, Romanticism, and Andalusia, and has a current project that I hope we’re going to hear about on psychedelics transnationally, but including in Israel.

And our final panelist is Graham Pechenik, who is a patent attorney and founder of Calyx law, a law firm, and I believe the only law firm in America, perhaps, specializing in cannabis and psychedelics-related intellectual property, especially as it relates to drug discovery and development.

He’s also the editor-at-large of Psychedelic Alpha, where he writes about psychedelics intellectual property and provides data for patent trackers, and maintains a psychedelic law and policy tracker with the UC Berkeley Center for the Science of Psychedelics.

It’s an extraordinary panel, and I will not take up any more time. I’m going to hand it over now first to Diana.

DIANA NEGRIN: Thank you so much, Poulomi. And thank you so much to the whole Social Science Matrix network, and I definitely have to say, Ambrosia Shapiro from the Geography Department for also helping network this in. My name is Diana. And also I want to add, I teach in the Ethnic Studies Department, so just a couple stories below us.

So I’m going to try to condense, in 15 minutes, what has really been a body of work that I’ve been researching for quite some years now, but it’s also part of my own biography in many ways, and so I’ll speak about that in a minute.

But I’m going to start with a little trip to a place called Las Margaritas. It’s an ejido. It’s communally-held land in the high plateaus of San Luis Potosi. One of the most beautiful places I have seen. It’s like a semi-desert in the sky, one could say.

And it’s a place that has been the site of pilgrimage for the Wixarika and many other Indigenous peoples of the Utah Nahuatl linguistic groups since time immemorial, but also since The Conquest, it’s become a very important site of pilgrimage for those Catholics that follow Saint Francis’s patron saint ethic, which is actually one that’s also tied to ecology.

However, there’s been a third pilgrimage, let’s say, they like to call themselves pilgrims, which has really begun since the 1960s, but taken off a lot more in the last 20 years or so, which is the new age pilgrims, the psychonauts. And Las Margaritas, Wirikuta, the way the land is called in Wixarika, has become one of many nodal points of these travels that psychonauts take. And there’s a transnational group, but many of them are Latin American.

And since 2010, I’ve been focusing a lot on the different communities of people who have been attracted to this land because of peyote, but in many ways have also participated, in one way or another with its– the land use change that’s happening. So in the summer of 2023, I went to Las Margaritas, and I found a new small retreat that had just been built since the previous year that I had been.

And this new retreat had been erected in a random plot of land, in the ejido, which is communally-held land, it’s not supposed to be bought and sold under law, and unlike the other houses in the community– there are houses. It’s a very small community. They’re all adobe houses. They’re very traditional. They’re all small farmers. This particular construction was made from materials that one would find at Home Depot, bricks and metal, principally, rather than adobe and wood.

All of the rooms were filled with bunk beds, and outside the structure, there was a small chapel that was being built with a Virgin of Guadalupe image and a cross at the top of the little steeple. And outside of there was the remnants of a sweat lodge, of a temazcal. The owner of this new construction– very modest, one wouldn’t think much of it if you were just walking, but I noticed it because it was new.

The owner is a Colombian psychonaut, a psychonaut, a traveler, a psychedelics traveler, who has a lot of relationships with people in the philanthropic circles of the north. He’s a Colombian individual who had already started retreats in other parts of Latin America.

And I spoke to the caretaker because the individual himself wasn’t there, and the caretaker told me that just a couple of weeks prior to me being there, there had been about 30 people lodging at this place, and they had gone and harvested great quantities of peyote, laid them out, dried them, ground them up, and took it with them.

Now that is, under law, illegal. Nobody is supposed to harvest peyote if you are not part of a tribe that is recognized as having practiced this harvesting since time immemorial. Furthermore, you’re not supposed to take peyote outside, much less of this region.

So what I think is so important is that, since 2003, I’ve been doing a lot of research with Wixarika struggles for autonomy, for sovereignty, land, defense. My first book looked at the activism of Wixarika university students and the way they were affirming their rights as citizens to Mexico. But at the tail end of that research, these mining concessions were declared, these transnational mining concessions owned by a Canadian company.

And that brought about a lot of attention towards Wirikuta. And many of the activists that were part of this network were people who had been attracted because of peyote. So my postdoc actually started to look at interviewing many of these individuals, who were largely of European descent, but Latin American, and all of my interviews started with the same point of departure, which was peyote, right?

They had encountered peyote prior to encountering Wirikuta, prior to encountering Wixarika culture, and it was from these transformative experiences that they wanted to now be a part of this transnational activist circle. And what we started to notice was that much of the attention was focused around Wirikuta, peyote, and the Wixarika, and the small farmers were largely foreclosed. They were erased from this picture.

And so, since 2010, in particular, I’ve been doing a lot of research in this area. And what I’ve been noticing more and more is that now it’s not just about the mining concessions, it’s also about large agroindustrial plots of land, mostly tomato for export. When we see dry farm tomatoes, that’s actually one of the indicators is that they might be coming from a place like Sonora or San Luis Potosi that’s semi-arid. Most of these are for export.

And then the third big land use change that I’ve noticed in particular in the last 10 years is the purchase of a [? helo ?] land in the name of land back, in the name of the Wixarika, without it being any Wixarika individuals.

Following Instagram, which has been a great source of netnography, I’ve come across, at least, a dozen initiatives, mostly led by either people from the United States, or maybe a Latin American that’s not actually connected to either San Luis Potosi or Jalisco that do events. Some events have actually happened at places like Yale and Harvard to raise funds to buy land to protect the peyote and to protect Wixarika sovereignty.

So my work started with mining in this typical political ecology, and I never would have guessed that suddenly I’d be looking at the question of psychedelics. And I think that Michael Pollan’s Netflix special is a really important reference for a lot of people, maybe, in terms of the question of mescaline and peyote.

There’s a small little bleep that’s given to the question of Wirikuta and to the Wixarika people. But it’s important to note that the same people that were intermediaries for Michael Pollan’s Netflix special are the same people who are intermediaries for these land purchases. And so I’ve been really trying to track, who are these individuals? Trying to follow the money.

Many of these individuals, again, Don Moore was one of my PhD professors, and I’ll never forget Donald Moore saying, good intentions can have bad consequences. Good-intentioned people that met at Burning Man might not understand land tenure practices in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. They may not understand that the concept of a land bank operates differently in the United States than it does in Mexico because of colonial and post-colonial structures. Again, of land tenancy, of legal recognition of Indigenous people.

So I don’t have much more time, probably, but I do want to say that a lot of what I’ve been observing is a loss of translation, right? Not only linguistically, where we have much of what’s happening in the mainstream of psychedelics happening in English. If you look at any retreat website, if you look at any of these philanthropic initiatives, they’re in English for an English-speaking audience.

And it’s only a few– for example, in the case of the Wixarika communities, there’s only a couple individuals that are actually connected to these philanthropic initiatives. But the way that they get presented in both conferences, everywhere from maps to, again, a university like Harvard is that they are representatives.

And this is an age-old problem with misrepresenting Indigenous leadership and autonomy. It’s very easy to do that when you are talking to a group of people who don’t understand who it is that they’re seeing, what the context is.

So what we’ve continued to see, not only with respect to land purchases, is that the mainstreaming of psychedelics has also started to really disrupt governance in Indigenous communities that are connected to these psychedelic plants and psychedelic traditions, if you want to use that term. So in the case of the Wixarika, peyote has always made them very hyper visible, right? From Carlos Castaneda to, again, the present Netflix example.

And I’m starting to really see a combination of, not just usurpation of leadership, but also of land tenure. And while the Wixarika have always claimed that the way to defend land is to coordinate with the small farmers, what is happening with these very powerful players that have millions of dollars at their disposal, literally, is that you have a lot of backdoor deals that are happening.

And so the result has been a lot of infighting, a lot of community animosity. And I’m quite concerned, given the landscape that we’re seeing right now, with– again, there was the constellation of Silicon Valley forces that are also interested in psychedelics, that we have very much an authoritarian view of how to manage land that is connected to endemic species like peyote.

And there’s very little time and space given to really understanding other epistemic approaches how to defend land. And that peyote is not exclusive to one particular community, but that we have ancestral communities that need to be, not just selectively at the table, but really need to be understood in a much deeper way.

And I’m afraid that a lot of intermediary work has continued to really disrupt Indigenous sovereignty. So that’s really the focus of my work right now. And hopefully soon I’ll have a film and a new book project to bring to people about this very issue. So thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

POULOMI SAHA: Next up is David Presti.

DAVID PRESTI: Wow, that was great. Yeah. Thank you, everyone, for being here. And you all who organized these Matrix events for pulling this together. This is really wonderful. Very important topic these days.

It’s interesting that we often talk about how we live in a bubble here in Berkeley or maybe even California or the West Coast or something like that. With respect to the mainstreaming of psychedelics, there’s still a way in which that’s very accurate.

Because if I talk with people in the middle of the United States who are not part of the academic establishment or something like that, this is not something that they’ve heard much about. So it’s just an interesting kind of contrast that we continue to appreciate and live in.

So I’m assuming that most of you know quite a bit already about psychedelics, what we call psychedelic. And really, they entered– really only entered the first time in the popular culture in America in the 1950s, even though there’s been, of course, a centuries- or probably millennia-, in many cases, long history of use of psychedelic materials by a number of Indigenous cultures around the world for a long time.

This was largely unknown, except for folks who studied it, anthropologists, folks like yourself, who actually knew this really intimately. And then it hit the more popular culture in the ’50s. The psychiatrist Osmond coined that word psychedelic, meaning mind-manifesting.

Because he thought these materials, which were represented only by two chemicals in those days, mescaline from peyote, and LSD, which was the synthetic that was discovered, whose properties were discovered in the 1940s, he felt that these materials and a number of other things from which chemicals hadn’t been identified like the Teonanacatl mushrooms from Mexico, Datura, cannabis, even the active components were not known–

He put all those into that category of psychedelic because he felt they should be– that psychiatry could come up with some good ways to utilize these powerful materials to open up one’s mentality in some way and make it more amenable for psychotherapy and for transformative change.

So in the 1950s, through popular essays like Aldous Huxley’s books and Gordon and Valentina Wasson’s articles in major media outlets, people became knowledgeable about something about these materials and their history. And then it really all opened up in the 1960s, of course, and psychedelics, especially LSD, became a huge part of the revolutionary processes that were happening back in those days.

And all of these things that happened in the 1960s that were really building up a lot of momentum, things like the Free Speech Movement right here on– just a few hundred feet away on the UC Berkeley campus, and the Civil Rights Movement, and Women’s Rights Movements, and gay rights movements, and very importantly, the anti-war in Southeast Asia movement, these were all melded together in people’s minds as just these, in some ways, chaotic things that were disrupting the status quo.

And psychedelics as well as cannabis got thrown into that category as well, and at the end of the ’60s, in 1970, everything was made illegal. So with the Controlled Substance Act in the United States, with the United Nations International Convention the next year, psychedelics, all the known psychedelic molecules at that point were declared illegal and whatever academic and clinical research had been going on in the ’50s and ’60s all came to a halt in the nonmainstream ways. I mean, not that they were ever mainstream, but they were a huge part of the culture.

And, however, there was a psychedelic underground that continued unabated from the time that they become illegal, in the late ’60s, California was the very first state to pass a law against LSD in 1966– and the underground, though, which was this constellation of folks that would take LSD at concerts, later MDMA and other things at raves, and artists, musicians, folks looking for some kind of recreational novelty.

And then a more reverent ceremonial component to that underground. Folks that held a more sacred relationship with the materials, they– often it was embedded in some kind of ceremonial structure for them. They usually knew quite a bit about what they were doing, and did it with respect and planning and so forth.

And there was an element of also underground psychedelic-assisted therapy, so-called, guides or therapists that would utilize LSD or psilocybin or MDMA when it was appreciated as materials to guide folks through a therapeutic or transformative process.

And this was all underground, in some cases, very deeply underground, especially the therapists, because there were draconian laws against all of these materials. And throughout the ’70s and ’80s and ’90s and even into the 2000s, there were many people who were arrested for distributing or manufacturing and so forth. Long prison sentences were handed out to young folks at Grateful Dead concerts for distributing LSD in the parking lot.

So it behooved people, especially who were doing this as their livelihood, like the underground therapeutic community, to stay very quiet about what they were doing. And it was taken very seriously as a profession. People often spent years and years apprenticing with other more knowledgeable people.

They knew the medicines, the materials they were working with really, really well themselves through their own experiences. So it was a pretty reliable kind of way to get introduced to the transformative properties of these things should you happen to have the right connections to meet someone like that since they were hard to find.

So this puttered on for several decades, the ’70s, the ’80s. By the mid to later ’80s, there began to be developed some activism around bringing these materials back into the public sphere to make them available for recreational uses, nonmedical use, as well as clinically administered use.

And most notably, the MAPS, the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies was started in 1986 with the explicit agenda of bringing MDMA, methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as ecstasy, back into the place where it could be legally used as a therapeutic tool.

But the bigger agenda was these materials should be legal for everyone, not just in the therapeutic context, but that doesn’t work to say that publicly. You have to go through the steps of getting government sanctioning through the FDA and all of that. So it was a wild vision to be able to do that at the end of the– I mean, to think that could be possible in 1986 because the laws were so draconian and so rigid, it seemed, with respect to all of these things.

But by the 1990s, by 1990, the first human studies, again, had started with a psychedelic, that was dimethyltryptamine, DMT. And then MDMA and psilocybin followed through the ’90s clinical studies. Quiet, low key. The media hadn’t noticed yet. The art of developing the finely-honed press release had not been developed yet.

So it continued on, though. Progress was being made. The FDA approved things to go on to the next phase of clinical trials, phase II, and so forth. And so by the 2000s, by the early 2000s, although the underground was still very active in all the ways that it had always been, there was beginning to be some above-ground approved activity, again, specifically FDA-approved clinical studies with MDMA for post-traumatic stress disorder and psilocybin for anxiety and depression, later, just the focus on depression.

And this continued to be successful. It was a slow process. There were only a handful of people doing this work. But in the early 2000s, psychedelic centers actually started at two major universities, Johns Hopkins and at University College London, so there are now beginning to be academic credibility, and papers were beginning to be published in mainstream journals.

And importantly, graduate students and postdocs were beginning to be trained because it’s not sustainable if there are only five people in the world doing clinical or basic science in psychedelics. But now there’s beginning to be a new cohort of folks who will be trained up to do this.

Of course, all these folks are now out there in the academic sector with projects of their own. And so now there are hundreds of universities that have psychedelic research going on. There are dozens and dozens and dozens of universities that have official psychedelic centers like our own here at Berkeley. And so it really has achieved, in the academic center, something of a mainstream status.

So this was already happening in the 2000– the first decade and then the second decade of the 2000s. By the end of the– and then I mentioned the press release earlier. The other thing that happened is that all of these early studies, when they were published, they had really good press releases. They had really good press coverage, so they got a lot of positive media attention. So the media juggernaut was beginning to take off.

And, of course, by the latter part of the 2000 and teens, then we have Michael Pollan’s excellent book, best-selling book that came out, the Netflix series, so more and more attention to more and more people to these substances. So here we are at the stage where we are in this trajectory.

The other thing that happened by the end of the 2000 and teens was that this was looking like a pretty good investment to a lot of people. So then startups formed to try to, in some way, capture. Now, remember, psychedelic molecules, LSD, psilocybin, MDMA, DMT, I mean, they’ve been out there in the public sphere for a long time, decades. The therapeutic procedures had been out there for a long time, for decades. So how are they going to make money off this?

So then– I’m sure you’ll speak to this– all kinds of schemes are concocted to try to grab intellectual property. Well, maybe if we tweak the crystal structure of the molecule in some way, then we can patent that. And it doesn’t matter whether that’s actually meaningful. As the CEO of that company said in a recorded interview, it doesn’t matter what I think. It only matters what the US Patent Office and the UK Patent Office thinks.

And so a number of things are now in the sector moving along. And so we have billions of dollars or certainly hundreds of millions, probably billions of dollars invested, certainly billions if you count ketamine, which I’m not even going to have time to get to, but we can come back to it in the Q&A.

And we have training programs, which have turned out thousands, now, of people that were being trained to participate in clinical studies and so forth. And, however, that’s all on hold because of the FDA’s unwillingness to improve MDMA for clinical studies. So in any case, it’s going to be, it has been, and will continue to be a wild ride, unpredictably wild ride. These are complex materials. Nobody ever said this was going to be easy or predictable, so to be continued. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

POULOMI SAHA: Thank you, David. And potentially setting us up for a pitch debate during the Q&A. But before we get there, up next is Charles Hirschkind.

CHARLES HIRSCHKIND: OK. First, a big thanks to Poulomi for the invitation to join this panel, and to my illustrious colleague, Cori, Director of the Matrix and good friend.

So I am new to this field. And, really, it’s only been in the last year and a half that I’ve put my foot into it. And that’s centered around a project that explores embodied practice in relation to different traditions involving psychedelic use.

So that doesn’t have a lot to do with mainstreaming. I’ve been working with a couple of colleagues at the Chacruna Center in Berkeley, who work on ayahuasca, and particularly in the context of Santo Daime, a Brazilian tradition.

So the question of the mainstreaming of psychedelics is, in ways, new to me. Of course, overall, the field I find to be exciting and with plenty of room for optimism, but, of course, also room for concern and worry. So today I’m going to focus my discussion on the mainstream of psychedelics and explore it from one particular national standpoint, that from the experience of Israel.

And the psychedelic phenomenon is well-established in Israel in terms of research, in terms of therapeutic practice, in terms of recreational use. The country has been an early and important contributor to studies in medical uses of psychedelics. There are numerous research initiatives, clinical trials, important conferences, workshops.

It’s one of the few countries outside the US where MAPS has an institution. Israel was the first national government to financially support MDMA-assisted psychotherapy research. It was also the first country to improve a compassionate use program, the use of MDMA in actual therapeutic practice.

Much of the research on the therapeutic use of psychedelics in Israel is focused on trauma victims, and particularly those suffering PTSD. Let me read briefly from a MAPS press release from 2020 on psychedelic research in Israel. So the report states that preliminary research has shown that MDMA-assisted psychotherapy may be a profound way to help those who suffer greatly from traumatic experiences, such as war or sexual assault.

Now, according to Keren Tzarfaty, the Clinical Investigator and Director of Israeli projects in collaborations with MAPS, in the face of the perpetual violence in Israel and the surrounding region, the innovative, heart-based treatment can transform suffering to wholeness. The article goes on, over 10% of the Israeli population experiences PTSD, and this figure increases significantly in regions frequented by rocket attacks. Military service is compulsory, and most families in Israel have histories of trauma and persecution.

The Israeli Ministry of Health is constantly looking for new tools to get better results in psychological and psychiatric treatment, says the Director of Psychological Trauma for the Israeli Ministry of Health. After seeing the very promising results of the completed MDMA-assisted psychotherapy research in Israel, we now believe that it is crucial to allow more citizens who suffer from PTSD to have access to this new treatment. This was back in 2020, and there’s only been growing momentum in this field in Israel since then.

In a talk that Rick Doblin, the founder of MAPS back in the ’80s, as David mentioned, a talk he gave at Google in 2009, he presented in a slide an image that, in his words, was the best image we have ever seen about MDMA for psychotherapy. This image, which was taken from an Israeli newspaper, showed a soldier largely submerged in a pool of blood, with helicopters in the background, and clinging for life onto a life preserver in the form of an MDMA tablet.

And this was, as Doblin suggested, the best image he had for what he imagined to be, we might consider it the mainstreaming of MDMA within psychotherapy. An article from Wired titled, “Israel is at the vanguard of a new psychedelic revolution,” the authors survey the explosion of new startups and companies entering the psychedelic field, affirming that Israeli startups are proving to be the pioneers in the use of mind-altering drugs, from mushroom to medical grade cannabis, to treat conditions like depression and PTSD.

So besides the medical clinical field, the genealogy of psychedelic use in Israel has another important element. Since, at least, the early 1980s, young Israeli tourists, many of them just released from IDF service, have traveled to India, particularly to Goa, but as well to other parts of India, giving shape to a distinct psychedelic-fueled party culture, party beach culture in many places.

By the 1990s, sigh party or rave culture was becoming well-embedded within Israel itself. And today, Israel is celebrated as a global center for rave culture. So these are a few snippets from the development of psychedelic use in Israel.

My point in mentioning them is to just suggest that Israel is a major contributor to and participant in the psychedelic renaissance. That the psychedelic culture, both medical and recreational and nonmedical being developed there, therefore has considerable impact on the global stage, and their considerable impact, perhaps, on the direction in which the future of mainstreaming psychedelics may take.

So, as the Executive Director of MAPS that I cited above noted, there is perpetual violence in Israel. Service in the IDF is mandatory, with some exceptions, which means that most of its citizens participate directly in the brutalization and violence that has been directed routinely against Palestinians for many decades, and now in the genocide of the last year and a half.

This is not easy for any human being, and I believe it is not at all surprising that one finds such high rates of PTSD in the country. When one participates, in my view, in extreme violence, including the type of atrocities we’ve seen more recently, there are psychic costs.

Often when the violence ends, when there’s a pause, there’s a sense that one eventually, in some form, will confront the acts that one has done. The psyche tries to defend against this, tries to avoid it in ways, sometimes through an intensification of violence. This has been documented in other global contexts.

So I set this stage because this is the context in which psychedelic use and interest has grown medically, therapeutically, and recreationally in Israel. We often think of psychedelics as offering a kind of mirror by which we can explore deeper dimensions of our consciousness and experience.

But here we see something that follows something of an opposite logic. Instead of allowing a patient, a soldier, or a citizen to confront the traumatic violence that they have had to exercise, in this case against Palestinians, psychedelics becomes a tool by which one can avoid or defer such a confrontation, and thus be ready to return to the battlefield. It is for this reason that the Israeli state finds this research on psychedelics so important. And the Israeli state is a major contributor, major funder of research in this area.

So insomuch as the Israeli state necessitates the will for participation of much of its population in the ongoing perpetration of violence in order to sustain the particular form of apartheid rule, it cannot afford to tolerate the psychic repercussions, the trauma that such violence produces among its people, and must seek out methods to limit those repercussions. It is for this reason that psychedelic therapy is seen to have such great promise in the country, and as I mentioned, receives considerable support from the state.

Nowhere, at least, in my exploration of the literature, which I acknowledge is limited, nowhere in the literature on psychedelic research in Israel have I encountered the suggestion that the state policies that produce a condition, a necessity of perpetual violence, and hence of traumatic experience be changed.

The violence is viewed rather as a natural feature of the landscape, as in the quotes that I cited above, a result, sometimes, of the savagery of Israel’s neighbors, a context where Israelis themselves can understand themselves as victims, ones whose suffering may be alleviated by psychedelics.

So I’m going to stop there. But my overall point is to suggest that Israel is an important reference in reflecting on the possible direction that a mainstreaming of psychedelics takes. Not only because the phenomenon is well-developed there, but also because of the influence that Israel exerts in shaping a global psychedelic culture. So this is a cautionary note.

POULOMI SAHA: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

And our final presenter is Graham Pechenik.

GRAHAM PECHENIK: Thank you. And I think this might be a giveaway that I’m the one nonprofessor on the panel that I need the support of slides to get through my talk, so.

So I’ll probably pick up actually where David Presti left off. Because where I start is in 2018, really, at the start of what people have been speaking about as a psychedelic renaissance. Well, my story maybe goes back a little bit earlier to part of David’s story, which was the research and the growth in the number of academic centers and just academics studying psychedelics.

Actually, my interest in psychedelics dates back to my first psychedelic experience in undergrad, and I thought at one point that I might become a psychedelic chemist. I was very inspired by the work of Sasha Shulgin, who created a lot of novel psychedelics and helped to bring MDMA back into the popular consciousness.

I had no encouragement of that. Maybe it was just a few years too early because now, certainly, there’s many people who are making that their work. Although I’m happy to have ended up back in the space. So I went to law school thinking maybe I’d do drug policy with my science background. I ended up going to do patent law.

And I continued to follow the science, and I’m actually at– I was at a MAPS info table volunteering the weekend after this article came out. So this article was really the first time, I think, patents, certainly that I had heard of, but even in general, were written about for the popular culture.

So this was before Compass Pathways, actually, their patent had published, but it was– it was known that they had filed patents on psilocybin, and an article about the work that Compass Pathways was doing came out talking about the patent. And I was very curious about it.

And in talking to people at MAPS who were themselves very interested in how somebody might even patent something like psilocybin, which, obviously, is a known compound and a compound that’s been synthesized and already patented in the ’50s by Albert Hofmann, I actually went home that night and made a table of all the psilocybin patents I could find. And I’m not sure– oh, that works. Just yell it out.

And so in 2018, after this article came out, there were just over a dozen. A couple of them were actually the original ones from Albert Hoffman. A few of them are from Paul Stamets, who many people might know has been working with psilocybin for quite a long time. So there really weren’t very many. This was still– again, as I mentioned before, Compass’s hadn’t come out.

Two years later, so on the next slide, there still had really only been less than even double that. Not even two dozen patents on– this is on psilocybin. These are just patents that have psilocybin in the word in the patent anywhere.

Today that list is– on the next slide, this slide probably took me the longest. I probably didn’t need to copy-paste every single part of it. But this is the number of patents on psychedelics today, over 2,000. So I’m fortunate to be able to work with BCSP on making this public. So this is a resource that’s on BCSP’s web page. And you can see and sort all the patents that are covering all sorts of psychedelic compounds.

The next slide is just an image to show, people might know, if you’re familiar with patents, they’re not public for 18 months. So 18 months from now, you may see the ones that were filed 18 months ago. So we only know the ones that have already published that have already been filed that long ago.

So on the next slide, the reason for all this activity, I think, is you already heard a little bit of suggestion from David is, in 2020, there were– start of companies in the space. There were not all that many yet, but there were quite a few who are looking at trying to figure out ways to commercialize psychedelic compounds.

A couple of years later, then that– on the next slide, you can see, well, this is now today, there are many, many dozens of companies who are looking to commercialize, in some way, psychedelics. Now, most of these companies are looking to bring some sort of psychedelic compound through FDA.

Many of them are looking to bring this same psychedelic compound through the FDA, competing to do the same thing. There’s a question mark on there because there’s many that are still in stealth and probably a question mark, too, because many of these have run out of funding, so. But there are really a lot.

Although putting this in context, on the next slide, the small circle with the other small circles in the middle is the whole scale of the psychedelic space, which is just a few million dollars– a few billion dollars in market cap. I mean, really dwarfed by– these are the three largest pharma companies by market cap.

And the three that are listed there in the middle, the psychedelics companies, I mean, a thousand times smaller than the biggest pharmaceutical companies. Probably the size– maybe not even the size of a single program within one of these pharmaceutical companies. Eli Lilly could basically buy every single company in the psychedelic space and wouldn’t make much of a difference to their accounts.

So at the time that all this has been going on, I think maybe we already heard a little bit of suggestion, some of these patents have been a little bit controversial. And indeed, from the next slide, we can see– this is just what I could fit on one slide– there have been dozens, if not more, articles written on the ethics of patenting psychedelics, what it means to patent psychedelics, how can people patent psychedelics?

So there has been a lot of conversation around it. Actually, on the next slide, the conversation has leapt even into the popular consciousness. So people might have seen this, perhaps. This was a couple of years ago from John Oliver, of course, talking about what was one of the most controversial patents in the space when it published.

It was another one of Compass’s patents, not that original one, but one that had claims to psilocybin treatment with a variety of things that people, certainly in the underground, would have known about. The fact that a person was laying on a bed or a couch, or wearing an eyeshade, or maybe wanted soft music playing in the room.

So John Oliver, on the next slide here shown, this was so obvious it would have been like patenting somebody sitting in a suit behind a desk telling jokes. Which if one filed for it, maybe it is patentable, although I haven’t seen one just like that.

So from the next slide, you can see the controversies over psychedelic patents aren’t entirely new. Actually, in the 1980s there was a fairly large controversy that actually caused some diplomatic rifts between the US and some Central and South American countries. I think the diplomats in Ecuador threatened to close their mission at one point.

This was called– so this was, I guess– for the context, this was a patent on– a plant patent on a type of ayahuasca vine. It was called an offense against Indigenous peoples. One said it was as outrageous as trying to patent a communion wafer. On the next slide, I was curious about that, too, I looked it up. There’s actually over 50 patents on communion wafers.

[LAUGHTER]

So if you’re eating a low-gluten communion wafer during the Holy Communion, you might actually be infringing some of these patents. I think that one is still active. So I guess patent lawyers really don’t have any shame when it comes to taking on clients and doing work. It doesn’t matter if it’s for ceremonial or sacred use.

So the next slide here, I can probably jump through some of this stuff pretty quickly. I think most people probably are familiar with why we even have patents to begin with. I think the pharmaceutical space is probably the most paradigmatic for what patents stand for, which is the reward of the patent people claim is necessary for people to make the investment in coming up with a new pharmaceutical drug.

And the reason for that, of course, is the patent provides the exclusivity that keeps others from being able to copy it and make it themselves. And if one were to be able to copy it, as the next slides show, you can probably just go through both quickly, the line is where the generic enters the market. So sales go down.

And then on the next slide, you can see that the price of the original nongeneric, the branded drug, drops pretty quickly to a small fraction of what it was. So the exclusivity of a patent is the thing that provides the outsized revenues for pharmaceutical companies, and that’s what gives them the interest, arguably, in bringing a new drug to market to begin with.

So from that perspective, this is a good thing for society. But then, of course, one can argue that the cost of those drugs to patients and the length of time that those drugs remain at that cost, depending on how long those patent terms last, something you have to weigh against the value of new drugs.

So going to the next slide. Yes, so those are patents. So patents, obviously, then play this important role. So I’ll go through these pretty quickly. If you go to the next slide, this is just what a patent is. As I mentioned, it’s right to exclude for a particular period of time. It’s defined by the claims.

The next slide shows the actual– this is the Compass patent when it did publish. So a patent itself is like a physical document. It has what’s called a specification, describes the invention, and then the claims. And the claims are really the legal words of meaning. People sometimes say the metes and bounds of the invention. They’re the property boundaries of real property. So this is Compass’s patent on crystalline psilocybin form Polymorph A.

And so for the next slide, thank you. So, again, the reason we have patents, of course, is to incentivize this type of work. So this is the first article in the Constitution. It’s called the progress clause, to promote the progress of science and useful arts.

So the next slide. And then so, of course, the patent stands as this reward or inducement for that knowledge to bring that new drug to market or those new psychedelic compounds to market.

So we go to the next slide. I think this is maybe just to put it in historical context. This isn’t a new thing. As far back as ancient Sybaris. Maybe people have heard of Sybarites or something Sybaritic. Sybaris was known for the outlandish luxury that people in town there had.

And part of the reason, some argue, actually, is because Sybaris had what was sort of like a patent system. They gave people who came to town and demonstrated that they had some peculiar and excellent culinary dish, or any new refinement in luxury, they gave them all the profits from the sales of those for one year, exclusive right to sell those. And that attracted lots of people to the town with their new dishes and new luxuries. So this is the goal of a patent is something that has been understood through history.

So go the next slide. Yeah. So when we think about the patent, we think about it as this balance. So what is it that we’re giving? We’re giving this monopoly. We’re taking something away from the public. Arguably, we’re taking away the ability to have cheaper drugs in the pharmaceutical context, but we’re allowing, in theory, more drugs and better drugs to actually come to market.

So the next slide. And this I like to highlight because I think a lot of people, rightly, see the patent system as really shrouded in two very difficult technical hazes. One of which is the legal haze of– I mean, the patent system is pretty complicated, one is the technical haze of what gets patented itself.

But I think it’s important to point out that, like, patents don’t just exist because it’s just like a natural right, and that’s what it is, but it exists because it is this outcome of what is arguably a democratic process, but not that many people participate in it. But I think it’s worth calling out because there are a lot of ways, if we understand the way the patent system works, to actually get involved and to try to make changes to it.

And now probably is a good time to think about that in particular because with the change in administration and the change in some of the priorities of the administration, what is going on with the patent system is a bit up for grabs. But typically, it tends to be just big pharma who’s sitting at the table and making a lot of these rules.

So next slide. And yeah, so some of the basic requirements for what a patent is. So it has to describe the specification, describes the invention and how to make and use it. And to get a patent, really, the crux of it is you have to have something that’s novel and nonobvious. It’s an invention, right?

So to be able to determine what is worthy of being granted a patent, the next slide– thank you, Dave– shows that, really, the crux of the patent examination process is the examiner searches for what’s called the prior art. So basically, what’s the state of the art? What’s everything that people know before the patent was filed?

They then compare it to what the invention is claimed to be. And they determine if that difference between what the prior art was and what the invention claims to be was obvious to what’s called one of ordinary skill in the art, so the ordinary person. Not the inventive person, not the inventors because they’re presumed to be, by nature of being inventors, a little bit maybe above the ordinary skilled person. But would this be obvious?

So we go to the next slide. So, obviously, the first thing then to be able to determine if something is patentable is to determine, is it novel? So here’s a patent that was granted on a DMT vape pen. People might have heard of DMT vape pens before. This was filed in 2020. DMT vape pens certainly existed before 2020, if you’re familiar with DMT vape pens.

So why was this granted? Well, the next slide shows the patent examiner missed– I mean, there were articles that one should have seen before 2020. And they didn’t search for– even DMT vape pen, they didn’t search Google. They spent really only less than seven minutes even searching. So this is a problem if people can’t find the prior art.

So the next slide shows, this is not just a theoretical problem, but actually, this is a pitch deck from the person who has this patent saying, in the bottom there, the visible internet is replete with sales of DMT vape pens, but they’re infringing. He’s going to go after them. Well, the reason the internet is replete with those sales is because those existed before he filed the patent. So this is somebody getting market power without actually contributing anything to the market.

So the next slide. Actually, this email is just from two days ago. So people may have heard of Porta Sophia, but it’s a nonprofit that is bringing together prior art. David Presti mentioned a lot of the underground work, especially the deep underground work and some of those techniques or the use of some compounds for certain things. Those might not have been in a place where a patent examiner, for instance, can find it.

So this nonprofit called Porta Sophia actually worked to pull together a lot of that prior art and make it available to patent examiners. And so this email just from Tuesday shows actually the– and this is quite a big deal. The Patent Office has made Porta Sophia part of their resource page.

So patent examiners now, because as you could see for the DMT vape pen, they actually don’t sometimes even go look on Google. They just go to the resources they have. So now they have this dedicated resource with psychedelic prior art.

So the next page. So just maybe to dip through a couple other things quickly. So here’s just another example of a patent. The MDMA and LSD in the same pill. So people certainly know that MDMA and LSD might have been taken together. The patent examiner, in fact, did have prior art to show that recreational users had MDMA and LSD that they took together, but they took them in separate dosage forms, not on the same pill.

So the next slide. So they granted that. So just to say that the bar for obviousness is actually quite low. So what makes an invention is not something that actually would take much inventive activity. So I probably don’t have– how much time? Am I done?

POULOMI SAHA: One more minute.

GRAHAM PECHENIK: One more minute. OK. So I’ll maybe see if there’s any other good slides here to go. Yeah. So what is in all these patents? Well, OK, next slide.

There are, as you would imagine, lots of these known compounds– you can probably just keep going– yeah, which, of course, we’re known for many years. And, well, you can probably skip through those. Sorry. I wish I had– yeah. So maybe just a couple other places to stop on my way out.

So, of course, if we’re thinking about how you want to design the patent system, we want to think about creating more innovation rather than having things that are just the same or very similar to what was already existing. I mean, we want to be providing this reward for things that are worthy of that reward. Maybe skip through a few others.

Yeah. I mean, I think, OK. Yeah. So maybe go one more. One more maybe. Yeah. OK. I’ll probably– I guess I’ll wrap up here. I think I have a few more slides. I mean, there are some things here that I wish I would have had time for. I know in 15 minutes is pretty difficult.

Maybe on the next slide we can show that– well, OK, this is another resource with BCSP is the Law and Policy Map. OK. Next slide. Yeah. I mean, there are so many other reasons to be critical of the patent system. I mean, one of the things that does is provides incentives for very specific things.

I mean, I think maybe one place to then end, like, David, you mentioned how MAPS was bringing MDMA through FDA as a reason to maybe figure out how to get MDMA available to more people. And that bringing it through FDA was like a Trojan Horse to get the government to permit it to be available, and then to bring it then more widely to the public.

But what has turned around is now all the investment is going to trying to bring drugs through FDA in a way that the companies who are doing so are now incentivized to make it harder to have access to those drugs outside of the medical realm. So turn what MAPS was doing on its head.

And in doing so, a lot of the philanthropic money that was going to MAPS has turned into investment dollars instead. MAPS has had a hard time– I mean, they became a for-profit entity. And so I think I’ve maybe– if you go to my very– next last slide that I’ll end on. No, not that one, the [INAUDIBLE].

Yeah. Maybe I’ll just end here just to say– I know I barely scratched the surface here, but just to say that the patent system really is something that I think it’s important for people to have more understanding of so they can have more say in it. So I’ll end there.

[APPLAUSE]

POULOMI SAHA: I’ll invite our presenters back. And we actually have– because everyone was actually wonderful about time, we have 15 minutes for questions. And I will not take moderator’s privilege except to say, this conversation was so exciting in the various overlap. Some of them, I think, expected and slightly scripted, and some of them truly unexpected.

And I would love for us to also think about some of the major things that have come up that cut across these presentations, including the question, I think, pre-eminently, of ethics and the question of power. Each of the presenters, in different ways, talked about how this question of mainstreaming has really gotten to the heart of questions of who has access to the resources.

Whether they be questions of Indigenous people and sovereignty, the questions of empire and violence, questions of moving away from the criminalization of particular kinds of access towards medicalization, towards money making patents, and how the question of money and ethics so intervenes with how we think about psychedelics today.

The fact that we are here at Berkeley, we are talking about funding available for this kind of research, and the shift, which is a highly materially driven one, which asks us to think, I think, in really nuanced ways that we begin to hear from our presenters about how we grapple with these real questions, the risks and the possibilities that mainstreaming psychedelics in this way might give rise to.

But before we let them speak to each other, are there questions? Maybe we’ll take a couple of questions at a time since we only have 15 minutes and ask the presenters to respond collectively. There’s a question in the back and here. You can take probably one more. There’s a third, but otherwise we’ll let the presenter– and there’s one all the way in the back.

AUDIENCE: Hi. I had a question for Graham, kind of following up on the last little bit. I’m a bit confused how people get patents when the drugs are federally illegal. Is it specifically like with medical exception, or is it just like– yeah, I guess I’m just a bit confused on the nuances there.

GRAHAM PECHENIK: Yeah. No, it’s a good question. And actually, I have that in my usual deck as a second slide because it is one of the questions I get most often. There are no prohibitions on patenting anything that’s illegal, with, really, two exceptions human clones and nuclear weaponry.

But it doesn’t have to be for medical use. So if you had a new way of making methamphetamines in your bathtub, you could get a patent on it. And it would be examined, too. So the patent examiner would purportedly have to go and see if there’s any prior art on it, but.

POULOMI SAHA: An invitation, perhaps.

GRAHAM PECHENIK: I mean, there may already be a patent on that, actually.

POULOMI SAHA: I think all the way back.

AUDIENCE: Hi. This is also a question for Graham. I’m curious as to how you see the landscape for psychedelic research changing in light of the fact that the recent phase III trials for MDMA-assisted therapy failed. Do you think that there’s still going to be investment and as much patenting in these substances and trials as there was previously?

GRAHAM PECHENIK: Yeah. That’s a really good question. I think the space did get a bit of deflation after the decision to not approve MDMA. It does seem, in general, like that has certainly slowed down the patent activity. I think, to some degree, it’s probably a good thing that there’s less focus on bringing as many drugs as there have been or as many companies bringing the same drugs through FDA.

So whether we need 10 competing companies to bring psilocybin all at the same time through FDA, I think, is a waste of resources, given that there are so many other ways of getting access to it that maybe would provide better access to people, like through state-regulated markets, through just local deprioritization or decriminalization.

So I guess that’s not exactly a direct answer to your question. I think the answer to your question is, I think it did make people realize that it’s going to be, perhaps, harder than they thought. That the money is perhaps further away than they thought because of the difficulty of getting these through FDA.

I think that may have changed with the new administration because people see RFK with the silver lining of maybe it’ll make it easier to have psychedelics approved with the co-president being, for instance, someone who is a very big fan of ketamine, perhaps he’s sympathetic to people who like to use psychedelics, but.

POULOMI SAHA: Let’s take a cluster. I see three hands. Let’s take all three of those questions at once, and then we’ll have the panelists respond.

AUDIENCE: I have a quick question for Diana. As I listened to all of you guys share and just my understanding, I’m curious about, how should psychedelics be mainstreamed from a decolonized perspective?

And what are a few, not necessarily concerns you have, but ways that you would like to see it unfold? Because when we mainstream something with the context of our society, it seems like, with RFK or with co-president, it will be born out of continued colonization and imperialism and capitalism.

DAVID PRESTI: Well, great question and great points. Thank you. Well, first of all, I have no–

DIANA NEGRIN: They wanted to take three questions and then let us all answer.

DAVID PRESTI: Say that again.

DIANA NEGRIN: I think they were going to take–

POULOMI SAHA: We’re going to take a couple of questions first–

DAVID PRESTI: Oh, sorry about that.

POULOMI SAHA: And then I’ll let you all run free with your answers. But let’s just grab these questions. Here and then here.

AUDIENCE: Thanks so much. This question is for Charles. I really enjoyed your talk. Yeah. I was talking to some people in the Jewish psychedelic sphere the other day. I talked to this psychedelic rabbi, and he was saying some interesting things that were dovetailing with some of the things you were pointing out. He was talking about some sort of– what he thought of as Indigenous Israeli psychedelic culture.

And mentioned that even like on the October 7 attack, that there were– the Israeli people were in a rave and that apparently there was some sort of ongoing research looking at, if those people who were taking psychedelics at that rave, how they fared.

And then I just wondered if you were aware of the study on ayahuasca, which brought together Israelis and Palestinians that there was a lot talk about in the psychedelic world. So those are a lot of questions. And I don’t know, in an aside, I guess the question is just how that would fit into your thinking on the current situation. Yeah.

POULOMI SAHA: Right here. Yeah.

AUDIENCE: Hi. Application, I’m a family doctor, end-of-life. My wife’s a therapist. And a lot of this involves the board that oversees therapy versus the board that oversees doctors. And the specific questions about right to try.

One of you mentioned that, but that’s people in end-of-life or people in dire situations, that’s been used for cancer medications, we use for HIV. And I wonder if you see any role for that from your various advantages. And thank you for being here.

POULOMI SAHA: OK. I’m going to let the panelists respond.

DAVID PRESTI: Well, I mean, I’ll say something to just kick it off. One of the questions had to do with, what’s my vision for mainstreaming and going forward? I don’t have one, and I’ve never had one. And my role has been, I’ve been teaching about psychedelics for 35, going on 40 years.

And it’s always been about education, and to move things along by the maximal amount of education. I mean, I do have an opinion about I don’t think folks should be arrested for anything having to do with psychedelics. But other than that, I certainly have no vision of how this is going to play out.

And I think, as I mentioned earlier, we’re in for a wild ride and anything could happen. For decades, these materials and practices were occult. They were under the radar. They were underground. Maybe they should stay there, I don’t know. And they will stay there. I mean, there will be– that will continue.

And there may be another path where there’s some legal FDA-approved availability, probably quite expensive. But with more knowledge out there, people will be able to grow their own mushrooms and develop community around how to effectively and transformatively and, with good preparation, utilize these materials.

DIANA NEGRIN: Yeah. I guess I’ll answer to a couple of the pieces. And I think that there is a very big– there’s a lot of dangers in the current moment, and I think that, at least, from my studies, and even listening to you all, it’s a lot of the same people.

So when we talk about power and ethics, we’re talking about a lot of the same actors, whether it’s Doblin or Bronner’s or Cody Swift, that are involved not only in clinical trials and conferences, but also in land acquisition south of the border. So the question of indigeneity and decoloniality is really important.

And I think I got in a big problem when I had a– last January, I was going to have an article about the relationship between indigeneity and land in the context of psychedelics, and why the psychedelic community should understand how land expropriation and settler colonialism is part of the picture that we’re seeing right now.

And I withdrew my article when I found out that MAPS was holding– continued to hold the conference in Israel in the midst of the genocide. And there was a huge debate online around the question of indigeneity, the trial using ayahuasca with Israelis and Palestinians. Ayahuasca is Indigenous to the Amazon.

So as a geographer, I’m thinking about, what are the ecological and cultural issues ethically with moving plants around that are actually in threat of extinction, whose lands are being taken over by mining, cattle ranching, other forms of drug matters like cocaine and poppy production. These communities are dealing with so much.

And unfortunately, a lot of the people who are making the rounds doing this work at a global power level are completely abstracted from how people are experiencing this on the ground. And if we don’t treat the fundamental issues of trauma, if we replicate and perpetuate war, then, yes, psychedelics become part and parcel of the same project rather than a liberation. And so that’s my big concern of the dangers and how decoloniality needs to really address those rooted issues, so yeah. [LAUGHS]

CHARLES HIRSCHKIND: Yeah. No. I agree. Thank you for the question. I think I am aware of that study. And it brought Palestinians and Israelis together in the context of using ayahuasca to see the way that that might bridge differences between them and change their feelings for each other and open up possibilities of dialogue and connection and so on.

It’s predicated on the idea that what drives the problem in Israel-Palestine is attitudes, feelings, antipathies, when actually the problem is driven by the policies of the state, which have the effect of producing those antipathies and feelings.

And so I’m not really optimistic in any way, actually. I think that– I don’t think there’s much use in that kind of study when it ignores the political facts that drive the struggle. So I thank you for the question.

POULOMI SAHA: I saw another hand here. We have time for one. Unless there’s a burning second question, we’ll end with one last question.

AUDIENCE: Yeah. I was just curious to compare– I think, Dr. Presti, you had started to mention the political moment of the early psychedelic landscape and how that was integrated in with a radical politics, versus within the mainstreaming we’re now seeing of a neoliberal psychedelic politics about how we can become more mentally fit to maintain the status quo. And I’m just curious how we would think about those dualities as we’re considering mainstreaming psychedelics.

DAVID PRESTI: Bingo. Mentally fit for meeting the status quo is not sustainable.

[LAUGHTER]

POULOMI SAHA: A pithy answer to an excellent question. On that note, please join me in thanking our panelists for that really terrific panel.

[APPLAUSE]

[MUSIC PLAYING]

 

Podcast

Social, Spatial, Ecological, and Racial Fixes in New Deal South Carolina: Interview with Morgan Vickers

Morgan Vickers

For this episode of the Matrix Podcast, Julia Sizek interviewed Morgan P. Vickers, an Assistant Professor of Race/Racialization in the Department of Law, Societies & Justice at the University of Washington. Vickers received their Ph.D. in Geography from the University of California, Berkeley, and their B.A. in American Studies, Communication Studies, and Non-Fiction Writing from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Their work has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and the Simpson Center for the Humanities. (This interview was recorded in Fall 2023.)

Vickers is currently a Content Editor for Environmental History Now and an Executive Board member of the Black Geographies Specialty Group of the American Association of Geographers (AAG). They previously worked with The Black Geographic, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Community Histories WorkshopA Red Record, and the Landscape Specialty Group of AAG.

The interview focused on Vickers’ research on drowned towns of the Santee-Cooper Project in South Carolina, wherein 901 families were displaced in the name of New Deal “progress.” Vickers’ work highlights New Deal infrastructures, transformed ecologies (notably, swamplands), and dispossessed (racialized) populations in order to challenge myths of universal progress and narratives of purportedly moral geographies.

Thematically, Vickers’ work contemplates Black ecologies, placemaking, federal dam and reservoir projects, racial capitalism, moral geographies, community memory studies, and questions of belonging.

Podcast and Transcript

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Woman’s Voice: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

Julia Sizek: Welcome to the Matrix Podcast. I’m Julia Sizek, your host. And today, our guest is Morgan Vickers, a PhD candidate in Geography here at Berkeley. Morgan is a National Science Foundation graduate research fellow and the Black Geographies Fellow at UC Berkeley.

Morgan’s work illuminates Black geographies and ecologies, placemaking, federal dam and reservoir projects, rural planning, moral geographies, the Black commons, and racialized underdevelopment in the New Deal. Thanks for coming on the podcast.

Morgan Vickers: Yeah, thank you for having me.

Sizek: So you trace this program that’s called the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, and more specifically within that, the Rural Rehabilitation Program, which later becomes part of the Resettlement Administration. This is already a lot of acronyms, but what does this program look like and why is it an important program to examine?

Vickers: Yeah, Yeah. So yeah, you’re exactly right. It is a mouthful. And I think that’s why scholars, and I think just general people, consider the New Deal kind of an alphabet soup. It is a lot of names and dates to keep track of. And I have them written in front of me so that I can keep track of them.

I’m studying the New Deal and the New Deal administrations, specifically because I’m offering what I think is a critique of New Deal progress, or this myth of progress that was sort of proposed by the New Deal. A lot of these administrations were sort of designed to rehabilitate the nation.

And in the South Carolina context, a lot of the rehabilitation was intended to transform the human — and often the racialized human — into a more productive citizen, a more productive farmer, and someone who would be in service of rehabilitating American capitalism, essentially.

And so that’s sort of the project I’m working on. And more specifically, in this chapter that we’re sort of chatting about, I’m focusing on how rural resettlement was a project of American rural development in American development as a whole.

Sizek: Yeah. So let’s sort of just dig into resettlement as a project and why resettlement versus other forms of aid. What was sort of the idea behind a resettlement project versus, for example, just giving people some money?

Vickers: Yeah, yeah. So in the South Carolina context, it was not an either/or situation. So in parts of South Carolina, they were offering different forms of aid. So this could be fiscal aid in the form of grants.

In several cases, the federal government, or state governments, brought people out of their homes that were— their homes and farmland that were seen as unproductive and sort of destroyed depleted soil. So they purchased these homes with the idea that these farmers, with whatever money they were given, could move into different properties.

So these people weren’t essentially placed into resettlement communities, but they were “offered,” and I use offered in quotations, a chance to move somewhere else where they could be more productive. But other forms of aid included seed grants, for example. They included tool loans, the construction of schools. It was essentially a lot of different things that would make communities more productive in a variety of different ways.

But compare that with resettlement — and I’m thinking resettlement here as specifically organized and planned communities that were often places, where families were often placed on meticulously designed lots on pre– in prefabricated homes — that was different.

And that’s of interest to me specifically because it wasn’t just about rehabilitating the farmer and rehabilitating his land, but also about rehabilitating the entire human.

So in these resettlement communities, they were placed amongst neighbors who were equally in service of the project of becoming better humans or becoming better financial contributors to the nation. And in these communities, they were offered— or they were sort of forced into positions where they had to undergo meticulous health observations. They had to go to school for a certain amount of time. They had to sort of complete quotas, agricultural quotas.

And some of these things were really positive. Like, these health surveys helped reduce malaria in communities, and some of these communities didn’t have schools before. But other portions were sort of in service of producing for the community and not for sort of the sake of your own family, the sake of your own happiness. And that’s sort of what I’m interrogating here.

What was the creation of resettlement community in service of and was it really in service or for the benefit of these individual farmers and their families and the types of lives they wanted to live?

Sizek: Yeah, so let’s dig in, and maybe we can talk about a couple of the resettlement communities that you look at. So how do you go from folks who are living on either their farms or in some town elsewhere, how do they get picked and then sort of plopped down into this new prefabricated community?

Vickers: Mm-hmm. The quote that I often use is meticulously vetted. So these families were vetted at multiple levels. And you had to meet a series of criteria in order to qualify for placement in these resettlement colonies. One of which is had to be a male under the age of 50 years old.

You had to undergo background checks where your previous landlords, if you weren’t a landowner or your previous employers, would sort of give character statements about you. You had to demonstrate that you were capable of paying off your loans.

That was the key sort of dynamic of this. You were not just supposed to be someone who contributed to a community, but someone who was able to sort of financially take care of yourself. And you were vetted at— I think I mentioned this. But you were vetted at multiple levels.

So you underwent a federal sort of background check, and then you underwent a state background check. And oftentimes there was a community leader, an overseer in some ways, who would do their own individual background check to make sure that you fit within the community.

And I mean “fit” sort of within the structure of the community, but also within the values of the community.

Sizek: And so given that there’s all these sort of extensive background checks, how do people and why do people choose to opt into these resettlement schemes? Because it seems like it’s not like the government is saying, hey, you, go settle into this other place. How do people opt in?

Vickers: Well, some people weren’t given a choice as to whether or not they had to be resettled into these communities. So right, my larger dissertation project studies the Santee Cooper Hydroelectric and Navigation Project. This was a New Deal project constructed between roughly 1934 and 1941.

And 901 families were dispossessed in the making of this project. The majority of these families, about 80 to 95 percent of them were Black. And a lot of these– I think, to the earlier question, a lot of these families were offered money or were relocated through eminent domain and were sort of scattered.

They were forced to figure out where to go. But a select number, again, those who met these criteria, these quotas and these qualifications, were “allowed,” and again, I use allowed in air quotes, to move into these resettlement colonies as they were called in South Carolina.

So they were moved into specifically Orangeburg Farms, one of the largest resettlement colonies in the state. It was the only interracial resettlement colony in the state, but they weren’t really given an option in that case.

They were told, you need to move off of your property because it is going to be flooded. It’s going to be inundated in this hydroelectric project. You can either go into this resettlement colony, or you can find somewhere else to live.

And the amount of money that a lot of these families, especially the Black families and especially the former tenant farmers who didn’t own property, it was a much better option for them to go into a planned community where they could, in theory, acquire the right to their own property at the end if they were to pay off their loans, rather than trying to find property on their own with the small amount of money they were given.

So I– at least from my understanding, a lot of these families weren’t really given an option. Just as the families who were resettled and not placed into resettlement colonies, a lot of them also weren’t given an option.

The government deemed their property to be sort of unfit for farming, unfit for human habitation. And it was sort of, get off of this property, go somewhere else, whether it’s with your family members in another state, onto a resettlement community if you qualified, or just get up and go somewhere else, essentially.

Sizek: Yeah, so you mentioned Orangeburg, which is one of the resettlement communities that you study. Can you tell us a little bit more about this site and what’s sort of interesting about Orangeburg in relation to the other resettlement communities in the area?

Vickers: Yeah, so– and for some background context, there were four total resettlement colonies in the state. One was Orangeburg Farms, one was Allendale Farms, one was Ashwood Plantation, and one was Tiverton Farms.

So Ashwood Plantation was the only all-White resettlement colony in the state. Orangeburg Farms was the only interracial resettlement colony in the state. And interracial is sort of loosely interracial because there was a dividing line between the White and Black populations. They called it a buffer zone.

But the other two resettlement colonies were all Black. And so originally, in the state of South Carolina, the state proposed having one singular 1,000-unit resettlement colony. Essentially, nowhere in the state was willing to accept 1,000 what they perceived to be destitute families.

They didn’t want to have that many impoverished people in their own community, and so they decided to scatter it into four different resettlement colonies. Originally, it was supposed to be six, but they reduced that number.

So how Orangeburg sort of compares to the other ones. A lot of these properties, a lot of these communities received sort of similar aid. So they received, again, prefabricated houses. They received seed grants. They received tools. A lot of homes were constructed— sorry, not homes. A lot of schools were constructed in these communities, recreational facilities, stores and businesses, et cetera. So there were all sort of given this baseline similar infrastructure. But what differed was the amount in the levels of support in each community.

So in my research, I found that Ashwood Plantation, the all-White community, was sort of given the largest capital investment, but not only the capital investment. They were given more robust homes and schools and infrastructure.

And by more robust, I mean they were given a brick school rather than sort of a prefabricated, poorly designed school that was often given in Tiverton Farms or in Allendale Farms, for example. These all-Black communities.

Orangeburg was a little bit different again, as I mentioned, because it was interracial. It was one of the only communities that was explicitly fought against. There was an organized group of, I think it was roughly around 300 families in Orangeburg County, who actively resisted the construction of Orangeburg farms.

It was originally intended to be an all-Black resettlement colony, but because of resistance of local White elite families specifically, who didn’t want to have a Black belt in their town, the government essentially decided to reduce the number from 200 Black families to what was supposed to be 160 Black families and 40 White families.

And that number eventually came down to about 80 Black families and 40 White families. And so the dynamics were totally different in that community. They had to provide separate facilities.

And part of why I focus a lot of attention on this community in my chapter is because it sort of illuminates, in the highest definition, the fact that the New Deal government on the federal and state levels in this community were not willing to sort of push back or challenge any existing racial orders.

They were willing to provide funding to the extent that it would improve the individual citizen, but not improve the racial or social dynamics of the state. So this one— this community, Orangeburg Farms, was sort of in high definition demonstrative of these racial tensions at play within the community, but also in relation to the larger community, which they were sort of expected to participate in.

Sizek: Yeah, so what did some of those tensions look like on the ground at Orangeburg Farms? Like, on a day-to-day level, what were the interactions, or perhaps the lack of interactions, between the Black families and the White families that were there?

Yeah, it’s my understanding that the interactions on a sort of face-to-face daily level were not many, basically. This buffer zone was literally only feet apart. Like, the houses were not allowed to be in close proximity to each other.

So it was sort of a line dividing the White communities from the Black communities. And in some texts, I read that there was a fence. I’m not sure if they ever— there was a planned fence. I’m not sure if they ever actually constructed that fence in between the communities.

But because of segregation laws at the time, they weren’t allowed to be in the same school houses. So even the infrastructures that they had to produce required them to attend different schools.

And in some cases, before these schools were constructed within the communities, families had to go to community schools outside of sort of the community proper— the constructed community.

But sort of beyond just within the community, there were, I think, six or seven lynchings that happened within this time period between the ’20s and the ’40s within Orangeburg County. So they weren’t explicitly within this community, not that I can identify at least.

But there were still severe and intense racial tensions at play in the community. And so this was sort of an overarching or looming sort of background experience that informed the lives and the racial relations within this community.

Sizek: Yeah, and this also– for me, this raises a question of how you’re pulling together all of this information from different sources to try to figure out what’s happening here, because you mentioned there’s a planned fence that was going to be constructed. Maybe that’s coming from a federal document.

What was the work that you did to try to figure out what’s happening in Orangeburg Farms?

Vickers: Yeah. So this– a lot of my dissertation, but especially this chapter, is largely an archival project. Orangeburg Farms doesn’t exist anymore, and so it’s trying to sort of reconstruct or understand a community that you can’t go and visit, you can’t go and look at the homes.

It is a lot of looking at former photographs, or looking at photographs of former homes, and reading sort of through the lines of these archival materials. I had to go to state archives in South Carolina, University of South Carolina archives, National Archives in both DC and Atlanta to try and sort of paint a picture of this.

And I think to go back to the first question about sort of all of these different organizations being sort of formative in the creation of these resettlement colonies, it makes it really difficult to reproduce this story or to understand this story because you’re looking at FERA archives on one hand. And then you’re also looking at Civilian Conservation Corps archives, on the other hand, and Santee Cooper archives. So I’m sort of looking all over the place just to try and reconstruct this story.

And it feels like every different organization or former organization has their own take on how this community was supposed to look, how all of these communities were supposed to look. And it’s difficult to understand how they actually looked.

And so as I was constructing this story, some of the things I looked at included things like architectural renders of the prefabricated homes. I looked at lists and lists of seed grants that were given, livestock that were sort of housed within the community.

It’s a little bit ironic because it was easier for me to figure out how many cattle were in a given community or how many cattle that a specific family owned. But it was sort of impossible for me to figure out the name of every single family that lived within the community.

So a lot of this reconstruction work that I was doing in a historical sense was about pulling all of these puzzle pieces together, trying to figure out where the gaps were in telling this story through these extant materials about the geography, the sort of material — well, now the disappeared material reality that they lived within.

Sizek: So one of the people who you follow in this town of Orangeburg Farms is Cammie Fludd. And she sort of has an interesting and maybe different story from how you discovered some of these other people. So can you tell us a little bit about her and her role in the community?

Vickers: Yeah, Cammie Fludd was a home economics advisor. She had a few different positions. But as a home economics advisor, one of her tasks within the community was to offer guidance to women specifically about how to keep a home.

She taught them skills like weaving. She taught them how to bake, how to run a home garden in the backyard. But she was also sort of an interlocutor between farm agents at a state level and a county level and then also farmers on the ground.

So she was instructing them on how to sort of keep the best agricultural land, how to maintain livestock, things like that. She was one of dozens of home economics advisors across South Carolina — and probably 100 across the country — whose role it was explicitly to help create better people.

It was— her job was not explicitly about the farm itself, but how to sort of maintain an entire family, a farming family, a community oriented family, a civically-minded family within this sort of modernizing era.

So Cammie Fludd was from South Carolina. She worked specifically with Clemson University, part of their extension service. And she had a few different roles throughout her time working with Orangeburg Farms. And she also sort of worked with other resettlement communities from afar, including Tiverton Farms.

But because she was a local and because she was a Black woman, her role in Orangeburg Farms was specifically designed to sort of physically and socially get closer to the Black community. There were also White extension workers and White home economics advisors, and they largely worked sort of to the point of segregation at the time.

They largely worked with the White community. And in the times where they did work with the Black community, they were often met with distrust. They were often met with resistance, because a lot of these Black families specifically didn’t want an outside— an outsider, but an outside White person to come in and tell them how to live their lives.

And so Cammie Fludd was in this interesting position because she was an agent of the state, technically. She was an agent of the state. She was an agent of Clemson University. But she formed these really deep, intimate relationships with these community members in Orangeburg Farms.

And she was sort of growing alongside them. So part of the journey of her life, part of what I follow within this story, is not only her time within Orangeburg Farms, where she is helping to improve — and improvement is the word that they use — to improve the community as a whole in the Black community specifically.

But this is also a trajectory of her life. I follow her afterwards into Spartanburg, South Carolina, one of the largest towns— one of the largest cities in South Carolina — where eventually, there is a statue created in her honor. There are buildings named after her, public housing buildings named after her.

And she has this legacy of sort of trying to improve the Black communities around her and the communities within wherever she is living at the time. And so, part of this chapter is about studying improvement in how specific individuals are responsible for the improvement of entire communities, of entire races to some extent.

And improvement is a word that we hear a lot in relation to home economics and Blackness, essentially, in South Carolina, specifically in the New Deal, but sort of throughout the Progressive Era into the 1950s.

Sizek: So when you say improvement, obviously, there’s a sense of agricultural improvement, or maybe improving a field. How do they think about improvement, and what does it have to do with race in South Carolina?

Vickers: Yeah. So improvement was quite a racialized term. Improvement of the White community was often thought of in the context of creating better citizen consumers. That’s sort of the phrase that they used.

And actually, Mona Domosh, who is a professor at Dartmouth, wrote a really wonderful book called Disturbing Development, where she talks specifically about improvement in the Progressive Era. And so I think alongside that book as I think about the racialization of improvement.

So in the White context, its improvement in terms of becoming a better consumer, becoming a better citizen, becoming more active. And we see this in Ashwood Plantation, where a lot of the community events every single year, the May Day festival, performances that children put on, were all in service of demonstrating how they were becoming better every single year.

They were a strong community because of the government intervention. They were strong because they were independently minded, because they could produce on their own, because they paid their taxes every single year.

But then improvement in the Black context, in the other three resettlement communities — and I’m including Orangeburg Farms here because improvement is really targeted in Orangeburg Farms — so improvement in the context of Blackness was to bring them up to the standards of modern society.

So a lot of the improvement measures included things as simple as rural electrification. They believe that the Black populations before were not modern citizens because they were doing work by candlelight, for example, or they didn’t have modern fixtures.

Part of it also was intense health and sanitation measures in Black communities, whereas those were sort of marginal in White communities. And so they had extensive health testing, extensive health treatment.

There’s this belief that this population, the Black population, was pestilential or malarial. And so a lot of the targeted improvement measures were about cleaning up the Black population. But other measures included sort of trying to standardize how communities behaved in the home.

And a lot of the behavior— the behavioral improvements they were trying to make were to trying— were trying to make sure that the Black population was on par with or behaving in the same way that White families were in the home.

And so a lot of this, even when not explicitly stated that we are trying to bring you up to the standard of White people, it was based on White metrics of productivity, White metrics of health, White metrics of what is proper behavior in the school or in the home.

And this was met with some resistance in Black communities. But I think to bring it back to Cammie Fludd, for example, the government may be rightfully believed and understood that putting a Black extension worker into their homes and communities could offer a way for the government to physically get closer to these Black populations and improve them without the threat of sort of a looming government entity trying to enforce that.

Sizek: So you mentioned that the improvement projects were seen as improvements to the families, but they’re also improvements for the community and sort of new experiments in different forms of living.

And so you mentioned in this piece that Ellendale Farms was a place where New Deal economists thought that the settlers would have to create new institutions, and sort of create new ways of being. And all of them were also a little bit of a social experiment.

What were some of both the successes and the failures of these as experiments? You already mentioned that Orangeburg Farms no longer exists.

Vickers: Mm-hmm. Yeah, most of these communities no longer exist. In fact, I would say pretty much all of them no longer exist, at least in the form that they were in the 1930s and ’40s. Most of them failed by the end— by the end of the ’40s, but by 1950.

Except for Ashwood Plantation, in which the high school continued long after the community sort of existed in its structured form, existed with government funding. And a lot of this, I think, has to do with sort of the Whiteness of the community and the funding that was imbued into the community.

But I think, to your point about experimentation, I think there are a lot of experiments at play here, one of which I would say is health experimentation. I mention this in the context of Orangeburg Farms.

Essentially, the health programming that was happening in South Carolina at the time was one of the most robust health systems in place. This sort of pre-dated a nationally— a national health system, basically that we have a standardized health system across the state or across the nation.

And so this was sort of an experiment in community health, in public health on what at the time was a massive scale. There were also agricultural experiments, as you mentioned, and these were sort of scientific experiments.

I mentioned how Cammie Fludd acted as an interlocutor between the federal government and the local communities. But other extension workers, specifically ones that worked with the Clemson Extension Service, for example, where they had test farms on their campus — part of what they would do is go into communities, listen to the needs of the farmers or sort of identify issues that they were dealing with on the ground there, bring these questions and concerns to the scientists at Clemson University, who would run their own tests.

And so it was basically testing grounds in different agricultural spaces across the state. I mentioned that originally it was supposed to be a 1,000-unit single resettlement colony. And part of why they distributed it, beyond just community resistance at the time, was because they wanted to have communities situated in different agricultural zones, different agricultural regions across the state, in part because they could test out the success of cotton in one region, for example, or the success of growing corn in another.

And so these were agricultural experiments. I think to some extent— and what I argue in this chapter is about social experiments. Orangeburg Farms, again, is a good example of trying to see what it would be like to have an interracial community. To that extent, it was not successful because it was not actually an integrated community. It was a community that housed people of different races, but it didn’t really push back against any of the existing social orders at the time, which meant that it sort of was a failure in that it didn’t actually integrate anything.

And some of the other social experiments included things like requiring children to go to school up until or through high school, which was not standard at the time, especially for children of farmers, for example.

And to sort of bring it back to Ashwood Plantation, they do have such a robust alumni association from their high school, in part because the school lasted, I think, until the ’70s or maybe into the ’80s.

But because eventually, Ashwood Plantation, despite being the only White community, the White resettlement community at the time, integrated in the ’60s and ’70s. And so they expanded their reach with this single institution of this school that was sort of founded upon these federal dollars, this federal funding that these other communities weren’t given.

So it was an experiment in differential development, uneven development across the state. And that’s sort of– these series of experiments, I think, are sort of the sum of what the New Deal was. I think they were just throwing things at the wall and seeing what would stick.

And in the case of Ashwood Plantation, their school system is what really stuck. The buildings were torn down throughout the early- to mid-20th century, but the school was always this standing building. And in fact, the school itself doesn’t serve as a school anymore, but it still stands as like a gymnasium, an auditorium, a place where people gather.

So I think it’s sort of a testament to sort of the investment, like what sort of investments have longevity. In this case, a school does the lack of investment in these buildings that were to house people, was an experiment at the time, too, and obviously led to sort of the failure of the construction of these buildings, but the failure to continue to house them long-term.

Sizek: Yeah, so you mentioned a lot of sort of the infrastructure that sticks behind. What are some of the social things that you think maybe lasted beyond the duration after this program was over?

Vickers: Yeah, I think— at least in Ashwood Plantation, I think it was a lot of community networks. They had an annual May Day festival. And part of the May Day festival, it coincided with the National Health Day. And so one of the things they would do every single year is gather, throw essentially like a parade and celebration.

And this was a longstanding tradition thereafter. And so that’s sort of like a social gathering that I see as sort of developing the social network within the community, a space to convene, have these conversations, et cetera.

I think in terms of some of the other communities— so Tiverton Farms might be a good example where Tiverton Farms was founded at the same moment as a state park was founded right down the street. And part of the development of the state park required Civilian Conservation Corps labor.

At the time, originally, it was Black labor, and they met some resistance in terms of the White surrounding community didn’t want Black people to sort of exist within their community. So they had to move them essentially to another CCC project.

But one of the lasting social relationships that I follow within this chapter is about how a man who lives with— lives and lived within this community of Tiverton Farms started working at the state park at the moment he moved into Tiverton Farms.

So he was, I think, 14 years old and continued to work at this park six miles down the road for the rest of his life. And he built these strong relationships, not only within his immediate community, but within the park system.

He passed away in the 90s and is still honored to to this day as sort of an integral part of the formation of this park. But also because he had built roots in this community and Tiverton Farms only had 20-something houses by the end of the construction period.

It was all Black, only 20 something. In theory, 20 something families lived there but because he was born and raised there, refused to leave after sort of the failure of Tiverton Farms. And maybe refused to leave is too strong of a term because he had paid off his home in full.

He built— he essentially added additions to his home. He built bricks on the outside of his home to make it more durable and insulated in the winter time. And he also had children. And his children ended up moving into houses sort of adjacent to him down the street from him.

And so part of building a social network for him in this case was creating his own community, literally birthing sort of the new generation of this community. His children ended up marrying people who were also from that community. They still live in this community as recently as, I think, 2012.

I read newspaper articles about his daughter still fighting for their street to be paved in 2012, nearly a century after this community was created. And so I think that’s sort of a testament to sort of the woven social networks and the woven economic networks.

So much of his economic life and his ability to stay in this place was because he worked just down the street six miles, but he worked down the street from where he was living.

And then he was able to form these really strong connections because the community was so small, because it was only 20 families, and he knew every single person who lived on– they all lived on effectively a street.

And so despite the fact that they weren’t receiving the maybe financial and infrastructural investment that Ashwood Plantation was, they formed these really strong kinship networks that sort of essentially outlived the life of this community.

Sizek: Yeah. So you mentioned that often these social networks can survive, but ultimately, the communities sort of fall apart, either because the houses literally were not built to last that long. And one of the things that you sort of theorize this as being is “planned abandonment.”

So can you tell us a little bit about how you landed on this term as describing what happens to these communities?

Vickers: Yeah, yeah. So part of it– part of it emerged out of my identification or recognition that essentially, just like the prefabricated buildings were never meant to sort of last decades and decades, these communities were sort of never invested in in such a way that would enable them to endure, at least without sort of outside intervention as they were given at the beginning.

And part of me arriving at the term “planned abandonment” is because I was reading about planned obsolescence at the exact same time. And planned obsolescence is a concept that emerged in the early 1930s just as the New Deal was sort of ramping up. And the logic there was that, prior to the New Deal, a lot of goods, a lot of furniture and things like that, were constructed with longevity in mind. They were constructed to be purchased once and to last sort of a lifetime.

But the man who coined planned obsolescence argued that what we should really be doing to bolster the economy is to construct and to build and to sort of manufacture goods that did have an expiration date, in order for them to sort of consume more and put more money into circulation.

And so in thinking about that, and in thinking about these resettlement colonies, I was thinking about how specifically one of the concepts or one of the phrases used by the government was that these resettlers, these rehabilitants, as they called them, were designed to be tax payers and were designed to be people who eventually put more money into circulation for the government.

So they were given money at the outset and given loans that lasted five, seven, ten years that needed to be paid off. But at the same time, to the point about improvement, they were given tools and skills that would allow them to sort of do all of these things on their own.

Eventually, the idea was that they would never need federal intervention again. They would never need government dollars in order to pay their taxes and in order to pay for a loan and in order to purchase things on the market that would help them sort of feed the American economy.

So that’s why I think about it as planned abandonment. They planned only for the first five years, or they planned only for the first 10 years, which is why these a lot of these resettlement colonies had a lifespan of 1939 to 1949, for example. They only planned as far as sort of a 10 year span.

And then after that, they pulled out all of the funding, regardless of whether or not these families had paid off their loans. They had just never planned for a long-term lifespan. And I mean, one of the things I theorize as well is that they—

—part of this investment that was unevenly distributed, the uneven development of these communities, had to do with the fact that they were sort of put– literally putting money on the success of certain communities over others.

So the robust infrastructure put in place in Ashwood Plantation, for example, that I just mentioned as being sort of part of their longevity over time, had to do with the fact that the government was quite literally banking on them succeeding in paying off their loans, succeeding in continuing on after– succeeding in paying their taxes.

Versus Tiverton Farms, which I just mentioned, as recently as a decade ago still didn’t have paved roads. They weren’t banking on the success of that community. They were banking— because this was a Black community, they were banking on improving this population.

And to that extent, improvement perhaps was the end goal, but they weren’t there to sort of see it out beyond that time period. I think there were also a few other factors at play, right? In the early 1940s, the US entered World War II, and they sort of extracted funding from these communities.

They no longer needed to invest in them because they had other means of making money at that time. But there was— but part of my argument is that there was specifically this plan to only invest in the short-term in hopes that they would have long-term sort of profit from these people.

Sizek: Yeah. And so this also– I mean, for me and in thinking about the broader significance of this project is, like, what happens at the end of the New Deal and, like, how do you think about this fitting into the New Deal’s legacy and how we can think about this, this time that is now being brought back into the news through thinking about things like the Green New Deal, for example?

Vickers: Yeah. This is– it’s not the focus of this chapter per se. It’s something I am thinking about in my dissertation broadly in terms of sort of the second or the new life that the New Deal is getting in this present moment.

I think in terms of thinking about how it relates to the Green New Deal, for example, part of my critique of the New Deal right now is about offering avenues or pathways towards what I think could be more equitable policymaking within the Green New Deal.

So how do we attend to these historic wrongs or these historic unevenness– this historic unevenness that was sort of enacted within different communities with the same goal in mind, right? Like creating better citizens, despite not providing them with the same financial or social or agricultural opportunity.

Another factor, though, in terms of thinking about sort of the end of the New Deal, I alluded to it a little bit ago in terms of the start of the Second World War, but thinking about what came out, sort of what happened to American citizens on the other side.

If the goal in the New Deal, specifically New Deal resettlement projects, and more specifically in White resettlement projects, was to make them better citizen consumers, than we sort of see that at play in the 1950s with sort of this era of consumption, this era of modernization.

Like, this was a project to modernize America. But another component— especially in these rural resettlement communities, part of this modernization was rural electrification.

And rural electrification, not just for the sake of illuminating the nation, but also to make them more tied with urban society, and make them more tied with the rest of the nation. We do sort of see that emerge in the post— in the post-New Deal era.

And I should say that in terms of rural electrification, some of these Black communities specifically didn’t become electrified until the mid ’50s or the late ’50s, even into the ’60s. And so there was still this unevenness in the wake of what was supposed to be New Deal progress for all.

And so again– so to return back to the Green New Deal, for example. In thinking about how to make policy like that more equitable, I had a conversation about this with someone the other day about how it’s essentially not about sort of unilaterally implementing the same policies in every single community.

The New Deal itself was kind of a mess in terms that there were so many different organizations operating at local, state, national, federal levels. But part of that distribution of policy at multiple levels did function to enact these national policies differently within specific communities.

And although it wasn’t always successful, as I was talking about earlier, and although it wasn’t actually always equal, part of this had to do with who was in charge at these different levels, I think enacting policy with regional specificity— so the South is a very specific region in terms of its agriculture politics, et cetera.

With regional specificity and community specificity in mind is something that I’m sort of pushing for and pushing towards when sort of retrospectively looking at the New Deal itself.

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Sizek: Well, thank you so much for coming on the podcast and telling us a little bit more about the New Deal.

Vickers: Of course. Yeah, thank you for having me.

Woman’s Voice: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Interview

The State of Higher Education: Interview with Lorna Finlayson

Part of the Global Democracy Commons project

Lorna Finlayson and James Vernon

One measure of the fragile state of many democracies is the way in which public universities have come under attack around the world. A new podcast series, produced as part of the Global Democracy Commons project, seeks to address the myriad forces seeking to foreclose public universities as spaces of critique and democratic protest across the globe.

The series explores diverse trends such as those related to the defunding of higher education; its redefinition as a private, not a public good; the increasing authoritarian nature of university management; the use of culture wars and discourses of civility to police classrooms; the waves of layoffs and closures of departments and programs; and the attempts to delimit academic freedom, free speech, and rights of assembly and protest.

We hope our conversations with those who work in higher education around the world will allow us to consider the degree to which the university has become the canary in the coal mine for the fate of democracy.

Episode 3

As universities across England and Wales continue to announce redundancies and close departments and programs, we talk to political theorist Lorna Finlayson about the nature of the crisis, why academics are relatively restrained in their responses to it, and how students offer some hope for alternative visions of higher education.

Lorna is a political theorist and a philosopher who teaches in the school of philosophy and art history at the University of Essex. She is the author of two books, The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy and An Introduction to Feminism.

Listen to the podcast below or on Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

ANNOUNCER: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

JAMES VERNON: Hello, and my name is James Vernon. I’m a professor of history and the director of the Global Democracy Commons at UC Berkeley.

One measure of the fragile state of many democracies is the way in which public universities have come under attack around the world. In this podcast series, we explore how universities are increasingly being targeted as spaces of debate, critique, and democratic protest. We hope our conversations will allow us to understand why universities are one of the canaries in the coal mine for the fate of global democracy.

Today, I’m absolutely thrilled to be able to talk to Lorna Finlayson about the state of higher education and its relationship to democratic life in Britain. Lorna is a political theorist and a philosopher who teaches in the school of philosophy and art history at the University of Essex. She is the author of two books, The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy and An Introduction to Feminism. They were published in 2015 and 2016.

She also frequently contributes to the New Left Review, where recently she’s written about the petty authoritarianism of Keir Starmer’s politics, the limits of our conventional understandings of freedom of speech, and a bracing piece about the complicity of academics in the managerialism that has hollowed out universities as critical spaces in Britain. Thanks for joining us, Lorna. I really appreciate it.

I’m going to start by asking you a set of impossible question, which you can take in whatever direction you want because I think many of our listeners won’t necessarily know much about the state of higher education in Britain. So I wonder if you could briefly give us a sense about how higher education and the position of universities have changed over the last 30 or 40 years, and particularly perhaps what that means about our changing understandings and experience of democracy in Britain.

LORNA FINLAYSON: Yeah, sure. I think it’s important to resist the temptation to go into too much technical detail with this sort of thing, because even those of us who care about it can get very easily bored very quickly once you start getting into the details of thresholds and repayment rates and so on. And it’s very easy to lose sight of the overall point.

I think that might actually be strategic to some degree. You can do a great deal of evil if you make it boring enough and complicated enough that everybody kind of tunes out. So I want to just try to say something very general about the change that I think has taken place in the last 30 years or so.

And roughly speaking, that change is one from a public goods model of higher education to a private goods model. There are various, as I say, caveats and complications you could add to that. It’s propped up with various kind of bursaries and student loans. And then they get withdrawn.

But without going into all that, the underlying essence of that change, as I say, is from a public goods model to a private goods model. And roughly speaking, a public goods model of higher education or of something else like health is that people pay into this institution, which we collectively think is worth having around in society. And we may pay according to our ability to pay as in progressive taxation.

And the institution is funded in that way and is available to people in general. A private goods model, by contrast, is where you think about something as an individual product or investment that you can pay into and from which you expect to derive benefit. And so these two modes or models are associated with different kinds of justification.

The first, the public goods model, as I say, is to do with whether it’s fair to pay for something is understood in terms of your ability to pay your means. In terms of the private goods model, the question becomes, well, what’s in it for me? Am I getting anything out of this? And if I’m not getting anything out of this, why should I pay for it?

So you hear what I think of as a faux progressive argument, which is, well, if I’m not benefiting from higher education, why should I pay for somebody else to attend university? And of course, you can see what happens when you apply that logic to something like health care. The wealthy are not benefiting from the health system. So why should they pay so that the unhealthy can be treated? So that’s the rough change that I see as having taken place and as having been entirely detrimental to the good in question.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

LORNA FINLAYSON: –which is that, the way in which it’s been detrimental is not just [INAUDIBLE]. And I think this was a mistake that we made, those of us who were involved in the movement against fees and cuts from the early 2000s onwards, and in particular 2010 in the UK. We placed a lot of emphasis on the question of access. And the claim was often made that working class people wouldn’t be able to afford to go to university. They’d be put off by the debt. Or they just wouldn’t be able to come.

I think the transformation of higher education in the direction of a private goods model has had bad effects in terms of preserving and, in some ways, exacerbating social inequalities. But it’s much more complicated than that story that I just mentioned would indicate. So it hasn’t really been the case that poorer people have been put off from attending university altogether.

And this is something that the defenders of the fees regime make great play of. They say, oh, well, actually, you see that the number of people going to university– the proportion of the population going to university has continued to rise, including amongst poorer people, people from poorer families. And therefore, it’s not exclusionary. And I think that’s a mistake. But I think it also shows that our emphasis arguably was in the wrong place.

What I think that this story about access to a good misses out is that the good in question is not something that is fixed and constant across this process of change. Rather, the transition from a public good model to a private good changes the thing in question. It changes the kind of good that higher education is.

And when I say that, I think people probably assume that I mean something entitled student consumers who are coming in demanding a top grade because they’ve paid a lot of money. And that happens to some extent. But I have to say, in my experience, that’s not really how students have responded to this change.

It’s actually, in a way quite heartening and in a way quite poignant to notice the ways in which students relate to higher education even under a system which puts a lot of pressure on them to relate in that entitled consumer kind of a way. What you actually find is students, even without having any acquaintance with the system of higher education that used to exist, sort of have a yearning for it, kind of implicit or instinctive yearning for that. And they seem really to want a space where they can actually pursue thoughts and develop as people in an unpressured and unforced and non-instrumental way. So I don’t really see that they have become these kind of entitled brats that you see depicted, for example, I think in certain media representations of students.

Instead, actually, what I see is they want this dream of what you might call the old school university experience. At the same time, they have to meet rents that are getting higher and higher and their loans no longer cover the rents. And so they have to work in Tesco. And they’re stressed about grades. So rather than entitlement in the student mindset, I would characterize the atmosphere among students as one of great anxiety above all.

But when I say that the good in question that is higher education has changed, I mean something else primarily. And what I mean– and this is going to sound really hyperbolic and possibly paranoid. But I think actually what so-called paranoia is quite a correct and reasonable response to the political reality that we find ourselves in.

I think that the change that we’ve seen in how higher education is is about making thinking almost impossible. It’s about creating an environment in which it’s almost impossible to complete a thought. And this is where it begins to sound paranoid to some people.

But I think that’s no accident. I think that those in power would quite like us not to be able to complete a thought. They would like that pressure that really makes reflection and critical consciousness impossible.

So I think that’s the way in which it’s changed. It manifests itself in lots of different ways. But I’ll just say something a little bit about the mechanisms by which it happens.

So there’s an argument for the transition to a private goods model of university, which is sometimes known as the driving up standards argument. And according to that logic, if you subject higher education or anything else to the discipline of the market, you will get people to work harder and better and be more productive and creative. And you’ll drive up standards.

And of course, as we know from any number of examples, including higher education, pretty much exactly the opposite happens. So instead of actually focusing on the core functions of a university, like teaching and research and thinking, you get more and more energy and more and more resources displaced onto peripheral functions, like recruitment, like branding, paying consultants to come up with supposedly better branding.

And you have a kind of a process where the means and the ends become inverted. Or rather, the ends slip out of the picture altogether. So you think, well, just as an academic, if I just apply for one more grant, maybe I’ll finally be able to complete a thought. Maybe I’ll finally be able to do the thing that actually interests me rather than just trying to get the next application done or jump through the next hoop.

So I think that’s the really big thing that I think people ought to understand about the transition from a public good to a private good. It’s not just about access, although that’s still important. It’s about a hollowing out actually the ruining of the good in question. Your question, though, was really, how did we get here? How did that happen?

And I think one really important thing to say about that is that it didn’t happen for the reasons that it sometimes claimed to have happened for. So I think a popular assumption might be the reason we ended up with the fee system is that university access was expanding. And that’s a good thing.

It’s good that more people should be able to access higher education. But that’s not affordable for more than a tiny percentage of the population. So you need to change something.

And so it makes sense that students should bear some of the costs of their own higher education [? so ?] that good can be expanded and enjoyed by more people. And of course, maybe we can make it a bit fairer by having bursaries for the poorest and so on and so forth. And now, if you say it like that, that can sound very reasonable to a lot of people.

And the problem with it, of course, is that it’s complete nonsense, as with so many arguments for austerity and privatization. It’s nonsense because, in fact, the private goods model of higher education is so expensive to administer that it’s not clear that it actually represents a saving as opposed to a public goods model, even allowing for an expansion to the sorts of numbers of students that we see now.

And in fact, it may even be more expensive. So the reason that it’s happening, as with cuts and privatization more generally, is sometimes said to be ideological. It’s just because people are so committed to this particular view of the self and of society that they will push it through even though it’s actually irrational. I would only add to that that I think it’s not purely ideological at the expense of some kind of material logic.

And here, this is a point that comes up again later. But there’s a question of, what is the correct unit of analysis with which to think about this? So if you think about things just from the point of view of the government, say, the national finances, then it looks like it’s irrational to replace one system with another on the basis of an austerity or saving money kind of rhetoric when that doesn’t, in fact, save money.

But if, on the other hand, you remember that, in fact, those in power don’t necessarily care about the public purse, that’s not necessarily that’s driving things here and, in fact, that its private companies, then it begins to make a lot more sense because there are beneficiaries from all of these transitions. And those beneficiaries are private companies. So in the context of higher education, outfits like Kaplan that do certainly stand to gain from this process.

Then the final thing to say that I think is really important is that this transition from a public good to a private good has not been democratic in any way. It’s not something that anyone, as far as I’m aware, ever voted for. The system of fees was introduced first by Tony Blair’s new labor government. And it wasn’t part of the manifesto. There was no mandate for it in that sense.

And then in the 2001 labor election manifesto, there was an explicit promise, in fact, not to introduce so-called top-up fees, which were the fees that went up to 3,000 pounds. They said that they would not do that. And in 2004, of course, they did that.

So it was without a democratic mandate. And in fact, against an election promise, I think the top-up fees vote, in fact, also only scraped by five votes in parliament at the time. And it was also against mass protests by students and by some academics. So I think that’s a really important thing to remember, that it was something that was really forced through in the teeth of opposition by a relatively small number of ideological zealots. So that’s a really long answer.

JAMES VERNON: That’s so great. And it gives us so much that we can talk about. There’s so many threads there that I want to pick up that the way in which the intensification of work, both for people who teach in universities and for people who try and study in universities but after work, jobs to cover their loans, make it impossible for people to be able to actually learn, let alone to think the massive expansion of a managerial class, which aims primarily to market and the university.

So it can recruit more students and develop what they call now the undergraduate student experience and build fancy, new facilities for them. And then critically, of course, also this question of the profoundly undemocratic way in which these changes have been made. And so there’s so much there that we can get into.

But we’ll maybe take each one in turn a little bit. But let’s just dwell on the fact– because I think it’s a really important point that, as you say, people often forget. So much of the current crisis in the UK at the moment– and listeners should understand that in the last couple of years, universities have been making– university staff faculty, as they’re called in the US, redundant in unprecedented numbers. They’ve been closing departments and academic programs in ways that the university sector has never seen before. And the way in which these cuts are always explained is as a financial necessity and that universities are in a state of bankruptcy.

So the very fix that was meant to be able, in the logic of this transition from a university as a public good to a private good, the mechanism that was meant to be able to, as you say, democratize the experience of university, the introduction of fees that would allow a greater number of people to attend university, clearly hasn’t worked.

If the logic now is we have to make– we’re laying people off because we can’t fund this program, we can’t fund this program, so this language of financial crisis that is used to justify the cutting of programs and the cutting of staff, really, above all, seems to indicate that the entire model of higher education as a private good that can be sold on the marketplace hasn’t worked. Am I missing something? Am I missing something there? Or is there genuinely a financial crisis in British higher education?

LORNA FINLAYSON: No, I don’t think you’re missing something. I think this is something that I’ve sometimes been slightly confused about for reasons I’ll try and explain. But I think the most obvious thing to say first is that the parallels between the sorts of austerity arguments we’re hearing from management of universities and the sorts of austerity arguments we’ve heard from governments over the past few years are unmistakable.

And we know just about how much validity the arguments made by governments about for austerity had. And we know that they were bogus. And I think that basically the same thing is the case with the arguments that we’re hearing coming from university management. And some of the replies are parallel too. So you can point out that, really, statements about economic necessity are never just neutral statements of fact, right? They are the products of framing. And financial situations are also the products of past decisions.

So when, for example, a university says, oh, we can’t afford to pay this many staff or we can’t afford to pay our staff properly, that may be technically true in a framing where they’ve already decided in advance that they have to spend this amount on capital expenditure and vanity projects, and they have to have a vice chancellor who has a six-figure salary and also a private chauffeur and all the rest of this stuff.

So I think we have reasons to be extremely suspicious of those arguments coming from management. At the same time, it is true that universities are facing severe financial pressures, and that’s not an accident. So if you look at the early statements of or the proposals by the architects of the present system, people like Brown as in the Brown report, you find that the idea of market exit was always part of the plan.

The idea was that those– it’s like survival of the fittest, and those universities that weren’t up to scratch would again be subjected to the discipline of the market and would go under. They would fail because they deserved to fail. That was the idea. So it’s not surprising to see that things are going in that direction because that was always the intention of these reforms.

How do you then put these– the reason I’m puzzled about this sometimes is that how do you put these things together? So our universities are really in dire straits economically, or aren’t they, right? Is it a bogus rationale only, or what’s going on? And do universities actually have any or management have any choice but to act in the ways that they act? And that’s something that I think can sometimes, as I say, be quite confusing.

So from the perspective of many academics, it appears that management is acting in ways that are just irrational and self-defeating because they could, in fact, invest in their staff, and they’d probably do better if they did. And they probably even do better by their own metrics, in terms of their reputation and their position in the rankings if they didn’t waste all their money on consultants who tell them to adopt slogans that are exactly the same as the slogans adopted by every other marketized university in the UK.

So it looks like management are stupid from the point of view of a lot of academic critics of what they’re doing. But I sometimes think, well, we’re the stupid ones if we really think that that’s all that’s going on here. Might it be that, actually, there’s something else driving this, and might it be that the people in positions of power in universities, as with the kind of national level with rhetoric around austerity, they don’t necessarily really care about whether the university flourishes or even survives?

They’re going to be fine. They can go through the revolving door to a job in Kaplan, or they can be bussed around from one destroyed university to destroy the next one. So looked at that way. And again, this is a point about what’s the right unit of analysis. If you think about individual management creatures and also outfits like Kaplan, profit-making outfits that are poised to cash in as soon as a university does go under, then these decisions by management no longer look so obviously stupid or irrational.

So to put it another way, I think the right thing to say is that universities actually could act differently from the ways in which they are acting. And it’s not obviously the case that they would fare worse financially, if they did, than they already are faring. But they won’t, and they won’t for quite systematic reasons to do with where their interests lie and their own ideological commitments and so on.

So in sum, then, I think it’s true that the economic situation of universities is, in many cases, dire. But one, this is often partly of their own making through what, from our point of view, seem like perverse priorities and financial decisions but which, as I say, from another point of view, might actually look rational. Two, the economic direness or the economic necessity or need is, anyway, not the reason for the sorts of cuts that are being announced.

That is something that I think, again, is ideologically driven. And these moments of crisis are often just used as a pretext or an excuse for doing things that they wanted to do anyway. And then thirdly, these measures are also not going to solve the problem that they claim to be trying to respond to. And I think you mentioned this really already. You don’t cut your way out of a crisis.

That doesn’t work at the level of a country. And it also doesn’t work at the level of the university. So it won’t work, and universities will go under, but there’ll be some people that will be quite happy about that.

JAMES VERNON: It’s a bleak situation that you’re telling us about. I want to come back to some of the other issues you raised right at the beginning.

But just while we’re on this, let’s lean into the responses of students and staff, those who teach university students in Britain to this predicament because, as you said, right at the beginning, the introduction of tuition fees was undemocratically imposed and led to– I mean, actually, I remember, in the early ’80s, when I was an undergraduate student going on a protest march for the abolition of the student maintenance grant, which was actually the very beginning of this process.

But the protest that we were doing in the 1980s was nothing compared to the size of the protests that paralyzed London in the 2010s when the big introduction of fees came in and fees went up to 9,000. And also in an unprecedented way, university lecturers have organized through their union. And listeners in the United States, especially, should understand that all university teachers are members of a union and in this country.

And that union has mobilized two nationwide strikes in the last four years, which had not happened for a very long time, if at all, I believe. So there is a clear resistance to this resignification of higher education as a private good and to the debt financing of that private good and to the austerity measures that have been introduced to it. But you’ve also written about the complicity of many university teachers in this system. Can you explain a little more why the business of university teaching is still going on in these impossible conditions?

LORNA FINLAYSON: I think I can say a little bit about the complicity and some of the reasons for that as I see them. It reminds me of– there was this famous interview that Chomsky did or with Andrew Marr, when they’re talking about the media and they’re talking about the kind of selection mechanisms which make sure that people who are really boat rockers or people who are really too critical just don’t make it into positions of influence in the media in the first place.

So Chomsky was saying to Marr, look, it’s not that I think that you’re being manipulated or brainwashed or being led into saying something that you don’t believe. You just wouldn’t be sitting there if you didn’t believe the things that you believe. And I think a similar selection mechanism exists in the case of academia. It begins at school. It’s also something that Chomsky mentions interestingly.

But people who generally were successful at school are going to then, with plenty of exceptions, of course, to be those who reacted well, to a reasonable extent, to authority or were able to tolerate authority. And those, of course, are the people who are going to end up in academia. In addition, if you think about the changes that have happened to academia just in the last few years– and I’m really talking in my own time from being a student to being an academic. This happened very fast. And I don’t know if I could have got through these filters now.

There are these additional screening mechanisms that have come into play whereby if you want to get a job or if you even want to get PhD funding, it used to be that you could just write what you wanted to do your PhD on. And if you were lucky, you would get funding. Now, you almost have to be this kind of corporatized academic self-entrepreneur even to fill in the forms to get to the point of– and I’ve seen people go through this process. And by the end of it, it had messed with their minds.

They didn’t even want to do a PhD anymore. They were unable to think in that kind of free, unforced way that is the whole point of doing PhD. Anyway, so my point is there is a selection mechanism that I think selects for conformists, even against those people’s own better judgment or instincts. It’s hard to get through that net without coming out deformed in some way on the other side.

And I think that that partly explains why academics are the way they are. I think part of it also has to do with class interest. Certainly more senior academics might, in fact, not care so much about the fate of precarious junior academics. They’re OK. They have their pension.

They’re far enough through their career. They feel it isn’t really going to affect them. So they will turn out when it comes to pensions, but they will then not turn out when it comes to opposition to casualization. We’ve seen this in the UK. So I think those are some of the mechanisms that are involved. Did that answer– I’m not sure if that answered all your questions.

JAMES VERNON: Oh, that’s great. That’s great. And it leads us to where I wanted to go next, which was, you raised at the top of our conversation this question of how when a university degree is presented and experienced as a private good and it’s presented as a private good in conditions of labor, both for university teachers and for undergraduate students, where it becomes impossible to think, where everyone is just trying to get by and get through the next deadline of whatever it is that they have to do, and that the university is a critical space, becomes hollowed out, basically, because everyone just has their work down there filling out the forms, as you say, that they have to fill out for the next grant or for their next leave or for their next teaching evaluation or anything else.

So I wonder if you could just say a little more about– it’s been 25 years since I’ve taught in the UK, so I think it would be really helpful for me to understand what universities in the UK, how they’ve been changed as critical spaces, how– you’re talking about the production of a certain type of conformity and consent around the system that currently exists.

And I wonder whether there are spaces of exception to that type of rule or whether universities have just become degree factories in which university teachers and students are focused on output and the product, as opposed to thinking and learning so that they can be informed democratic citizens of a country that would think that universities could be a public good of some type?

LORNA FINLAYSON: Yeah. I’m going to say two things, which maybe point in opposite directions. One of them is sort of borderline sentimental, and the other is very pessimistic. I think the more optimistic part of it is that, yes, there are exceptions. And in a way, I think that life is all about the exceptions.

And I said already that I thought one heartening thing was that the way that students don’t really conform to this model of the consumer that management really want them to be and even their student unions, which have been taken over largely by management, really want them to be. And they really try and whip them up to be that and to pressure their lecturers and to be that kind of entitled customer that they actually don’t really want to be.

So there is this kind of human resistance that I think is a source of hope, and nothing bad is ever really total. Or when it is, maybe there really is no hope. But none of these processes, I think, are absolute or complete. And there’s some, I think, solace in that. So that’s the happy bit. The less happy bit is that– and this is going to sound rude, but I don’t really buy and I’ve never really bought the idea that universities are, were ever critical spaces.

And this is, I think, where I part company with some people on my own side because now, obviously, if you want to defend the public university against something worse, which is the marketized hellscape, it’s tempting to want to say very nice things about the old model of the public university and how wonderful it was, and it was a source of this critical consciousness, and people were really doing this genuine reflection and thinking critically about power structures and all the rest of it.

Well, why would you– I mean, really, why would you really think that that was going to be allowed, right? And unless you think already that society is much nicer in general than I think it is, why would you find in a society, which is in all sorts of ways, exploitative, oppressive, exclusionary, why would you find these islands being allowed to flourish where this wonderful kind of critical thought is going on? I don’t think that’s the case.

I think maybe this is just a kind of a Marxist story in a way, but I think it’s correct that overall function of something like a university and of academia is going to be to oil the wheels of the machine to find and to come up with, one or another, more or less elaborate justification for the status quo. And that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t defend it because it doesn’t mean that– it’s still better than the marketized hellscape. And it doesn’t mean that there aren’t exceptions. But I don’t think we should be naive about what the overall character of institutions like academia is.

JAMES VERNON: I’m so glad you say that. That’s such an important point to make that we don’t forget that universities in Britain, for an unspeakably long time, were training schools for an elite that would govern the country through what they considered to be their own excellent judgment. Universities were intricately related to the development of and the implementation of colonialism across the British Empire.

All of the disciplines were profoundly shaped by that in different ways. They were locked in relationships with industry and with the production of technologies used for the conduct of war. So clearly, I think even an old white guy like me doesn’t want to go back to the post ’68 expanding university. We know the limits and the contradictions of that as a type of space.

But that begs the question then I think of what words are public university– how do we imagine a public university now that could be a type of critical space? How do we reach for a sort of new utopian vision of the university? And what would that look like? I’m actually just interested in whether you have any sort of roadmap or ideas of whether the university can be saved not just from its marketized self, but from those remnants of its public spirit that I think you talk about really wonderfully as still existing in certain pockets and locations.

LORNA FINLAYSON: I think just before answering that bit, a sort of footnote on the first thing you said– in a way, I would want to go back to something like the ’68 model, not because I think that that was perfect or that the overall function was critical or revolutionary but because the factors that you mentioned– complicity in the arms industry and so on and so forth, the production of an elite, and now, in the case of the contemporary university, I think also the production of indebted consumers as well, indebted and perennially stressed consumers– are still very much with us.

It’s not as if there are student movements for divestment from the arms industry that are still going on. But those things haven’t gone away, and other things have got much, much worse. So in a way, I’d be content for going backwards a bit before anything else.

In terms of the utopian question, I don’t really have an answer to that. And partly, I think, what’s the point in me having an answer because there’s no plausible mechanism for me or anybody else’s vision of something better for a public university at the moment coming to fruition because those in power are completely hostile to anything that would be better. So in a way, it almost seems like an indulgence.

But I think maybe there’s a couple of things that I can say about it. I think the first thing is that the problems of things like hierarchy and the reproduction of a ruling elite are problems of society, not just of the university. It’s the same with access. People always used to talk about this at Oxbridge a lot. And really, they had no serious interest in doing something drastic to improve access. Otherwise, they would have done it.

They could have just had– OK, I, years ago, annoyed a lot of people by writing a thing about how they should just have state-school-only colleges and that would be one way. But of course, no, no, they couldn’t possibly.

Anyway, though, that’s a tangent. What I was going to say is if you want to transform the university, you would have to do that as part of a wider project of transforming society. That’s the only way you could not have it something which is compromised, elitist, reproduces inequalities. You take on the inequalities in the first place. And you take on the war machine in the first place.

And if you didn’t have something like our modern arms industry, then you wouldn’t have universities being invested and complicit in it. So I think that’s part of the answer. It has to be part of a broader process of social change, much broader than just the university.

I think one more thing to say about this is that– I’ve said that it’s sometimes bad to get rid of something which is itself bad, right? So even if I have a really dim view of the university and of academics and of academia, it could still be bad to get rid of it in a certain way, which we’ve talked about, which takes the form of the marketized university. I think, though, by the same stroke, it’s possible to imagine better abolitions.

It’s not possible, I think, to imagine them in very much detail. We are talking about a radically different kind of world here from the one that we see or that we’re likely to see anytime soon. But if we’re talking in that frame, then I think what I would say is I don’t necessarily think we ought to be wedded to anything recognizable as the university. I think the same about schools, for example.

If you were just to abolish schools overnight and replace them with a voucher system like Milton Friedman I think wanted to do, then I think that would make things worse rather than better. But that doesn’t have to mean that in a kind of postrevolutionary world, you would want something recognizable as a school. And I think maybe you can say something similar about universities.

Maybe in that sort of transformed society, universities would actually be obsolete, and forms of learning could be much more dispersed among groups of people and among different institutions, libraries. I don’t know, it’s hard even to imagine it in any detail. But what I’m just saying is there’s no particular reason to think that universities as we know them are something that is absolutely necessary if anybody is going to learn anything or think anything.

JAMES VERNON: And that’s really interesting. If we can think of the history of the university in the UK of moving from a institution that educates a handful of elite students to one that is democratized, the public version that trains an elite, the private model, which turns into a factory and produces a much larger number of people.

But you’re saying that in both contexts, there’s a type of constraint of thought and of imperatives that means we may need to think of a third model, which is– yeah, the abolition of the university as a space of confinement of education and to unleash education, higher forms of education that might happen in different types of spaces and ways.

I’m going to push back a little bit because it seems to me that one element of universities that we might want to hold on to is the way that they have produced forms of knowledge that appear dangerous to the ruling classes. So, I mean, we can think of probably– I mean, perhaps closest to your own interest would be think of the role that second-wave feminism had in actually beginning to take shape and rearticulating what was possible in universities.

And we can think of– you could think of other types of examples. So is there something about traditions of critical thought that come out of universities that need to be salvaged and rescued and reimagined rather than simply dispensed with?

LORNA FINLAYSON: I think that critical thought is valuable and to be defended wherever it’s found, really. I don’t at all disagree that it sometimes is found within universities. And I think the way I would express my ambivalence about universities is that, as I say, while the overall function might be a conservative one, there are exceptions. And what’s valuable about universities is that they have provided a kind of space where it’s possible to have exceptions. And that’s better than not having the space.

So they give you a kind of breathing space. And sometimes good things come out of that. Having said that–

JAMES VERNON: OK, I was going to hope that you were going to end on that, that you were going to end that thought on that positive note. [LAUGHS]

LORNA FINLAYSON: Fair enough, I can do. I don’t have to ruin it.

JAMES VERNON: [LAUGHS] Well, I want to pause you at least. You can come back to the miserable afterthought that you were about to give us. But I wanted to pause you there because I wanted to ask about the university and culture wars in Britain. Obviously, in the US, we’re experiencing right now a level of insanity around the culture wars and universities.

And it’s also been very, very present in the UK, the right critique of what they call wokery and which in the old days used to be called political correctness. Those are attacks precisely on those critical traditions of thought that we are saying it still exists in pockets in universities. So I wonder whether you can give us a sense of how far those debates or those attacks on the types of critical thought that’s still possible in universities is unfolding in Britain, and what you think is driving that or involved in that process?

LORNA FINLAYSON: Yeah. Well, the woke thing is interesting. I think one of the things that’s most striking about universities is that people outside of them really have very little idea of what they’re like or what actually happens inside them. And that’s not really surprising because why would they? There’s the lack of direct experience of it, but then there’s also this proliferation of totally misleading media accounts of what universities are like.

So I think most people operate with them are completely false image of what goes on there. And part of that false image is that universities are these palaces of wokeness. I think the Netflix series The Chair played on this, where the idea is you can’t say anything, and students will somehow be triggered, and then they will shut you down and get you fired and all the rest of it.

This has very, very little basis in reality. And most of these stories that you hear, these free speech rallies, are almost entirely confected in my experience. So you don’t necessarily– you’re not necessarily able to verify that for each one of them. But so many times it’s happened that I’ve read a story in the media, and because I was there or I knew somebody was there, I happened to know that this is not at all what happened. Absolutely not what happened.

So I think most of it is just complete hype, really, to be honest. But is that answering–

JAMES VERNON: Yeah, but, presumably, it’s hype with a purpose. I mean why invoke an enemy? Why make the account that you’ve given us of higher education in the UK as pacific places, as docile spaces, where they’re just the remnants of the possibility of having an education that allows you to think differently?

So why, if universities, if the private marketized model of the university has created docile subjects, why then have this critique of the extremities of thought, which is how wokery is characterized. And I’m interested in what you think is going on there.

LORNA FINLAYSON: I see. Yeah. So it’s part of the thought that why would the right wing media need to pick a fight with universities and academics if they didn’t pose some kind of a threat?

JAMES VERNON: Yeah, exactly.

LORNA FINLAYSON: Well, I think that’s also an argument that came up in around 2010, which I thought was interesting, where people would ask questions like, who’s afraid of the humanities? And there was this common narrative that the reason why there was this push to close down humanities departments in particular was because we in the humanities are free thinkers, and they’re scared of us.

And I can see why people in the humanities would want to think that because it makes you feel very good about yourself. But I think, even at the time, I thought that that was probably too self-congratulatory a narrative. But that’s not to say that there’s absolutely nothing to it.

I think what it is that, as I say, what there is not an overall critical function, but there is a little bit of air, a little bit of space where things are possible. And those in power, maybe not exactly are threatened by that because, actually, I think of this as more a case where they’re just on the up. And they have unbridled power, and they’re just triumphant. And they would like to stamp out as much as possible.

So if they can complete the process where they can really shut down the last places where a thought might possibly sprout, then they will, and they’ll take great satisfaction in doing so. I think that that’s a bit different from saying that they’re really scared of us because I don’t think that’s plausible. But in terms of what the argument about wokery does, I think it nevertheless does something.

But perhaps what it does is not so much defeating the great enemy of the universities or the humanities, but it functions very usefully as a form of ideology by distraction. It keeps people focused on a false problem and a false enemy, which allows you to distract them from other things that actually they would do better to be thinking about because they actually are real. So I think it’s functional in that way.

JAMES VERNON: Yeah, it’s imaginary, like the danger of the migrant is– it’s a fiction that is deployed in order to create a public that is scared of something that doesn’t really exist.

LORNA FINLAYSON: Yeah, and I think there’s also a strand of anti-intellectualism that is part of it as well. And again, like from my point of view, I’m a little bit ambivalent about this because I can understand why people might despise academics. I can see why they might have the view that, well, they’re all just sitting around saying obvious things to each other and are overpromoted and overvalued and are not really contributing anything of use.

I do think largely something like that, but perhaps for different reasons. I think they’re too complicit in the social, political, and economic status quo. But this anti-intellectualism is of a different kind, I think. And it’s something which is quite easily weaponized by those in power. I don’t really claim fully to understand it, but it certainly has a degree of fire to it. It’s something that people can get whipped up about quite easily.

And there’s a certain kind of philistinism to it, a kind of idea that actually all this stuff is just hot air. And we should just get down to cold, hard money and getting things done. And that’s something that I think has become quite dominant in our culture and usually in ways that turn quite ugly.

JAMES VERNON: My last question and it’s going to be a brief one, but I’ve been very struck how quickly the Palestine Solidarity Movement has been closed down on British university campuses. And I mean, to me, as a historian, it seems markedly different from the policing of other types of student protests on university campuses in Britain, going back to campaigns for nuclear disarmament in the 1950s or the anti-apartheid movement. Or I could give you lots of examples going way back.

And I wonder whether you have any thoughts about whether that’s reflective of the bizarre sensitivity that seems to now coalesce around the question of Palestine or whether you see it as reflecting a more sort of authoritarian political climate on university campuses in Britain?

LORNA FINLAYSON: I think there’s maybe layers of it. I think, firstly, the university was never the friend of students in the way that it might have presented itself to be. And it’s always been the case that universities would ultimately call the police and get student occupiers hauled out. And they did that when we had an occupation against fees in 2010. And that’s what they will do. I think it has also got more authoritarian.

And I think, on top of that, Palestine is a special issue. It’s not only a special issue in the context of student protests, which, as you say, have been cracked down on with particular brutality. It’s also a special issue in the case of the issue of free speech.

So while I’ve said that a lot of these rules about free speech are simply made up and the ones that aren’t made up are the ones that you tend not to hear about in the media, which generally have to do with Palestine, there is one issue where it really is the case that I don’t think academics would feel safe speaking critically about Israel on campus. And they’d be right not to feel safe doing so because there would be repercussions. And we’ve seen many instances of that already.

And we also know that there is a much wider chilling effect, way beyond the handful of instances that we’ve seen where people have been disciplined. So people know that they cannot, in fact, speak clearly on the issue of Palestine. I would add, more broadly, critical criticisms of British foreign policy are increasingly difficult to express.

And academics who I think, for example, were to deviate from the line of the British government on something like the war in Ukraine would quickly find themselves in trouble in a similar way. So I think that’s something which has changed very quickly and is extremely concerning.

I think in the question of– in the case of Palestine, it can’t be separated really from what happened with the Labor Party under Corbin. And I think that the effort to demonize that incarnation, that brief incarnation of the Labor Party, and to demonize speech that was pro-Palestinian, anti-Zionist speech was so successful that those who pushed for it and those who wanted to see that happen have no reason to stop.

It’s working so well, so they just keep going and keep going. And it’s also been extremely effective, extremely successful in universities, the vast majority of which in the UK have adopted the so-called IHRA definition of antisemitism, which is then used to discipline critics of Israel because it faithfully blurs the line between criticism of Israel and antisemitism.

And I have to say, this is also an area where I think the spinelessness of academics has been much in evidence because there hasn’t been anywhere near the amount of opposition to this process as there really ought to have been by liberal academics’ own self-professed standards, their belief in academic freedom and freedom of speech.

JAMES VERNON: Thank you, Lorna. And I can’t say I enjoyed having that conversation with you because we came to some pretty miserable conclusions, but it was such a helpful and thoughtful conversation. And I really thank you for your time and for your insight today.

LORNA FINLAYSON: Thanks for inviting me.

ANNOUNCER: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Matrix On Point

Los Angeles Wildfires: Risk, Resilience, and Collective Action

Part of the Matrix on Point Series

As wildfires grow more frequent and devastating, they expose vulnerabilities in infrastructure, governance, and community preparedness. Tackling this escalating threat demands interdisciplinary solutions that address not just the immediate risks but also the broader systemic changes driving extreme weather events.

Recorded on February 18, 2025, this Matrix on Point discussion featured Christopher Ansell, Professor of Political Science and Executive Director of the UC Berkeley Center for Catastrophic Risk Management (CCRM); Kenichi Soga, Distinguished Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Director of the Berkeley Center for Smart Infrastructure; and Marta Gonzalez, Associate Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and City and Regional Planning. Louise Comfort, Professor Emerita and Project Scientist, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, moderated.

This panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of City and Regional Planning, the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science, the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management, and the Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society (CITRIS).

The panel was presented as part of Matrix On Point, a discussion series promoting focused, cross-disciplinary conversations on today’s most pressing issues. Offering opportunities for scholarly exchange and interaction, each Matrix On Point features the perspectives of leading scholars and specialists from different disciplines, followed by an open conversation. These thought-provoking events are free and open to the public.

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to a recording of this panel below or on Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

[UPBEAT MUSIC]

WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

CORI HAYDEN: Welcome to the Matrix. My name is Cori Hayden. I am the interim Director of Social Science Matrix this semester from the Anthropology Department, otherwise.

It’s a real delight to welcome you all here for this panel, which was organized on relatively short notice. And thank you so much to Louise Comfort and colleagues here for helping put this together, not just helping put it together, for taking the initiative and making this happen, obviously, in response to the devastating wildfires in Los Angeles. We’re going to explore some of the many dimensions of the issues that come up with urban and wild wildfires threats, bringing together a range of absolutely critical perspectives from political science, civil and environmental engineering, and, of course, from the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management.

We’d like to thank our co-sponsors as well. City and Regional Planning, Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society, CITRIS. Now, I know that Louise Comfort, as moderator, will have some substantive introductory comments, so I will keep it short here.

I do want to– let’s see if I can do this. Oh, yes. –do my due diligence as center director and remind you or let you know of some upcoming events at Matrix.

We have a very packed semester of extraordinarily timely conversations. Upcoming next Monday– Virtual Realities and Digital Spaces. Thursday, March 6, really interesting panel, lunchtime panel, on mainstreaming psychedelics.

Monday, March 17th– An Author Meets Critics Panel With Areej Sabbagh-Khoury from the Department of Sociology to discuss her recent book, Colonizing Palestine. Additional events are up here. Please do keep us in mind as you are looking for interesting things to do with all of your copious spare time. But today, as our topic is the Los Angeles wildfires. And we’re going to be talking about risk, resilience, and collective action. I will leave the floor to our panelists, but let me introduce our moderator, Professor Dr. Louise Comfort.

Louise Comfort is project scientist with the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the co-principal investigator for the NSF grant, Designing Smart, Sustainable Risk Reduction and Hazard Prone Communities, which runs from 2022 to 2025 here at Berkeley. She’s Professor Emerita of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and was the director of the Center for Disaster Management at the University of Pittsburgh from 2009 to 2017. As a fellow– she’s a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and received the 2020 Fred Riggs Award for Lifetime Achievement on International Comparative Administration.

She studies the dynamics of decision-making in response to urgent events, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, wildfire, COVID-19, among them. That list was probably going to just keep getting longer. Without further ado, let me turn it over with enormous gratitude to Louise Comfort. Thank you.

LOUIS COMFORT: Yeah.

[APPLAUSE]

Thank you. Thank you very much. And I am delighted to introduce this panel, a sad panel but an important panel and one that we really need to pay attention to.

Let me just give you just a very brief context of these, were catastrophic– and we’re looking at catastrophic risk, a set of conditions that’s the extreme of the extremes. And this is probably the most consequential, the most costly, the most difficult wildfire we have seen.

Just some brief statistics. It was not just one wildfire. It was 10 wildfires burning successively. In the two big wildfires, the Eaton wildfire and the Palisades fire, were burning simultaneously.

So this was a situation where we had– it burned over 16,000 acres. The numbers keep changing. And there were at least 25 people who were dead, found dead, but likely the consequences from of smoke, pollution, et cetera, will lead to more and thousands and thousands of people harmed.

The evacuation was really rather remarkable. About 200,000 people were evacuated in a matter of hours. It was chaotic. It was difficult.

Cars were being pushed off the road, but they got people out. And the total cost was estimated at $250 billion, largest, most expensive wildfire we’ve had. The critical thing about this event is that was the initial event.

And already what we see is the rains came, and the mudslides that followed, and the floods. And then the whole discussion of recovery. So we’re looking at these catastrophic events of very complex systems that are interacting and interrelated. And I’m very pleased to say that we have, from our own Berkeley faculty, some expert analysts to address exactly this.

And we have Kenichi Soga from the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. And Kenichi Soga, if I read all of this, I think I’m going to shorten it a little bit. He is not only professor, and he’s a distinguished professor of all kinds of things, but he’s also the director of the Center for Smart Infrastructure and also the principal investigator of a project that is focused on designing resilience for communities at risk and the interaction between the built infrastructure, the organizations that manage it, and the people in the communities and interacting with them.

And second, we have Marta Gonzalez, professor of city and regional planning, who has looked at modeling in complex systems. And then we have Chris Ansell, who is professor of political science, is focused on governance issues, and especially governance across jurisdictions. So this is what you’ve seen, but I do have to point out this was a photograph.

And anyone who lived through the ’91 fires here will see that ominous standing chimney. And then this was the critical issue. It’s where we are now in– excuse me, cascading and compound risks.

And this is the burn scar from both the Eaton and the Palisades fire that is now subject to mudslides, landslides, flooding. And so our challenge is really to understand these complex conditions, the dynamics that are driving these extremes, and to anticipate the risk for the next time, which will surely come. Now, I’ll turn it over to Kenichi.

[APPLAUSE]

KENICHI SOGA: So I’m Kenichi Soga from the College of Engineering, Civil and Environmental Engineering Department. I see my colleagues here. So it’s great to have our College of Engineering and Civil Engineering colleagues here.

We’re coming from a very technical side. And I think gradually it goes to Marta and then Chris into social science side. So please bear with me.

We have a project really promoting what we call socio-technical digital twin. But before I do that, two weeks ago, Louise and I were in LA area looking at the aftermath of the wildfire. And these are the photos that we took. And we took a lot of photos in Palisades and also Altadena.

And one thing that you see– the burned the car on the right. And it’s the first time I saw no EV.

So we start to see this new technology creating an issue on the other– when you have a wildfire, what do we deal with this EV-related cars and that sort of things? So that’s another interesting area of research, I think, that we need to think about.

During the weekend, I went through a variety of news articles and figured out what are the issues on the evacuation, which I’m focusing a little bit more today. But you can see there are a lot of articles, and you’ve probably read some of the articles related to that. The one on the right– I’m not sure you can see it. It’s the purple one. It’s showing the evacuation order that happened. It’s from The Wall Street Journal.

I have to go through, check with the– going to LA to find out more about it, whether this is true or not. But you can see that the evacuation order was done on the one side of the street that you see on the purple side. And then, the after eight hours, evacuation was on the left side of the street. And then you can see on the bottom figure showing that who were killed in that particular incident you see more on the left side.

So there’s an interesting– think about evacuation and that thing. And this is where we come familiar earlier with Paradise and Camp Fire event that I started working in this area with Louise. And I’m going to show you more on that.

At College of Engineering and Center for Smart Infrastructure, many of our colleagues know that we run a lot of simulations. And the simulation is coming from the street level to the regional scale. So in the left, we see the area where we are. There are about 7 million people. There are about 15 million trips every day.

We model each individual trip and see what’s going on in each of the roads. And then we say, OK, Bay Bridge goes down, what’s going to happen? On the right is our water network, is pipelines that you see. And then, when earthquake happens, what’s going to happen to the pipelines, and then how we recover? So these are the things that we do in our simulations.

And really we’re looking at systems of systems or how one system affects the other through the simulations. And then, we hope that will inspire some of– or work together with our social scientist colleagues.

The SimCenter is an NSF-funded Center. So it’s a collection of our research colleagues working in not only wildfire, but also earthquakes and also on tsunamis and other things. So if you want to know more about it, please let us know.

This is an example of when earthquake happens. There’s a Hayward earthquake that happens here. And you can see the ground shaking, which is shown on the left top. And then, you can start to simulate which part of the pipeline will get damaged and then how much water will go, so you do a simulation of the water. And then you start to see earthquake may not happen in one particular location.

It’s probabilistic. So you have to do a lot of simulation to figure out. And then, we can also simulate what happens to the red-type buildings, and then traffic disruption. So these are the interactions that we do simulate.

And then looking at the functional recovery, how long it will take, and how do we recover. So these are working with East Bay MUD. This is a project with Caltrans.

For example, Caltrans have thousands of bridges. Of course, Bay Bridge, Golden Gate Bridge are good, but then there are thousands of bridges. When earthquake happens, which one is going to be? So we have a project to see which bridge is very important so that everybody has access to hospitals, everybody has access to fire station, everybody has access to police stations. So these are the things that we’re working with Caltrans, and looking at emergency recovery and functional recovery.

The project that I want to highlight today is what we call a smart and connected community. It’s a National Science Foundation project that we’ve been working together with the counties of Alameda and Marin in particular. And Louise is one of the colleagues. But Steven Collier, who you may know, and then Michael Goldner from the mechanical engineering, we all work together with the UC Santa Cruz and UC Davis colleagues.

For my part, it’s really using socio-technical digital twin, the simulation that you see, a wildfire simulation that you see on the top, a traffic simulation. So what you see in the dot is like a usual traffic. It’s ordinary traffic that happens.

And then, you start to see some people in the blue evacuating. And then, what are the interaction? What are the bottlenecks?

Obviously, it’s a simulation. So it’s not going to be true. Every event will be different, but you start to see what-if scenario. What are the things happening? And then it allows the community to discuss with the local government by looking at each other and trying to understand each other.

So I’ll go through this a little bit more carefully, and that’s what we do. So what we do in this particular project is that Louise will look at through the interviews and looking at the network. So Louise may talk about this later on, but then there is a formal network, how people talk to each other during the wildfire event, but also there’s an informal network like fire councils and all these organizations. And then, the link may be related to PG&E, for example, not through the local government, Cal Fire and Cal OES.

So on the formal network, you see Cal Fire and Cal OES linking closely together. But then, in the informal one, it’s really fire councils that I see some of the colleagues here linking to PG&E. We do simulations on wildfire modeling and agent base. And then important part in the most important part is that how to model the communication, how the organization talk to each other, how the organization talk to the public, and how do we model that is a tricky part. But I rely on Louise to work on that.

And so we can combine everything together to see what’s going on. And I’ll show you some later on. And then my colleagues from UC Davis and UC Santa Cruz creates games out of that. So because these are complex system, outcomes are quite complex sometimes. So how do we bring that into gaming environment is what we’re working on.

In terms of social science questions, these are the three questions that my colleagues highlighted. You see on the left? One is called social dimension, which is complex time. How do people look up time, how they think about time?

Your time is different from my time. Sometimes, my time go quickly. Your time goes very slowly.

What are the times? And I guess that’s something about complex time scales of risk and capacity for action. So again, whether it’s a local, or government, or regional, how do that– risk and capacity can be looked at and make action?

And the action is related to the third one, collective cognition and action, is that how community– it’s not only a person making action. It’s really how the community collectively make a– realize what is going on at that time and make the right action.

So again, it’s about cognition and action as a community. And that’s what the– another third question that my colleagues came up.

So in the project, these are the important questions to answer. And then, myself, I will work on the right side on the technological dimension, is to figure out how it works together. And obviously, by showcasing those together in community is what we want to do.

So Camp Fire is probably, you may remember, in 2018, that happened in November 8. And, of course, the Camp Fire wildfire happened, as you can see, on the simulation. And we see how fast it went to the Paradise. And within one hour or two hours, it consumed all the town. And obviously, everybody has to evacuate, as you can see on the right bottom.

So we do simulation of this in terms of wildfire and then communication model and how traffic goes. Oops, sorry. And then, how the traffic simulation happens? And then, compare that with the reality and try to see.

Obviously, there are a variety of issues. For example, if you evacuate, you may have two cars in your household, so you want to use two cars. You may have three cars, so you may have three cars. But it may be better to just have one car because it don’t create traffic jams. So the question is that if you only have one car, what would have happened?

At that particular day, cell tower went down, so people didn’t have a communication. And what would have happened? So again, if you don’t have that communication part, what would have happened? And that’s something that we can look at as well.

The most important part is really looking at the timeline of what happened. And then, this is the video of the fire chief going to the site in the morning, where actually the fire has consumed the city, and then town, and then people are evacuating. So Louise and I and ourselves got together to really looking at the timeline because that’s so important in terms of understanding what really happened and how organization behaves. So we really want to do this for the LA Fire as well. And we just submitted a supplementary request to NSF, but we’ll see how NSF goes.

The incident is that fire arrived at Paradise at 8:00 AM. And then 10:30, the communication went down. Actually, the Paradise had 14 zone divided, and they had an award-winning evacuation plan. But then that assumed a staged evacuation. But in this case, it went so fast the fire chief had to decide everybody evacuate at the same time.

And the question really is that the right thing to do? And this is something that we can simulate and understand. You can see that there’s a four exits, different roads.

And then, at every point, because the fire was coming from the right side, they had to stop the access road stop. And then you can see when that happens. So again, that allows us to look at the simulation, how the people evacuate.

They did use a contraflow, meaning that there are four lanes to two, but then they 4 lanes. But then the issue was that sometimes if you’re on the right side, you’re not very used to it. Your police chief and the other cars are coming against you. And so you have to figure out is that the right thing to do. So there was confusion on that particular part as well.

So that is a finding that we made. And then we’re trying to simulate the most important part of the communication challenge is really how people decide to evacuate. And that, we see that on the wildfire in LA as well, is that you– people, the fire chief will come and say there’s a siren saying that evacuate, but people don’t usually evacuate.

It’s only your neighbor knocking the door saying you’ve got to evacuate that you evacuate. So these are the things that we do see often, but we have to create a timeline. So that’s what you see on the right, is that we inform population and how they evacuated. So these are an important part of our simulations.

And at the end, we do simulation like this for this particular car. Each individual cars are modeled. But then you can see time it took for 90% of evacuees to leave Paradise. So that’s what you see on the right top, which is called baseline.

So if you see on the right top, I’m not sure I can show you. This is the baseline, which took about five hours, six hours to evacuate. But let’s say if you had one vehicle to go, then it takes about three hours. And then if you do contraflow, what would the effect?

We have a phased evacuation. It did have an effect, but then actually doing an immediate effect did have a good results as well. Real-time information is about if your smartphone is working, if you knew about the traffic.

But in this case, you only have one way to go anyway, so it doesn’t really help. But in Berkeley Hills, there are different ways to evacuate because there are small roads, so real time– we know that real-time traffic information does help to evacuate faster.

Obviously, it’s not only evacuation, but then if you’re evacuating under the fire, it becomes your lifetime trauma as well, being exposed to fire. So you can be safe, but you’re under the fire, creates a psychological, mental issue in the future. And therefore, we also look at how long you are in the fire as well.

So the simulation does like this. Actually, what you see on the right is simulation. We’re working with City of Berkeley. Maybe you’re familiar with Marine Avenue, Marine Circle. And there we do simulation of that and then trying to work together what are the issues on that particular Marine Avenue, and then how do we evacuate effectively?

We do have a game. So if you go to a QR code, you can look at some of these games that my colleagues from UC Santa Cruz are developing. There are entertainment game developers, but then they also call them serious game developers. So we’re working with the community to showcase these ones.

We also have a startup called WUI-Go!, trying to use this particular simulations and then trying to make more evacuation personalized. So you can see some of the apps that we start to create. And these embedded simulations are part of that. But at the same time, this particular software is– trying to make it small so that it works without cell coverage.

And then we’re trying to do that as well. So we tried to put the information as possible inside your small computer on your smartphone. So if the internet goes down, at least you can see how you evacuate. So it gives you different routes by putting, if it is blocked here, what’s going to happen?

So this is my last slide just to see two sites that we looked at. Altadena, which is on the left– and then, Palisades on the right. And just looking at the geographic but also street, they’re all quite different.

In other words, we also see in the other cases, Berkeley Hills, we work on Sunol, we work with Marin County, Inverness area, but also with the Novato. They’re all different street condition, which means that they’re all different scenarios that we need to think about. One is more important than the other, and that’s where it’s very important that what you learn from one does not really reflect the other.

What we need to do is to find out some other things, and hopefully that what we want to do with these simulations is not just understand what your belief is correct, but then also find out what your belief may not be correct, and find out more scenarios in your community.

And therefore, when something happens, you can see which one is the right one for your community to take and make the right decision. So that’s what we’re doing at the moment. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

MARTA GONZALEZ: All right. We were in the civil engineering domain. I belong to civil engineering and city planning. So I would like to bring some data-driven planning and modeling in wildfire research.

I had to put things in context. And what is surprising to me is, if you see, from 1985 until a few years ago, the number of fires, contrary to what you may be perceiving, is not increasing. However, the area burned is increasing a lot, which is this black line here.

And then, the suppression cost increases. And California is right there with the US suppression costs. But what is most surprising to me is the number of infrastructures that have been destroyed.

So if you see here, from the last 16 years, it is only this amount of infrastructure. But in the orange line, until 2019, we have this. If we include the wildfire of LA here, the red zone is already going to be all this size because this is the campfire with 18,000 buildings infrastructures, and we have 18,000 infrastructure.

So the amount of infrastructures destroyed is growing an exponential rate. And that brings us to the urban planning domain. The problem is that we know how costly housing is in our state.

And we have this model of growth that is low density growth, also called sprawling. And that brings us to go from the urban side to what we call the WUI, the wild urban interface. And that is a problem we need to address.

And, well, it’s a political problem, not only a modeling problem. So that is what brought me, the urban planning had brought me into this problem. And here is just– from 2020 until today, how many more blocks increase the WUI.

So here we have LA, is in a dramatic context and also the Bay Area, so all over California. This is the PNAS 2024 by Greenberg is showing us where the WUI blocks are increasing. And here, in the right-hand side, we can say the climate.

So this is the infrastructure planning growth, and this is the climate, which means that we have more bigger areas fire. So the fire is getting worse, and we are building in the WUI. That is our problem that we need to tackle.

And it’s a sobering case. I will not solve it. But let me go into three examples in which I think data and modeling has helped us.

And this is the first one, what brought me into this topic. So it’s basically how we predict wildfire behavior and intensity of spread. It was through the realization of this type of law. We want to spread when– this is in the wildfire, not in the WUI.

Just in the wildland, when we are spreading the fire, we need fuel type, fuel moisture, wind speed and slope. And the physics of that is the so-called Rothermel equation, which are not microscopic physics like the one Michael Goldner is doing. This is semi-empirical laws. And these laws are in different simulators, Prometheus in Canada, Farsite here in the US, like the one Kenichi was using.

And the problem is that this physics is old. The simulators were built in the ’50s probably. And I thought as a physicist, and engineer, and data scientist, we should be doing better, something that everybody can use, that is friendly. Let’s bring the IT here. Then I had this student from Iowa, a brilliant student, that developed– we shared this thing. It has to be better. Let’s develop it ourselves.

He wrote down the equations in a cellular automata model, and it is open source. And here what we have is what’s the angle of the ellipse, and what is the rate of spread in the front, in the back, and in the flank. So we are able to– because it’s relatively simple physics, we are able to write down the equation, Cristobal was, and develop the model.

And here is where Minho comes, our PhD student, to follow up on the thesis of Cristobal. And we have here the fire spread of our model itself to fire in Santa Barbara versus the standard fire simulator that is Farsite. And we can do better because the physics of these problems are simple. Then we have the typical problems, that here is the real fire scar. Here is what the simulator saw. So we are falling short in how to model the fires.

We have the hope that applying machine learning would give us better models. Sobering story. Just simple black box optimization was better. And we set the fire, change the shape of the ellipse, parameters and get better results.

So right now we have an open-source fire spread simulator that can produce fire scars. It’s not very elegant because, again, it’s not the physics of the problem, is semi-empirical models. But we have it and we expect to use our models with CRM to have something open source. And as we know, Berkeley is very keen in open source.

Then, the second story is facility allocation, is again, where is the communities? And there is one aspect that I see, the environmental science modeling is not together with the human models. And this is what brings us into the second story.

We have the ability to download and process the whole 2 million nodes of the road network in California. We are able to download all the fire stations, and we want to see something as simple as the accessibility to fire station of the different census blocks in the state. However, we need to do a facility allocation, not only take into account where the people is, that is more the planning had. That is not doing the environmental science part.

We also have in every block what is the fire behavior, that is, the fire intensity in the block in the state. And then, we have this optimization model that is for every block of 0.1km, what is the shortest travel time from the fire station, and what is the fire behavior in that block? Then, you have a risk index that is the combination of these two. That is the shortest time to the fire station.

If you have these too long, your risk is very high. You have the fire behavior. And here comes the number of infrastructures and amount of people.

So we have all the different variables. And these type of thing, when we are doing optimization, we come still– I think we fall short. The best ideas for facility allocation may come from the social science.

And here, we have the fire behavior only is worse in the North. If we only look at the amount of people and infrastructure is here in the South. This is a LA County. And with this, together having fire behavior and sociodemographic utility, we have this weighted utility to then minimize the risk to every block and allocate the facilities.

In this paper, it was before the fires in LA, what we show is that all this region in the South are lacking access to fire stations. And if we relocate the facilities, we have all this shortened in the shortest travel time to the fire station. So here is where we come from, infrastructure data and optimization.

The last story brings us more into the WUI and land use. And it’s assessing the mobility in LA in context. And here we have 21 cities around the world. Notice that we have from the more sprawl to the less sprawl.

And there, if you look at the name, we have Latin America, Europe, China, and California. And what we see interestingly is that when we compare, let’s say Boston area with LA, those are the probability density function of wind in a radius of travel for every mobile phone user in these cities. And what we see, in short, is that in cities like Bogota, the poorest population live in the skirts and need to travel more. In cities like LA, the poorest population live in downtown. So who is the sprawling is the surprise, surprise, the richer neighborhoods in California?

And then we started seeing something very interesting, is depending– what distance you are from the CBD, how many people you find? And here you see in LA all this amount of people that travel everywhere. In Boston, you travel more if you are far from the CBD. This is a monocentric city. But LA, mobility wise, is a polycentric city.

So we are sprawling and traveling everywhere. And when we compare polycentric, monocentric, which is the travel behavior, with the development of the land where people is, which is the Gini of the population distribution, we see that LA is in this a box, that is, polycentric and dispersed. And when we see this, a plot of the 21 cities mentioned, California cities are in the worst parts, dispersed and polycentric.

So we got to put this into our model. So with slide, I would like to wrap up. We need to develop physics-based models informed, hopefully by AI, to improve prediction of fire behavior.

Data science and decision science allow us to target vulnerable locations at the state level. Our next step includes market design, Mansi, I am looking at you, for land use planning and more compact urban development. And that’s it.

LOUISE COMFORT: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

And now, I’d like to introduce Chris Ansell, who will take us into the governance nexus.

CHRISTOPHER ANSELL: Good.

LOUISE COMFORT: Thank you.

CHRISTOPHER ANSELL: OK, hi, everybody. Thanks, Louise. Thanks to the Matrix for organizing this.

My co-panelists, thank you very much. Strangely, our topics complement one another, even though I don’t have any models here at all. So Louise suggested that I focus some of my comments on governance, which is what I’ve done.

And before I get into the details, and maybe I’m dating myself, but I want to make an analogy between the Los Angeles fires and Hurricane Katrina. Some of you may remember that. That was very formative for some of us to think about. I know Louise worked there as well.

And just like in the LA fires, there was a blame game that went on. And I’m sure you spotted it in the newspaper. It started very early in Katrina and continued. And you may recall that a lot of the blame fell on FEMA.

And FEMA was the villain of the story. And it was argued to be too slow and too unresponsive to the needs of the local community. OK, and so FEMA certainly didn’t perform amazingly well, and there were definitely some mistakes made. But I recall a conversation that was important for me with a colleague who Louise knows named Arjen Boin, a Dutch scholar, also a well-known crisis management scholar.

And he said– he ended up writing a book about Katrina. And one of the things he said is everybody was focused on how to analyze the errors of FEMA.

He said that’s kind of misleading. He said if you really look at it, the best emergency management agency in the world would have failed in Katrina. And focusing on their errors, not that they’re unimportant, that’s not the point.

Not that they’re unimportant, but focusing on the errors of FEMA is distracting you from the big picture. And that stuck with me as an important thing. And I think a similar thing as I read the newspaper articles.

A similar thing is true about LA. We got focused on a lot of blaming across– between the mayor, and between the governor, and between the LA Fire Department, and other people. And if you focus on that, you can find errors, things they did wrong, but it sort of distracts you from the big picture. So I want to try to put it a little bit in a big picture for you.

And this quote up here by John Keeley, who is a US Geological Service Survey fire ecologist based in California. And just to paraphrase, he said something like, and this caught my attention as I was thinking about this, how this puts things in perspective. He basically said when the winds are blowing like this, all bets are off.

So the severity of the winds were just overwhelming almost anything you could do in response. Now, again, that doesn’t mean that there weren’t ways you could improve, that there were things you could do better. I’m not saying that, but just kind of trying to get you to focus on some of the bigger issues.

OK, and what are the bigger issues? Sticking with John Keeley, I’m impressed by a particular distinction he makes in his work with some colleagues. And he distinguishes between fuel-dominated fires and wind-dominated fires. And fuel-dominated fires are driven by the buildup of excessive fuel.

You’ve probably heard a lot about this, about how in the West we suppress fire so long and it built up fuel. And that led to our President saying that the problem in California was we were not raking the forests enough. But it turns out that the fires in LA were wind-driven, not fuel-dominated fires.

And that actually has implications for how you think about public policy, as I’m going to try to bring out a little bit. And the first big thing is, and you can see down here, is that a lot of the wind-driven fires, which, by the way, are mostly along the Coast of California, except for the camp Camp Fire– it’s a little further in. But they’re all being impacted or lit, or many of them are being lit by power line failures. So there, that’s an important public policy issue there to think about governance.

Now, if you think about power lines, they’re kind of a tricky issue. It’s an important issue to think about, but it’s a tricky issue. There’s speculation, by the way, that the Eton fire, but not the Palisades fire, was caused– speculation.

There’s still investigation. Speculation that it was caused by Southern Edison power lines. Is that right? Southern Edison? Yeah.

Now, one of the ways that you can address the power line issue, this is a governance question. You can put the power lines underground. Really expensive, effective, but really expensive.

Now, what Keeley says is that that’s a good public policy solution. Whether people will pay for it or not is another issue. He says we can be a little bit more selective.

We know, we’ve done modeling of extreme winds. We have a lot of data on that. We can tell, show you where the extreme winds are likely to come in the future, and we can selectively put things underground. But if you see pictures of where the Eaton fire was, up in the hills, it’s a pretty hard place to put things underground. So that’s another point to keep in mind.

OK, so now let me talk about a second issue. And Marta already brought this up. And this is the issue of what are called the wildland-urban interface.

And the wildland-urban interface or WUI– that interface is where you get basically high density of vegetation coming into contact with high density of settlement or buildings. Where those two things come together, it’s not a very good place for big wildfires. A lot of the big devastating wildfires we’ve had are in these or near these WUI zones.

And so what I wanted you to– first, I should say that people who do a lot of research on this have found that there’s different ways to measure WUI. And this one is using remote sensing. It says that it’s an improvement on several other measures.

But anyway, what I really wanted you to see was this, a map of California in the middle, B. And what I want you to see is that these are measuring the amount of area of WUI in a particular county. And you see, the worst place from this perspective in California is in San Diego. It’s not so good up in Sonoma, either.

OK, that dark brown area is San Diego down there. You go two counties up. That’s LA. That’s like the second worst county to be in.

OK, now think about this in governance terms. We have fire-dominated– fire-driven fires in areas that are dominated by wildland, by WUI. So this is a real challenge in LA.

OK, now this is leading me to my next point, which is going back to the blame game. But before the fires, the LA– there’s two fire departments in LA. One, the County Fire Department, and one, the City Fire Department.

Before the fire, about a month before, the Fire Chief had– the City Fire Department sent a message to the City Council and the Mayor saying, you cut our budget by this amount of money, and we’re not really prepared to deal with a lot. You’ve undercut our capacity. So this is part of the issue.

And in fact, one of the other issues was that the LA Fire Department didn’t really respond very quickly and very adequately to the fire. There were other issues that came up in the blame game. And you may have heard of them, the water and fire hydrants. The water basically ran out for the fire personnel, firefighters. And that made national news.

It turns out, just to say something about this, again, Connie, you need to put this in context of a larger perspective of the magnitude of the fire. There’s a guy, a water resources expert at UCLA, named Greg Pierce, and he basically said there is no fire, there is no water system in the world that would have been able to function perfectly under these conditions. And then he said, and this is also– I’m getting you to think about costs and what the trade-offs are.

You can put– you can make the water system really reliable for giant wildfires, but it’s going to be really costly. And the question is whether that’s the best use of the money. Is it better that money goes into maybe burying power lines, for instance?

So now I want to come back. There’s a bigger structural issue, and it was brought up in Marta’s talk about the polycentric and dispersed nature of Los Angeles. And that is, if you look at LA County and LA City, you see that the fire departments cover this incredible size geographical region between the two of them. It’s much bigger than New York City’s metropolitan region, by the way.

And one of the things they found, I wasn’t able to find reliable data on this, but one of the things they found is that the number of firefighters that you have in LA– they’re very thin on the ground. And it’s partly because they got to cover these big geographical distances. So this goes back to the finding that Marta found.

Now, when the fire chief said, “Mayor, you’ve cut our budget. You’re undercutting our capacity.” That was, I’m sure, true to some extent. But the Mayor said, well, we had some tough choices to make. And you can understand that.

They had to make some tough choices. We put this into education, or do we put it into the firefighting, et cetera, et cetera? Do we put it into affordable housing, which is a big issue in LA, or do we put it into firefighting? You can see that there’s tough choices.

Now, what I expect is after this, the fire department will get a budget increase, and the budget increase will improve their capacity at the margins. But I don’t think that LA is ever going to have fire capacity the same as New York or Chicago because it has to deal with this basic structural problem of a big dispersed polycentric area.

OK, now let me come to my next point. And this brings me, in terms of thinking about governance, to what some of the planning and regulatory approaches are for dealing with issues of wildfire. And let me just say, take one step back and say people like John Kelly who’ve been studying these wind-dominated fires– he says you’re really better than thinking about response because that’s how we think of LA.

The fire department is a response function. You should think about preparedness, prevention, preparedness, and resilience of community like Kenichi is working on. And that’s probably a better use of money. But what’s happening there when you actually look at that?

Well, one of the things that’s happening with planning is that there’s a couple of different ways that local– well, first of all, I need to tell you that a lot of planning is very localized for wildfire. It’s basically 88 cities in LA County. They’re all doing their own little planning for the issue.

And one of the things you learn from the research on this is that there’s a lot of variation in the quality of those plans. Some communities are really doing a good job, and some aren’t doing such a good job. And then, there are different mechanisms for planning. And there’s three big ones that I found. One is called community wildfire protection plans.

These were prompted by federal legislation, but they take place locally. And it turns out they’ve done research on these. And they find out that some do good work, but a lot of them are superficial. So they don’t do great stuff, unfortunately.

And other research has found that these hazard mitigation plans, which are sponsored by FEMA– that they actually do a better job than the wildfire plans. And the reason why they found is interesting to me is because they found that local planners have to check more boxes in order to actually get the plan approved, and that leads them to be more systematic. And then there’s also something called the general plan, which all counties do. They put together a general plan, but those– the best approach is through these hazard mitigation plans.

OK, another thing I want to tell you, which is interesting, I think, is that California and Los Angeles are pioneers. They’re really out ahead of a lot of other places in terms of wildfire planning. In some ways, they’re doing a really good job, although it’s limited in ways that I’m going to tell you in a second. But they’re out ahead of other states and many other cities.

So one of the ways that California has been ahead of things is that they have what are called– they’ve developed maps of high-risk areas, and they’ve connected local planning regulation to those maps. So basically, in these high-hazard zones, you don’t actually– you do actually have to build to a higher standard. And that’s something that California has been ahead in.

OK, now that brings me to regulation. And I found that there’s two big types of regulation at the local level that are designed to make communities more resilient. One is basically to get rid of the vegetation around your house.

That’s called producing a defensible– what is it called? A defensible space. Thank you. And the other is called home hardening, basically making your home more resistant to lighting on fire in the first place through the materials you would use on your roof.

Now, vegetation. For instance, I told my wife, OK, there’s a new rule that says we’re going to– there’s going to be a new state rule that says you have to clear stuff within 5 feet of your house. I told my wife that. She says– her reaction is, “Oh my god, that’s like half of our garden.”

[LAUGHTER]

 

And I think– and I just use my wife as an example of– I think a lot of people feel that way. And one of the things that they found is that there’s a lot of pushback on these local regulations. So there’s a political angle to this.

OK, in terms of home hardening, again, California has been a leader on that, has very strict building codes. But one of the limits of this is that this only works for building, new buildings. And old, wooden houses like mine in Berkeley– they’re like tinderboxes.

And we’re not really not really improving those. So there’s a long-term transition to really move towards greater resilience in this way. OK, I’m almost done here.

And so my conclusion about these regulatory measures is that they’re good, they’re important, but they don’t really meet the need for responding to fire on a big level. And I had some more slides, but I’m going to jump to my conclusion, which is the governance of large fires in Los Angeles and California is, to be very understated, a big challenge.

I think the good news from what I– from my reading is that cities like Los Angeles and the state of California are really leaders in addressing wildfire risks, contrary to what our President has been saying.

And also, I saw a lot of evidence in reading things that there are– that fires do lead to incremental improvements in wildfire safety. So you do see learning going on, although I would describe it as mostly incremental.

The bad news is that addressing these more fundamental challenges is really confronts some significant political and financial barriers, addressing the problem of utility lines, or building up the capacity for fire response, or accelerating home hardening. All these things are expensive, and they pose trade-offs across these different programs.

So if you look at local planning and regulation, it’s kind of mixed. It’s very variable by community. Some communities don’t have the capacity to do it very well. There’s limits in the willingness of citizens to go along with local regulations.

So I hope in the end, I’ve provided a little bit of perspective on the governance. I hope I didn’t go too far past. Yeah, thanks.

LOUISE COMFORT: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

 

Well, thank you, Chris, very much. We’ve had three different perspectives from different disciplinary of views. And now, I’d like to open it up for questions if anyone would like to ask a question. Anna.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks for all the presentations. I have a question regarding to the first presentation. How do you couple the information from the network’s analysis with the simulations that Kenichi does?

KENICHI SOGA: So when you say network analysis, our simulation is a network analysis.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: The network analysis is a network analysis.

KENICHI SOGA: Oh, I got it. So I asked Louise to create– we are agent-based model. So each agent decides when to evacuate. So that means that the agent’s decision is made from the model. Does that make sense?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I see.

KENICHI SOGA: Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK.

KENICHI SOGA: So wildfire propagates seeing the– so there is an agent who will see a fire and say I got to evacuate. So there are certain proportion of that saying that some proportion will say, well, somebody said so I’m evacuating. So Louise is creating that model for that.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: To inform form the agent-based model?

KENICHI SOGA: Yeah, for the agent-based models. Yes, yes.

LOUISE COMFORT: We’re actually looking at the network of people and managers and the communication between the people and how that is communicated actually to the managers of, say, the traffic system, who sets the traffic lights, and which direction? When the roads are closed, how is that information communicated to the people?

So this is the sociotechnical aspect of a digital twin, recognizing that the roads are fixed, but people can change their minds and they can redirect and go in a different direction if the communication is there. So it’s communications and traffic. And it becomes a dialogue between the two.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you all. Wonderful presentations. I have a question for Kenichi.

So your SNCC proposal was about Alameda and Marin. And so you’ve transferred that knowledge down to Southern California. So I’m just curious.

I have maybe two questions. In terms of modeling what’s going on in Southern California, were there variables that you had to consider that you weren’t expecting? So what came up as different– as the most prevalently different from your Bay Area modeling? And what is the spin-up time for transferring those models to other places?

KENICHI SOGA: So the first question is currently working on Alameda and Marin. And actually colleagues from El Cerrito, which is a Contra Costa, recently contacted, please include us. So that is a really because fire doesn’t know the boundaries. So that is a very big issue.

And, of course, we have to confine ourselves. So we started with city of Berkeley. We now have LBNL. We now have our campus colleagues, Office of Emergency Services colleagues, coming together and thinking about it. And, of course, we’re trying to expand that to Kensington and the area.

So I think that’s a challenge. But then I’m hoping we go or some of the startups or these colleagues will create a little bit more how to scale up. Yeah, and then our SimCenter also helps to scale that up.

Number 2 is what we see in LA. And here, I think that’s something that we really want to find out more because we find that every locations are different. We see in Palisades that they did do education pretty effectively, but they did say that issues were there. It’s one way out.

But then, typically, if you’re in one way out, people are a little bit more aware of the issues. So it works better. It’s really the Eaton fire was a little bit more sporadic.

Maybe they were not prepared for the wildfire because they’re quite spread. And so we do see that differences. But then I really want to find out why.

And that’s why it’s very important to find the details to get that because I think every fire is going to be different. But it’s a good question that– and it’s really about community understanding that, is that one person you may have a past experience of wildfire.

Sometimes, the issue is that they think that’s the case. It’s going to happen again, but that may or may not be the case. So realizing that is very important. Sorry, I’m maybe talking too much.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: It’s interesting.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I appreciate all of your presentations. And what I wanted to ask about is– so Berkeley has extreme fire weather and suggests people to pre-evacuate. Trying to get people to pre-evacuate– ooh, that’s hard.

OK, we did, but a lot of people didn’t. But what I’m wondering is, do you simulate in your simulations– because you were talking about a lot of wind-driven fires. And if we get the spot weather forecast, which Berkeley’s been doing, they say very low humidity predicted, high winds, Diablo winds around here, so please evacuate. Do you ever put that in your simulation in a way to maybe encourages more of that?

KENICHI SOGA: Yeah, that’s a good question, and we would like to. So we are hearing different scenarios that you can think of and trying to see what– would that have an effect?

Maybe your community may have a good effect, but then the other community may not have an effect. Just understanding that a little bit more is an important one to start. And what we want to do is that– maybe City of Berkeley has that particular evacuation notice that we received.

I live in North Berkeley as well, but then maybe the public don’t understand that. But having perhaps, and I’m not sure this is the case, but we start to see that people see the simulations, and they start to say, OK, this may be the case. But having that particular dialogue is important rather than telling that this simulation is true because it is not going to be true because every simulations are different. Yeah, but I think we want to try that. And working with the community is very important.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. I have a question for Professor Gonzalez especially, but if others want to share, too. I’m curious about the fire growth simulations, the optimized simulations that you showed us. I’m curious how feasible it is to be producing those and using those in real time for localities and local fires.

I assume that these might take a while to complete. And also then there’s the issue of– I do work in the rural counties in California, like Plumas, Butte, more rural, that are impacted by fire and don’t have the resources, also local computing resources and would rely on, I’m guessing, like Cal Fire having those resources to then distribute that information. So I’m curious just whether those can be used in real time and what the feasibility of that is.

MARTA GONZALEZ: Yes, that is what brought me to the topic. I said, if there is so much computation, we got to be doing better than this. And then I discovered that the accuracy, meaning the physics of the models, to make– just the physics of fire is a whole complex work in itself.

Then, I refer to Michael Goldner, Kenichi’s collaborator. That type of problem is the frontier in terms of the research. To make it more for operational purposes, real a decision-making, it would be these semi-empirical models.

And right now, with my students, we just make the search of what are the existing models. And the existing models are Farsite, Prometheus, you name it. Every country has its own. And it was built long ago.

So the idea was, OK, let’s do our own. It’s open-source, and let’s improve from that. Then, it brings us to one sobering realization that is high-resolution wind injection. Wind data. What we call data ingestion is limited. So I believe one of the main components is the good high resolution of wind, is one big limitation to make real-time meaningful because you can do a video game, a movie, but it is not accurate. Then ingesting wind in high resolution is one frontier that we would like to. And that brings CCRM, our center, with a new initiative in campus that is the Environmental Data Science Center.

LOUISE COMFORT: Exactly.

MARTA GONZALEZ: That would be the idea. So it’s a social good problem. And what I realize is not going to be done, let’s say, by Google.

The technology is there– we need to be aiming into that. And I believe in a public university like Berkeley it could be done. It’s not there yet.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Great. Thank you. One quick follow-up. How long do those optimize– how long does it take for you to get those simulations? What is the actual computing time?

MARTA GONZALEZ: –just behind you?

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Are you referring to those simulations? Running those simulations don’t take that much time. And so they’re definitely able to be run in real time. I will say in a matter of minutes.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK, great.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for great presentations. One topic that hasn’t come up here that’s quite in the public mind is insurance. And from, I guess, beyond the governance level.

So perhaps could one of you comment about the direction that discussion is going in, and who might know where the next catastrophic wildfire is going to occur in California in a probabilistic sense? Is it somebody like First Street or the risk– the analysts with their proprietary models, quite in contrast to the wonderful open-source models that you’re presenting here, which are very, shall we say, propagation models rather than general risk models that a real estate insurer might use?

So maybe start with the provocative part of the question. Who knows where the– in a probabilistic sense, where the next catastrophic wildfire will occur in California? And what do we do about it?

LOUISE COMFORT: I’ll respond to that because I’ve interviewed an awful lot of fire chiefs in California. The fire Chiefs know that there are certain areas that burn repeatedly. Malibu that burned in the Palisades fire burned in 1993 in three-four different times.

The fire chiefs know that it’s the combination of the geographic terrain, the fuel, and the winds that come. So they are making investments in mapping those areas. And this is where the select– Kenichi mentioned this, and also Marta, and Chris.

The selective, for instance, undergrounding of power lines might be a good strategic decision. But I will say that CAL FIRE has invested in the last five to seven years enormous amounts of money in modeling equipment and training their own personnel to do this. The difficulty is that there is a direct, almost one-to-one correlation by the increase in emissions and the increase in the size and ferocity of the fire.

The critical issue that we can change, and this is social action, is literally reducing the number of emissions that go into the air. And framing that as an issue, Chris, is a public policy issue. And so this is why addressing this problem of increasingly exponential wildfire is a interdisciplinary inter-jurisdictional issue.

And we have to do it smart. We have to do it recognizing that we’re dealing with a very complex set of interconnected systems. And this is why I think the University of California, with campuses across the state, is in an excellent position to do this. But it’s not going to be easy, and it’s not going to be fast, and it’s not going to be soon.

KENICHI SOGA: Chris, do you want to talk about insurance issue? That’s a big issue.

CHRIS ANSELL: Well, one thing I’ll say about insurance because I have been following a little bit is that the FAIR Plan– the FAIR Plans are the last-resort plan. I lost my insurance this year, by the way, in my house.

The FAIR Plans basically were driven bankrupt by this. Or they can’t fulfill the claims because of the LA fires. And what the state did was it allowed the FAIR Plans to basically– I guess it’s– what do they call it? Not meta insurance but reinsurance.

Basically, the FAIR Plans could take $1 billion from other insurers in the state, who are set up in the state. And I think you can maybe see some– one of the implications of that is we’re all going to be paying for the LA fires. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: [INAUDIBLE] produce this?

CHRIS ANSELL: Yeah. I don’t know that, but it’s a good question. Yeah.

LOUISE COMFORT: I will say one of the members of our team, Steven Collier in Urban and Regional Planning, has focused on insurance. And his basic quick assessment is private insurance is almost going to be gone in California. And that’s a really difficult thing. So looking at alternative plans and the FAIR Plan, publicly supported is one of those.

KENICHI SOGA: Yeah, that’s the next workshop, I think, which is a very big one.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: –much for bringing this to us. I have a question. So Louise, you mentioned almost in passing, but as a take, something very obvious, we need to reduce emissions. And this is the elephant in the room as there’s something that the models are maybe taking for granted, which is– I’m curious what you all do with the fact of the driving causes of those winds that mean that all bets are off, or of climate change, these changing conditions.

And so I’m not– I’m assuming that this is very much on all of our minds. There’s one question one could ask of like, well, the governance issue is how do we put pressure on Exxon and fossil fuel companies. And that was part of the blame game.

Actually, some community– some affected folks are trying to sue some of the fossil fuel companies and name them as the responsible parties. So there’s a governance question there with the blame game. That’s probably the one blame game to be played.

But I’m just curious, and from where you all sit and the expertise you bring to the table, where does that conversation– what input is that into the simulations? Are you taking for granted that things are just going to get worse and the winds are going to get worse? Or how do you factor this very messy political world into this story? And I ask that, having just read that Trump just agreed with–

MARTA GONZALEZ: Yes, actually, I like to quote Dan Kammen from ERG in this topic. And it is that a housing policy is a climate policy. And what the data is telling us, why the areas burn is getting worse is the drought. So we have drought, and then is– fuel is worse and that’s why it’s getting worse.

However, interestingly, we cannot continue building at risk. That’s why I like to put our cities in the international context. The model of land use development that we have in the US and particularly in California, that this low dense that we all love is not sustainable.

And then, right now, even CARB, California Air Resources Board, is funding a call for proposals that brings housing policy with vehicles miles traveled. So we need to reduce vehicle miles travel, and that means sustainable transportation, but even how far we need to travel. And California is aware of that marriage.

And then, housing policy is a climate policy. And we are now being affected by the fires. So it’s all intertwined.

KENICHI SOGA: I’m not trying to promote our work, but then I think we can really go to the details to model what you see in a climate change model right now. So I’m hoping– Stephen Collier is a great example. He doesn’t believe on models that we do, but then he creates different ideas and said, wow, that’s interesting. Maybe we can model that and see how that goes.

[LAUGHTER]

So it allows us to do that right now, I think. And so I think Stephen starts to see maybe what we do maybe link to what he’s thinking. And that’s what we see in this project. But probably before the project, maybe he did believe at all what we’re doing.

So I think that’s where we can have an interesting discussion on what can be integrated if we can because there are lots of interesting ideas that come from you that we may want to think about. And Louise has been very promoting, yes, I can do it in the communication style. So we need a model to put it in that. Of course, the model may not be correct, but then at least we try.

LOUISE COMFORT: Thank you. I’m looking at the clock. It is 1:30. Others may have other appointments.

If there’s any last question, you might ask any one of us. But I really want to thank all of you for coming. And I’ll ask one big favor.

Keep this in your mind. Start thinking about it. We need an innovative approach to deal with these increasingly catastrophic risks. And the one thing that we can change is how we think and act about risk. So let’s– please join me in thanking–

[APPLAUSE]

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

 

Authors Meet Critics

Society Despite the State: Reimagining Geographies of Order

Presented as part of the Authors Meet Critics event series

Recorded on February 10, 2025, this “Authors Meet Critics” panel centered on the book Society Despite the State: Reimagining Geographies of Order, by Gerónimo Barrera de la Torre, Assistant Professor of Geography at UC Berkeley, and Anthony Ince, Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Human Geography at Cardiff University and British Academy Mid-Career Fellow.

Professor Barrera de la Torre was joined in-person to introduce the book, and Professor Ince presented remotely. The authors were joined in conversation by Dylan John Riley, Professor of Sociology at UC Berkeley, and Anna Stilz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley. Jake Kosek, Associate Professor of Geography at UC Berkeley, moderated.

The Social Science Matrix Authors Meet Critics series features lively discussions about recently published books authored by social scientists at UC Berkeley. For each event, the author discusses the key arguments of their book with fellow scholars. These events are free and open to the public.

The panel was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of Geography, the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science, the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology, and the Center for Interdisciplinary Critical Inquiry.

About the Book

The logic of the state has come to define social and spatial relations, embedding itself into our understandings of the world and our place in it. Anthony Ince and Gerónimo Barrera de la Torre challenge this logic as the central pivot around which knowledge and life orbit, by exposing its vulnerabilities, contradictions and, crucially, alternatives.

“Society Despite the State” disrupts the dominance of state-centred ways of thinking by presenting a radical political geography approach inspired by anarchist thought and practice. The book draws on a broad range of voices that have affinities with Western anarchism but also exceed it. This book challenges radicals and scholars to confront and understand the state through a way of seeing and a set of intellectual tools that the authors call ‘post-statism’ In de-centring the state’s logics and ways of operating, the authors incorporate a variety of threads to identify alternative ways to understand and challenge statism’s effects on our political imaginations.

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to the event below or on Apple Podcasts.

Transcript

[MUSIC]

WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

CORI HAYDEN: Welcome to the Social Science Matrix and to this fantastic panel. My name is Cori Hayden. I’m the director of Matrix for this semester. I want to say that it’s been a hard week in social science world with the loss of Michael Burawoy. And I think it’s fitting and in fact, rejuvenating and energizing to have this panel fortuitously lined up for today, that’s really going to push us to think how things could be otherwise. To think about a politics far beyond the terms that normally define our politics and our critical vocabularies about politics.

You’ll hear more about that in a second. But I just want to say I’m really glad that we are gathered here today for this particular panel. And let me just say a few words. The panel, of course, is one of Matrix’s Author Meets Critics sessions, and we are delighted to celebrate and talk about the 2024 book, Society Despite the State, Reimagining Geographies of Order.

We’ll be discussing that book with the authors Geronimo Barrera de La Torre from UC Berkeley Geography and Anthony Ince from Cardiff University. He’ll be joining us on Zoom. We will be joined for commentary by Dylan Riley and Anna Stilz, and Jake Kosek from Geography will be moderating, and he will introduce the panelists in a bit more detail.

Today’s event is co-sponsored by geography, political science, and sociology departments and the Center for Interdisciplinary Critical Inquiry. So thank you to all of our partners in this event. And I want to thank our amazing Matrix staff also. Chuck Kapelke, Sarah Harrington, and Eva Seto, who already have and will continue to make this event run smoothly.

Before I turn it over to panelists, I want to briefly mention a few other upcoming events for the spring semester at the Matrix. And as you can see, we have a couple Matrix On Point events. Los Angeles wildfires, something on virtual realities, mainstreaming psychedelics, colonizing Palestine, and other book panel. Please do check out the Matrix website and all your socials for further details.

And I get the easy job of standing up here and taking credit as if these are my events, but I want to thank Marianne Fourcade and Ambrosia Shapiro, who really helped put together– actually, in fact, did put together the programming for this semester.

All right, without further ado, let me turn things over to our fantastic moderator, Jake Kosek of the Geography Department at Berkeley. Jake’s research focuses on the intersections of nature, politics, and difference, drawing on geography, anthropology, and history.

He explores how cultural, racial, and national dynamics shape environmental politics with a particular emphasis on the politics of natural history and its role in shaping social and ecological systems. Without any further, I will now turn over the panel to Jake. Thank you so much.

JAKE KOSEK: Welcome, everyone. It is a remarkable moment for this panel. It’s like this panel was planned a long time ago. And to think about just the radical transformations of the state in the last couple of weeks and also what they make visible the structures of the state, what it looks like, how it might be working, how it might be working differently. The questions that are directly related to the book in some ways.

Also what the book holds is also the possibilities of other geographies. And the moment where we try to figure out as things are shifting and new forms and threats of state power emerge, the desire to find, and identify, and build alternative geographies couldn’t be more timely. And so two central themes of the book, I think, are just right at the tip of all of our minds and in this current moment.

A couple of things. I’m not going to go on long commentaries. I have lots of questions. But if there’s moments towards the end, I will start asking some of those. But I want to get to the questions and really wanted to center it on all of you. But just say two things really quickly.

One is the remarkable collaboration that goes on here. This book is a 10-year project. We don’t do that many 10-year projects, and you don’t do them so deeply collaborative in a way that the voice of the book is actually one voice. It is a collective voice, and you can see and feel it as you read the book.

The conversations that have gone on, the tensions and differences in the voice. There’s moments where it’s more open, where they point to different directions they could go. But also moments where the voice of the book is so clearly in one voice. That is a remarkable thing that happened over a very long period of time.

Another thing that just to mention, that the panelists hit some of the main themes, but other things you mentioned that really stands out to me is just the multiple voices around the state and anarchy here. When we think about anarchy, and they mentioned this very directly in the introduction.

As such, having such a Western European history, and to open that up is remarkable. It’s not just that it’s opened up here, but the voices and the citations and the engagements are global in a way that makes this conversation really quite remarkably different than the conversations we often have around state, capital, anarchism.

And I think that those pieces, just for those who haven’t read the full book or don’t know where it’s coming from, those two things I wanted to mention because both that collaboration and that sense of where are the conversations emerging from, and who they’re having conversations with is a different set of people, and I think it’s part of what makes the book really quite different and what it’s saying.

All right. A couple of things. First of all, I am so psyched that Geronimo Barrera de la Torre is here. In Geography, he is one of our newest hires, and we work very hard to get him here, and I’m very excited that he is among our faculty. He’s already changing the feel of the Department and the focus in the Department, covering a whole new area, bringing really questions of anarchism and a whole bunch of other things, methods into the conversation. So great to have him here.

His interests are really at the intersection of political and historical geographies, political ecologies, critical cartographies. It focuses on really the intersection of land or territory and landscape while engaging in much broader discussions on environmental politics, colonialism, and statism.

His research is grounded. One of the things that really stands out is how grounded his research is and really collaborative methods, not just with other academics, but with the community. And those are long term collaborations also. He’s working in Oaxaca for 10 years.

And so you can see that in his work that he does but also in the methods he uses, social mapping. His videography work is really just really deep and long term engagement with the community members around political issues there, such as forest conservation, agrarian change, social mapping, and his involvement with them around a bunch of political issues in the area.

And also, yeah, the diversity of methods is new. One of his newest projects that I’m really so excited about. I’ve only seen little glimpses of his new cinematography work. His new movie that’s coming out of a documentary, which really looks at this really interesting intersection of international carbon offset markets and the consequences and effects on a rural communities in and around Oaxaca.

It’s a remarkable piece of work, and I think it’s July is its first launch date, or what’s the film festival, or I think there’s something– August, sometime this summer. So keep your eyes open for that.

Anthony Ince is a senior lecturer, associate professor in human geography at Cardiff University and British Academy mid-career fellow there. He is a political and social geographer with particular interest in agency, social movements, and migration. His current research explores the role of civic virtue, citizenship, and dynamics of the far right and anti-fascist struggles.

I know him as a geographer. He is known as one of the long-standing central person in debates around anarchism and anarchist geographies. And so he’s been part of holding that space and creating and remaking that space for quite some time. And he’s also known for his co-leadership of the Cardiff Interdisciplinary Research on Anti-fascism and the Far Right, which is a lot of what he does.

Dylan Riley, who I failed to recognize, even though I know him quite well when I walked in the room today, is a remarkable professor of sociology at UC Berkeley. He studies capitalism, socialism, democracy, authoritarianism in really a broad comparative and historical perspective.

His work as a professor, the students that I’ve sent and taken his classes come back really transformed not just by ideas but also by depth and mode of engagement. A remarkable, a remarkable teacher and has been for quite some time.

His books, many things he’s published in many debates he’s involved in. I mentioned first his book, The Civic Foundations of Fascism in Europe, Italy, Spain, Romania from 1870 to 1945, really argues that fascist regimes arose paradoxically on the basis of strong civil society in the pre-fascist period, which kind of raises some really interesting, tricky questions for us I think, we’ll hear about today.

Also how societies and states count comparative genealogies of census, where he argues that state-centered accounts of unofficial information that census work best where there is an intense interaction between state and civil society kind of paradoxically. Anyway, lots of different works and lots of these engaged in all kinds of interesting debates around state and political economy and beyond.

Anna Stilz, I have never we never met before today, but I’m so excited to have you here. I mean, I was reading about your work. And I was like, oh, my God. This is the perfect person. Who is the person who put this panel together? So as a professor of political science at UC Berkeley. She’s the author of a Liberal Loyalty, Freedom, Obligation and the State, which deals with questions about moral importance of political citizenship and state authority. Again, kind of perfect for being on this panel, her first book.

Her second book, Territorial Sovereignty, A Philosophical Exploration, investigates where there seems to be a good ethical justification for organizing our worlds into systems of sovereignty and territorial states and explores the limits of state, justified power over its territory, how we think about that relationship between state and territoriality and its boundaries.

Professor Stilz is working on a new book project on the challenges that climate change poses on the territorial state system, including climate displacement and the large scale changes in land use and global governance that may be necessary to adapt to this moment of warming climate. Or the state frame is so limited as it’s crossed over with the broad transformations of climate change.

All right. Those are the panelists. It couldn’t be a more tightly thought out group of people. And I’m so excited about today’s debate at Animo. And Anthony, why don’t you want to kick off your presentations and get us going?

Or I should say, sorry, I said that before. They’re going to have a presentation at the beginning here. And then Anna’s going to go, and then Dylan’s going to go after that. And then we’ll open it up to everybody. So that’s the order of the order of things. OK. Excuse me. Geronimo, please.

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: No, no, no. Well, thank you so much, Jake, for the introduction. Thank you, Annie, Dylan, for being here and for taking your time to bring this work. And also thank you for those who make this happen. And here also at Social Science Matrix, thank you so much.

So we’re really looking forward to this discussion to talk to your questions and afterwards, your questions as well. For this first minutes, we really want to make just a few comments on the main ideas around this book. But I will start also talking about how this project came about.

Mostly, yes, as Jake, the idea was to make something collaborative. And from the beginning, this project was thought as a collaboration from very different perspectives as Anthony’s in a, well, a different country obviously but comes from a different perspective in geography than mine, that I was trained at then first in Mexico and then in the US.

And so we have very different perspectives. And we met in 2013 in a conference, in a sessions about anarchist geographies. And I remember that I wrote back to Anthony after we met that session. And just, I was very interested in what he was doing, and he was telling me that he was also interested in what I was presenting at that time.

So then we start this collaboration, and we start working on different texts that we published later as a paper and also chapters. I’m trying to take different aspects of this idea around the post-test autism geographies.

And so we were trying to really fill this gap in, we’ll say, in political geography but in geography in general, about the role of the state in our discipline. But drawing from different perspectives mostly first and anarchism with frameworks, but also from anti-authoritarian perspectives and broader ideas.

And so we were trying to draw from our strengths, from our different perspectives in what is geography and what are the voices about the critique of the state of statism. So we start to develop these themes and these ideas, in these different texts.

And then we decided that we were ready to go for the book as a way of commenting not only in the discipline we’re starting to go and to have at the center of the geographical imaginations. How this state defined how we understand not only the discipline of geography but also territory, place, cartography, et cetera in a broader perspective of the politic and geographical imaginaries in our daily lives.

And so this is what we want to talk about with you today. And one of the critical questions of this book is why this? The state remains central to our understanding of the territory. Why is fundamental ideas of order come from the idea of the state, but also how the state remains a neutral vessel for good or bad governments, but also represents like the pinnacle of this political evolution of human societies, or as well, logical progression in the development of a complex and large societies.

So all these what we call myths that remain in question and challenge and are ingrained in the ideas of social territorial organization. Also, the idea of this book was to bring different voices about the critique of the state, not only from anarchist geographies, but also from this broader perspective of anti-authoritarian.

And the idea is to bring together these two different sensibilities that we call it, to weave them together into a radical geography of understanding the state and these logics. Because we thought that anarchism in a way is part of a very large, or we’ll say, a large family of anti-authoritarian perspectives that share these ideas around vertical organization of order.

So we thought it was necessary to decentralize also the ideas of what is anarchism and also considered the plurality of anarchism. So we were trying to decenter not only the idea of the state but also the idea of the critiques about the state.

So the book reflects that the role of the state needs to be called into questions instead, as a contingent religion institution, like the modern state, and a self-referential framework defining modes of knowing and mode of being.

So this book is an investigation into how states shape our understanding of the world, how they acquire the symbolic and material power to do so, and what and how ways of being and knowing help us to rest ourselves from its narrow conception of what life ought to be.

I would say just a few words as well about my work aside from this project because I think it’s important in how I’m approaching this project with Anthony. I mostly work with communities in Oaxaca, communities in the Indigenous Chatino and peasant communities.

And we have been working from more than a decade together in different projects. But in a way, it has been a way to documenting the history of this place and these communities, understanding the internal colonialism and the different strata of this history of colonialism in this place in Oaxaca.

But more importantly, it’s been an opportunity for me to learn many ways in which I was taught geography and also to learn from and with community members, to really understand how intricate, how complex is the relationship with the state from these communities.

I will say, for example, the role of the commons in reimagining the world, but also how this is not something fixed. This is not something that is natural to communities. It’s always that it’s changing and remaking their own world. So in a way, this relationship with the state is based on this possibility to bring new futures for themselves and not just community against the state.

And that way, I think it’s also how we’re approaching here and trying to really decenter the idea. We’re not trying to define what is a state. We’re more interested in the place-based analysis and how different communities have related and challenged, avoided, disregard the state in many, many ways. So I will now turn to Anthony, and I will finish this presentation later.

ANTHONY INCE: So first of all, Thank you very, very much for having me and for doing all the tech work to make this possible. I couldn’t quite justify the carbon footprint of traveling all the way to literally the other side of the world to be here, but I’m so glad I am, even though it’s the middle of the night here.

So thank you also for the very, very generous introduction. In the UK, we’re always very self-deprecating. So it’s nice to have an American welcome in that regard. So I want to just build on some of the things that Geronimo has introduced by diving a little bit more into some of the central themes of the book.

And although this is a long process of writing, and thinking, and discussing together, kind of a low and slow kind of thing, this book isn’t like an endpoint as such. It’s really an introduction, a statement of purpose.

So we start the book with a slightly provocative question, which is what if the state had never existed? How would we act? How would we think? How would we make sense of our shared world differently? And this isn’t just a hypothetical question asked for fun. Counterfactual thinking like this can help us open up other ways of being.

And the state is so central to dominant ways of seeing the world. But if it had never existed though or perhaps was only one idea among many broadly equal ones, would almost inevitably think about the world and our place in it quite differently. So that’s the project we’re trying to come across here.

We’re trying to descend to the state from its position as the pivot around which our political and geographical imaginaries orbit. I was explaining this to somebody recently, and I sort of accidentally came out by saying, the book tries to understand how the state becomes ordinary, or regular, or uninteresting, so we can make it feel strange again. And I think the idea of making the state feel strange is something that’s quite significant to what we’re doing here.

So we’re not asking, like Geronimo says, a definitional question, what is a state? We’re talking more about its logics. And when we’re talking about logics, and we’re really interested in what we mean by this is the repeated rationalities and repertoires of order developed and reproduced over time that produce a thing called the state, a kind of equality of stateness.

The state in this regard is sort of an effect of a set of operational logics, not the logics themselves. Now, these do have real life effects. It’s no coincidence that many states, especially modern ones, have arrangements of similar or at least kind of equivalent kinds of institutions.

And the empirical study of these state institutions and how they functions is absolutely essential. We’re just trying to do something a little bit different here. So what our book is trying to do is think through these logical foundations of what we broadly call statism, that’s expressed through a whole wide range of everyday frames, be they cultural, social, cosmological, that incorporate the state but also massively exceed it.

And we take this deliberately expansive gaze because we argue at least, it needs to be expansive if we’re to take seriously. The multiple and often contradictory effects of statism, of states but also far beyond them as well.

So we’re quite critical of the state, but the book isn’t specifically a critique of the state. We’re not saying this is why the state is bad, and we should definitely get rid of it. We’re more interested in how it maintains its order over time and across multiple contexts and how it maintains its imaginative centrality amidst the many problems and crises which it faces and in many regards, may be unable or unwilling to resolve substantially.

So we think about this by considering how the state becomes ordinary. And we call this ontologization. The process of rendering the state is kind of just there. It just is. Not unlike something like Mark Fisher’s capitalist realism.

So through this thinking, we start to make sense of how the state becomes ordinary, unremarkable, and so on. But through this process, crucially, we actually spend most of the book writing about that. But through this, we also try to tease out some of its dissonances, its contradictions, its gaps, rips, bumps, and kind of frayed edges of what we call the statist fabric. And we use metaphors of fabric, and thread, and weaving right the way through the book.

It’s almost kind of very basic to say that the state doesn’t have a total grip on everything at all times, OK? So what do these gaps and dissonances tell us about other non-state, or in our framing, post statist logics of order? A lot of people have written on similar topics, but we’re particularly interested in the logics and rationalities, the ways of doing things rather than the specific outcome.

So we work with contemporary and historical sources. Geronimo has taught me an awful lot about historical work, which I’m not well trained in until we met. But we often focus particularly on accounts from below and at the margins of state societies. And these are generally really where the state touches people’s lives, either on the one hand, most violently, or on the other hand, not very much at all. And often, a kind of an awkward combination of the two.

So these kind of examples don’t just expose how fragile perhaps statist logics can be, but also demonstrate that alternatives are already living among us and can help us to triangulate what we’re particularly focused on is affinities that can be found across very different contexts, cosmo visions, and so on.

So importantly, rather than sort of capital P political alliances, which often rely on quite straightforward sort of ideological alignments or misalignments, we look to affinity between logics of order that can perhaps highlight points of solidarity across this anti-authoritarian family that Geronimo mentioned that might otherwise go unnoticed.

So I’ll just finish off briefly. Ultimately, we might not all want to abolish the state. In fact, probably most of the people in the room don’t. But even if we’re wanting to make the state better, we won’t get very far if we’re only or mostly looking to the logics of statism for inspiration, OK? So we’re looking to abolish the centrality of the state in how we look at the world because it severely limits our imaginations.

So in a context, the contemporary political context where we find complexity, and uncertainty, and fragility, becoming a more and more pronounced aspect of daily life, of political life, of social life, we suggest that, and I quote, which logics of order will emerge through this is a pressing question of our moment. So our book is a sort of a small contribution to perhaps responding to that question. So back to Geronimo.

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: OK. Thank you so much. Well, I just want to finish this presentation just to talk to you about the sections, how the book is organized. And as Anthony mentioned, we use some metaphors or ideas about weaving and threads.

So the first section is titled Threads and is trying to work on these connection, trajectories, tension, and conflicts among the different experiences that we refer to against and about the state, but also the shortcomings in conventional frameworks exploring the multiplicity, the plurality of ways of being despite the statism, and then the reflections on the state as an integrated fabric, transversing and conjoining the different forms of hierarchy and domination. And then we explore this idea of myths that have been crucial for us to understand this idea of post-statism and the statism idea.

So the idea is to this aestheticism is defined by myths that are the pillars that define this logic. And so we divide this section, which is I think is the core of the book in a way, in three sections. One is time, nature, and order.

And so we’re interested in this statist time scapes, the normative frameworks that delineate our lives through linear evolution is determinist time scapes. But trying to also bring other temporalities, other ways in which experiences in the past and in the present, the time has been thought differently. And what it makes us think about the contingency and fragility of the state and its logics.

Then nature helps us to criticize it, to really engage into the naturalization of the state and how it brings this– well, we try to go in depth into the relationship, but this patriarchal tendencies, patriarchal framework, and the divide between nature and civilization that has been carefully policed through the statist logics.

And then order. We try to question how states impose this particular order and how state logic saturates the meaning of order [INAUDIBLE] in the multiple orders that do not conform with these logics or use instrumentally and strategically elements of it.

And finally, we end up with the idea of horizons in trying to bring and contribute to the pathways of interrogating and taking seriously the role of the state in our geographical imaginations and expand the dialogue about the logics that sustain these logics. Sorry. To sustain the statism. And finally, we try to bring some ideas, not only the academic work or outside the academic work, as part to destatize our geographical imaginations. Thank you.

JAKE KOSEK: Thank you. That was great. So we’re going to start off with Anna. You want to start us off for the first commentary?

ANNA STILZ: Sure, great. So thanks very much for inviting me to be part of the event. I should also explain that, I’m going to have to leave a little bit early, and I apologize for that. I just have to go pick up my daughter from after school.

So yeah. I was very engaged by this book, and I really enjoyed having the opportunity to read it. So society, despite the state, offers a pretty strong and searing critique of the state as the dominant form of political order in the contemporary world. And it also gives us a plea to consider and take seriously alternative kinds of political futures that might be inspired by various anarchist traditions, particularly local, self-organized, cooperative practices like mutual aid organizations, for example, and also other kinds of non-state communities that are structured by different bonds, like bonds of kinship or family.

So I, in my previous writings, have had a little bit more sympathetic take on the state than the authors do. And that probably is why I was invited to be a commentator. But I’m afraid I’m going to disappoint a little bit because I actually think anarchism is very interesting, and I’ve always thought it was a tradition that’s very much worth taking seriously.

And I think we should consider the question of whether a non-state society ultimately would be a more ideal society, whether it would better realize democratic values like freedom and equality than even the most democratic state that we can imagine.

I think that’s a question worth thinking hard about. And as a higher ideal that we might aspire to achieve, an anarchist society has always seemed to me kind of attractive. But my role here is to be a critical commentator. So I’m going to just mention four questions that I have about the book. So I just want to signal like I’m not as one might think in some fundamental ways.

So my first question is just that while most of the book was critical of the state, and Anthony actually said this wasn’t a question that they wanted to engage, but it was a question I had. I wanted to get a better sense of what institutions count for the authors as a state.

So it’s very clear that sort of modern Iberian European nation states are definitely like paradigmatic cases of the state. And it’s also clear that things like a local mutual aid society is not a state. But in between these two kinds of very clear cases, it seem to me there are a lot of other things that might or might not be a state, and I wasn’t sort of sure.

So for example, I mean, I think of the modern European state as emerging around 1,500 or so. But the authors do discuss like archeological findings about the earliest states that emerged 3,000 years BCE. So there are some pre-modern formations that the authors are at least willing to countenance as states.

But they strike me as completely different from the Iberian nation states that we’re familiar with. So I just wonder, like some liminal cases, what the authors would say. So Ancient Athens, this is a direct democracy based on a highly restricted, highly inegalitarian citizenship. But it doesn’t have a lot of features that we might associate with the modern state, like centralized bureaucracy. It’s a direct and not a representative democracy. So I’m not sure if it’s the state or not.

I thought also of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy that organized the five nations in what is now New York prior to European arrival. They governed the Mohawk and the Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca peoples. Would that be a state? The Aztec or Inca Empires, would that count, or China under the Ming Dynasty? There’s just a lot of political forms, and I’m not sure if they’re states or not.

So I’m not sure if the authors are arguing only against the modern Ibarian nation state, kind of European nation state and post-colonial state, or they’re arguing against a y-intercept of political forms. So that was my first question.

My second question is I’d like to hear more about exactly what features of states are objectionable. Like it’s clear that the authors object to the states, and I think they object based on a variety of different things. The hierarchy, inequality, centralization, and coercion are all things that they find objectionable.

But I wonder. So modern states, they characteristically feature a set of binding procedures by which to make decisions for everybody in a territory. Sometimes but not always, those procedures extend some democratic rights to the people that are subject to those decisions.

But modern states also typically feature a centralized, hierarchical, often bureaucratic apparatus that coerces people to obey those decisions. We could imagine a polity though that did feature binding democratic processes that everyone in a territory was expected to comply with but that didn’t have a bureaucratic coercive apparatus.

Maybe the ordinary citizens of this policy would polity would enforce the rules themselves maybe through social pressure, or ostracism, or other kinds of informal sanctioning practices. And I’m just not sure if that would be objectionable in the same way that a state is or not for the authors. So I’d like to hear more.

So that’s my second question. I have a total of four. So I’m halfway through. My third question is that the authors sometimes speak as though all the bad stuff that states have done is like constitutively and definitionally part of the state.

So states are said to require an outside in the form of borders to citizenship and to exclude and other the people who are outside in ways that cast them as unclean, and threatening, and unruly, and oppress them. States are also said to inevitably engage in cultural assimilation to homogenize kaleidoscopic, pre-existing cultures. Colonialism, displacement, and removal are also said to be conceptually part of the state.

So I don’t disagree that there have been and often have been settler states, exclusionary states, assimilationist states. But I wondered whether there could also be anti-colonial states, multicultural states, maybe even states with open borders. Would those formations be possible or not?

And it seemed like for the authors, that there would be some constitutive or conceptual feature of the state that made those possibilities impossible, rule them out. And I also felt like while the authors valorize local self-organized communities, there have also been lots of local communities that were pretty exclusionary to outsiders. There have been groups that have been based on kinship ties that have engaged in what we might think of as quasi-colonial practices, conquering and subordinating, expropriating other neighboring groups.

So I kind of wondered, is the state ultimately a neutral institutional form that could be used for good purposes or for bad purposes, and local communities as well, like could be good ones and bad ones? So one example that I wanted to consider was the US state during the period of reconstruction after the Civil War.

This is a state that went into local communities in the US South and very forcibly interfered in their internal self-organized processes, and I’m not inclined to think that was a bad thing. I’m inclined to believe that a little more interference was necessary. The state did not interfere enough. It withdrew before the job was done. So I’m open to thinking that there’s some kinds of state action and interference that’s actually ultimately good.

And my last question is when I think about the contemporary world, I wonder if we need the state to achieve certain important and progressive aims. There’s always been a strong set of left traditions, from unions and social democratic parties to Marx and also Lenin, that argued that the left needs to take control of the levers of state power in order to achieve its aims.

And I’m thinking here about goals like the large scale redistribution of wealth, the taming of corporate power, the control of artificial intelligence, and the resolution of the climate crisis. How are these aims to be achieved in our society if not by harnessing the power of the state to dislodge the organizing and wealthy interests that often block progress and to enforce policy on these fronts?

Now, it’s definitely true that the state can and often has served as a protector for elite interests. I don’t want to deny that, but I think it’s also true that the state can be and sometimes has been harnessed by mobilized popular democratic majorities in the interests of socially just ends.

And doing that requires major investments in political organizing to build popular power. But I think the state’s regulatory, and planning, and coercive capacity is going to be necessary to transform the world in the service of these kinds of progressive aims. Because the state is the only organization we have that can plan and carry out these kinds of large scale social initiatives, like providing public health care, education, as I said, redistributing wealth, building a resilient climate infrastructure, and so on. It’s hard for me to imagine that we’re going to decarbonize the world economy in the next 20 or 30 years by relying on self-organized mutual aid collectives.

So I think that’s why the Marx and Lenin argued that the working class needs to seize the state and wield its coercive capacities to reshape society. I think a proposal to get rid of the state here and now might not usher in a kind of world of equal freedom for all. It might just usher in the domination of the richest and most powerful among us and the organized corporations that dominate so much of our life.

So unless we remake society and probably do so using the coercive power of the state, I think getting rid of the state is just going to leave ordinary folk potentially prey to forces of private oppression. So I’ll stop. Thanks.

[APPLAUSE]

DYLAN JOHN RILEY: Yeah. OK. So thanks a lot for sharing the book. And I have many of, I guess, my reactions are very similar to Anna’s. But I did also want to start off with a real appreciation of the project of the book. I think it’s actually very important for people in academia but also just outside of academia, on the left and among progressives, to think about anarchism, to think about radical critique of the state, to think about the notion of a political order beyond the nation state.

I think that’s often, I think the political imaginary of the left is impoverished by not being able to imagine a political order that goes beyond the state. I also have to say that I really liked the composition of the book with these kind of alternating sort of analytic sections and then these little intermezzos.

I especially appreciated the discussion of Asterix the Gaul. That was great. It was sort of the little village as this sort of image of the stateless society that was very evocative and appreciated that very much. But yeah. So I guess I too have some questions that I’ll just raise, and you can see if these are useful or not useful and you’re thinking about it.

So I guess the first question I had in a way is similar to Anna’s question. In a way, I’m just wondering who the target of the critique that is being developed is at times in the book. At one point, you describe a view that suggests that the modern liberal state is an inevitable endpoint of a process of social or social evolution.

But I was just thinking kind of analytically, I mean, if you think about the classics of political sociology, it’d be hard to argue that a Weber, or a Hintze, or a Perry Anderson, or Charles Tilly or even [INAUDIBLE] writing on Latin America, would see the idea of the modern state as the unfolding of this kind of telos.

I mean, their work, it strikes me, is very much about contingency, non-evolutionary thinking in a lot of ways, and particularly within the Iberian tradition, a rejection of the idea. I mean, obviously there’s the idea of a rational state. But for Weber, it’s only instrumentally rational, and that actually, the modern state includes deeply a rational or irrational element that is kind of intrinsic.

It’s intrinsic other side of the rationalization process in the instrumental dimension. So I just wondered like what you guys think about how are you situating yourselves in a relationship to that sort of tradition?

So the second point I was thinking about is the question of contingency. So a number of points in the text, you say that the state is contingent, and the evidence for the contingency is to reference the fact that the state is a recent historical form. But I’m not sure that the evidence that the fact that the state is recent, some 200 years, depending on exactly how we want to date this, let’s say 200, 300 years.

Why would its recency be evidence of its contingency, and its an abnormality in the trajectory of humanity, as you put it at one point? Surely, there must be some reason for why the political form of the modern state is sort of universalized in a certain kind of way. And even its origins, if we want to say the state is of European origin.

But I think you could make an argument that these political forms have developed in a number of different ways. I mean, clearly, one of the reasons that the state emerges is because of this dynamic of war-making, which has its roots really in the European feudalism.

So it is recent but not contingent. I mean, there’s lots of reasons why one would get organizations like the state. So I was just wondering how you guys are thinking about the relationship between the historical argument and the argument about contingency.

Now the third question is a little bit more specific, and it has to do with the issue of colonialism. So you say that the modern state emerged in tandem with colonialism, and that the state and colonialism nurture each other, establishing the boundaries between humans and non-humans, civilized and savage.

But I wonder whether that’s– I mean, as a general matter, I wonder actually about that in the following way. Two sides of this. First of all, were the first colonial states modern states? I would say not, actually. They were basically, with the Dutch, it’s a kind of merchant dominated oligarchy. It’s not really a modern state.

And then in the Iberian Peninsula, these seem to me to be late feudal absolutist states. And that’s actually very important because what really drives them out, in a sense, is the search for solving the problem of the second sons, right? That is to say what do you do when you have limited land, right? And you have to do something with these noble sons?

Then in the British case itself, was colonialism a state project? Perhaps. I mean, it depends on what we think about, how to define a state. But clearly, these merchant companies and the chartered corporations, they were not, although chartered by the crown, they’re not exactly state. I mean, they’re a little bit more like private enterprises.

So I just don’t know exactly. I think maybe some thinking needs to go into actually how we understand the relationship between colonialism and the state. Of course, it’s true that in the later period, there is an infusion. I mean, in the period of classic imperialism. Yes, it’s clear. But of course, in the 19th century, that’s connected to a new kind of new phase of capitalist development.

So I was just wondering, how do you guys think about the relationship between the state formation, colonialism, and the different phases of colonialism to imperialism and that whole set of issues?

Then I guess the fourth question is just about this question of cartography, which is really interesting and lots of really fascinating stuff in the book. It’s very worth checking out. But I wondered, even on this, I mean, in my understanding, I mean, obviously, in some ways, map making has gone along with state formation but not always.

And I mean, even in the case of thinking about the case of the enclosure movement, I mean, it’s important to understand that enclosures in the is my understanding of this anyway. In the British case, this is largely a movement of private actors who are making maps of their estates, which they are then using in the context of cases that are brought before parliament.

But this is really a dynamic, not from below, of course, but it’s a dynamic that comes out of agrarian capitalism as much as it comes out of the state. Or at least that’s my understanding. Maybe I’m misunderstanding this. So how does mapmaking and state-making go together?

The other thing about that I was thinking about this I’d be interested to hear is, of course, the real breakthroughs in cartography are made in Renaissance Italy, which is one of the places with the weakest and least integrated states in all of Western Europe. And it’s very much associated with these kind of merchant oligarchies and so on, which are not particularly modern state-ist in its origins. Of course, later, it’s a different matter. But just how are you kind of thinking about that?

And then I guess the sort of fifth point that I wanted to just ask you about is really to go back and very much resonates with Anna is saying, is that, well, what does this all mean in the light of contemporary politics? I mean, what does it mean to have a radical critique of the state?

I mean, so one thing I would say and this may be a slight point of difference between Anna and myself. I actually think that Marx and Lenin offer a deeply radical critique of the state, that is smash the state. And he’s only after you use it. So you need the state, and then you smash it, right?

So the state, this is, of course, coming out of the civil wars in France and then obviously taken up again in the state and revolution. Lenin’s point is that the anarchists are great. They’re not Kautskians. Great. But they’re like, they’re just missing this little point, which is that you need to use the state before you smash the state.

So how are we going to do that? And then I guess that raises this whole question of this moment that we’re living through now. I mean, I think these guys who are running the US state at this point see themselves as anarchists. And they may be wrong, but I mean, we’re basically, are we not living under a kind of anarcho-capitalist regime? So what do we do about that? Anyway, thank you very much, because it was really a fun read, and I really appreciated your sharing it. Thank you.

JAKE KOSEK: Geronimo and Anthony, do you want to take a couple of minutes now, or what do you want? We have some time for you to respond directly right now, or we can open some questions too.

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: With me or–

JAKE KOSEK: Sure. Why don’t you start?

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: Yeah. OK. Well, I’m going to maybe go around different of these questions because I think there are some of those related. And then maybe Anthony can help me with others. So I want to start just, I think that’s one of the main different perspectives on what to do with the state.

So I will start first about the idea of what is really what we’re thinking about the state here, because we’re really trying to make a framework about the logics, not exactly what the state per se. So that’s how we’re trying to draw not exactly boundaries about a modern state and non-modern state.

Because we saw also in the works that we examined in archeology, for example, in anthropology, that the definition of the state was sometimes anachronistic in the way that through the perspective that of we now define what data state. We’re trying to portray or to make other organizations as a state in the past. But we don’t necessarily know what that mean for them in that moment.

But for us, what we were interested in was the logics around this perspective that were shared across many of these types of states. So that topology we’re not exactly following, but more interested in the vertical and hierarchical coercion that defined many of these types of states.

And for example, with the first question, we were, in one of the chapters, we were quoting some Chinese commentators, thinkers from the ninth century. We see that they were exactly considered by some, arguing around this idea of anarchism because we’re exactly counter to the ideas of the state in China at that moment.

So from that moment, we’re considering that these ideas have been, through the history of when these type of coercive, centralized organization of authority, there is a voice always that is trying to attack these perspectives.

And so for that idea, this is what we are considering also other voices that organize differently. For example, I’m using the example of autonomy in Mexico. But they are using this different organization of their own zones, autonomous zones. And they have their own infrastructure, their own health, their own education. They say Zapatistas, Rojava, et cetera. There have been examples of this that does not require the hierarchies that we are assumed that we need to organize this infrastructural structure.

So yeah. For the need of the state, I mean, I think Anthony will help me more on that. But I think we’re clear in the sense that we’re trying to make the argument that through history, we have been taught that taking control of the state has never come true. Yeah. The dreams of using it for good. And that was, yeah, what anarchist said in the 19th century, and we’re repeating ourselves here today.

Yes. So in a way, I mean, the difference here in the US has been difficult for me to talk about. There is a difference in the genealogy I think of libertarianism and anarchism. So sometimes, and it’s here, it’s here in the US. And this idea of libertarianism as this capitalist ideas of free markets and free private property or not, really get rid of the state.

I don’t think it’s nothing to do with the anarchist perspective. The anarchist is coming from the socialist family in the 19th century, and this is a different and even take, the name of libertarian. Because in Spanish or in French we use libertarian, libertarios, et cetera, as anarchist, as the other far right capitalist perspective.

So I think [INAUDIBLE] for example, has a very interesting book about these projects, mostly the US-based libertarian projects in the Pacific and in Latin America. They are trying to buy territories to implement these ideal places for anarcho-capitalism, which for me is like a really paradoxical, contradictory ideas.

But they also show, is the state is required to make this happen? Because they needed the state to secure that private property, right? They need the state of Guatemala, for example. They need a state in any Pacific area to really secure that rights of this private property. Should I stop here? Yeah. So we have time.

ANTHONY INCE: Sorry. Hello. I would also echo Geronimo’s point about when anarchists, left wing anarchists of the socialist tradition, talk about abolition of the state, We’re not talking about just getting rid of the state and leaving everything else intact. That’s very much the kind of the right libertarian tradition there.

So the anarchist abolition of the state comes with a whole set of other transformations. And those were very much similar kind of transformations that Lenin and co, for example, were trying to do with the state through the state. And I understand in that Russian context, there was definitely a valid argument there, even though it didn’t work out so well for, well, Russian people.

It’s a shame Anna had to go. I wanted also to pick up this definitional question and these questions of obligation, political obligation, which again, is something that actually, in fairness, the anarchist tradition has not really pushed that in ways that it perhaps could or should have done.

But I would highlight, How do we create conditions where people feel politically obliged to act in concert, kind of universally or together? And what kind of sanctioning practices might there be? She used the word sanctioning practices.

And it’s good that Dylan’s here because I’ve read his book or parts of his book on the civic foundations of fascism, which also connects with some of the early, early work that I’m beginning to do on citizenship and the civic.

But there’s quite a lot of empirical evidence and kind of theoretical frameworks that allow us to see political obligation beyond the state. So the work of Mohammed Bamyeh, for example, he wrote this wonderful book, Anarchy As Order, where he talks about the state as actually a kind of a growth on our civic environment.

The state doesn’t create citizenship as a practice, as a social and political obligation to one another. It actually intervenes in those relationships. And so we can’t automatically assume that political obligation is created by the state. And we see this in all kinds of places in civil society, where in fact, actually, the state can disrupt these obligations to one another, not least through the creation and policing of state borders and the various things that happen at them and around them.

So that’s one thing I wanted to pick up on. And also, this matter of large scale infrastructure and public services. We need mass strategic social functions. We need infrastructure, and utilities, and all of these kinds of things. But do we specifically require states to enact them?

Now, states are able to mobilize lots of things very quickly across a large scale. So that is efficient. That is efficient. Is that the right or the best way to do it? Well, that’s up to a kind of wider debate, but I would flag up that in many regards, states have actually taken ideas from below and implemented them as their own.

So in the UK, we have the National Health Service. I don’t want to talk about the US health system slightly more– slightly different, let’s say to the UK, the European model. Well, the National Health Service was modeled. It wasn’t just a wonderful idea that the government came up with.

It was actually modeled on grassroots, very large scale, well-developed infrastructures that were produced, particularly in South Wales among the coal mining communities, where they created a sort of a proto-National Health Service that was then seen by Aneurin Bevan and a number of others in the Labor Party after the Second World War and saw and thought, that’s a great idea. Let’s take it basically. Let’s not steal it. I won’t use the word steal, but let’s take it and claim it as our own.

So alongside these contemporary examples. Rojava, Chiapas, if we want to go James C. Scott, the Zomia Region, for example, there are many examples of autonomous regions. But there are also others that are perhaps less well known about, where people have produced and cooperated and created social goods from below at quite a large scale and high complexity of development.

We also see non-state forms of regulation as well. The international organization for standardization, it’s exceptionally dull, I know. But ISO numbers, you see those ratings on safety and so on. That is global, that is cooperative, that is led by technical expertise, and it’s voluntarily opted into by states but also by businesses, by organizations, and so on. And the ISO is a great example of global non-coercive regulation that really, really works.

So let me have a look at my notes. Was there anything else? Was there anything else that you wanted to come back to?

JAKE KOSEK: So let’s do some questions. If you’d state your name and department or where you’re coming from and address the question.

AUDIENCE: Hi. My name is Jane Mongo, and I’m from the political science department. I’m a PhD candidate. Thank you so much for this. And I think the book is fascinating and interesting. I know very little about anarchism, and this was a good introduction to it.

And so for me, I feel like the most important question that needs to be answered for me to buy the whole argument, or at least begin to buy the whole argument, and you might have addressed it in the book. I’m just beginning to read it, so I might not have gotten to that point.

But I just wonder, what is your understanding of human nature? And I’m asking this because Thomas Hobbes, the most passionate proponent of the state or sovereignty or whatever, they always based it on human nature. They are like it’s chaotic. Like if there’s nothing to rule over them, people will eat each other.

So I guess if, I don’t know if you’ve discussed it. If you could, then maybe you could share that. If you didn’t discuss that, maybe you could also discuss, tell us maybe why you didn’t necessarily see it as relevant.

JAKE KOSEK: Let’s just open with that. The small treatise on that, you can open that. If you can do that in two minutes and like and also really touch on who else has talked about human nature in the state, that’s great. It’s a good question. Which of you two would like to take that one?

ANTHONY INCE: Why not? Let’s give it a shot. It’s a great question. And I think we do attend to that a little bit in the book, this idea of the state of nature, as this world where life is, what is it? Violent, brutal, and short. Which I know has many different iterations. If you look at Rousseau, it’ll be different from Locke and so on.

So we take quite a broad brush stroke on that. And we pull apart that idea as an empirically and also conceptually slightly simplistic, let’s say, way of thinking about human societies. So if you look not just from the anarchist perspective but also others like Protevi, I can’t remember his first name. He wrote this wonderful book called The Ages of the State.

Where in fact, if you look at not just historical examples of non-state societies but also kind of evolutionary psychology, and in many ways, biology as well, that state of nature just doesn’t stand up to empirical scrutiny.

So there’s that empirical side. But we also have, from the anarchist or kind of slightly anarchist leaning area of political theory, we think about human nature in a slightly more open way. I mean, for example, Peter Kropotkin, one of the great anarchist geographers and frankly, one of the best beards I’ve ever come across.

He writes in his final book on ethics, which is unfinished. He died before he finished writing it. He writes about how the human nature is, in many ways, it’s slightly deterministic, and it’s in that slightly kind of Victorian way of thinking of things. But I think there’s a lot of validity to it.

Human nature is not defined fundamentally. We can’t a priori create a kind of an image of what human nature is or isn’t. It is produced, in many regards, it’s a materialist thing. It’s produced through the material conditions where we live. So he bemoans in perhaps his most famous book, Mutual Aid, the many ways in which the cooperative ethic of living has been sort of eroded over time with particularly but not only through the expansion of the state and also capitalistic enclosure of things like commons.

And that, he says, again, it’s slightly deterministic. I don’t fully buy it. But he says that has actually affected what human nature is. So human nature is always becoming. It’s never finished. It’s never complete. And I think that’s probably where I think we would stand. Geronimo, you might say something slightly different there but–

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: Yeah. Just quickly. One of the last book, what’s the name, from David Gabriel? He is examining just these ideas. And he’s exactly saying that no one really reads this text because they are arguing that this is just a model for their argument.

They are never presenting any evidence for that idea of the state of nature. It’s just how they’re trying to argument through these ideas, and they don’t give any evidence of that, aside from what Anthony already said. But even they didn’t think that was the idea.

JAKE KOSEK: I had one in the very back in blue and curly hair. And then back up here.

AUDIENCE: Thanks for the talk. A really sympathetic to the ideas in it. I guess the title of the book makes me think society, despite the state, society itself is also this kind of totality that emerges as a concept alongside the state. And if you think of the Age of Revolutions, it’s all these attempts of society to impose its kind of legislation, autonomy over the state.

And one thing that Marx and Tocqueville say is that they ultimately fail, and the state only gets stronger every time society tries to do that. So I’m just wondering, should an anarchist also be suspicious of the concept of society as well, or is it possible to have a mass society that is autonomous or anarchistic, or is this only a small scale thing?

JAKE KOSEK: You want to take some questions? We have a few minutes. Why don’t we take a couple questions around, and then you guys can kind of pick which ones you want to respond in the short time we have. So I think Cori had one, and there was somebody else in the white shirt there first and then Cori.

AUDIENCE: Hi. Thank you for this wonderful presentation and discussion. My name is Hanna Hilbrandt, and I’m a visiting researcher at the moment in geography, but a professor for social geography normally at the University of Zurich.

I was really fascinated by the arguments, and I kept wondering, how would they be taken in geographies or areas of the world where the state is not as present as we think of it, potentially from here or from Europe, in areas where non-state armed forces or the Pentecostal Church or what have you would be ruling society in much stronger ways.

And so I guess my question is to what extent you’re also engaging with the kind of epistemological critique of Eurocentric views of the state, and to what extent we can just already denaturalize or decenter the state just by reading geographies from other places, potentially Southern places, the majority world.

JAKE KOSEK: We’ll take Cori and then one more, and then you have 5 minutes or so just to answer all these huge questions. An impossible task. There we go. That’s what we set up for you. I’m good at that.

CORI HAYDEN: I think the discussion so far has almost proven the point of your book. One of the biggest points, which is that it’s almost impossible for us to have a discussion without obsessing about the state. The whole discussion has been about the state, and the whole point is to try and think otherwise.

So I want to invite you to tell us about, for example, the radical pluriverse as an alternative formation or something. Just curious about some of the terms that anchor your imaginations otherwise, because we have been very focused on the state when you are joining us to not do that anymore. Thank you.

JAKE KOSEK: There’s one more person back here. Yes.

AUDIENCE: Yes. Hello, I am David Dopazo. I am a diplomat, so I represent the state, working for the French embassy. But I am also a historian and scholar. My question is actually following yours. When you look at all the social movements in Europe, in Western Europe especially, and people fighting to defend the health care system, the pension, the education, even the police and the mean for the police to act, is there not a way from inside to take the state and smash the state, and at some point, the society embracing or most part of the community becoming the state?

And my perspective as an early modernist is always like the society is within the state. And it’s very difficult when– I mean, the question about when the state start was super interesting for that. And my second question is very quick. When you look at the Web3 and all what the blockchain can offer today, do you think there is a digital space for anarchy, or all of that is just all the opportunities for a radical capitalist?

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: Thank you so much.

JAKE KOSEK: Let me give you another 10 if you really want some challenge.

GERONIMO BARRERA DE LA TORRE: I would have some of them and then– OK. Yeah, I would say, first of all, I don’t think there could be a universal set is exactly the idea. I haven’t really place based perspectives on how to organize the territories and the politics in that territory.

So the idea was to try to play with this word exactly because it comes up with the idea of the state. But what we can say about it in spite of it, in trying to, yeah, take that language without state, right?

I would say more about the radical progress that we were trying to bring together these other voices, these other perspectives of trying to organize territories otherwise, in despite, or negotiating, or avoiding the state in any way. We’re trying not to divide or make a stark division between a non-statist or a medium or something like that.

Like we’re trying to bring together those ideas that are struggling to organize themselves in the contradictions that they are already into, right? Because it’s not possible to be outside of it, but yes, to organize within. And that’s why we use despite as the idea.

And one of the things that from, well, from the historical anarchism, that they will always say that solidarity was like a rare resource in this world. And we’re trying that’s why we’re trying to come up with this idea of picking up the different ways in which to build these solidarities among different ways of organizing these territories.

And so you will see these different projects in these territories, how they share ways of organizing through the commons, through horizontal ways of organizing the territories or through different gender organizations, et cetera, noise of knowing nature, ways of constructing knowledge and healing, et cetera, et cetera, is a way to try to see the multiple, the diversity in these ways. Because the state is already diverse, and we’re arguing that through the diversity, how we can really find ways to build these places despite of the state. Yeah.

ANTHONY INCE: Yeah. Really interesting questions. I think the question about areas where the state is not very present is actually really quite significant or not present in the way that traditionally sort of like European, Westphalian model of the state would be.

It comes through actually quite strongly in Geronimo’s work independently of our book as well. So definitely read his articles, and I would defer to his authority heart, if I can use that word. What anchors our imagination? That was a really good question, whoever asked that?

One of the things we work with towards the end of the book is this notion of disregard as a way of navigating between state, non-state/gray areas in between them. Disregard is a sort of it’s not ignoring the state. It’s not pretending that it’s not there. It’s not about hoping that it’ll go away. And it’s not just about evading it at all costs.

Disregard is devaluing. It’s a really conscious word. If you think about what disregard means, it’s really consciously this like decentering or very consciously, sort of touching it very lightly and instrumentally. So we talk about a few examples of disregard towards the state, where people have actually engaged substantially with the state in some cases, but in ways that somehow sort of disrupt its authority, disrupt its centrality.

So one very niche historical example is the IWW, the wobblies in the states. So I’m using an American reference here. Hopefully some people know of them, where they would deliberately fill the local jails and cause utter chaos for these small, small kind of police forces in the kind of farming towns and what have you.

As a political vehicle for or as an opportunity to organize but also as a political vehicle for disrupting the capitalist state that they were challenging. So I think disregard is something I want, I personally at least want to push on a little bit more, as well as this notion of affinity as well.

Affinity, which is slightly different from solidarity. Because solidarity sometimes come with a certain sort of 20th century baggage of it has to be organizations formally constituted and so on. But that doesn’t necessarily connect very well with the way that actually, the reality of solidarity is if anybody reads David Featherstone’s work on solidarity, it really comes across. It’s not just the institutions that are doing the solidarity. It’s actually the people, often in spite of those kind of hierarchical institutions like trade unions, for example.

So one other thing about digital spaces is a huge thing, but I’m old enough to remember to have been sort of politicized around that sort of global anti-capitalist movement around the turn of the millennium.

And during that movement, there was a huge amount of digital innovation taking place among activists, anti-authoritarian activists that were creating logics of organizing digital space in ways that were collaborative, non-hierarchical, open, and so on.

So Indymedia, for example, if people remember that, and actually, the sad thing about it is that these sort of techno Bitcoin bro-types have actually picked up on those logics and have actually appropriated that for hypercapitalist, sort of right libertarian ends. And that was a weakness. That was always going to be a weakness of that in hindsight.

But there are spaces in there that continue to be those digital spaces. I’m not an expert on them, but there’s something there, I think. I think that’s everything from me. We probably haven’t covered half of what Dylan was talking about, but I’m afraid that might just be for another time. It’s half past 1:00 in the morning for me, and I’m ready for bed.

JAKE KOSEK: Anthony, Geronimo, and Dylan, thank you very much. This is obviously the very beginning or continuation of a deeper, longer historical conversation that we’ll keep having. But really thank you for the book and thank you for sharing it with us. It was great. And thank you, Dylan, for thinking with us on it. And thank you all for coming.

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WOMAN’S VOICE: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

Podcast

Interview with Julia Sizek: Regulating Off-Roading in the California Desert

Julia Sizek

Julia Sizek is a writer and anthropologist who studies the California desert and rural land management more broadly. Her work focuses on the politics of land in the California desert, including: the cultural politics of conservation acquisition in the railroad checkerboard, the rhetoric of environmental impact reporting, and the legal geographies of off-highway vehicle use. In addition to this work, Julia has also led the qualitative portion of the 30 year social and economic monitoring for the Northwest Forest Plan. Previously, Julia was a postdoctoral scholar at Berkeley’s Social Science Matrix, running programs, planning events, and interviewing social scientists about their research. Julia also hosted the Matrix Podcast.

In this interview, recorded in Spring 2024, Sizek talked with Marion Fourcade, Director of Social Science Matrix, about her paper “Impossible evidence: The legal dismal cycle of regulating off-roading in the California desert,” published in Geoforum. The paper traces a 40-year battle over off-road vehicle use in the California desert through the concept of “impossible evidence,” evidence that is legally demanded but cannot or does not exist. In a forthcoming summer 2025 article in Environmental History, Julia builds on this story by detailing the rise of the “Bureau of Livestock and Motorcycles” in California.

Listen to the podcast below or on Apple Podcasts.

 

Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

MARION FOURCADE: Hello, Julia. Welcome to the podcast.

JULIA SIZEK: Thanks for having me.

MARION FOURCADE: So, Julia, today’s episode is a bit unusual. Today, actually, you are our guest. But for the past three years, you’ve been the person doing the interviewing at Matrix. You started at Matrix as a research assistant while you were finishing your PhD and then as a postdoctoral researcher since July 2022. And over nearly three years, you’ve produced a series of extraordinary features for us.

You have interviewed scholars from a wide range of disciplines, both faculty and graduate students. You have done visual interviews and written interviews and podcasts. So our audience knows you very well. They know you as a master interviewer, and they know you, of course, as the indispensable person who organizes and runs our programmatic events.

But in fact, they probably don’t know that much about you and about your research. So today, we want to remedy that gap. And we want to erase that ignorance. So today, for once, the roles are reversed. Today, you are the interviewee.

And my name is Marion Fourcade. I am the Director of Matrix. And I have the pleasure of interviewing you. We’re finally getting to sit down and talk about your research. So let us begin. How about I let you introduce yourself.

SIZEK: Yeah, so I mean, thanks for the kind introduction. And also, yeah, it’s exciting to be able to share my work. So outside of the Matrix responsibilities that I have, I have been working in the long term on a research project about the California desert.

My PhD was in cultural anthropology from the department here at Berkeley. And in my dissertation, I examined the land ownership checkerboard in the California desert, which is, in short, this imperial land ownership pattern that long outlasted its imperial transcontinental railroad purpose and persisted all the way until the 1990s, and in some areas, through till today.

And so I had done this large research project on that for my dissertation. And most recently, my attention has turned to the history of off-road vehicle use in California, which I think is what we’re going to talk about today.

FOURCADE: Yes, indeed, today, we said we would discuss a wonderful piece you recently published in Geoforum, which is titled, “Impossible Evidence.” So let me begin where the article begins, really. You write, right at the onset in the introduction, that it all started with a fateful dinner you had with an environmental activist named Talia back in 2017. So what were you researching at the time? And what did Talia say that piqued your interest?

SIZEK: Yeah, so I was working on my dissertation at the time, which was really focused on this checkerboard land ownership pattern and how environmental groups and Native American groups were working to try to figure out the problems of the checkerboard. I had also been doing a pretty large project that resulted in a couple of publications about the Cadiz Water Project, which was a groundwater project that lays underneath this land ownership checkerboard.

And when I was meeting with Talia, she was the perfect stand-in for an anthropologist or a researcher first coming into the field because, although she was not new to environmental issues, she was new to the California desert. So she had this view of someone who was both extremely enthusiastic about her new job, but also didn’t quite know the ropes yet, which made her the perfect stand-in for me.

And when she came in, she was telling me— we had gone to do these different meetings. And we had tried to recruit different local businesses to the California Desert Monuments Coalition on behalf of different environmental groups. And then we had this dinner because she just wanted to meet more people who were out in the desert.

And she was telling me about one of the more interesting parts of her new job, which was this thing called WEMO, which is the West Mojave plan, which is abbreviated W-E-M-O. And she was so enthusiastic about this project. But what was so interesting to me was that it seemed like her enthusiasm was not reflected by the broader environmental community.

And she told me, you know, I’m really enthusiastic about it. But besides me, the only people involved are crazy people and lawyers. And I thought, what could be so — such a large problem and something that was so long lasting, as I found in my research, but was ignored by the broader environmental community and also ignored by people in general?

So what was the problem that was so large that could not be solved ,and also was so large and so long-lasting that it could become boring?

FOURCADE: So why was it so invisible? I mean, can you explain a little bit, you know, why it’s been so hard to regulate off-road vehicles using the California desert? I mean, maybe you can explain what WEMO was about, right? Why it’s been so hard to regulate off-road vehicles using the California desert and why, in fact, it’s been such a contentious issue for over 40 years, but a contentious issue that remains fairly, invisible to the general public?

SIZEK: Yeah, I mean, I think there are a couple of theories as to why this issue, off-road vehicle use in the California desert, has become really invisible, or maybe in some ways has always been really invisible. One of the reasons, of course, is that the California desert is considered to be a backwater of the state. And so a lot of people ignore what happens in the desert. And so it doesn’t really become a top news story in that way.

But I think the broader reason why it became an issue that is sort of shunted to the side for environmentalists, as well as for other groups, is just how contentious it is. So actually, just this week, I was talking to someone who worked as a biologist for the BLM in the 1970s. And one of the things that they were telling me was that a lot of people avoided this issue, even back then, because it was considered to be ugly, and therefore, something that you didn’t want to become involved in if you didn’t have to.

Other things that I’ve found in the archives is that a lot of people avoid the issue of off-road vehicles because it’s so contentious, as well as because it is the sort of thing that you have to have a certain kind of temperament for.

So one letter I saw in the archives, I saw a different biologist had written, “I just don’t have the temperament for this work,” and said, you know, “I’m going to go off and do my own different thing.”

So that’s, on the one side, why people might ignore it. But the reason why it has become, I think, such a contentious issue is about this— something that is actually very familiar to us in other realms. And this is the problem of what might be called regulatory lag, that you have a new use of an area and that you need to figure out how to regulate it. But by the time you do regulate it, it may have already become too late. There may have already been patterns established that are really difficult to break.

And this is actually a classic problem in transportation. So when cars first came on the streets in the 1920s, there were lots of debates about who had more rights. Should cars have rights? Should horses have rights? Should pedestrians have rights? More recently, even on UC Berkeley’s campus, we can think about when Uber and Lyft started dominating the campus roads and the problems that this caused for the university.

So this, in many ways, I think is actually a classic problem. And one of the reasons why it became so contentious in the California desert is that the rise of off-highway vehicle use in the California desert— and at this period in time, this is mostly motorcycles for technological reasons— it really coincided with the environmental decade.

So the great rise of off-road vehicles in the California desert was during the 1960s, starting in 1969, 1970. This is when you start having laws like NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, that begin to regulate a lot of environmental issues in the US.

And this coincidence of this new use that becomes extremely popular with the environmental decade means that you have this new awareness of detrimental effects of humans on the environment at the same time that you have a bunch of people who are engaged in this new recreational activity that is very bad for the environment. And it doesn’t really end there, either.

One of the things that I think is really fascinating about the off-road vehicle story is that the cultural side of off-road vehicles actually ends up aligning with a very unusual — or what I find to be an unusual and interesting time in the late 1970s, where environmental groups are getting a lot of pushback from what would later be called “wise use groups,” that are trying to promote the free-ranging use of the desert.

And so in a sort of unusual moment of political alignment, you have this group of off-road vehicle activists that become engaged and aligned with other movements in California that are considered to be more right-wing backlash movements, like the movement for Prop 13, which was led by Howard Jarvis, which is a famous, I guess, anti-property tax movement that still persists today in California. So in many ways, I think that dirt biking is sort of like a microcosm of these other problems — and this broader world that was the 1960s and 1970s.

FOURCADE: That is fascinating. So you are telling us that we have this clash between the environmental and then the recreational, both of whom have sort of a particular view of freedom and the relationship to nature, but which tend to be sort of opposed on sort of political grounds. And regulators are essentially constantly playing catch up with both of these. And they’re trying to both satisfy one and, but also preserve the other, and constantly trying to contain what’s going on the ground.

So let me go back a little bit to the case itself that is the center of your paper. It is a case called the CBD versus BLM — BLM, that’s the Bureau of Land Management — it’s really the most important case for the story you want to tell. So can you summarize a little bit this particular case? And maybe you want to go back to the history before it, because there’s an important case before that involves precisely these recreational groups. And can you explain to us why you see this case as a pivotal moment in the regulation — or rather the absence of regulation — of off-road vehicles in the California desert?

SIZEK: Yeah, CBD vs. BLM, which is the Center for Biological Diversity, a famously litigious environmental group suing the Bureau of Land Management, is — it’s one in a string of cases. And so I’m examining not the most recent one, which is actually currently in litigation, but the one prior to that, which was decided in 2009. And this string of cases has been about WEMO, the West Mojave Transportation Plan.

And what WEMO is all about is trying to determine how many miles, and where those miles are, of off-highway vehicle trails there are in this one area in the California desert, the West Mojave. And this, in some ways, it seems like this should be like an easy thing to solve. You want to determine, this is where people can go. This is where people can’t go. But this is actually a much thornier issue, as you can see, if you look through the records of this court case. And in many ways, I would argue that this case really began in the early 1970s, which is before, I think, many people would say it began.

But the reason why I say this is, as I mentioned previously, there is this regulatory lag problem in the California desert, where in the late ’60s, you have a ton of people coming out there, just riding their motorcycles wherever they want. And then in the late 1960s, in 1968, the Bureau of Land Management says, no. We’ve got to figure out what to do about this. They put exclamation points in their bureaucratic report saying, we need to figure out, something must be done.

And when they do this, they end up coming up with this plan in 1973 called the Interim Critical Management Plan, where they set out a list of places where people can go and say, this is where you can ride. This is where you can’t ride. This is where you have to stay on the trails that have already been established. This is where that is not necessary. This is where you can’t go at all.

And this plan, the 1973 plan, ends up getting sort of sucked up and spit out again into a new planning process, which is one that’s mandated under FLPMA, the Federal Policy Land Management Act of 1976, which is also the organic act of the BLM.

In short, what this means is that, prior to 1976, Congress had not told BLM what to do. There were no real rules governing BLM’s role as a federal agency. So from 1946 through 1976, there really were not formal responsibilities for the organization. In 1976, they say, here is what we want you to do.

And one of the other things that FLPMA does, in addition to giving the rules to BLM, is it also says, the California desert is an important and special place. It establishes this zone called the California Desert Conservation Area, that is subject to a special planning process, which goes from 1976 through 1980.

And then in 1980, they say, OK, we made a plan. We have now decided, in part, based on this 1973 plan, where dirt bikes can go, where they can’t go, where you need to stay on trails, and where you don’t need to stay on trails. And the passage of this 1980 plan allows environmental groups to sue the BLM and say, we disagree with your plan. We don’t think that you planned right. And this is what ends up leading to this current case that’s still happening today.

And in this string of cases, the basic issues at hand are that the Bureau of Land Management puts together a plan. They say, this is where we think everyone should be allowed to go. And environmental groups say, hey, no, actually, we think that’s too many — or too many trails, or too many miles of trails. And then this gets adjudicated through the court system.

And a really important part of this is that this is all enabled through these public participatory processes that really take off during the 1970s, and through NEPA or through other environmental legislation, and depend critically on this thing called the Administrative Procedure Act, which is the formation of administrative law in the federal government, and allows for entities to sue based on rule-making decisions that the federal government makes.

So under these sets of laws, CBD says, we disagree. We think that you shouldn’t have as many miles. The grounds for doing this is that BLM in 1980 said, this is the number of trails we’re going to have in the West Mojave. And we’re going to stay attached to this baseline from 1980.

The problem is, you actually can’t know where these are from 1980. And the reason for that being is that, over time, people will decide to go off the trail. And they will create new trails. So if you don’t have an accurate map from 1980, then that means that the trails that are out there now are not the trails that were out there in the past.

The Bureau of Land Management gets stuck with this 1980 standard. But they don’t actually have a map. They don’t know where people went in 1980, which leads to them to this problem where you basically have ceaseless litigation telling them to go back to this 1980 standard that can’t exist. This is the problem that I call in the article “impossible evidence.”

FOURCADE: Yes, so this question— let me go back to this question of impossible evidence. And you explain in the paper, actually, there’s sort of a footnote in the paper that explains why it arises. And it arises because, in the designation of the California Desert Conservation Area, any use plan proposed by the Bureau of Land Management must reference the 1980 trail baseline for off-road vehicles, right? And that specific mention in the document, which is not everywhere in all environmental planning documents, but it is there in this one document, the California Desert Conservation Area — you say that this specific mention is both a blessing and a curse for the cause of environmentalists.

It is a blessing because it gives environmental groups this legal hook. But on the other hand, it is a curse because this question of the 1980 baseline that the BLM must rely upon is, in fact, an unsolvable problem since the baseline doesn’t exist. They don’t have these maps. So can you explain a little bit why these maps don’t exist, why this evidence is so impossible? And then I would like you to go a little bit further in describing your analytical framework, because I think you have a whole series of concepts here that are very interesting. Impossible evidence is one of them. But the other one is what you call the “legal dismal cycle.” And you explain how impossible evidence is precisely what starts this legal dismal cycle that can never end. Can you explain the relationship between these two concepts?

SIZEK: Yeah, so this is a very– I think, a very interesting and thorny question because it’s really at the center of this case. But it’s quite unusual in the broader context of off-highway vehicle planning in the United States. So probably the most famous case about off-highway vehicles is this case SUWA versus Norton, which is the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance versus Norton, who was the Secretary of the Interior at the time. That was decided in 2004.

In this case, it was determined that basically, that the planning process, which had not taken place to determine where vehicles could go, that environmental groups could not sue to make this planning process happen. And it was precisely because there was no plan that there were people going wherever they wanted, and there were no rules as to where people would go. So people would go wherever they wanted.

And in contrast, in the California desert, you have this sort of unique world where there are actually tons of rules. You have to abide by this 1980 baseline, a map that was never made, basically, because there was not enough manpower at the Bureau of Land Management to make these maps, to survey and to complete these surveys.

And in addition to the lack of manpower problem, there were additional issues like the fact that you can’t use satellite imagery to determine where these trails are. And so even the satellite imagery that they have from the late 1970s and the early 1980s can’t be used because there are many natural features of the California desert that appear to be similar to off-highway vehicle plans.

So when they can’t form this plan in the early 1980s, this ends up having this ripple effect all the way to the present, because since the BLM has to abide by this old baseline — but they don’t have this information — this means that every time they make a new plan, the environmentalists, in their lawsuits, can say basically, well, you should go back to that plan.

And every time, this basically is just a new iterative loop, what I call the “dismal legal cycle.” And this is really building off of my conversation with environmentalists and with environmentalist lawyers, some of whom are involved in this case or earlier iterations of this case, who told me that they always had to relitigate plans.

They said, well, the first time the BLM will come up with an OK plan. And then they would get the new version of the plan. And environmentalists would be unhappy. They would decide to sue again on different grounds in order to get the plan to just improve a little bit every time. And this is also how you end up with these long cases where you just have cycles of the same issues coming up and over— I guess these same issues appear over and over again.

The other inspiration for coming up with this idea of the legal dismal cycle was actually early off-road vehicle use. So a early sociologist of off-road vehicles, Diana Dunn, wrote this article for the magazine Parks and Recreation, which was actually for recreation planners, which was an emerging field at this time, where she described what she called the dismal cycle of— she used a different term than off-road vehicles, but essentially, the dismal cycle of off-road vehicles.

And what she said was this dismal cycle is you have a bunch of users of this new technology, and they want to go to use their technology on lands. They get kicked off of private lands because private landowners don’t want them there. And so they get pushed out onto new lands, where they inevitably also get into conflict, for example, with ranchers. Or they might get into conflict with other recreationists. And this means that eventually, a land manager will step in. And either the land manager will set down some rules where they say, this is where you can go, this is where you can’t go. Or the land manager will just say, nope, you can’t come here anymore. In the case that they decide that they can’t come here anymore, then this sort of same cycle repeats elsewhere where the users decide to go.

In the case that they stay, you have what motorcycle groups have called the 1% problem. You might think of one percenters as being part of Hell’s Angels, if you’re in on the motorcycle history. But the one percenters also apply to this group of basically unorganized or unaffiliated motorcycle users who feel like they don’t need to follow the same rules as other people.

So these are the people who are probably making new trails, doing this thing called route proliferation. And in this dismal cycle, when this route proliferation happens, then you get to another tipping point, which is where the land manager just says, man, we cannot deal with all these motorcyclists. We have to do something about it. And they end up in the same problem they had before, deciding, are we going to try to regulate them? Or are we going to kick them off entirely?

In Diana Dunn’s version, this ends up repeating, particularly as motorized users are becoming more popular, and this activity is becoming more popular during that time period. So there are always more users than there are places to go ride. In this case, what I find in the legal dismal cycle is that this cycle of repeating litigation is occurring. And it’s essentially a debate between land managers and people who care about the land about motorcyclists.

So actually, motorcyclists and off-highway vehicle users are in some ways left out of this new legal dismal cycle, where the effects on the ground are not really entirely relevant for the proliferation and continuation of this litigation over time, which sort of leads us into this really sad place, where the environmentalists or the hope of the environmentalists that this litigation is doing something – there’s a real question about whether or not the litigation is actually preventing erosion or other problems that off-road vehicles can cause on the desert. So, “is litigation a worthwhile strategy?” is one of the questions that I had while I was writing this paper.

FOURCADE: Yeah, so you’re showing this really interesting disconnect or decoupling, as sociologists would say, between what is going on in the court, which is sort of a fairly abstract debate about essentially, does the BLM comply with this impossible standard from 1980, and then on the ground, this constant change, this constant proliferation of routes. And indeed, every BLM survey shows that there are more routes than in the previous survey. So you see this proliferation on the ground.

So what I wanted to ask you is, so why these WEMO — or these successive WEMO plans — are being litigated? How does the BLM concretely enforce any standards? Since nothing has been accepted, everything is in litigation, everything is up in the air, what is happening concretely on the ground? And how is the BLM trying to regulate or to enforce any kind of rule?

SIZEK: So it is very difficult for the BLM. And I will be among the many to say that I do not envy the BLM’s position here. And I think it’s actually incredibly difficult. And of all of the groups that are involved in this, I think I probably have the most sympathy for the BLM, because they are put into this rather impossible position where they are trying to act in a world where the rules are sort of all set up against them. And it makes it really challenging for them to do anything.

Another challenge for the BLM is that they are trying to prevent future proliferation. But they can only really do this in cases where the re-proliferation is rather extreme. So one of the images that I use in the article to demonstrate this is there’s one area around Ridgecrest, which is part of this WEMO plan, where you can just see the map of– there are two maps. One is a map of the designated routes and trails allowed under WEMO, and then the other is of what they call “transportation linear disturbances,” which are where people have gone, but not part of the system.

And if you look at it, there’s one area where it’s just almost entirely red. It’s almost entirely full of these transportation linear disturbances. And it butts up against this wilderness area, which is, by law, an area where you are not allowed to go on your off-road vehicle. But you know, based on looking at this map, that there are tons of people who are just crossing over this wilderness boundary.

And as you look at maps like that, you can see that the BLM is both hamstrung in the enforcement, but under these lawsuits, some of the interim plans sort of between the lawsuits have been to allow them to have limited enforcement in some of the areas that are impacted the most and also in areas where the impacts are most detrimental for wildlife.

So there’s one area south of Barstow where there was an interim plan put in place that included some fencing to prevent further route proliferation. But this is very much the exception. And so they have this real challenge where they can do a limited amount of stuff, and they can do a limited amount of enforcement, but ultimately, they’re hamstrung by the fact that the Bureau of Land Management, of course, is not a very wealthy agency and doesn’t have a lot of money. And at the same time, without any final formal plan in place, the only things that really get solved are the most dramatic problems, and these cases where I think everyone, including a lot of off-road vehicle advocates, would agree that something has to be done.

FOURCADE: So it seems, and indeed, you argue in the paper that both environmental groups and the Bureau of Land Management are expending enormous amounts of resources in litigation. And these resources could have been better used elsewhere, for instance, in enforcing these regulations for the BLM, having more people on the ground. So I wanted to ask you a little bit, how did the people that you interviewed, people from the BLM, but also people from environmental groups, talk to you about this? Are they possibly reaching the paradoxical conclusion that the cause of environmentalism might have been better served if this litigation was not taking place?

SIZEK: It is a very complex, and as I mentioned before, sort of an emotional issue for a lot of people. Some people think that they don’t have the constitution to deal with this kind of issue. And that’s also what I found among people at the Bureau of Land Management and environmental activists, both who worked on this case — and I think why Talia noticed that the only people engaged in this were what she called “crazy people and lawyers.”

Because this has been such a long standing litigation, and also because it has required such enormous amounts of energy on the part of the Bureau of Land management, environmental groups, and many others, everyone is very exhausted by this process.

One of the things that actually really inspired me to write this paper, and to write about this issue more broadly, was I was reading through this court case from 2009, and in one of the footnotes, they have this quote from a BLM employee in a previous iteration of this lawsuit where he is explaining what’s happening. And he, in this quote, he basically says, for the sake of my sanity, this is what I’m going to tell you. And I think it was a very telling moment, where everyone who has been engaged in this issue has been burned many times, or perhaps they have just found this issue to have been going on for so long and to be so intractable and to feel like there has been no progress made on it, that the only answer is to be exhausted or to abandon it altogether.

And I certainly found this in the case of when I was working with BLM employees, who would frequently try to sidestep the issue of WEMO as much as possible, in part, because they didn’t want to get caught saying the wrong thing. They knew how thorny it was and how complex it was. And so the best way to talk about it was to not talk about it, which is also the case for environmentalists.

So for the people who I interviewed for this article, no one agreed to go on record with their name. And one of the people, in fact, told me, you can’t go on record with my name, because if people at my organization found out what I told you and I said something wrong, then I would be in big trouble.

And I think this is very indicative of the broader issue of off-road vehicles, where there are a lot of people who feel — and I think on both sides, this is true — that there is no trust between the environmental community and then between off-road vehicles and between the government. So everyone feels like they’re in an antagonistic relationship, which doesn’t end up solving the problem.

FOURCADE: Yes, I mean, that’s pretty clear that nobody is satisfied. And I guess the only people who are still continuing to do pretty much whatever they want are the people who are sort of riding these motorbikes. I mean, it seems like that’s the story. That’s the big story underneath your article. Is that a fair assessment?

SIZEK: Yeah, I think that one of the things that’s really interesting about this problem is that, to a certain extent, even though everyone is pretty antagonistic toward each other, I think there are things that the three main groups — that being the government, environmental groups, and organized off-road vehicle coalitions — can agree on, they actually can agree on a fair bit. But the people who are not part of this agreement are folks who are not affiliated with these groups, and also people who maybe are affiliated with the groups but don’t feel bound by the obligations of taking care of the environment or treading lightly or following the rules.

And this means both that you have this automatic scapegoat, where everything can be blamed on the bad apples that are rotting out the rest of the barrel, but also that the bad apple problem, I think, is relatively real and having real impacts on the desert, as well. So it’s both a way to excuse blame or to set it aside at the same time that like, yes, there are actually people who are cutting down fences and deciding to trespass. And that’s on them.

Ultimately, because the Bureau of Land Management doesn’t have a lot of funds, the enforcement is extremely low in a lot of these areas. And a lot of people know that they can get away with things.

So in the early stages of this project, one of the people who I interviewed was Rick Sieman, who recently died, who was a famous off-road and, more specifically, motorcycle advocate in the California desert. He actually might not like being called an “advocate” because I think he would rather prefer being called an activist.

And one of the things that he did, and he told me about rather extensively, though he thought some of the details were perhaps not suitable for my young female ears, were about instances when he would cut down fences in the desert and go riding where he wanted, or when he rode with the “Phantom Duck of the Desert,” which was this man, Louis McKey, who organized a so-called “unorganized ride” to protest the closure of a famous cross-country race course that went from Barstow to Vegas.

And people like Rick were extremely involved in protesting and creating a movement of people who are willing to break the rules and ultimately got away with it. So in the late 1970s, Rick and Louis, as the Phantom Duck of the Desert, were both prosecuted by the US government for planning and staging this illegal protest ride. But ultimately, the judge, at the end of the decision, said, well, we are not going to actually ruin your lives by making you subject to these rules. It seems like the judge basically said that he didn’t want to ruin Louis’s or Rick’s lives by making them subject to the law, which I think is extremely indicative of how a lot of these people were treated at this time, which it was just a slap on the wrist for doing the wrong thing.

And this actually — the result of this case, in part — made people like Rick and people like Louis, the Phantom Duck of the Desert, into these heroes and these folk heroes of the late 1970s during this more conservative backlash to a lot of the environmental decade.

FOURCADE: So what is the effect of all of this in the long run? We’ve talked a lot about the people. We’ve talked about the people at the BLM. We’ve talked about the environmentalists. You just talked about the off-road vehicle coalition members. But we haven’t talked really about the desert itself. So what happened to the desert during that time? And can you talk a little bit about the ecological impact that this proliferation of off-road trails is having on these ecosystems?

SIZEK: So one of the biggest challenges of this is that, at the very beginning, when all of this was starting, is no one really knew what the impacts of off-road vehicles were on the California desert. And a lot of the earliest research, which I am right now working on another paper that is about the history of ecological research of the impacts of off-road vehicles, one of the things that they found is that there are tons of erosion problems. But they ultimately were looking at all of these issues once there had already been widespread use. So it was more, instead of having before and after snapshots, they were really comparing unused areas to used areas.

And we know about the impacts of off-road vehicles on the California desert and elsewhere really came out of this crucible of research in the 1970s, which, in many ways, was spearheaded by this soil scientist, Howard Wilshire, of the US Geological Service, who wanted to try to figure out, what are the impacts that we’re having on this land? What are these anthropogenic uses — anthropogenic recreational uses — having on the California desert?

The other challenge of this later having the research happen after the fact is that, by the time this research is happening and by the time that researchers are realizing that the impacts are long-lasting and perhaps irreversible in many areas, that it’s already too late. There’s already been a lot of use. And when people are trying to solve this problem, it’s maybe not a problem that can be solved anymore because of the continuing proliferation of use in the California desert and elsewhere.

FOURCADE: So let me try to draw out the big payoff of this research or payoffs of this research. In fact, I see a little bit of James Scott in your work. I think your work speaks to the contradictions of the high modernist state, which must try to frame reality from above in ways that can never contain life on the ground, except that in your case, you flipped Scott’s logic. In some way, you wish high modernism would succeed, right? So what do you think of that? Is that one way we can understand your work?

SIZEK: I think you’re exactly right in pointing toward James Scott and his work on the high modernist state, because one of the biggest challenges overall in the California desert, and I found this a lot in my research on the checkerboard as well, is that there’s basically a lot of imposed rules from the top that don’t really match what’s happening on the ground at all.

And in this case, I think that everyone would agree that there would be many problems solved if the state had done its job in 1980. If they had made this map in 1980, then I think there would be significantly less conflict over this issue because they would have something to go back to. But the lack of this does both point to the limits of the state as well as to what I think is the broader issue here, which is the limits of administrative law as a way of deciding environmental issues.

And in my opinion, I think that administrative law is actually becoming one of the most important parts of regulating the relationship between the courts, Congress, and the executive branch, which would include executive agencies like the Bureau of Land Management. So to quickly go back to, what is administrative law, and why should you care about it? Administrative law is a set of rules through which groups like the Center for Biological Diversity can make these cases to the government that they have been harmed in this plan-making process. And then they can say, you need to go back to the plan. You need to follow these steps all over again, one by one.

And administrative law is basically the set of rules by which— administrative law is the set of rules by which executive agencies make these plans. So there are a number of steps. And then each agency has to follow these step by step. In these court cases, environmentalists will say that agencies chose to ignore some important or critical piece of evidence. Environmentalists also might say that they didn’t follow their rules, which is, in this case, what happened. They didn’t follow the rule that they were supposed to base their current numbers off of these past numbers.

And this administrative law strategy has really been quite central to a lot of environmental litigation in the United States, obviously, since Sierra Club versus Morton, which was decided in 1972, and was really considered the beginning of environmental law at the federal level.

Today, however, environmental law is actually— and administrative law is actually taking an opposite tack. So instead of being about increasing the power of federal agencies, which arguably, this is about doing, the environmentalists want the BLM to be more active. They want them to do more things in the desert. They want them to prevent more people from going off road.

Administrative law in the environmental context today is actually moving in a quite different direction, which many find to be equally disturbing. So one of the more recent cases of this has been in the West Virginia versus EPA case, which was decided in 2022 by the Supreme Court, which was about this thing called the Major Questions Doctrine. More or less, the Major Questions Doctrine is a question about what agencies are allowed to decide.

Are agencies allowed to make little tiny rules? Or can they make big rules? And if they can make big rules, at which point is a rule too large that it needs to be decided by Congress, rather than by the agency? You can quickly see how this becomes a balance of power problem where Congress can make some decisions, agencies can make some decisions, and then the court is deciding between these two, who has the authority to make which decisions?

In this West Virginia versus EPA case, what happened was that the courts decided that the EPA had overstepped its boundaries. It was trying to do too many things without direction from Congress. Essentially, they were saying EPA, do less. And in contrast, environmentalists have always been trying to say, in these court cases, EPA, do more.

This represents sort of a broader turn in the Supreme Court towards a more conservative bent. And it also points to the way that Congress, by arguably not doing its job — many people have said that this current session of Congress is the least productive session of Congress in history — that they are leaving a lot of things open.

And then this means that the other two groups, branches of government, the courts and executive agencies, are taking on a lot of these responsibilities that Congress previously had. But if the conservative strategy is to basically get rid of the administrative state and to get rid of administrative responsibilities, then one of the best ways to do this is, in the courts, to say that they don’t have the authority to do anything.

So I think this is part of a sort of broader conversation about the role of administrative law and environmental law in thinking about our current issues and how we decide to solve environmental problems at the federal level.

FOURCADE: That is, I think, an extremely powerful finding, the notion that judicial review becomes the way by which the regulatory state is undermined in this country. So in some way, your finding speaks to the much broader set of issues.

You’re looking at this very small case in the California desert. It’s, in some ways, a historical case. But you’re showing how it contains within itself the germs of what is actually to come and what we are seeing today being on full display with the cases that are being decided by the Supreme Court in a direction that completely tends to undermine not only environmental regulation, but regulation in many other— potential regulation by many other public agencies.

So what do you think environmentalists should do? Do you think there are better remedies out there, are there other ways in which environmental regulation or environmental— pushing forward the cause of environmentalism, are there any better ways in which it could be achieved?

SIZEK: Yeah, so this is a great question, in part, because it is one that is really challenging for me. And one of the big challenges for me in writing this paper was really thinking about how a lot of this is quibbling about strategy. It’s a question of, is this the best strategy? Is this the best way that environmentalists can be using their limited time and resources? And should we be spending so much time basically debating the miles of trails that are put in this BLM plan? Or are there more useful strategies and means to go about approaching this problem?

In terms of thinking about this turn from litigation and basically how environmentalists suing the government used to be a way to get the government to do more, but now, it seems like increasingly, attempts to sue the government are actually about getting the government to do less or result in the government doing less and abdicating a lot of authority, I think this is obviously a broader problem that environmentalists and I, certainly, cannot change alone.

It also — I think there are a couple of paths forward that can help us think about this issue a little more. One of them, I think, is about enforcing and actually the role that enforcement has for the Bureau of Land Management as a chronically understaffed agency. What would happen if the BLM actually had power to do more enforcement activity, which is something that they have been asking for since the 1960s? And although they have the authority to do that, they’re often spread really thin on the ground.

I know that I was — in talking with a lot of BLM’s employees, one of the things they would frequently tell me is how many acres they were responsible for in their position. And they would often phrase this in millions of acres. So for example, one archaeologist who I spoke with said, well, I’m in charge of 5 million acres. And that’s about the size of Massachusetts. So it’s a pretty large area to be responsible for.

So one direction I think is actually pursuing enforcement. And I think another direction to think about is to actually move back to some of the older models that we have already tested out and, in some cases, have failed for managing off-road vehicle management. So this would be strategies like returning to empowering some of these local boards, which emerged out of grazing committees in the 1960s into multiple use committees, where you are actually bringing everyone together in hopefully a less antagonistic setting so that they can work together toward solving these issues.

And ultimately, it seems to me like the current solution to these problems is not going to be a federal solution, which is what I think a lot of people have used for many years as they’ve just turned to the federal government to ask them to do things. It seems like this might be a moment in which more local action could be useful until perhaps the tides turn again.

FOURCADE: So now taking this demand for alternative perspectives back to the case that preoccupies you in this paper, have you thought about the possibility that your article might be used in subsequent litigation to show precisely that the BLM is being asked to complete an impossible task, to show that to a judge and try to find some other way of adjudicating the problems of off-road vehicles?

SIZEK: One thing that is actually quite helpful for me on this particular issue is, as this case has progressed, one of the things that BLM has been told is basically that the judges understand that they are under significant duress and that the thing that they have been asked to do is more or less impossible. And therefore, the judge has actually allowed them to eliminate the baseline as a justification. And the baseline is no longer going to be relevant moving forward. However, they do have to justify how whatever they have selected is good.

The BLM is not entirely off the hook, though. Even though the judge has said that the baseline doesn’t need to be used in the future, they still have to justify any movement that they have made from this baseline number, which is rather small, toward any new number that they might present.

One of the challenges, of course, for the BLM is that the number of trails and the miles of trails have increased in every survey that they’ve done. So back in the 1980s, they were really thinking it was closer to 5,000 or 8,000. And then by the time you get to today, the number is over 10,000 miles of trails.

And one of the challenges that they’re going to have is deciding which trails they’re going to keep that exist in the world and which ones they are not going to keep. On the other hand, I think there could be a chance that this would be used in any subsequent litigation. At the same time, many of the people involved are actually quite aware of this problem. And this is in many ways the problem at the center of the case.

Everyone acknowledges this as a problem. So one thing I think that we frequently find in writing our academic articles is that the things that we are writing about and that we find interesting are things that people who we work with in the field often find to be part of an ordinary part of their life, or something that is just a fact of life that, for whatever reason, is interesting to the weird academic who sees them out there.

FOURCADE: All right, Julia, so thank you so much. Before we part, do you want to tell us what you’re working on now? I know that you keep returning to the desert. Is your current research agenda still located there?

SIZEK: Yes, so currently, I’ve been working on a couple of projects that are related very much to this WEMO project. One of the things that I’ve been working on is the history of off-road vehicle management and looking at the earliest years of the Bureau of Land Management’s response to off-road vehicles, primarily motorcycles, between the years of 1968 and 1972, a very specific time, and of course, before the Bureau of Land Management has any official mandate from the federal government, which is part of the reason why it’s interesting.

I’ve also been looking at a couple of other early off-road vehicle issues that are not quite as far along in the research pipeline. One of them is the history of environmental litigation regarding dirt bikes and the role of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and other groups like the Environmental Defense Fund in approaching recreational issues, in addition to the more traditional part of what they would look at, which would be things like mining or grazing or extraction.

And finally, I’ve also been looking at the history of the science of off-road vehicles, basically trying to understand this moment in the 1970s when a lot of federal agencies are starting to hire their first herpetologists or their first non-game specialists, and when these agencies are trying to understand the entire ecology of the areas that they’re working with, rather than only looking at the important species, whether that’s bighorn sheep or some other game animal. And so I’ve been investigating how all of these intersect with dirt bikes.

FOURCADE: Wonderful, so you have plenty of exciting research in the works still. So thank you so much for talking to me. Thank you also for everything you are doing for Matrix and for the social sciences at Berkeley.

SIZEK: Well, thank you so much for having me. It’s been a pleasure.

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WOMAN’S VOICE: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

New Directions

New Directions in the Study of Fringe Politics

Fringe politics today is highly diverse and dynamic, reflecting the rapid social, technological, and economic changes of the 21st century. While the term “fringe” suggests ideas or movements outside the political mainstream, many fringe ideologies have increasingly influenced, or even reshaped, national and global political landscapes.

Recorded on February 4, 2025, this panel brought together a group of UC Berkeley graduate students from the fields of geography, anthropology, and sociology for a discussion on politics on the fringe through the lens of such topics as QAnon, religious studies, and California secessionism.

The panel featured Josefina Valdes Lanas, PhD candidate in Anthropology at UC Berkeley; Alexis Wood, PhD student in Geography at UC Berkeley; and Peter Forberg, PhD student in Sociology at UC Berkeley. Paul Pierson, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, moderated.

The event was co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Department of Geography, the Department of Sociology, the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative (BESI), and the Berkeley Center for Right-Wing Studies.

Podcast and Transcript

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WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

CORI HAYDEN: Welcome, everyone. It’s great to see you on this rainy Thursday on a very exciting week on all matters related to our panel. My name is Cori Hayden. I am the interim director of Social Science Matrix, and really delighted to welcome you to this extremely timely panel. The panel is about fringe politics, which seems to be more and more a misnomer.

Fringe politics are no longer confined to the periphery, as we have seen. And this is the case from the rise of QAnon to debates over California secessionism, Catholic theologies that offer a window into the anxieties and aspirations of this very rapidly changing world that we are in.

So today we have gathered an extraordinary panel of UC Berkeley graduate students, our pride and joy on this campus. These are students from anthropology, geography, and sociology to explore the dynamic forces that are driving fringe politics today. Now, this event is part of our new directions series, which features the cutting edge research of Berkeley PhD students.

Today’s panel is co-sponsored by the UC Berkeley Departments of Geography, Political Science, and Sociology, the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, and the Center for Right-Wing Studies. Now, before I turn it over to our moderator and the panelists, I do want to just give you a quick preview on some events that are coming up.

We have a full slate of really exciting events coming up at the Matrix in the next, well, this whole semester. Next week, a fantastic Author Meets Critic event on the book, Society Despite the State– reimagining geographies of order, a couple of matrix on point events three in a row on wildfires in LA, virtual realities, digital space, and mainstreaming psychedelics, and then some additional Author Meets Critics events, as you can see here.

So I do hope you will continue to join us for what looks to be an action packed semester at the matrix. Let me now introduce our moderator, Paul Pierson. Professor Pierson is the John Gross Distinguished Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and the Director of the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative, also known to many of you as BESI.

He has written extensively on American politics, including his latest book, Let Them Eat Tweets– How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality, which examines how plutocrats and right-wing populists have shaped a party that undermines democracy. Without further ado, let me turn this panel over to Paul. And thanks very much. Looking forward to this.

PAUL PIERSON: Thanks a lot. Like you said, it’s very timely, this panel. I’ve been studying the political right for over 20 years, and watched as what started out as a fringy operation gradually marched its way into greater and greater control of the Republican Party. And there I’m thinking about the Koch brothers network and folks like that. And then the last few years, we’ve watched a new, even fringier set of actors, or what we’re seeing is even further on the fringe at the outset, pretty rapidly displace those folks.

And now they’re not only have displaced those folks, they’re displacing the people who work in USAID and the Office of Personnel Management. And they’ve moved in with their cots and everything. So I think the basic message is what starts on the fringe doesn’t necessarily stay on the fringe. So it’s very timely to be having this conversation. And it’s a very Social Science Matrix Event, I think, to have people from three different departments moderated by somebody from a fourth department.

And as you were saying, to have to really be celebrating our graduate students. So without any further from me, we’ll have presentations first by Josefina Valdes Lanas from the Anthropology Department, and then Alexis Wood from the Geography Department, and then Peter Forberg from the Sociology Department. And they’ll each talk for 12 or 15 minutes, and then we’ll open it up for discussion, open it up for questions. So, Josefina, the floor is yours.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: OK, thank you, Paul. Can you hear me? Yeah. Thank you, Cori, to the organizers and, well, everyone who’s here, despite the rain. I want to show you a piece of my dissertation that is titled The Passion of the Exception– Ordinary Sacrifices and the Flexibility of Authoritarianism, in which I examine Opus Dei practices in neoliberal Chile.

Opus Dei is a movement, a congregation of the Catholic Church, a conservative branch of the Catholic Church. And all over the world, but in Chile in particular, they congregate a very conservative, traditional, wealthy elite. Yes. And my project so far is looking like what I’m calling a phenomenology of authority. I’m looking at the sacrificial imagination of these practitioners, my interlocutors.

The sacrificial imagination means basically to look at their practices, internal and invisible practices in which they frame their very ordinary actions, most times, trivial actions as a sacrifice, and actually, as a liturgical sacrifice. And in these practices, I’m seeing like a very profound encounter between neoliberal values and theology.

And I address that encounter happens very concretely in the notions that I encounter in the field of efficacious action or efficacy that are both present in the theology of the liturgical action and, of course, in neoliberalism. And in this combination, my argument is that they are actually because they have too much power, power is expanding on its own. So they are actually transforming the theopolitical substance of their authority.

And yes. And a few minutes before, this was my last slide. But I move it here just because I want to be able to show you– my main objective is to show you that through these practices, Opus Dei members are actually inhabiting an ethics, a differentiated ethics, an ethics that is different and that implies different temporal and therefore political horizons.

OK, and before starting, a very few words on why the neoliberal, even though I know it’s like a very unfashionable term these days, but I don’t want to– I’ll be happy to speak more about this if you’re interested. But I want to delve into the theology. But why neoliberalism? Just because I’m like, again, examining the conceptual congruence between economics and theology and its actual social effects.

Of course, because of the very exceptional history of neoliberalism in Chile, we have to remember a history of foreign intervention in which the US State Department crafted this Chile project and a project that could only be implemented through the means of a civic military dictatorship.

And it’s in this civic component of the dictatorship that allowed for it to last 17 years, that Opus Dei members are introduced both as supporters of the regime and as implementers of the neoliberal system, and also because Opus Dei in general, since its beginning in Spain, its project of aiming for sanctity, from perfection, from your own state could be certainly read as an anti-communist project.

OK, so we all know that the neoliberal model ended up producing very clear inequality even in Chile. And despite the fact that Milton Friedman called it the Chilean miracle, the inequality until it’s still ongoing. And I have figures, if you’re interested. But I wanted to say that it’s important neoliberalism because as a concept, and as an ideology was very prominent in the social revolts of 2019. And it’s also important because there was lots of public debate around neoliberalism in its specific relation with Opus Dei.

OK, so a few years forward, we are now enduring also in Chile, a conservative backlash after the social revolts and its failure into achieving structural transformation. This man was recently, well, not so recently, but was selected in the second project of the constitution.

And he is an honorary member of Opus Dei. That means he lives in chastity, lives in communal life, gives all of his salary to the congregation. OK, so this also meant that the public opinion had to learn what it means to follow the form of life of Opus Dei.

Now, let me radically shift gears and go into the more satirical parts that are my thing, the theology. I’m calling this section the tyranny of immanence, liturgical authority, or the ethics of action of Opus Dei member. This is a photo from the field that I love because it’s very imminent and has a lot of things, but I also really like that it has a bottle of mayonnaise, and we Chileans really love mayonnaise. We put it into everything. So it’s very characteristic.

So the life plan are the norms that Opus Dei people follow, and they are a lot of norms– very concrete, tangible norms, such as going to mass every day, corporal mortification, fasting, but also very abstract ones such as being joyful, smiling. But it’s overall it’s a lot. So I was very surprised in the first phase of my fieldwork. But when at the beginning, I met a senior member and she said, I am a member of Opus Dei because it is extremely easy.

They give you complete freedom. Nobody cares if you do this or that. OK, so this was in sharp contrast with what I knew from Opus Dei discipline and what is known from the outside. A very complete account of the influence of Opus Dei in Chile starts with the testimony of a former member who had left by saying it was simply too difficult for me. I couldn’t comply with all that was required.

OK, so just keep in mind this tension between too easy from the inside and too difficult from the outside to then go back to the ethics. OK, so I learned soon, during my two years of ethnographic fieldwork, that the life plan has a very flexible structure that is very important. People were very recurrent in repeating the metaphor that the founder, Escrivá de Balaguer, who is a saint of the church, used to say about the life plan having to fit like a glove into your own particular life, into your very different secular activities.

So how this flexible structure can be combined with a total regimentation of life, it is by finding the divine in the ordinary actions of your life. So the ever shifting focus of the sacred, that is moving all around, and also the leniency towards norms and the flexibility towards norms can be found in this quote by a young woman, mother of three.

She says, “When there are simply no more hours left in the day, and I can’t attend to daily mass, I don’t feel bad. I transform bath time with my kids into a liturgy. In those cases, bathing my children becomes my liturgy.” So OK, this quote could be read as an excuse, as a desire of being mindfulness, mindful, sorry, and present with your children. But these explanations wouldn’t illuminate what is actually happening, the practice that this woman is performing in her imagination.

She is referring to making an offering, which is not actually a rare practice in the Catholic Church. An offering is an event of the imagination, a practice of framing an action in alignment with the passion of Christ. It has a ritual effect, pleasing God or alleviating his pains. And any action can be aligned with the cross. A very common example that I encountered often was, for example, skipping dessert, or skipping a portion of your dessert that was like all over.

And everything can be aligned as a passion because the passion we shouldn’t imagine just the action of death of Christ in the cross, but as a whole complex apparatus of a narrative, a theological apparatus, normative, affective, dramaturgical, participatory that inhabits the imagination of my interlocutors.

And I really like the example of bathing children because of its corporeal intensity. I really think it illuminates the passion aspect because, well, everyone who has ever done this will know that cleaning up a toddler is both very exhausting. You have this woman is on her knees. It’s draining physically, emotionally, but it’s also so joyful and delicious. It’s a clean baby.

And so I want to invoke a choreography of also sensations, bubbles, smells, caresses that really bring the passion effect here. So what is particular of apostate? My argument is that when this woman says, this is my liturgy, she’s not using a metaphor, even if we take the metaphor very seriously.

She actually is invoking the theological framework of the liturgy. She’s framing her actions into the liturgical logic given by theology, which means that she assesses her actions within this framework. Because of this, when my interlocutors would offer daily actions, they never really doubted their efficacy. They never had doubts on their intentions, the earnestness of it, should I be offering something that is more relevant, more big, more important? No.

Ritual efficacy appeared to be completely secured, yes, completely guaranteed by a differentiated logic. So this meant that it was removed from features of interior features. And of course, this has to be a transformative device of subjectivity because if your quotidian actions are continuously embedded in this logic of complete ritual efficacy, this comes with power. But also it emerges from power. So keep that in mind.

So what is the differentiated logic that I’m referring to? I’m referring to the liturgical praxis that Giorgio Agamben explained. And this is basically a system that the church had to create to secure the continuity of its mystery, the death of Christ being repeated in the mass. So it’s this is very like cryptic, but bear with me. You need to have a mystery, that is, the passion, the liturgy, the sacrifice being if it’s what they believe it is.

The mystery is administered by a minister by virtue of a ministerium. This means that the mystery coincides with the minister through a ministerium. This means that the priest, when the priest is performing the Eucharist, he also partakes of the mystery.

And my argument, through examining their practices and watching the authority with which they perform these sacrifices, is that my informants place themselves in this analogical chain. And they, in fact, would participate of this paradoxical subjectivity, that is, the paradoxical subjectivity of the priest in which what you do, your action coincides with your being. So coming back, they are inhabiting an ethics of action that was created for a sacrament, and they are taking into their everyday lives.

And I made something to close with neoliberalism, but it’s not necessarily about efficacy. And yeah, we can talk about that later, but it’s related to the efficacy of the neoliberal with the efficacy of the theological. Sorry. OK, thank you. And my email, if you were to have any questions or suggestions, I love to talk about this. So please write to me. Thank you so much.

PAUL PIERSON: Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

ALEXIS WOOD: Hi. My name is Alexis Wood. I’m from the Department of Geography and the Berkeley Center of New Media. I work out of studio geo, an experimental cartography studio in the Geography Department. And thank you so much for the invitation to come speak today. And thank you so much for Peter for suggesting us all get together because it’s the right-wing studies thing. It’s not a big thing on campus, unsurprisingly.

So before we start off, I want to address this question right off the bat because I teach intro to geography, and this is the first question we try to address immediately, or else our work doesn’t really make too much sense or it’s confusing. So I wanted to give you three principles. Space– it is not just a surface where events take place. It’s a multiplicity of flows that are produced and reproduced by power relations.

And within this, there are power geometries imbued in space that produce and reproduce that space, influencing what sort of stories get told. And three, the stories, the stories that we choose to tell influence the production of power and space. If we find new ways to tell stories, we change the way power and space are produced. And this in turn changes what stories can be told. That sounds very roundabout, and it’s because it is.

Our favorite geography quote is from Ruth Wilson Gilmore. A student questioned why she would get a PhD in geography. I mean, like all of our parents do constantly. And she’s like, well, why would you study where Nebraska is? She’s like, I’m not studying where Nebraska is. I’m studying why Nebraska is. And if that didn’t confuse everybody so much more in my household.

Well, I study particularly the state secessionist movements and how digital space in a rapidly changing physical space come together to produce and reproduce what would be considered a fringe politic, a fringe geography, if you will. Today I’m going to focus on the geographies of Northern California in particular. And now, keeping in mind our three principles of geography, I want to bring you back to 2021, I’m so sorry, to an ultimately unsuccessful California Governor Gavin Newsom’s recall election.

When the petition was handed in and the signatures counted, there was a general shock that emerged in the news media that the petition number had actually been achieved. Even though that number is quite low in comparison to the general population of the state, this was only the second time in the state’s history that had been achieved. So in this sort of flurry, various maps flew around the internet trying to explain why this petition, out of the 100 that had circulated previously, was successful.

There were maps overlaying signature data with 2016 election data, population density, educational attainment, COVID 19 cases, trying to understand what it was about these counties that led to a successful petition. But here’s the thing about maps. They are very, very particular types of abstractions. They are very particular arguments which demonstrate a thing’s most quantifiable aspects. They are inherently limited by the types of data available. And then in data itself is limited by the world’s quantifiability because not everything is or should be quantified.

So if you make a map using that signature data provided by the Secretary of State, you will end up with something that looks similar to on the left. This is actually, the first map I ever made, and I keep it because it’s close to my heart. But because I lived in the far North of California, I know that these counties fall in the boundaries of the State of Jefferson, a 150-year-old state secessionist movement.

I also knew that the act of organization of the State of Jefferson had been aggressively leading that particular recall campaign in-person and on Facebook since 2019. But again, maps are limited by data. And what data is an imaginary state boundary to a state GIS office. And as some of my U reps in the room can attest to, they are not well organized either.

I argue that these boundaries, even though they are imagined, are exceptionally important in understanding deep and long standing socioeconomic and political fractures if one wants to use that word in the United States. And while Northern California and California more generally has always had a tendency towards breaking apart, the movement that we’re seeing today is directly descended from a movement that began in 1940, when Northern California and Southern Oregon tried to secede from their respective states.

In this image, supporters shut down Highway 99 every other Tuesday to hand out this proclamation of independence I’ve copied on the slide. At this point, the movement had elected a governor and had a capital city, Yreka. But this movement would be put on hold with the event of Pearl Harbor about a month later.

Today, the movement has remained quite consistent in their messaging. Their home is simultaneously an extraction site for the government, while suffering from a lack of investment in economy and infrastructure. These frustrations are further exacerbated by the idea that the interest of rural regions lack fair representation in the respective state governments and in the federal governments.

The result is an rural or rural urban divide, not being not only a political division, a geographical division, but an untranslatability between the two spaces. This was one of my favorite copypastas from that minute just because of that first sentence where it says, while I live in the same state as you, I feel a world away. And that’s geographical, folks.

So with this, I ask that we look at these regions as more than official boundaries delineated by the map, more than demographics, but rather as affective states, where power geometries present between rural and urban divide have produced and reproduced a space where feelings that accompany state secessionism proliferate.

So just to bring us back to geography, think of space in this context as layers of paint where actions, events, the general trajectory of an age, as Raymond Williams would say, lays down texture for the next layer that is being splattered plopped on the page. Space is constantly being reproduced, retextured, but what came before it is still there, in a way, is being constantly produced and reproduced.

It’s not about where the state of Jefferson, but why the State of Jefferson? With this question in mind, I’ve been hosting a project documenting the imagined states of the US alongside archival work to understand where, yes, sure, it is still a map, but importantly, why these state secessionist movements exist, what develops and sustains these spaces, and what do they look like? All boundaries are constructed, but it’s which one of these constructions we choose to tell stories about that matter in the creation of space, particularly, and in the continuation or disruption of power.

So back to maps. If we choose to only tell the stories that we’ve heard again and again, what are we aiming to understand, actually? Look at this map. It’s telling me, telling us something we all know. I ask you to propose questions that center around why and to be open to different stories. So why the State of Jefferson? Why is it that both a white supremacy group and a gay liberation movement tried to overtake Alpine County in the 1970s to institute a new community? Why the most rural County in California?

There’s something about that geography in particular. Why are stories about white settlers the loudest stories? Where are the agencies of diverse identities in the regions that we paint as white? Yes, colonialism and white supremacy. But there is more than just these structures which have shaped and continue to shape space. What are the geographies of Northern California, which have continued as an American frontier, where there is intense precarity, but also amazing possibility? California has always been the frontier, but Northern California has always been on the fringe.

I find it hard to believe that we can look at these images and not understand in some capacity why the state of Jefferson? And this that we can look at these images and not understand the ongoingness of space, the reproduction of space, which has been hijacked by colonialism, by neoliberalism, by capitalism to produce precarity and insecurity.

This image was posted on January 7, 2021. Insurrection seems outrageous. But when a region has required a life of insecurity, where do you put that anger and that grief? This is not solely a problem of politics, but one of economic insecurity and economic system which demands exploitation. If we’re told a different story about the State of Jefferson, what would it tell us about the rural urban divide in the US? If we took a step back and shifted to a conversation about class, about wealth and poverty, about race and settler colonialism, what could we address?

Thanks to my advisor, Clancy Wilmott, and my colleagues of the Department of Geography have so far endured almost three years of my rage. And thank you to the Berkeley Center of New Media, as well as the NSF, for as long as it exists for my funding. All right, thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

PETER FORBERG: All right, I’m going to stay sitting here, if that’s OK with everyone, because I do not have slides to present. At some point, I’ll ask you to imagine a slide, but we’ll get there. So first, thank you to the Social Science Matrix, to Cori and Ambrosia for organizing this, and to Paul for moderating and for my co-panelists for presenting their work up here.

So I’m going to go through three stages. I’m going to start in the very concrete and talk about some empirical work. And then I’m going to move into higher and higher levels of abstraction. At some point it may seem like I am speaking in tongues, but I promise I will then come back down and get real again.

So let’s start with the concrete. So my previous work has been on the conspiracy theory QAnon. I’ll do a very brief explainer, which is simply that QAnon was a conspiracy theory that began on Fortune. You might have heard of it. It is a well-known alt-right message board. It essentially alleged during Trump’s first presidency that there was a secret plot that was working to overthrow the “Deep state,” which was comprised of celebrities and bankers and intellectuals who actually run the United States government.

So QAnon alleged that there was an insider within the Trump administration, who was telling them all this information about how soon Hillary Clinton would be arrested, the United States would be liberated by perhaps the National Guard. Maybe it was the COVID vaccine was actually going to eliminate all the bad people.

The conspiracy theory came in many different flavors and forms, but ultimately, it was a conspiracy theory about a group of people, QAnon, who had secret access to information that would help them revolt against an evil, authoritarian United States government that we didn’t even know about because it lurked so far beneath the surface. It was not the people we voted for.

So I want to understand how people joined this movement. How did people come to believe the political reality of QAnon that I have just described to you. And I did this by conducting interviews, doing ethnographic work with QAnon followers, and doing some computational analysis of their Twitter bios and tweets. Some of the general takeaways is that QAnon acted as a place for emotional investment in an identity, as a response to particular political grievances.

What do I mean by that? Well, if I had a slide, it would be one of my many, many attempts to visualize QAnon Twitter bios. These are all incredibly difficult to visualize. Their language, language is messy, and I’ve tried a million strategies. I’m finally getting close to one, and I wish I had it prepared for today.

But you would see a big bubble that says QAnon, and then you’d see a million different lines heading out in different directions, going to disabled veteran or animal lover or Save the Children or anti-pedophilia, or sometimes gay liberation, Brazilian liberation. Portuguese liberation, QAnon Japan. It’s a raft of identities, all of which center around this thing called QAnon, which I explained to you. I told you what it was, but that’s really a misnomer.

I like to think of QAnon as a floating signifier. What I mean by that is that there is no thing that is QAnon. Qanon doesn’t represent any one ideology, any one belief. Instead, it’s a placeholder for a lot of different beliefs, a lot of different etiologies. It’s where people who were abused in the foster care system, or people who served in Vietnam, can project their anxieties about the current state of the United States and claim that they have agency and control over what’s going to happen because they have this secret knowledge about how they’re going to overthrow the US government.

So what does QAnon represent? What does it mean? It’s an identity. It’s an identity that people invest in because it makes them feel good, and it allows them to project political possibilities. It allows them to build a community. It allows a lot of people to make a lot of money by selling merch, by hosting podcasts, by making crypto coins. So there’s other reasons for investing in QAnon beyond the emotional, but the financial investment.

And it’s a way of converting apathy, of taking a lot of people, such as some of my interview subjects who said, I’d given up on politics. I hadn’t voted in years, and now here I am. And this is why QAnon resonated not just among Republicans, which was by far its largest demographic, but also among independents. What I really want to say QAnon allows, though, is a form of identity, which necessarily entails a vision of social reality. A vision of political reality is a counter epistemic discourse.

You learned that the Constitution worked from Schoolhouse Rock of writing a bill, and it goes and it’s contested and it’s made into a law. That’s not how the government works. There’s someone else pulling the strings who’s actually controlling the government. And this is what QAnon offers. It is a counter epistemic, a counter truth claim that gives people control over organizations that don’t really make sense to them, like Big Pharma or the government, or the finance industry, the banks, the hospitals.

So it held a theory of social reality. And with that it held a theory of political change. And this is why QAnon has been coined– it has been called participatory disinformation. Participatory disinformation, a term coined by Kate Starbird. It’s not disinformation coming from just the Russians broadcasting it into your brain. It is instead disinformation that you are actively creating with your friends. And QAnon would view it as a community of friends and a family working together to build this alternative truth.

And then they’ve built this alternative truth, and they stormed the capital. And they start running for boards of electors and school boards and house reps. And that’s where my research ended, right? Was right as QAnon was getting close to the sources of power. I left my undergraduate institution. I had to find a job. And I was left with this question, what happens when the dog catches the car?

What happens when these people who have an alternative vision of how the government works, are suddenly the people leading the government? I think we’re getting a good image of that right now. I think we’re getting a good image of what happens when the dog is driving the car if we look at what is going on in the United States.

And so what I’m interested in are two movements, not social movements, the way I’ve talked about QAnon, but two intellectual movements of where I think those of us studying fringe politics, those of us studying the right, should be looking. And the first one is I want us to think about these floating signifiers, things like QAnon, things like the anti-trans movement, things like the State of Jefferson, things like the new Christianity movement, whether that is the Opus Dei, whether that’s Evangelicalism, these identities that people have been able to latch onto, and invest their political ambitions in, and how they’ve become linked together.

Why are all of these people from disparate backgrounds attaching to something like QAnon? Why are there people from diverse political sects who have all come together to agree on this signifier of QAnon? And I think this has a lot to do with the way we talk about myths/disinformation. You might not have ever heard of myths/disinformation five, six years ago, but now it’s how we understand how everyone joins these political movements.

We think people must have had their brains hacked by YouTube. People must be so gullible as to believe in this misinformation. I like Kate Starbird’s version better. I like the idea that people are investing in this misinformation for a reason. They’re joining these movements because they believe in what’s going on, but also that there are media structures that are enabling them, such as social media, to create this kind of misinformation and that these media structures are really effective at grouping together disparate beliefs and creating new political contingencies that surprise us.

Some of the work on QAnon, I was surprised to see that a lot of people with left leaning critiques of Big Pharma or the mainstream media were suddenly like, I can deal with the White supremacists. They were able to use their position in digital space and media space to come together and create new political formations that we hadn’t seen before. And now those media elites, the people who have created these platforms, the people like Elon Musk, who has a wild political background, are now in the reins of government.

We’ve had more people from Fox News, from One America News in the Trump administration than we’ve ever seen someone from MSNBC or the Washington Post joining up in previous administrations or even Fox News in previous Republican administrations. What does it mean that these media elites, the people who have helped to construct signifiers like QAnon, are now part of this government coalition? So I want us to understand how these disparate groups come together.

The second movement that I want us to make, the second intellectual move I want us to make, is to understand what happens when the dog is driving the car. I think that is the big question. What happens when people like QAnon, who believe that the election was stolen, are suddenly in charge of boards of electors, and are trying to put their belief, which is often based on absolutely nothing. It’s completely fake. It’s completely fabricated. They’re trying to govern on the basis of an ideology that has no grounding in reality. What? These are the two kind of maneuvers that I’m very curious about studying.

So that was me getting more and more abstract. But now I want to bring it back down and talk about what would it look like to continue doing this kind of research, to start studying the political elites, to start studying the processes of the formation of something like QAnon? I will say the landscape has changed drastically. In the past two weeks, the landscape has changed.

I think we need to be very careful about how people who are studying the right-wing think about doing this kind of research. Is it possible that someone like me could just go out and interview a bunch of QAnons, again? Would I be able to do that? Would I be able to study State of Jefferson or white supremacists, or is this still possible, given the way that researchers have been exposed in recent weeks to more and more political threats? What does this mean for our disciplines, for our field studies, if researchers are increasingly being seen as the target by the administrative state.

So this is something I’ve been thinking a lot about. If anyone’s interested in this topic, I’m working on a paper on it with a professor in which we’re thinking about research because she’s a scholar of gender. She has a lot of students who come and say, I want to study the abortion providers who are defying Texas State law. I want to study the teachers who are still using pronouns when they shouldn’t. I want to study the children who are transitioning in states where it’s illegal.

And we say, why would you do that? Why would you open yourself up and open your research participants up to all of the dangers in this current moment? And so we need to think– and I’m not saying that kind of research can’t be done. I’m not saying it’s not important. I’m not saying there aren’t strategies for doing that. But I want to know, how are we working to make sure that researchers are safe and that we’re studying up, rather than just studying the people who are in danger?

How do we create research programs that are focused on studying the media elites, the administrative elites, the people who are taking away our funding, who are trying to shut down our schools, who are taking away course requirements in Florida. What does sociology, geography, anthropology, political science, anything do in this kind of research environment? And how do we do it ethically?

I think we also need to think about how– I’ve learned a lot about QAnon. I think I know quite a bit about how QAnon started and how it was formed. But in the midst of January 6, in the midst of the recent Trump election, I don’t know what to do about it. How do we also think about praxis? How do we think about taking our insights into these kinds of movements and using them to inform political organization counter movements that are addressing some of these concerns, that people in these movements have to try to undermine their power and authority within the US?

And my last note is when I first started studying QAnon, it felt surreal. I started studying QAnon before the COVID pandemic. At that time, it was still kind of a fringe thing on some message boards, and I was like, oh, this is just strange. It reminds me of some guys from high school I knew who would spend a lot of time on Fortune. It was odd that this thing was happening. I think a lot of political reality right now feels very surreal, and I think we should lean into that.

I think there is a tendency to just dismiss it, to call it misinformation, to call it disinformation, to call it fascism. And I it’s all of those things. But I think we should say, but then why is it here? Lean into that strangeness, try to understand why it feels strange to us and get inside of its head. And with that, I think this is a panel for scholars of the right-wing, scholars of fringe politics. And I guess my statement is, I think we’re all scholars of the right-wing and of fringe politics.

Now, I think if you’re studying medicine or finance or governance, if you’re studying politics, if you’re studying education, these forces are now determining, they are overdetermining, I think, the trajectory of a lot of our studies in the way that during the COVID 19 pandemic, everyone had to account for how COVID was changing, how we thought about our research. I think we all have to think about how the current political environment is changing, how we approach and think about our research.

And I think we’ve done ourselves a disservice by pretending in the past that we could study politics without addressing this– that you could study politics in the early 2000 without thinking about the Tea Party. You could study what was going on during COVID and the recent Trump election without thinking about QAnon or thinking about these kinds of movements. Yeah, so that’s my spiel. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

PAUL PIERSON: All right, so we can open it up for questions. I have to just– I can’t resist before doing that to say, Peter, that when you said the dog is now driving the car, I kept waiting for you to say the DOGE is now driving the car.

[LAUGHTER]

PETER FORBERG: I missed it. Dang it.

PAUL PIERSON: Any questions? Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a question for Peter. Oh, thanks. Really interesting presentation, all of you. And I guess this is a question for you, Peter, that I think ties into Josefina’s presentation, too. I’m curious how you think about and how you theorize the difference between– you said the elites that are sort of controlling the offices of government now, and they might be taking on the QAnon mythos without actually participating in the ritualistic practices that actually are understood in the same way that someone, a mother washing her child, is understanding that practice through the actual structure of a Christian understanding of the world. So I guess I’m wondering how you think about those two– the differentiation there.

PETER FORBERG: I could– yeah.

PAUL PIERSON: You can start.

PETER FORBERG: I’ll say, this is something I’ve been thinking about. I really like this question. I have this budding theory of things like Trump’s maneuvers around tariffs, or this whole DOGE, or whatever these kinds of political spectacles might be. I see them as being a way of– I mean, I think Paul’s book does a wonderful job of analyzing these kinds of forces of– I don’t want to say mystification, but there’s a reason why we talk about misinformation.

There’s a reason why we talk about there being a separation between what is going on in government and what is going on with the people on the ground. And I QAnon is a perfect example of this. In which people would say, oh, Trump is doing xyz thing. They would think he would use the right language. He would make symbolic gestures showing that he has taken up their beliefs, that he’s practicing their beliefs.

I think there’s a lot of people in the elite who are doing that, who know how to speak the language of the people who give them– supply them votes and supply them support, and then to do whatever they want behind the scenes. And I think that’s where studying power becomes really important. I’ll just quickly say, I think someone who had a really great understanding of this was Arlie Hochschild in her latest book, is talking about how there’s bifurcations of media and thus of understanding.

Such that Trump does something or xyz right wing figure does something, and the liberal media interprets it one way, and the right wing media interprets it another way. And then the people on the ground only see that slice of reality. And so we’re able to put together the logic that says, Trump didn’t actually get anything when he threatened Mexico with tariffs.

They did something that they already promised to do four years ago. But people aren’t seeing that half of the narrative. They’re seeing Trump threatened, and then he got a concession. And this kind of bifurcation of reality between what the elites know and what the people know allows them to fill that gap with the spectacle of the right language, of the right discourse. I hope that addresses what you were getting at.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: Hello. I guess I would just add that in my case, because of scale, I’m very interested in your point and in the interaction and how authority acts between different elites. But in the case of my research, because of scale and numbers, is very different because Chile is a country of 20 million people. I think California only is like 70 or 40.

So the traditional elite dominates– the elite that I’m describing dominates the media. Of course, I’m there are intellectual elites that don’t participate of Opus Dei, but it’s– I have it easy in that way, I think. But what I wanted to add is that studying the right wing always will confront you with your own elite status as we in an intellectual elite. And this day and age, I think it becomes more tense, the relation that we get with it.

A few weeks ago, I was chewing on some words that I heard because, of course, we are all in shock. But a very intellectual person was asking, how immigrants can vote for someone that, of course, we’ve heard this a million times, for someone that is like going to impede their rights. But that has the presumption that immigrants are just immigrants and not they’re people with a vast variety of beliefs and an ideology, some cross by history. And so yeah. And in that sense, you get the overlapping power structures of elites working right in that comment, I would say. Like, reducing a subject into just this legal status. I don’t know if– yeah, that’s what I think [? I have. ?]

PAUL PIERSON: Any questions.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi. Thank you so much for your presentations. So my question is about the relationship between neoliberalism and right wing populism, like in QAnon, or intermingled with QAnon. So I’ve argued in my research that neoliberal economic policies propagated by both major political parties severely impacted many regions of the US, and that both major political parties had populist rebellions in 2016, resulting in Bernie Sanders movement in 2016 and Donald Trump’s movement in 2016.

And that the Republicans were– had their populist rebellion win out while the Democrats suppressed their– largely suppressed their populist rebellion, which is– and I’ve argued that that’s part of why we’re here, where we are today. So what do you all think that that might mean in the future for partisan politics being the way to maybe combat the rise of QAnon or push back against it in any way?

PETER FORBERG: Anyone else want to talk about neoliberalism? I think it applies to all of us. But yeah. I mean, I think you’re positioning the rise of QAnon and the right wing populist politics as emerging from neoliberal practices, I think, is– largely resonates with everything that I’ve come to understand about the political trajectories of a lot of these figures, how they’ve been able to tap into this discourse.

In terms of partisan politics, I mean, I think what we’re witnessing right now is that there’s this huge bifurcation within the Republican Party in which you’re able to have a party that holds people both like Steve Bannon and Elon Musk and Stephen Miller and however many– like, people who represent different economic factions, different class factions– as possible are all subsumed into this party, and they’re able to do this mystification strategy in which they can pretend that there are populist politics going on. They can talk about prices at the grocery store.

And I think what we witnessed with the campaign of Kamala Harris is really no concessions to a kind of a populist vision in that sense. It was about homeowners and the people who aren’t homeowners are like, I don’t know what– does that do for me? And so I think when we think about partisan politics, I mean, my take on it right now is the Democrats are failing deeply to show that there is a partisan way to integrate these kind of populist policies into their program.

And that they remain committed to, at best, a reactionary program against what is currently going on. But their responses to the takeover of USAID or any of the Treasury, so on and so forth, does not really suggest that they’re building a positive program, that they’re articulating a positive program that can address these concerns. Yeah. So that’s, I guess, where I’m at. Yeah.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: In that sense, I would just add that neoliberalism is also, I would argue, an empty vessel signifier. Because when a party’s become under neoliberalism and they start making exceptions into integrating someone that, I don’t know, salted the capital and things like that, to accommodate– to have the flexibility to accommodate the exception is– well, from my department, famous anthropologist, Aihwa Ong– is not it’s not an exception of neoliberalism. It’s actually how it works. It has to work like that because it’s structurally inherently empty and it moves. So yeah, just I wanted to add that to your image that I think it’s great.

ALEXIS WOOD: Not explicitly related to my own research. But as somebody who grew up in the UK, which is only slightly less on fire than the US is on fire now, I think we’re seeing the Republican Party filling the vacuum for what would be a Labor Party. Because of increasing economic widening between classes, you see instability, you see a lot of desperation. I grew up with a– who is now a QAnon mother. And it was– a lot of it is charged by this, there is so much instability in my own life because there is nobody actually fighting for the working class, and now you just have two parties of elites bickering at each other. And who is there, really, except the Republican Party, which is now this face of instability and possible change, or you just have more of the same.

CORI HAYDEN: I think because I’m holding the mic, I become the eye contact person. So I have a cue here, there, here, here. I love it.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks for this panel. My question is for Josephine. So first, I loved your image of bathing the child. I can relate to the holiness and the hell of bathing a toddler, so that was very evocative. My question for you is about gender in Opus Dei. I’m not very knowledgeable about this movement. And if I’m understanding your presentation right, it sounds like there’s at least one individual in elected office from this movement. I’m assuming there’s maybe more. Is that right? Is it that one individual or are there more elected?

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: I know of one.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: One, OK.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: I know it must be more. But there’s always someone important of Opus Dei in the history of Chile, I would say.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. So my question is about, what is the role– what is the gender makeup of the followers of Opus Dei? Because it sounded like most of the quotes you had were from women. And I saw some parallels with the tradwives I follow, American tradwives, that I follow on social media, about sanctifying the domestic life. And so yeah, I’m just curious, what– and there’s women on social media play a big role in laundering white supremacist ideas here in the US. And so what role is the mother or women playing in widening the appeal of this movement?

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: Yeah, I appreciate that you’re bringing the tradwives because I think that they also– they inhabit a similar paradox than the women in Opus Dei. I’m thinking of a tradwife that supposedly sells like making everything from scratch and being submissive to the husband, but we also know that she’s the one earning the millions of dollars and there are plenty of domestic help. In the case of my [? interlocutors, ?] it’s the same.

They’re devoted to the domestic in this very affluent– so I’m very interested in what domestic then. And working with their ideology, their theology, as I said, is all about being efficient. So I’m just working now in a chapter that deals with those issues. And it’s, what is the efficiency of the domestic, which as a person that clean floor every day can imagine? But they don’t. So they would say, for them, the domestic is changing the water of the vessel.

And they actually think that that is effective because in their views, well, yeah, the role of women is about making atmospheres for others to thrive. And that gender model of efficiency and efficiency that is based on details. The productive efficacy of a detail, it’s very interesting because it has completely been integrated into the corporations and the institutions that Opus Dei lead.

For example, in a university that has– that is lead by Opus Dei, not directly, but people that are an Opus Dei and that work in a department of, let’s say, economists, they have a person that has a position of something administrative. But how people would frame it is, she’s like the housewife of the department. She is in charge of making everything nice.

And that nice is about productive for them, but it’s also a marker of class, of course. But yeah. And I didn’t mention, but because of the structure of Opus Dei, I only work with women. I knew that person, that guy, but just an interview. But I was bathing toddlers with women and attending to spiritual events. And thank you for your question.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Great panel. Just blown away by everybody’s research. One for the table, it’s a bit of a mouthful, but how do we reconcile a push for epistemic plurality, or recognizing that there are multiple ways of knowing and that some have been silenced by these legacies of slavery or colonialism, imperialism with the need to critically engage with fringe political discourses that challenge mainstream or orthodox truths. At what point does valuing diverse epistemologies risk legitimizing destructive, or at the very least, harmful ideologies?

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: No, I don’t know. That’s the most difficult question ever. I would say, like, where do you put your limit to engaging in dialogue with others? Is it fascism? But I think that line is very corrosive to me. And working with people that, yeah, still support a dictatorship that meant all sorts of atrocities, but also working in the scale of bathing children is always confronting me with that– because people are so layered, and that’s the beauty of anthropology, I would say. But I have no idea how to reply.

ALEXIS WOOD: This is actually a question that we think a lot about in my department in particular. One of the first things that we’re introduced to is, what would it mean to live in a flactoverse, basically, instead of a one-world world? And I think it really depends on what you think your contribution is, where you put your politics, and then how that translates into method.

So in my office, we do a lot of alternative cartographies. So right now, we were working with a Sogorea Te Land Trust to develop a cartography of the Bay Area that’s rooted in anti-colonial projection, working with them specifically to put their stories into a new cartography. And that in itself, producing that map, changes the story. And often, my students get very overwhelmed when I introduce them to the idea of epistemology. And they’re like, oh my god, so nothing actually means nothing.

And I’m like, no, no, no. You have to choose what means something to you in particular. And I remind them of the story that I try to tell them at the beginning of the semester that was a New York Times piece about somebody berating somebody else for being interested in anti-reflection glass on buildings to save birds. And he’s like, how could you care about this in a world that’s just falling apart? And he’s like, but how can any one person deal with a question of the world ending?

That’s just too much for any one person to deal with. You can only face the direction you can face, and then hopefully, enough of us face that direction, and we start moving in a better way. And seeing diverse stories as ways to re-world, basically. And I think my answer to the how do we risk engaging with damaging narratives, aren’t we already? So I think there’s more of a risk in not entertaining more diverse narratives.

PETER FORBERG: Yeah. I mean, this is the question. This is always the difficult one. I was reading Donna Haraway today. So my brain is not primed for this because I’m just thinking about situated knowledge. I think one thing– I mean, my kind of research program, if I’ve ever had one, is to say, I just– I want to take these beliefs seriously. And I think that there are a lot of people who, when I started doing this research, who said, I would never want to engage with this. I would never want to think about these things. I could never give an inch to any of these people.

And I think that’s a totally fair position, especially when some of the beliefs that you’re being exposed to strike so deeply at your core moral, ethical values. And so right now, I’m talking about it in the research ethics and the research practice framework. But I do want to say that that’s part of what I mean when I talk about the surrealism of doing this is. I mean, for this research, and I’m sure all of us have experienced this, it’s like bingeing content that makes me feel cognitive dissonance and deep anxiety about the nature of reality for hours and hours on end every single day.

And I think leaning into that anxiety and understanding, trying to understand the situated knowledge, a little bit of [INAUDIBLE], if you will, to get at why people believe in these epistemologies, these counter epistemologies is important so that when Curtis Yarvin or JD Vance goes on The New York Times there is an alternative that debunks that. And I’m against fact checking, debunking culture as a cure to democracy, but the practices that I’ve seen from research participants is, they’re so willing to look up alternative information.

But oftentimes, the kinds of– this is a tactic for conspiracy theory propagation, is that they’ll choose news stories or they’ll choose terms that are so specific to their conspiracy theory that when you look it up, you find yourself in a completely closed room. Such that you can’t find any– there’s nothing from the outside intervening on that epistemology. There would be times where I was deep into a three-hour documentary on some part of QAnon kind of mythos, and I would try to– I would be like, that can’t be true.

And I’d Google it, and all I would get would be references to this documentary. We can’t go out and fact checked everything. We can’t go out and do all of that. But to understand their language and how they present that language, I think, is important for developing an alternative discourse that both can provide a pathway for leaving that closed box, but that also addresses whether it’s the lack of a narrative for the working class.

Is like, OK, what are the kinds of questions that people in the working class are asking that lead them to this kind of epistemology? Literally, what are the things that they’re googling? What are the things that they’re checking on their news feed? And how can we understand that language and think about intervening in that language to put a different perspective in there? That’s a very– yeah, I think I have a lot of problems with what I’ve just said, and nobody should hold me to it, [LAUGHS] but that’s my initial thought.

CORI HAYDEN: We have a couple questions stacked up here. So I’m going to suggest [INAUDIBLE]. I’m going to suggest that we cluster the three remaining questions and put them to you all as a group. I have a question here, here, and in the back as well.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Sure. Thank you for such a rich panel. So I’ll try to be brief. Essentially, what role of history here? Because I think when we think about French politics, when we think about the surrealness of the dog driving the car, there’s this tendency to say this is either completely unprecedented or it’s totally isomorphic with 1930s Germany. And nothing in between.

So I wonder– this is not the first time that Christian cults or secession movements or fringe politics have had social movements and political rises. I mean, I just think about my own history, growing up in Mississippi, I went to two elementary schools. One was named Jefferson Davis, and the other was Beauvoir. The president of the Confederacy and the name of his White House. So I grew up around these things, and the US grew up around these things as well. So what role do we pull history out to understand that what’s new is, in a lot of ways, old as well.

CORI HAYDEN: Thank you.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks. Great panel, everyone. This was a question for Alexis, and I was really curious– you had this throwaway slide about arguing for affective states over imagined states or imagined communities riffing on Benedict Anderson, I assume. And I wanted you to unpack that a little bit, and to also think about, you’re using this in reference to geographically bounded secessionist movements, and I was wondering if you might be able to– could we think about the idea of affective states as a more dispersed kind of geographic imaginary? Does that make sense?

ALEXIS WOOD: Mhm.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. OK.

CORI HAYDEN: Take notes on these questions.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thanks. Thanks for the panel. I’ll pose my question as maybe something you could drizzle over these other ones and just– you already commented on this a little bit. But I think when I think of the church and a rural secessionist movement and Fortran, I think of these things as very male-dominated patterns. And so I’m curious if all three of you could maybe comment again on the gender dynamics relevant in your movements, whether that’s the priests or the manosphere or and male female dynamics in rural America. Thanks.

PAUL PIERSON: And I can’t resist adding one more, because it’s all so interesting. And it’s probably not huge. And this is for Alexis as well. I’m wondering what happens to the state of Jefferson with the rise of Donald Trump and what we learned– so if they’re saying they have this really strong place-based attachment but then some national figure comes along who has nothing to do with that place, but who resonates for them, to what extent do they just like flip to now being MAGA?

To what extent– how do they reconcile their attachment to Jefferson and to being separate from the United States, or separate from the way that things are organized? But now, they’ve got a MAGA guy in control? I’d just be interested in what you learn when you drop Trump into that situation. So you guys can– I said before, it’s good to collect questions, because then you can pick and choose and bob and weave. If there are things you don’t want to talk about. But we’ve got we’ve got about 10 minutes, so you probably each have three.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: Well, I don’t know. The women I work with are very much disputing the power of the priest. I would say Opus Dei as a whole. But in their daily interactions with the priest, they would refute the priest answer in the confessionary, like, at that level. If they feel that the priest is being lenient with something, they would be like, well, but then what do we believe? They are demanding from the priest is very structured. But then again, in their own– they have this flexibility with their own practices. Yeah. I was going to say something more to you, but I forgot. But it’s going to come back, so maybe you want to go?

ALEXIS WOOD: Oh, yeah. OK. So on the first question, I don’t believe in history nor time. They are all rewritten to serve the present. But within that, I do believe in space. And space is very bound up with narratives of history. I believe in patterns, because space is determined by power geometries, which fall along the same things, which they have since the closing of the Commons.

We’re going to see capitalism extract from people what it can until it’s done, and it’ll move on to something else, and again and again. But I think it’s more of a question of space than history. And then, I guess, that falls into affect. I want to go for affective states, precisely because it does account for, I think, dispersed geographies as well. I study what digital space is within the context of state secessionist movements as well because rural areas are dispersed geographically. Social media is a big part of this.

And these introduction of technologies, even though it’s a characteristic of dispersed spaces, what it’s doing is collapsing space. And so even though somebody, which I’ve seen before, on the East Coast, is a state of Jefferson supporter– and it’s random, but it happens all the time, because they believe in the anti-elite state, a new mission for what the US could be, what a state could be.

Gender dynamics, I find that the women in my group specifically in the state of Jefferson are in charge. They are in charge of the social media. They are in charge of organizing the events. They are in charge of making sure that everybody is where they’re supposed to be, and that is the same throughout Western society. We are in charge of timekeeping. But the face of the organization is a man. But women play a huge role in that organization. And what has happened SRJ in the face of trump, of course, they’ve adopted the MAGA rhetoric because it speaks to them. But I think because it is a place-based movement, it will exist after Trump, just as it existed before it. Speed run.

[LAUGHTER]

Well, I’ll start by addressing history. And I agree that there’s often this dichotomy that’s posed of– there’s a few– I’ve always worried that I’m just someone who’s– and now I’m the human chasing the dog driving the car. That I’m just like, whatever is the most present controversy, I’m there, I’m on it. And that I haven’t done a lot of historical work. But then the more that I’ve spent time thinking about QAnon, I’ve always thought, it’s interesting, why have we come up with these– we’ve got these neologisms for mis/disinformation.

And I’m like, well, propaganda was a thing. There were debates in the early 2000 about the rise of infotainment, and Fox News. And so some of the things that I’m looking at in media studies suggest to me that there’s– these are not either directly analogous to something that’s happened in the past. They’re not entirely new, but they seem to be part of an emergent pattern or a recurring pattern.

And it’s really hard to take in the whole of history and from that then say, oh, yeah, all– here’s a checklist of the political-economic media, cultural sphere, and how this 2020 is an exact replica of 1920, whatever it is. So for me, I think the project has been to think about how– what are the small pieces present that we can really hone in on, and just trace that.

And so I think that this is a way of opening into what is sometimes the complexity of history and of the nuance of discussing history and trying to avoid these simple analogies. Is to be like, let’s take one process. Let’s take a single process and see if this recurs as a pattern throughout history. And so now I’m like, OK, I’m studying media. Of course, I have to go back to Stuart Hall. And I have to go back to people who are writing about the printing press.

And if we’re talking about conspiracy theories being propagated over social media, let’s talk about conspiracy theories being propagated over the printing press. And that is a way of both destroying the analogs and being, like, [? press and ?] [? reformation ?] is not exactly like QAnon in 2020. But it gives us some small sliver of history that we can trace. And from that, start to build up a bit of a catalog of historical threads to hopefully arrive at– I’m a Gramscian at some conjunctural kind of analysis of the present. So that’s my piece on history.

And then the piece on gender. I’m very ambivalent about how to frame this, because I think it’s interesting to hear that state of Jefferson was is really dominated by women, because QAnon was often assumed to be dominated by women. It was often thought that it was a very feminist movement because of the whole save the children kind of faction of it. And because you had a lot of these mothers being the face of it.

And I often was like, this is fascinating because it is a big part of QAnon, is one of the identities that are helping construct this thing that is QAnon, but it’s also a way of really downplaying all the white nationalists in it. It was like the male politics of QAnon was sublimated to introduce the fanciful progressive politics of the mothers in the movement and how harmless they are. And it was not the save the children protesters that we saw being arrested on January 6 who had connections to the QAnon movement.

So I think there’s– we have to be very deliberate about how we study gender and how we use it to discuss these politics, which is not at all me questioning the role of women within QAnon, but just thinking about, how do we talk about gender when it comes to these movements? How do our own frames about gender and biases about gender start to bleed into our political analysis of what’s happening?

And how do we square the fact that something like QAnon was at once a deeply kind of– I hate to reify these binaries, but yeah, it’s like this maternal thing that’s about protecting the children. It’s also a big thing in the manosphere. It’s all about red pilling. That is the language. And that these two worlds are colliding and negotiating with one another. And there are women who are telling me that they’re choosing to ignore some of the other parts of the movement because that doesn’t represent them. Yet, they’re still part of the– I think it gets very, very complex for a movement like that. But that’s all to just say, I think gender is always a key thing to be talking about in these. Yeah.

PAUL PIERSON: OK. Do you want to say one more thing?

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: Yes. Yeah.

PAUL PIERSON: OK. Sure.

JOSEFINA VALDES LANAS: Speaking about space, I’m just thinking that all that we are referring to here is about a very self-contained space where really, at times, no air enters. And in my own research, I can think of one or two, maybe three moments in which the system that they have created for themselves really collapses. And these are very particular moments.

And I’m thinking with history on how to study those moments and what’s unprecedented of these times. For example, I was also, with gender, thinking about what technologies of IVF mean for women that want– that are called to have plenty of children, or the circulation of bodies and information. Like, how an elite that is so privileged to maintain itself bounded and all that applies for your cases as well. Just that.

PAUL PIERSON: OK. What a rich conversation. Thanks to everyone. Thanks to you guys for sharing your really wonderful research, and we’ll call it a day. Thanks.

[APPLAUSE]

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WOMAN’S VOICE: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

California Spotlight

The Future of California Agriculture

As one of the nation’s agricultural powerhouses, California’s farming industry stands at a critical juncture. Climate change, labor availability and migration, and rapidly evolving technologies are reshaping the landscape of agriculture in the Golden State.

This panel, recorded on January 30, 2025 and presented as part of the UC Berkeley Social Science Matrix California Spotlight series, brought together experts to analyze these changes and explore their implications for agricultural communities and rural economies. The panel featured Federico Castillo, Lecturer in the Department of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley and Project Scientist at the College of Natural Resources; Julie Guthman, Distinguished Professor Emerita at UC Santa Cruz; and Eric Edwards, Assistant Professor in Agricultural and Resource Economics at UC Davis. Timothy Bowles, Associate Professor in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, moderated.

The panel was co-sponsored by the Center for Science, Technology, Medicine, & Society (CSTMS); the Berkeley Food Institute; the Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative (BIMI); and the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE).

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to this event as a podcast below, or on Apple Podcasts.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

WOMAN’S VOICE: The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

CORI HAYDEN: Hi, everyone. Welcome to Matrix. My name is Cori Hayden. I’m the interim director this semester of Social Science Matrix, and it’s a real delight to welcome you all here for our inaugural panel of the spring semester. As I don’t need to emphasize to you all in this room, California agriculture is at an absolutely critical juncture right now between climate change, shifting labor dynamics, and rapid technological change.

We’re seeing a real reshaping of the landscape of one of our most vital industries. We’ve assembled here a really wonderful panel to help us navigate these transformations and their far-reaching implications not just for agricultural communities, but also for the economy writ large. So we’re going to explore how farmers, policymakers, tech innovators are grappling with the changing climate and are embracing or questioning new technologies.

So together, as a panel, we’re going to examine how these trends are reshaping the fabric of California agriculture and what it means for the future of food sustainability and our collective livelihood. Now, this event is cosponsored by the UC Berkeley Center for Science, Technology, Medicine and Society, the Berkeley Food Institute, the Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative, and the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment. Thanks to all of our partners in bringing this event to fruition.

Now, before I turn it over to the panelists, I just want to give you a quick preview of some other events we have coming up at matrix. Next week, in fact– starting February 4, a new directions panel with emerging research from advanced graduate students on the study of fringe politics. On February 10, an Author Meets Critics Panel on society, despite the state reimagining geographies of order with the author, Jeronimo Barrera de La Torre in geography. Matrix on point event on Los Angeles wildfires and more.

So we were just saying here with Tim that there are very few things right now that are not timely in an emergency footing. But I hope you will join us for a bunch of these events, and we’ll see where we’re going in this world of ours right now. Let me now introduce the moderator for this panel, Professor Tim Bowles. Tim Bowles is an associate professor in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, a member of the Berkeley Agroecology Lab. And by virtue of sitting at this table as a moderator, an honorary member of the social sciences.

His research focuses on supporting transformations of our agricultural system from one that is currently reliant on intensive synthetic inputs to one based on ecological processes. He’s interested in how diversified biologically-based farms affect soil health, resource use efficiency, and resilience to environmental change, especially drought. He has a PhD in Ecology from UC Davis and a BA in Molecular and Cell Biology from Vanderbilt University. So without further ado, I will turn the panel over to Timothy– Tim’s capable hands.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Thank you Cori, and welcome everybody. In many ways, agriculture in California is really a study in apparent contradictions and extremes. It’s where water makes crops blossom in the desert but leaves behind soils too salty to farm. It’s where some farmers can get rich growing high value crops, but farm workers are left as among the most vulnerable and marginalized people in our society.

Where the largest synchronous bloom of flowers occurs in the world in the Central Valley with almonds every spring, but where the loss of habitat and pesticides make much of the landscape too toxic for bees. And where some of the most advanced and innovative agroecological farmers, who have inspired generations of other farmers and activists are neighbors with some of the most intensive, chemically-dependent farms in the world. So I could go on.

And so but the question we have for us today is, what does the future hold for California? Do the seeds of a more sustainable and equitable future for California agriculture lie somewhere in all of these contradictions and extremes? Is it waiting to germinate and grow? So I think our panelists will help us answer these important questions.

And just to give you a little bit of a preview, we’ll have three presentations from each of our panelists in turn, and then we’ll have time for questions and answers after that. And so I’ll introduce each of them prior to their presentation, and I want to start with Dr. Federico Castillo. And Dr. Castillo is a lecturer in the Department of Ethnic Studies here at UC Berkeley and a project scientist in the College of Natural Resources in my same department– environmental science, policy and management.

And he is an environmental and agricultural economist with graduate and undergraduate degrees, all from here at UC Berkeley so a long time, Cal Bear. And his research interests center on the socioeconomic impacts of climate change, particularly as it relates to the agricultural sector. He currently serves as deputy director of the University of California Planetary Health Center of Expertise, and is co-lead of Latinx in the Environment Program here at UC Berkeley. So with that, I’ll turn it over to Federico and hopefully get your slides launched, too.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: Thank you very much, and good afternoon, everybody, and thank you for taking the time to be here with us today. A brave Thursday at the end of the day, at the end of the week, so to speak. We know that some of us probably want to do something else, but I’m glad that you found this interesting enough to be here.

I would just say that, yes, I’m a project scientist here. My research centers on labor issues, agricultural labor issues– I’m also part of an evaluation team for the Farm to School program– California Farm to School Program. There I look a little bit more into ag production rather than the labor issue, although, of course, labor is an important component of AG production, as I will share with you.

I took to heart the issue of the future of California agriculture, and I will talk about that but probably– and I know, basically, from a labor– agricultural labor perspective, what’s in store for labor and what are the implications of issues related to climate change, for example, in regards to labor for California agriculture? So further ado, we’ll– this is the outline of what I will be saying.

Basically, we’re just going to spend a couple of minutes looking at what agriculture in California means. We will talk about what farm labor, what the hazards the farm labor face. What are the socioeconomic conditions of farm labor? And then we will get on to talk about climate change and the compound impacts of the different environmental hazards the farm labor faces.

By the way, I say farm labor because that’s what I do, but other outdoor labor folks face similar situation. Construction workers and folks who work on the highways, fixing potholes or whatever they do, they are also exposed to these environmental hazards. And then we’re just going to close with a few remarks. OK. So this is what California agriculture looks to you– looks nowadays. These are the principal crops in California, the California Rural sector so to speak.

So milk and cream is the biggest value. These are at least by value. Cattle and calves is number three. Pistachios is– I don’t know, number 6 or something like this. But the most important thing that I want to point out is that on the right column, it looks pretty much like the left column. So California’s main crops have not vary greatly over the last few years. They remain pretty steady. Pistachios– they were– they’re number six. There were– now, they’re number five.

And so some– did you have a new comer? Carrots, for example, or one that left the top 10. But basically, California Agriculture looks very similar. Why is it relevant? Because there is labor associated with these crops. And some of these crops are labor intensive, where others are not. And so it just set the stage. These are the counties with the highest value on agricultural production. And as you can see, a lot of these ones are– well, in fact, except Ventura and Imperial, they all are in the Central Valley or the North part of the country. Right? Yolo County– or Yolo is not even there. San Joaquin, Merced.

And so, again, if you were to look at this table 20 or 15 years ago, it would look very similar. The Central Valley has remained the main agricultural production section, geographical area, together with Imperial. So what does agricultural labor look like in the state of California? And by the way, if you were to look at North Carolina or you were to look at other states, it would pretty much look like this. Most of the farm workers are from Mexico.

There is a fairly significant number– 7% of Central Americans. Although I will say Central Americans are probably heavily undercounted for all kinds of reasons. And then there is a few United States, but in these United States citizens, there is a bunch, of course, Latinos and Latinas present in that labor force. It just means that they were born here. This is what the demographic picture looks like.

Most of the folks are fairly young– between 20 and 50 years of age– as you can see here, I will say that– that said, the agricultural labor force in California is becoming older for all kinds of reasons. The militarized border implies that there is less flux of individuals coming in. And so that means that there is no– that renovation, that revolving door that used to be from the rural areas to Oakland or to San Francisco to do something else is just not happening. Folks are pretty steady there.

The agricultural labor force is becoming less first generation. Meaning children don’t want to work in the fields, where their parents worked. And so they go elsewhere, and that also contributes to an older labor force. The average age is 41 years old. If we had taken that number, if you look at the agricultural census about 20 years ago, that means that’s about 10 or 11 years younger. I mean, for the– although it doesn’t look like a big change, demographers will, like, blink at this, right? Change of that.

And about 50% do not have authorization to work in the United States. And that probably is also– that number is probably an undercount. With all the implications that we have today with the new administration– I mean, we can talk about that. There is a big debate whether Trump actually is going to go after labor in agriculture because his constituency is farmers, and he didn’t want to mess around with that or say that, yes, he will do that. That’s a different conversation, of course.

This is the research team that I work with. One of them here present, Michael Wehner, in the hat, but I like to work with a lot of different folks. So we work with demographers– Professor Carr on the left, and Armando Sanchez, an economist. And of course, we have our stellar undergrad student working with us, Montserrat Hernandez on the top– on the bottom right.

Most of my work is funded for these folks– by Alianza and the University of California Global Health Institute. But again, I do a lot of work with the state of California through the grant on the Farm to School Evaluation Team. So this is the– I’m going to share with you, and then talk about the future here. These are some of the top producing counties in the state of California on the left, and on the right, you see the heat incidence.

And as you can see, heat incidence matches almost to a tilt where the most agricultural production in California is. That means that the labor force is very exposed to heat in those states. So what we did there was we looked at how agricultural production. And you will see a progression and what it means, in my opinion, for California agriculture. Here we look at how heat impacts agricultural productivity through a measure called a metric that we call the farm labor requirement.

And what does it mean for agricultural production? In other words, farm workers are exposed to heat. They in turn become less efficient for obvious reasons. They are more prone to accidents. They might even miss days of work. And so that means that there is less tons of stuff being harvested out there. And we did this. This is the method that we did– a very simple thing. And what we find is that for crops that are highly labor intensive, there is a 5% incidence in agricultural production. Meaning if there is a lot of labor use on these crops, they are impacted the most. That kind of makes sense. We just happened to quantify the obvious from an economic perspective.

For crops, this means onions, watermelons. And 5% doesn’t seem a lot, but when you start adding things up, it’s on the millions of dollars. And for other crops, less labor intensive, such as say, onions that are now being mechanized and others– the impact is less. So what does it mean? It means that with a very steady labor force in the future, with the current steady labor force, farmers can expect to become less and less able to hire, and that the only salvation for agriculture will be technological change. Meaning some crops will have to become more capital intensive in terms of machinery.

And if that doesn’t happen, then there’s going to be some adjustment because you cannot even– even if you have more land available to you, you don’t have the labor to satisfy that, then you cannot just produce. And we do that in another study later. But the most important thing for me is the farm workers are exposed to double whammies– double, double threats. In this case, we did COVID and heat because COVID we did a study in year 2021.

Early 2021, we surveyed 380 farm workers, and we asked them if they have been impacted by COVID and by heat and if they have reduced the number of hours and whatnot. We were surprised. We thought that farm workers were just going to decrease the number of hours due to disease, either COVID, or due to heat exposure. It turns out that that is not the case. Workers and– we did a lot of focus groups here and whatnot. Workers went on to work with COVID, and workers– even in the temperature or the heat index, which is what we use– was reaching, say, 105 or something. They were still out there.

And this is important to understand. Farm workers are in a very disadvantaged position. So although this seems contradictory– oh, well, farm workers are not reducing the number of hours. Well, guess what? They have to. They’re already low income. There is a power difference between the relationship– between either the labor contractor or the farmer and farm workers. In theory, they’re supposed to leave the field the moment the temperature reaches 90 degrees. But generally speaking, that is not the case.

So what that means is that the labor supply due to the occurrence of these two phenomena doesn’t change, and that has a social cost and a health cost, of course. You would think that this is good for agriculture. I argue that given the static supply of labor coming from other countries that that is actually not good for agriculture in the future. We’re now moving to heat and wildfires. I mean, all this happens because wildfires– they don’t stop because there is a heat day or heat doesn’t stop because there is a wildfire.

These things happen in conjunction, and farm workers are exposed to both of these. And we are actually writing a proposal at this point in time. We don’t know if with the new administration that’s going to happen, but we’re writing a proposal, where we move from COVID and heat to wildfire and heat. And we use a statistical method, the Heckman model, that I don’t have the– I have the results for COVID and heat, but I think they’re boringly numeric, so I will skip them.

The other thing with agriculture and the future of agriculture is information. And so I’m part of a team at the University of California, Santa Cruz. One of those climate action grants, where we generate information with the idea the providing that information to communities and to farm workers, they will be able to adapt better to climate change. And so you have not seen the naive– the kind of wishful thinking here. You probably should.

We develop a series of tools, and we realized that this was going to be the case, by the way. But we developed a series of tools, like maps and other digital things on cell phones, where people can check, OK, I’m going to be working in this area. It’s 95, right? So I probably shouldn’t be there. But do people really don’t go there. Of course, the answer is they go. They need the money. They have to pay the rent. They have to do stuff to make a living, like most of us, except that they’re in a very perilous, disadvantageous situation here.

And so we are developing a series of tools. We’re now trying to work heavily with communities. We have met with Promotoras de Salud. Thank you, Tim– and so on and so forth– to come up with ways that actually farmworkers can use these tools. We also have anonymous reporting tools. All this is about information. So in the future, information comes through all kinds of sources nowadays. Information used to be a privilege thing.

Farmers will have weather information, but now, farmworkers have weather information. Everybody has weather information. You actually look at your phone. It’s going to rain today. Should I take my raincoat? And one things that everybody acts on is information. So what’s the future for California in that sense? The future is that unless we empower some sections of society– some sectors of society– to act on that information, doesn’t matter what amount of information is there. Right?

So I don’t have a clear answer for that. We had a meeting today. And again, we’re consulting communities and our ministry of information and so on and so forth. This is one of the tools. It’s a map. It’s in Spanish and English, so this is the Spanish page. And you can go and check on air quality, heat conditions, water issues, and so on and so forth. And you can actually make a choice in terms of– I mean, you can think of actions that you can take, but not necessarily taken.

I always like to put this picture up because this is what the future of agriculture looks like. On the left, on the two graphs on the left, you have chemical use in agriculture. And as you can see, the change between 1991 and 2017 is not much. And if we were to have a 2024 map, it will look exactly like that. Probably redder. And on the right, you have a map that was developed by my colleague, Michael Wehner here, showing heat incidents in California. And as you can see, the redder areas of heat coincide almost to the tilt with the redder areas on pesticide use.

That means that farm workers, again, are exposed to a double whammy, if you will, and that is not likely to change. We know that organic, for example, production has increased steadily. The value of organic has increased as well. But that doesn’t mean that you change much in the future. I am a big believer in community-oriented solutions. That’s what we’re doing at the project that I just mentioned in regards to information. This is one example.

These are mobile stations that clean air and provide shade for farm workers. These are prototypes, of course. You can see there are solar power, and they help to cope with that double whammy. This was a product developed by the Leap institute– I’m almost done here– together with the California Department of Energy. And this is the kind of solution that will be into the future, where you have to come up with things that, otherwise, wouldn’t have been thought of in terms of solutions on climate change adaptability.

So what are the pros moving forward? What do we need to do with California in terms of policies and farm workers, which are a key component of the agricultural sector, of course? Must be grounded in community needs. In other words, consult, consult, consult. Sacramento is great with regulation, but in terms of what needs to be regulated, the matrices, the numbers, they need to be consulted. They need to be practical. Farmworkers need to be consulted about, hey, is 80 degrees OK to stay out there? Is 85? We don’t know. And the farmworkers tell us.

And we need to empower communities. In my case, farmworkers is a tough battle. Nobody wants to give up power. And empowering farm workers through one way or another is something that the folks don’t think too much of– either at the county level or at the state level. But that’s just the only way here to go about. And with that, I want to thank you, and I hope you didn’t go to sleep. Thank you very much.

[APPLAUSE]

All right. I don’t know if the QA–

TIMOTHY BOWLES: We’ll wait till–

FEDERICO CASTILLO: Until the end. OK. Well, thank you very much. And you know how to do this.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Yeah. Thank you, Federico, and thanks, everybody. So next up we have Dr. Eric Edwards, who is an Assistant Professor in Agricultural and Resource Economics just down the road at UC Davis. And he holds a PhD in economics and environmental science from UC Santa Barbara and an MBA from the Simon Graduate School of Business at the University of Rochester.

And some of his recent publications include “The Capitalization of Property Rights to Groundwater” in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. “Creating American Farmland, Institutional Evolution and the Development of Agricultural Drainage,” as well as another one, “Water, Dust and Environmental Justice, the Case of Agricultural Water Diversions.” And so let’s welcome Dr. Edwards, and I will get your slides launched.

[APPLAUSE]

ERIC EDWARDS: I’m a economist and agricultural economist, environmental economist, and also an economic historian. So you’re going to get some history, and you’re going to get economics, and you have to sit through it for 15 minutes. So taking the topic of the panel of the Future of California Agriculture, I thought, what a great way to start to just look at what’s happened since California started and think about what changes have happened since the mid-1800s and use that to motivate where we’re going.

So in my ag policy class, I talk about I’m from Northern Idaho. I’m from the region that has the largest wheat producing county in the country. And I asked my students, why don’t we produce much wheat in California? And of course they don’t know what we produce. But the answer is, well, we used to, right? 1878, 1889. California was actually number two, I think, in wheat producing behind Minnesota in those years.

And the question of what happened– and you can see the evolution over time from wheat and these other basic commodity crops that you see growing in the Midwest now to super high value crops essentially for export. And this change corresponded with dramatic changes with how we managed one particular resource in the state, which is one I study extensively, which is water.

So we have– I just drove from Davis, which is in the middle of this giant old floodplain that doesn’t flood anymore. Really rich soils that required extensive work to move into agricultural production. So diversions for irrigation, levees to prevent, protect against flooding and drainage to get these really flat soils to get the water off. And so when you look at what’s happened to California agriculture now– it’s a little small over there, but you can see these– prior to being at Davis, I was at North Carolina and then Utah before that.

They don’t grow this many of this type of crops really anywhere else in the world. So you can see the variety and just the kind of that– those colors are really representative of just the value and the sheer magnitude of the economic engine that agriculture is in the Central Valley. So there’s debate in the economic history, as it always is, of when this happened, why it happened, right? But I want to break it down in basic economics terms.

So we think about agricultural production via production function. And you take inputs, land, labor, capital, and you combine them, and you get wheat, grapes, whatever. And land is really a general term for all the fixed inputs that occur at a place, right? And so that’s going to be the climate of California, the water resources, and the soil. And so I want to emphasize– I’m going to talk about later is the climate and the water.

California is hot and sunny, which is really good for crops, provided you have enough water. And it turns out California also has a lot of water. And so the problem was just saving it up and reallocating it at the right time for agricultural production. The other thing that we talk about in economics always is markets. And if you think about where markets come in, firms are trying to maximize profit. Profit– revenue minus cost. The revenue side is price times quantity.

Wheat has a price. It’s a generic commodity. It’s a low price. Differentiated grapes from Napa have a different price, and its price is much higher. Almonds and pistachios have much higher prices. And then, of course, we get into, well, where are we going to go? What’s going to happen in the future? And there we can think about some of these cost factors.

California has really benefited from the abundance of natural resources and also human resources. The labor that we just spent 15 minutes talking about– that’s a distinct advantage. California employs about a third of the agricultural labor in the country. And that’s because a lot of these crops are very labor intensive. So that labor cost but also the water costs are important factors in production.

So I hadn’t really thought– when I agreed to do this in the early fall, I had thought I’ll just talk all about water. That talk has been preempted by events a little bit. So what do I see going for the future? Well, we have the underlying water and climate issues that you’re all already aware of right. But then we have these big looming issues that are maybe more near term issues of potential trade wars and potential changes in immigration policy.

So I’m going to talk about those two quickly here and then get into the water stuff. So we talked a lot about ag labor. I just want to emphasize a couple points from an agricultural production side. One third of the US agricultural workforce is employed in California. And part of the reason is– and I just ran by some vineyards being right hand trimmed yesterday. A lot of these high value crops are more labor intensive than growing corn in Iowa, right?

And so you have a lot of ag labor here. And a lot of that ag labor is what we would call undocumented, right? And you can see that evolution over time. And I was discussing this and trying to explain it like– it seems to me that this is not just in terms of who’s being hired, but these are all due to policy changes, right?

The demand is there. There’s labor there, but over time, the forced use of this undocumented labor force, which, as Federico pointed out, puts the labor in a very vulnerable position for a variety of reasons. So what happened during the last Trump administration? What’s going to happen to this one? There was a pronounced effect on immigration during the last Trump administration. We expect that to probably happen again.

That raises the cost of agricultural production. In the long term, that’s less clear what’s going to happen. But these are important, large underlying factors that are changing in terms of markets. And we’ll go through this quickly. Last Trump administration starts a trade war with China. Don’t import certain things from China. What does China hit back at? Well, the US is the largest agricultural exporter in the world. So of course, if you’re in a trade war with the US, the thing you put tariffs on are agricultural products, right?

So China hits back with tarriffs on ag exports. And you can see the total cash receipts from California’s ag production are about $60 billion. The export value is about 20– almost $24 billion. Right? So a huge value added of California agriculture is the export, right? Almonds, pistachios, things like that are almost exclusively grown in California.

And so some economists in my department did an analysis and say, well, under certain tariff scenarios, retaliatory tariffs scenarios, California agriculture could lose up to $6 billion, so up to a quarter in some cases– more extreme cases of agricultural export value due to these tariffs. In the short term, again, that’s bad. What happens in the long term? Well, generally, other countries are going to shift away from US imports, and that’s going to be problematic for California agriculture.

All right. So moving beyond– those are the standard economist things, open markets. Better flow of labor makes everyone better off. Let’s talk about water, which is really what I study. I think as this image points out, you can see these circles on the right of the amount of water used for urban uses, agriculture, streams, and rivers. California is not a dry state, right? That’s 65, 74, 82 million acre feet of water.

An acre foot of water in California is going to be two, three, four person households it would support. That’s a lot of water. It’s just the timing and location isn’t necessarily where you want it. Most of the water comes in Northern California. A lot of the population– a lot of the agriculture is in the Southern Central Valley or in Southern California. So we move the water around. You see all that infrastructure there.

So the other important factor– and I’ve slowly come to appreciate this over time– is how important water is to adapting to heat in agriculture. From a crop physiology point of view, water and heat are inextricably linked. Water is how– just like us, water is how plants cool down. Water helps plants grow. If you spray them with water, it cools them off. You can even spray them with water to warm them up if it’s going to freeze.

So water’s a great way to be resilient to climate, but that means having water. And so in California, a lot of times we talk about markets, and the reason for that is because water was allocated back in those early times in 1878. And allocated under a variety of different doctrines but mostly under a prior appropriation doctrine of first in time, first in. Well, not necessarily the first person who started using water is the highest or most important use today– or highest value or most important use.

And so there needs to be a way to reallocate water. In particular, we’re thinking how do you reallocate scarce water resources during a drought from maybe senior water rights holders who are doing some low value agriculture to maybe higher value agriculture, trees, grapes that need water, or else they’re going to lose their full investment? Or to cities or to environmental uses, right? How do you maintain stream flows for salmon during the dry times and things like that?

All those later uses I’ve talked about tend to be higher value than the typical use in agriculture, even for productive or productive agriculture in the Central Valley. And so some of the work I’ve done on the Salton Sea offers an example. So water markets and markets in general work to reallocate goods and services in mutually beneficial exchanges. But the Salton Sea offers a key example of some of the risks associated with this as well, right?

So in the Salton Sea, which has one of the largest irrigation districts in the country, the Imperial Irrigation District near it, right in Imperial County, has been diverting water, owns a majority of California’s water rights to the Colorado River– about 3.1 million acre feet. And from that, those water rights, they irrigate a large amount of Imperial County. A portion of that– maybe about a third of that water that they irrigate– runs off the cropland and into the Salton Sea. And it’s been maintaining the Salton sea’s elevation for 100 years or more.

Well, imperial is under a lot of pressure because California is using too much Colorado River water to reallocate some of the water. So they conducted a huge water transfer to the city of San Diego, San Diego County. And after doing that, the way they did that was they upped the efficiency of their water use, which meant they lined their canals. They reused tail water that ran off the fields to irrigate again and became very efficient. That also meant the water went to crops, not to Salton Sea.

So Salton Sea has been shrinking. And what we’ve been showing is that there’s increasing dust pollution as a result, and that dust pollution disproportionately affects disadvantaged communities in the region. And so water– great adaptation to climate change, but there’s risks with reallocating water. And then groundwater, and I think in the near future, the implementation and whether it’s implemented of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act is going to be the key driver of agricultural change in California.

So this figure over here shows the potential land flowing in the Central Valley as a result of the need to pull agricultural production out to reduce water use, to meet sustainability goals under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. So the blue on the right is without trading. The dark blue is without trading. The light blue is with trading. And so there’s going to be a reduction in farmland acres, and with that, a loss of agricultural jobs.

Reallocation of cutbacks using some form of market will reduce the economic effects. So the low-value agriculture will sell their water to the high value agriculture. There are key empirical questions. There’s not a theoretical answer. There’s key empirical questions of how these affect some of the equity goals you might have– maintenance of– wells for small communities, which size farms lose their water or gain their water and so on.

There’s some evidence that for certain– and to what extent do markets– we know that they’re going to increase value because that’s what they’re designed to do. To what extent do they increase or decrease the amount of agricultural jobs? These are all empirical questions because we don’t know. Does the water switch from low productivity to high productivity, low labor force to high labor crops or not?

And so there’s a lot of open empirical questions to understand in groundwater. And I’ll just add as a concluding remark here that we’ve done some work on the history of irrigation in the US. And groundwater has really been the key throughout the country to climate resilience. So you see areas that were able to put in wells– like the areas that were affected by the Dust Bowl in the 1930s. See virtually no losses, even in the most severe droughts because they’re able to tap that groundwater year in and year out. And that’s going to be true in the Central Valley as well because that’s a key adaptation to climate change is the accessibility of groundwater. All right? Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Our last panelist, Dr. Julie Guthman, is a distinguished Professor Emerita at UC Santa Cruz and principal investigator in the UC Agrifood Food Technology Research Project. Her interests include California agriculture, alternative food movements, food and agricultural technology, international political economy of food and agriculture, environmental health, political ecology, race and food, and more.

And so some of her past books and publications include things like the Problem with Solutions, Why Silicon Valley can’t Hack the Future of Food, Agrarian Dreams, The Paradox of Organic Farming in California. So during my own PhD, that was a critical book that I read. Wilted Pathogens, Chemicals, and the Fragile Future of the Strawberry Industry. And Dr. Guthman received a PhD in Geography from here at UC Berkeley.

And she was the recipient of a 2023 Distinguished Career Award from the American Association of Geographers, as well as a number of other awards for her work. And so with that, I’d like to welcome Julie.

[APPLAUSE]

JULIE GUTHMAN: Thank you. I just retired, and I hear panel I think, OK, I get to sit. I don’t have to do slides. I have to get out of my sweatpants to be sure. So if you don’t mind, I’m going to sit here. Is that all right? OK. Thanks. And you can hear me. So Tim just mentioned a few of my books, and what I want to do today is position my thoughts in relationship to these three major research projects. Not the only research projects, but three major projects I’ve done over my career that really represent three different directions for California agriculture.

So what I’m going to do is just briefly review some of the findings, and then from each of those– and then do a little bit of prognostication for the future, for what it’s worth. So my first research– this feels loud to me. OK. OK. My first research project was on organics. It was my dissertation project that I conducted here at Berkeley. Now, it just went away. OK. I guess it turned out. And I did that research in the 1990s when organic had just evolved from being a more hippie social movement into more of an industry.

And at the time, I came in very empathetic to agroecological practices and still am, but as I found not a lot of organic growers, particularly those transitioning to organics, were really abiding by those practices. And I really identified two reasons for that. One is the whole system of regulation that developed around organics, about which I could talk for a very long time– but namely, standards and certification really encourage the least common denominator of organics.

And so a lot of– particularly the newer growers would find inputs that could substitute for their disallowed inputs in organic systems. But the other thing is it was really hard for organic growers to escape the legacies of industrial agriculture in California, and that includes high land values that keeps coming up in all of my research projects because crops are– I mean, agricultural land values are based on what kind of crops you can grow there.

And so over time, land values have become very high. Plus, with all the urban pressures on land values as well. Use of marginalized labor– this is how– this is also baked into organic agriculture. Low wage, politically marginalized labor. Crop specialization for historically– California agriculture was divided into different zones, where you’d grow different crops, and different marketers developed around those crops.

And so growers have worked with particular marketers and particular crops, so that’s anathema to a more diversified farming systems. So lots and lots of like legacies of industrial agriculture have made it really hard to do agroecology just because of these common existing relationships. But that said, I mean, some farmers have shown us a different path. And those that– and there’s quite a few organic growers in California. And those that are farm truer to agroecological ideals tend to have to really break those constraints in different ways.

They may farm in areas that are lower land values out of the main agricultural zones. They may have more diversified farming systems, and so that allows them to employ labor differently. Still often low wage undocumented workers, but maybe there’s more variety in the work patterns. They sell differently. They’ll sell– they sell more to restaurants and to direct farming to direct market. It’s like farmers markets and CSAs and so forth.

So and their own commitments have made them farm differently. So organics has been a mixed bag. Lots of industrial organics, as I’m sure you’re aware of, but lots of people showing different way. And even those who practice industrial organics at least are reducing their use of toxic pesticides. So the organic movement and industry has shown us better ways to farm– not perfect ways to farm, but better ways to farm.

But right now, it’s only 9% of farmland in California, which is actually quite significant compared to the US, which is only 1% of farmland or less is an organically produced crops. So that’s all I can have time to say about organics for now. Industrial– so as an agrifood scholar, as an agrifood geographer, I’ve studied and taught a lot about the history and political economy of industrial agriculture, and particularly in California.

My most intensive direct research on this topic has been a project– was a project on the strawberry industry and its dependence on highly toxic soil fumigants. So soil fumigants are used before you plant any crops to kill soil borne pathogens. And because farmers– fumigation was widely adopted in the 1960s. And it allowed farmers to grow strawberries that are very prone to pathogenic organisms.

They allow them to grow on the same blocks year after year, rather than rotate other crops around or just give the soil a rest. So fumigation really, really intensified the strawberry industry and allowed it to become the industry it is today. You saw on a slide that it was the seventh major crop in California. At one point, it was up to number four. Other things bestowed advantages to California strawberries. The coastal climate which creates this eternal spring, so strawberries can keep growing for a very long season.

It’s a three-week season in Massachusetts. It can be a 10-month season in Salinas or Watsonville and Santa Cruz County. The use of fumigants, of course, allowed the industry to intensify a breeding mechanism built in for productivity. Again, marginalized labor. Strawberry harvesting is one of the worst jobs in California agriculture. If you’ve ever driven through strawberry country, you see people running through the fields with crates because they’re paid on piece rates because the growers say that’s what the workers like.

But the workers like– only the workers that can pick fast enough to make a good wage actually like that at all. But it’s extremely intense labor. So they’re paid on piece rates, and that means as much as they pick they can get a decent wage, but it’s not a full time wage. So they end in five hours. Anyway, so all these things that bestowed all these advantages to the strawberry industry have now turned on their head.

Oh, yeah. And I already said it’s an intense pesticide regime. So there’s now tighter restrictions on these soil fumigants, and I’m actually working on a committee that’s sponsored by the Department of Pesticide Regulation, looking at maybe further restrictions on two other fumigants, which is totally freaking the strawberry industry out. Labor shortages– I mean, when I was doing my research five or six years ago, growers were bitterly complaining of labor shortages. And the labor shortages exist in part because they don’t want to pay decent wages but also because of our strict border policies.

And we’ve all been following the horrific news this week, and this is obviously going to get a lot worse. Land prices and shortages– there’s only– strawberries do really, really well on the Coast. They don’t do so well elsewhere, and the coastal land competes with housing. Strawberries are often seen as the last crop before housing. So that’s bearing on that. And climate change is bearing on the strawberry industry as well. And particularly hotter climates bring in those– the salt or make more salinization in the soil, but also make the strawberries less resistant to these soil-borne pathogens.

At the same time, it’s really hard to change these practices. Not because there’s a lack of options or ways to grow strawberries differently– and growers do it. They do it through very diversified systems. But again, these expectations of the monocropping of strawberries, which are a very high value crop, are built into the land values. So the system’s baked in. OK. Next project, my most recent project that gave birth to the problem with solutions– was on Silicon Valley’s interest in food and agriculture.

And I got interested in Silicon Valley’s forays into food and agriculture while doing the strawberry project. They were talking about introducing soilless substrate as a substitute for soil because soil was hosting these pathogens. They were talking about robots as a fix for the shortages, labor shortages, and they still are. But silicon– so that’s what got me into the project. And that was a big collaborative effort.

So the question became, what could Silicon Valley bring to agriculture writ large to a sector that’s long been subject to technological innovation, including innovations like soil fumigants that have caused all these problems? And it’s interesting because the Silicon Valley techies were all saying, oh, agriculture is under-invested, and there’s not enough technology here. It’s like, are you kidding? This is like one of the most technically– agriculture is highly technical, particularly in California agriculture. The technologies have come often from the land grant universities, not from the techies, who I’m really particularly mad at right now for all the reasons you understand.

So the tech people were, at least– at the beginning felt like they were presenting a third way. They used the language of sustainability and of course, disruption. Presumably wanting to disrupt big bad ag, but in practice, most of the technologies that Silicon Valley has brought to bear are either uninteresting or are completely far fetched, like protein made from air. Seriously. I should have brought the slides. I can show you that stuff.

Anyway, or they are really much more of the same in terms of supporting industrial agriculture. Federico mentioned these digital technologies. Digital technologies provide information. It’s great that they can provide information to farm workers, but they’re also providing information to farmers that are supposedly supposed to make things– encourage them to reduce their pesticide use. But that hasn’t borne out.

I mean, what farmers need to reduce pesticides, for example, are better treatments or to be able to rotate their crops. Information technologies don’t do that. And I could say a lot about alternative proteins, but that’s just completely different ball of wax. And it turns out that a lot of the startups are getting bought out by big agribusiness, and that’s what they are looking for anywhere. They want their exit. And so Silicon Valley is not very disruptive at all. Oh, God. I just– oh, I’m just so angry at them.

[LAUGHTER]

So given these dynamics, what is the future of California agriculture in my opinion? Well, it depends. It depends on how much of the existing fixes are going to continue to fail. That’s what my last book was about. These solutions are problems that create new problems for new solutions and new problems. They fail. How much the public resists and asks for something different?

I mean, when you do see major changes in California, agriculture is often come from the public. The specifics– how this Trump administration is going to play out, particularly the deportations. Obviously, so much hinges on that. But my crystal ball says that with– that, basically, things are going to be more of the same. Drawing from a little bit of each of these past technologies to create the future. So I think industrial agriculture is really cheap.

And one of the reasons that some of the Silicon Valley technologies have not taken off is they actually can’t compete with that cheapness. They’re banking on the system to fail, and it actually doesn’t fail very easily because it’s subsidized in all sorts of ways. And the tech sector, again, is just delivering more intensification in partnership with incumbent corporations– basically replacing or trying to– maybe usurping a little bit what universities have been doing.

But no, I don’t think we’re going to be eating food created in vats or meal in the pill again because I don’t think it can compete yet with the cheapness of industrial agriculture. And I do think the alternatives will continue to thrive. I mean, there is a significant alternative food sector that creates great food, in my opinion, sells beautiful produce– farmers market, et cetera. Raises cows differently– I like all that stuff, but it still depends on high end markets.

And so basically, there’s no regulatory or state mechanism to drive widespread adoption. So it’s all depending on people willing to pay more for their food. And what’s interesting about juxtaposing the organic sector from the tech sector is organics have gotten so much attention over the years. Everybody talks about organic food, but it’s still a small percentage. While the tech people, they got money thrown at them to do silly stuff.

So in short, no, I don’t think the new technologies can save us. We have to– we have to find ways to address the long-term legacies of industrial agriculture that are built in, are baked in. We have to find ways to address highly valued land. The use of politically vulnerable labor, specialized marketing arrangements. So we really can’t address any of that without some pretty dramatic policy changes. And we all know that and here we are. Here we are in this moment in 2025 trying to hold on to a sliver of humanity. So that’s not a very optimistic look, is it? But there you have it.

[LAUGHTER]

[APPLAUSE]

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Thanks so much, Julie. We’ve heard about so many of the challenges– water, heat, justice for farm workers, land values, the lock-ins that keep the legacy of industrial agriculture in its place here, constrain our options for change. And I think at least one thing is clear. There’s not an easy pathway forward. I certainly have plenty of questions, but I don’t want to be selfish. So let’s open it up to our audience. And my first hand I see is back there. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: OK. Good afternoon. My industry specializes in consulting for cannabis in Northern California. And since this seminar is about the future of agriculture in California, I didn’t hear you mention cannabis at all. Just a rough cut. What do you guys think the future is? Crystal ball.

JULIE GUTHMAN: Take that briefly. I mean, the future is now. We’re already seeing the similar dynamics. Is a lot of the Industrial players are kind of– now, it’s legal. Now, the industrial players are taking over and squeezing out the craft producers, who were growing in Humboldt forests years ago. I mean, that’s what I know. I don’t know a lot about it, but I think that’s already happening.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: So many questions. [LAUGHS] But I will just say this one first. I guess certain people within the government would say that the future of agricultural labor lies in H-2A visas. And I wonder, maybe a brief explanation of those is worthy for the conversation. But I am curious about both your opinions of H-2A visas, but also whether they objectively could fill the gaps that certainly are going to come with much greater restriction on immigration.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: I could just say something quick about that. These visas what they do is they formalize, so to speak, in theory, in the paperwork sense. There’s a person who comes in with a particular contract and then performs a contract for a particular amount of time and then leaves. In theory returns and so on and so forth. Of course, the devil is in the details here.

Number one is what are the conditions that you leave that you actually you’re dwelling, but you are here? Housing for farm workers is a disaster to put it mildly. It’s actually an embarrassment. I have been on many– farm worker conditions in the Northern Central Valley. And it’s just that it’s unbelievable that folks live under these conditions, right?

Peeling paint with lead, critters of all kinds, shapes and forms, but water quality, sharing kitchens on families, et cetera, et cetera. I mean, it’s just a water quality is very bad. The buildings are not up to code and so on and so forth. So you’re bringing an H-2A visa folks to live under these conditions. Then there is not much change here, except that the person has a paper, and in theory is not undocumented.

So I have interviewed several farm workers, who have these visas. They place them in big hotels. So they basically– a labor contractor gets the whole 100 rooms in a motel in the Central Valley, and they live there. But again, they are living five to a room and so on and so forth, so the conditions are not that good. So I don’t think that those visas solved the problem in terms of quality of life. And if we want to see any precedent to that, that will be the Bracero program, which was a visa type of situation, where my wife’s relatives came with the Bracero program, and most of them passed away, but they tell a lot of very ugly stories when it comes down to entering the United States and the living conditions.

So I think that the visa program if done properly, yes, because you come with a contract guarantee salary and so on. But the living conditions and so on and so forth, in my opinion, are not necessarily there because of the visa program or that particular program. That’s just my– yeah. I don’t know if that helps. You want to say something?

JULIE GUTHMAN: We should take another question.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: OK. Sorry it took forever. Sorry.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Red shirt, right here.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. I’d like to thank the panelists. I’ve learned a lot today. And I also have a lot of questions. Federico, I’ll hit you up later. My question is for Eric. And you talked about groundwater, and my impression– and I can be very wrong on this. Is that a lot of the groundwater is ancient from aquifers, and it’s not really sustainable. Am I mistaken about that? Is groundwater a sustainable resource?

ERIC EDWARDS: So in California in general, yes, but basins vary. So for instance, in the Central US, the Panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma is over the High Plains or Ogallala Aquifer. That’s basically fossil water. So everything they’re pulling out– maybe a tiny bit of recharge. But there’s no way to make it sustainable and do agricultural production.

In California, a lot of the Central Valley aquifers are recharged from the overall hydrologic process coming off the Sierra Nevada. And they could be managed sustainably. They’re not in part because it’s difficult to reach agreements among all the users in a basin on how to do that. And so what you see is and– but it’s very spatially heterogeneous. So what you see is these areas where there’s rapid depletion.

And what a hydrologist will tell you is, yeah, those– essentially to get the water levels back up, you might have to wait 100 years. So the scale of our lifetimes maybe some of those are being mined essentially down, but other areas manage recharge. There’s much more potential to bring things into sustainable management. But I think overall, especially South of the Delta, there need to be cutbacks across uses to bring them back into sustainable levels of use.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Up towards the back there I see a black sweater maybe.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. We’ve talked obliquely about the federal government, but it strikes me that the state government is actually really, really important in all of your presentations. And it seems like– I really appreciated you saying, oh, Sacramento is good at creating regulations. They’re really bad at enforcing them, right?

On the one hand, they’re really good at enforcing at least somewhat the rules around pesticides and strawberries, right? Labor regulations, terrible. And so it seems like the real question about sigma and its eventual impact on California agriculture really comes down to, do you think the state will actually enforce it? It seems to me like the real unifying question for all of your presentations is, is California going to continue to have the get rich now strategy, or are they going to try and enforce regulations that would make California agriculture more sustainable?

ERIC EDWARDS: I guess I will just address that Sigma aspect. I think there is an open question of whether there’s a stick and so to speak of getting different basins to collectively manage their groundwater. And I think in some sense, the way Sigma is set up will make it difficult in the long run for California to enforce things because they’ve essentially said that basins get to choose what sustainability means.

But then they have an extensive set of rules that define what sustainability is. So be it’s not going to be clear IS a basin in sustainable use or not, which will leave a lot of questions unanswered. I think in my own research we’ve looked at what are the drivers of difficulties in managing groundwater basins across the US and across the world. And fundamentally, it’s that there’s just a lot of heterogeneity in what people want to do with the water.

And what you see with Sigma is what you see in a lot of cases, where you get fractionation across these basins. So you have one groundwater basin, but they split off into different groups, who want similar things. And maybe within their group they can choose we want to pump this much. We want to pump this much, but they’re trying to manage the whole basin together, and that makes it very challenging. I think the opportunity of sigma is to figure out a way to compel some negotiation and forced agreement, but whether that or how that will happen– I’m like, I’m with you. I’m not optimistic that it will be enforced in the way that I think that creators of the law intended.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Just one quick editorial. So also we have to keep in mind that regulations have trade offs, and the cost of regulatory compliance will fall disproportionately for small and mid-sized producers. And it’s also harder for non-English speaking farmers to comply. So regulations, part of the mix but not everything. Sorry. I saw this hand here with the blue sweater.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question– I’m curious all your takes, but I think Julie would feel more impassioned about it. But I think we’d all like a future, where cost of this alternative food market is accessible and also regionally more accessible. But I wonder, what are your takes on– do you think that somehow in some mechanism, like, reducing the cost to grow food in a better way will actually be like one of the end solutions to improving its uptake or improving Consumers’ Perspectives on it, for example?

JULIE GUTHMAN: Well, sure. I mean, it has to be both from the supply and demand. I mean, if people have better wages, they can afford it. But I mean, the fact of the matter is that alternative systems are more expensive. For instance, if you’re using a diversified farming system, or you’re growing strawberries that way, you have to rotate it. Broccoli works really well as a fumigant, but broccoli doesn’t get as much in the market as strawberries do. So you have to rotate broccoli.

So the only way to break– maybe not making those kind of ways less expensive to grow but making– it’s like industrial agriculture is very cheap to grow, and it’s cheap because of the water subsidies. It’s cheap because of the subsidies of our immigration and border system. It’s cheap because of– it’s not cheap because of land. So it’s cheap because of the University has provided technology, not for free.

I mean, there’s patents, but develop the technology. So I think it’s really about finding the cheapness of industrial agriculture that’s the problem for the proliferation of alternatives. So I mean, that’s one of the things that’s so interesting to me about tech. Is that they think we need new technologies. We actually have the technologies. We know how to do this. We don’t have an economic system that supports it. I mean, I’m not saying there’s not things that you could develop that would be useful from time to time, but it’s not a technological problem. It’s a social– economic problem.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: This might be unfair, but I was dying to ask your thoughts on technology. This might cause a shock in the room, but I’m a dual major in agriculture and CS here, so my biggest question is how do we understand small farmers with diversified systems and try to make their lives a little bit easier if possible? So I’m curious from the perspectives and stories of you all. Is there a way we can make technology do that? Just help in any way, or should we focus our resources elsewhere?

FEDERICO CASTILLO: I just wanted to add something to the issue of breaking the logjam between supply and demand and cost and this and that. I’ve been doing some reading about institutional buyers, for example. So that’s one way to increase demand. Schools, districts, and the Farm to School Program, The Department of Defense– we don’t know Donald Trump– what’s going to happen there.

And other big large buyers could very well help to break this logjam, where there is not enough demand for products that are produced under our ecological system. So they could start demanding good quality food for our school kids, for example, which is something that can happen. But also the prison industry and so on and so forth. So that would be one way that probably some of the costs because of economies of scale could come down, if that applies for some particular crops.

I want to say about technology and small farmers. It is very difficult for a small farmer to adopt a technology, particularly if that technology is strictly tied to farm size. For example, irrigation systems. They are very proportional to the acreage, so you cannot buy more piping than you need or whatever. But for example, you look at– the other day I was looking at a apple harvester– a machine that actually goes along farm trees with suction cups and with sensors picking the right thing– the right apple.

Turns out that thing is 90% efficient. I saw it at a video during a conference at UC Davis. And it’s 90% efficient, but farm workers are 98% efficient. So they’re still not good enough against the farm worker. But when it becomes available. Say, suppose the machine becomes 98% efficient. It’s just definitely going to be a small apple growers– this thing costs money. It has patents. It’s just crazy to adopt. And so I don’t see a small farmer. So it really depends on the technology. So we have to be mindful of that.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: We have time for one more question. I think there was somebody maybe in the middle. Yeah, here. Had your hand up for a while. Yeah.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. It was a very informative talk. And I’m a layman in the issue, but the two– all three of the panelists mentioned labors repeatedly, and I had two questions related to the labor issue. Number one, what is the labor productivity in the agricultural sector, particularly the industrial sector, compared to other economic sectors? And how is it trending through the ages? And what are the predictions on that?

And the other one was when– I’m quite old, as you can see. When I was young, we heard a lot about the unions in the United Farm Workers. What is the unionization environment today in the agricultural sector? Thank you.

ERIC EDWARDS: I’ll just make a quick point, and that is from a historical perspective. That first year, wheat year, I put up, probably over 50% of the labor force at that time would have been employed in agriculture. And in California today, it’s probably less than 3%. And so with substantially more production and more valued of production today. So maybe more than almost any other industry, agriculture has moved away from labor towards other means.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: I would agree with that. Technology has become far more– I mean– for example, you take onions. Used to be harvested by hand only. Now, you have some onion harvesting machines out there. Lettuce is another case. So of course, cotton, and tomatoes needless to say. But again, I think more and more agriculture will be more capital intensive if that’s the word to say here– more machine intensive, if you will, over time.

There are some crops that I don’t envision, right? Watermelons, for example. I just don’t see a machine picking big watermelons and putting them in crates or even the small– I don’t know how to call it the small melons, the water ones, the pink ones.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Cantaloupes. Cantaloupes.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: Cantaloupe. Yes. Thank you. And so more and more– yeah. Historically, it has been declining. Absolutely correct. But we can see it in some of the crops. Citrus is by hand still. I don’t see citrus being mechanized anytime soon. But grapes are. Grapes are now becoming more mechanized. The trend is– the writing is on the wall.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can I abuse the fact that I have the microphone in my hand to ask a follow up? So policy regulation came up, but at– what you’re all pointing to is that for there to be actual change, something different needs to happen. And the question about unionization, I think, is pointing us there. What kind of coalitional politics do you see being possible? I mean, obviously, undocumented labor is quite politically vulnerable. What kind of coalitional politics are in the mix here to push things? Because it’s not going to come from the top down. I don’t think.

FEDERICO CASTILLO: Well, it’s interesting. I’m sorry. I have to say this. When you look at the legislature, the California legislature today, I was talking to a member of the California legislature some time ago. And this person pointed out to me that the California legislature– meaning the state Senate and the assembly– were run by folks, White folks from the Coast– LA, San Diego, San Francisco folks were running the show.

Nowadays, you have far many more members, who are not White, who are Brown folks, mostly Latino and Latina members, who are from the Valley, from Imperial Valley, or from the Central Coast, whose parents were actually farm workers. There’s quite a few of those– or whose parents were janitors or something like this. So I think it doesn’t mean that these politicians are going to be more friendly to whatever it is that the farm workers go through, but they certainly are aware of the issues that janitors and farm workers go through. It’s not that they are not majority now, but some of them are president pro tem of the Senate or whatever.

So I think that there is a potential for a different kind of understanding between the policymakers, and the unions, and others in California. Of course, Oklahoma or whatever is a different ballgame. But I will say that at least, here, there is a potential for that kind of coalition, given the composition of the state and the [INAUDIBLE]. Yeah.

TIMOTHY BOWLES: Let’s thank our panelists and Social Science Matrix….

[APPLAUSE]

[MUSIC PLAYING]

WOMAN’S VOICE: Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

 

Matrix News

Applications Open: 2025-2026 Research Teams, Iris Hui Memorial Scholarship

MATRIX-SPACE-REDUCED

Social Science Matrix is pleased to present two funding opportunities: for Matrix Research Teams, and for the Iris Hui Memorial Scholarship.

Matrix Research Teams

Application Deadline: March 14, 2025

MATRIX-SPACE-REDUCEDWe are now accepting proposals from faculty, students, and affiliated researchers for Matrix research teams for the 2025-2026 academic year. Matrix Research Teams are emerging research communities who gather regularly to explore or develop a novel question or growing field in the social sciences. Successful research teams integrate participants from several disciplines, address a compelling research question with real-world significance, and deploy or develop appropriate methodologies in innovative ways. Ideally, all research teams — whether faculty- or student-led — will also involve members of diverse ranks (i.e. faculty, post-docs, affiliated researchers, and graduate students) from the Social Sciences Division (and can include members across the university). Research teams are expected to use their funding to support their community-building and research activities and to support Social Science Matrix’s goals of advancing transdisciplinary research and fostering connections across campus. Faculty-led Research Teams can receive funding up to $5000. They run for one to two semesters, meeting at least 8 times around a defined research problem. Student-led Research Teams will receive funding up to $1500. Coordinated by one or more graduate students, they will meet regularly, around 5-10 times over the course of the academic year, and explore an emerging field — a new area or question of inquiry — and assess whether it has potential for further investigation.

Learn more

Iris Hui Memorial Scholarship

Application Deadline: March 31, 2025

photo of Iris HuiEstablished in 2021, the Dr. Iris Hui Memorial Graduate Student Scholarship honors the vision and goals of Dr. Iris Hui, a PhD graduate of Political Science from UC Berkeley. Family and friends raised funding for this memorial scholarship in Dr. Hui’s name to support researchers and students tackling issues that meant so much to her — urgent, real-world problems facing all of us, including the governance of natural resources, climate change, political empowerment, and migration. As a former graduate student herself, Dr. Hui understood how funding like this can benefit graduate students. Social Science Matrix is honored to be chosen as the institutional home for this memorial scholarship, which will be distributed to awarded graduate students each summer. The maximum award amount is $1000; amounts may be less than requested. Applications for the research funding are accepted each year until March 31st. Money will be given to students as a stipend upon award. We anticipate being able to award 1-2 awards each year, depending on the amount of the awards and funding availability. Awards will be announced by June 1st each year. Eligibility: Applicants can be at any stage of the PhD process, and must be enrolled in any department in the Social Sciences Division of the UC Berkeley College of Letters & Science. Students are eligible to receive this grant once during their graduate studies.

Learn more

Global Democracy Commons

Making Sense of the Elections of 2024

Part of the Global Democracy Commons initiative

The American election closed out a year of momentous elections. Almost two decades on from the financial crisis of 2007 that helped unleash a wave of authoritarian, populist, and nativist movements in global democracies, a range of social and political forces have reshaped political processes around the world.

What do the election results of 2024 tell us about the health or fragility of global democracy, and how might we better understand the outcome of the American election as part of a broader global process?

Recorded on November 21, 2024, this panel featured a group of UC Berkeley scholars discussing the 2024 elections, with perspectives from different parts of the world. The panel featured James VernonHelen Fawcett Distinguished ProfessorHistory; Alison PostAssociate ProfessorPolitical Science; Trevor JacksonAssistant ProfessorHistory; Aarti SethiAssistant ProfessorAnthropology; and Kwanele SosiboLecturerArt History.

Presented as part of the Global Democracy Commons initiative.

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to the presentation as a podcast below or on Apple Podcasts.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

JAMES VERNON: Hey, everyone. Good afternoon and welcome. Thanks so much for coming on an utterly horrible day, which is maybe fitting for what we’re going to be talking about this afternoon. My name is James Vernon. I’m a professor in the history department and I’m the director of the Global Democracy Commons, which is the group on campus, which was organized this event. Now, it seems at the moment that every few weeks, we have an announcement launching a new initiative or program aiming to buttress American democracy and, dare I say, liberal understandings of it on this campus.

That’s not the purpose of the Global Democracy Commons. Our starting point is rather different. It is that the Euro-American model of liberal democracy has always been as much about containing the demos as emancipating it, and we are keen to remember the ways in which Euro-American democracy was always inseparable from settler colonialism, imperialism, slavery, and capitalism.

So while we’re interested in many of the issues that we’ll be talking about today, like the rise of authoritarian populism, neoliberal capitalism, and the planetary emergency, and the ways in which these phenomena have created a new crisis of democracy around the world, we’re also equally interested in the new forms of political mobilization unleashed by those phenomena.

We believe that some of these new forms of politics that we see arising around the world provide opportunities to realize the radical and unrealized promises of democracy to help us materialize a commons that could ensure our collective well-being. We aim to understand and propagate those approaches to democracy rather than believing scholars at Berkeley know best what democracy is or who should have it.

So the Global Democracy Commons is funding three collectives, which consists mainly of faculty, graduate students, and undergrads who are working with a variety of groups beyond the Academy to realize different histories, practices, and visions of democratic practice. The three labs at the moment have their work located in Guatemala, the Caribbean, and India. In addition, we have a Scholars At Risk program which is supporting the development of an English language version of the political diary podcast about Russian politics by the two elias Matvick and Brustofski, who are visiting scholars here at Berkeley.

And finally, we also have a monthly podcast exploring the way that universities around the world are being targeted as spaces of critique and protest, including, of course, here at Berkeley. All of these activities are traced on our website, demos.berkeley.edu. So please do get in touch if you’re interested in being involved or you want to discuss future projects. Now, let’s turn to why we’re actually here this afternoon, not to listen to me, but to listen to these wonderful people.

I hope it’s clear from what I’ve already said, that the Global Democracy Commons was not set up to study elections or to equate our understanding of democracy simply with the conduct of elections. Nonetheless, what a year we’ve had, and there have been some momentous elections all around the world, including in the largest democracies in the world, like India, Mexico, and the United States, all of which we’ll be talking about this afternoon.

In many ways, these elections allow us to see some of the ways in which political alignments and democratic practices have been restructured since the apparent global triumph of democracy in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union and then the financial crisis of 2007/8. So to make sense of all of this, we’ve put together these wonderful people, who I’ll now introduce. Let me just briefly say before I do that how this is going to work is I’m going to ask them a series of questions that they’re going to respond to.

They’ll be in conversation with each other. We’ll probably try and do all of that in the next half an hour or so. So there’s plenty of time for you to join the discussion, ask them questions, and for us to hear the ways that you understand the developments that we’ll be discussing. So I’m going to start. We’ll go down the row. We’re going to start with Kwanele Sosibo, who’s a freelance writer and editor, currently working as a lecturer at UC Berkeley’s History of Art Department. He’s a journalist by profession.

Sosibo started out as a freelance arts writer for various publications in Durban, South Africa, and he later worked at the Mail and Guardian in Johannesburg, covering beach ranging from labor to arts and culture. He was the arts editor at the Mail and Guardian between January 2019 and April 2022. Sitting next to him is Alison Post, who is an associate professor of political science and global metropolitan studies.

Her research, which has been funded by almost everyone on the planet, examines urban politics and policy and other political economy themes, including environmental politics and policy, regulation and business government relations. She’s the former chair of the Latin American Political Economy Network and the former president of the urban and local politics section of the American– section of the American Political Science Association.

Next to Alison is Trevor Jackson, who is an assistant professor of history and political economy. He’s an economic historian with research interests in crisis, inequality and occasionally catastrophe. So he’s well placed to speak here today. His first book, Impunity and Capitalism, is out from Cambridge University Press, and he writes about money, banking, and the financial crises for places like Dissent, The Nation, and the New York Review of Books.

And then finally, at the end, there is Aarti Sehti, who is an assistant professor at the Department of Anthropology and the associate director of the Global Democracy Commons. She’s a sociocultural anthropologist, primarily working in South Asia, and she has two projects on the go at the moment. The first examines cash crop agricultural economies to understand how monetary debt undertaken for transgenic cotton cultivation transforms intimate social and productive relations in rural society.

And she has a second project called Republic of Readers, which explores the relationship between reading, literacy, and libraries as sites of postcolonial democracy and citizenship. OK, I’m going to sit down and then get this conversation started. And I want to just go down the row here and briefly get everyone situated with the part of the world that you want to talk about this afternoon.

The outcomes of the elections in that country this year, who won and lost, and how far those results signal something changing or something staying the same in the political conditions. So I’m going to start with the momentous 30-year year test of South African democracy post-apartheid.

KWANELE SOSIBO: Yeah, so I think in a large sense, even as these elections were pretty momentous, I think one can kind of think of the situation in South Africa as largely unchanged as of now. I think the machinations of the election results, which for the first time saw the– which for the first time since 1994, saw the ANC fall below 50%, and not just below 50%, kind of hover at the 40% mark, kind of signals that something momentous is to come.

But the last 30 years have been basically characterized by a stasis of some sort in the sense that at the very beginning of 1994, the so-called post-apartheid period, the ANC found itself having to make many concessions in terms of with the former apartheid state and the interest that it represented, the population groups that were served by those interests.

And so, for example, CODESA, which took place in 1992, in which– from which came out a negotiated settlement, found it created a situation where mining, for example, land redistribution, mining, agriculture, and quite a lot of the financial sector remained in white hands. And that’s been a situation that it’s basically managed through the past three decades.

Some have characterized it as a compradorian sort of party, in essence, in terms of what it was handed and the maneuvers it could make largely because of larger geopolitical sort of happenings around the early ’90s and so on, the fall of the Berlin Wall and what that meant economically worldwide. So with it falling below 50% now, part of that is a manifestation of people’s frustrations on the ground.

But largely, it’s a part of it’s sort of internal erosion as well, which takes shape or is best represented here by the rise of a party called the MK, which styles itself after the moniker of the ANC’s liberation wing. Now, that party is now helmed by the former state president whose name is Jacob Zuma. So the party’s seemed to mushroom right under people’s noses, so to speak, right at the cusp of the election.

So it kind of took a lot of people by surprise, but maybe people who have been kind of watching the attrition of the ANC and its cannibalizing of itself internally weren’t surprised that this happened. So it’s unknown what the results of that will be because, in a way, it’s still partly a manifestation of the ANC just kind of going into disarray. But the rhetoric around this party has kind of caused a lot of people on the ground who are desperate for change to latch on to it as some kind of a vehicle that will take them there.

But obviously, local government elections are coming up in 2016. That’s where the chips fall. I think that’s where maybe we’ll start to see what decisive changes could take place, because what happened with this government of national unity in which the ANC was forced into coalition with the main opposition, which is a white-led party, the Democratic Alliance, was– and other smaller parties as well, was an attempt to circumvent this kind of rising up of the MK.

And I guess in Kwazulu Natal, where the MK is– actually stole a lot of the ANC’s ground and a lot of the other parties’ ground and almost got a 50%– 50 plus 1 majority, missed it by probably a couple of percentage points in that province as well, which is strategic and key because of harbors and so forth, the ANC was able to galvanize the other parties again to circumvent the MK, which only won 15% of the vote nationally.

But in KZN it represented a bigger threat. So they’ve been able to keep it at Bay. But nobody knows as of yet how that situation is going to unfold.

JAMES VERNON: Brilliant, brilliant. Thank you. Alison.

ALISON POST: Thanks. I’m going to be speaking a bit about the Mexican presidential election, which took place in June of this past year. What we saw in that election was the election of Claudia Sheinbaum, who is the hand-picked successor of the prior president, Manuel Lopez Obrador, commonly known as AMLO, from the Morena party. They want a very decisive victory against the PAN, which is the right of center party and a smaller left wing party. Presidential elections just take place every six years in Mexico, and there’s no possibility for re-election.

So this was essentially an election in which AMLO was anointing his hand-picked successor. And it was really a landslide, a landslide victory for Morena with 61% of the vote. At the time, Sheinbaum was the sitting mayor of Mexico City. Morena is emphasized as a left of center party in the Mexican context. At the same time, Morena won a really commanding number of seats in Congress, both in the legislature and in the Senate, and is now in a position to institute or pass constitutional changes following this election.

The results really signal continuity in the Mexican context. Sheinbaum is very much seen as carrying forward AMLO’s program at the moment. She hasn’t done anything yet really to indicate that she’s departing from that. Morena has been in power since 2018, so it’s looking like it’s going to be quite long run. Lopez Obrador had had very high approval ratings throughout his administration.

And now with this new increased control in Congress, the party is in a much better position to move forward with the program they have been advocating for since 2018. So AMLO has been an economic populist, pushing for increased role for the state in the economy, as well as for a movement towards more majoritarian control of political institutions for the country.

So he has been proposing, and these reforms are now moving forward in ways that we’ll talk about in subsequent questions that James has mentioned about unwinding and weakening alternative power centers outside of the executive. So things like the independent electoral commission, the judiciary, regulatory agencies, the press, et cetera.

JAMES VERNON: OK, thank you.

TREVOR JACKSON: OK, well, my remit is Europe. And I mean, one thing about Europe is there’s a lot of it, and it offers us a wide variety of different ways to think about failing. And so I think most of the– to kind of sum together many of the things that I’ll describe, I think we can imagine most of the elections over, not just this year, but the past few years in Europe as a repudiation of a prior politics rather than a coherence around a new one. Just by way preface, I think I would also say that as far as I could tell today, since 2021, there have been 54 national elections in the world, and in 40 of them, the incumbents have lost.

Even among those that the incumbents haven’t lost, there are different ways to lose. So one such example is the case of France, where Ensemble, which is, I think, the third rebranding of Emmanuel Macron’s party that he invented a few years ago, remains in government. But absolutely, every interpretation of that election is one of a repudiation of his party. In the first round, his party came third behind the front popular and behind the right wing coalition.

The actual election was the result of 311 constituencies having three or four candidate run offs, which is the most that has ever happened. And so his party was able to survive, but only through a series of tactical voting, largely on the side of the left to keep out the far right, thanks in no way at all to Macron’s own. So, OK, there’s a case of an incumbent staying in, but it’s still clearly a repudiation of his politics.

The other political story of 2024 was, of course, in Britain, where after 14 years of utterly murderous misrule, the Tories were annihilated and wiped out to their lowest level, I think, in the history of the party. Keir Starmer, the leader of Labor, has already seen his approval ratings utterly collapse. This was a repudiation of the Tories, not so much a move towards some sort of durable new Labor politics. If we’re able to step back a couple of years, another example that we might point to is the case of Italy, where Mario Draghi, former Goldman Sachs executive, MIT economist, chair of the European Central Bank, had led a government that he was appointed to.

They were wiped out. And now Giorgia Meloni is the leader of the Brothers of Italy Party, which has emerged as the largest party in Italy. They are an explicitly far right, xenophobic political party. Somewhere like Spain, the government survived, but at the cost of completely restructuring the governing coalition. Germany has been the great exception to the story of instability in European politics over the last couple of decades. And we have just now seen their governing coalition collapse, and they’re going to have elections next year.

So a great deal of instability. And I think maybe to pick on a couple of already obvious threads, a story in which attempts to form coalition governments have unraveled and a great deal of difficulty reconstructing some sort of political center.

AARTI SETHI: So I am going to talk very briefly about India, as we– this was a very, very significant election for many reasons. It was an election following on the last two elections in which the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is the party led by the current prime Minister Narendra Modi, had won– had done what no party had been able to do before him for the last two decades, which was an era of coalition politics in India, and had managed to take his party, the BJP, which is a far right Hindu nationalist party, to a kind of landslide victory in the parliament.

India has 543 seats, and so the BJP emerged as the single largest party in both those elections and which means that it could rule singlehandedly without the support of any other parties, which has been rare, which has not been the case in India for the last 25– 20 years, actually, almost three decades. And so it was very much an election.

And these last 10 years have consolidated Modi as a populist, charismatic leader, as a leader who, in a sense, goes it alone, much like Trump, where the party falls in line behind the leader, as a man who is able to command a kind of cross caste, cross class presence, someone who has concentrated the power of the executive into himself.

And he’s widely credited with, in a sense, running a parliamentary democracy, like a presidential– like a presidential system where he is where, in a sense, not just material power has concentrated on the prime minister’s office, but also symbolic power in the figure of Modi. And so this election was touted as one in which Modi would prove after Nehru that he was going to be the first prime minister after Indian independence, after Nehru, the first prime minister of India, who would win a third term and be in that sense, the longest running prime minister of India.

And that has happened, but certainly not in a way that the BJP expected. All exit polls, basically, which turns out were rigged, predicted a kind of landslide victory for his party. But that landslide victory did not happen. The BJP has come back to power. He is the prime minister, but the BJP and its allies suffered a very decisive blow. So the BJP has come back to power, but they have had to come back to power in a coalition government for the first time since they have come to power in the center.

And more importantly, and what is significant about the election is that it has dented– and this is probably its biggest gain– it sort of dented Modi’s image as an invincible man who cannot be defeated, because that is what the last 10 years of Modi rule seemed to suggest, that he is a kind of Teflon prime minister, that nothing he does can shake his sort of preternatural hold over the mind of the Indian electorate over the Indian polity.

And so this kind of shock and awe mode of running a government where the mishandling of the COVID crisis, the demonetization of the Indian economy, the successive worsening of the living conditions of most Indians, the extraordinary exacerbation of social inequality, the kind of crony capitalism, intense corruption in the government, that all of this– despite all of this, Modi’s kind of charisma is unshaken.

And what this election has done is to shatter that. It is to basically say that Modi is not a prime minister who cannot be defeated. And so prior to the election, he made the claim that he was fighting– There? Are 543 seats in the parliament, and that he was personally fighting on all 540. And so when the BJP has lost, and it especially lost in some of its key holds in the North, it’s seen as a moral defeat of the prime minister.

And that, if there’s anything that has been achieved, we don’t know actually what the long term outcomes will be. But this is– it is significant. It’s significant for this kind of reason, the sort of symbolic shattering of Modi’s power.

JAMES VERNON: Great. That’s brilliant. And we already have lots of overlapping themes between you, which is really great. So let’s try and make sense of these shifts that you’ve all been talking about, which with the exception of Alison and Mexico, seems to cohere to this story that Trevor was suggesting of a sort of revolt against the incumbent. Yeah, however entrenched in power they are as the ANC or the BJP.

So what’s your reading of how we understand that type of revolt, if it is a revolt against an incumbent? Are we thinking that this is– that there’s a political analysis here, which is about people’s exhaustion or loss of faith in the institutions of government and of democratic processes in and of themselves? Or the other frequent explanation proffered here is that there’s a materialist explanation, which is people are hurting, whether you’re in a country that produces stuff or you’re a country that consumes stuff, you’re not having a great time.

And so there’s a clear attempt to vote people out of office because people are having an economically hard time. I’m interested in how you would all try and figure out what’s happening, both in your own cases and in others. And because Mexico seems to be the sort of exception in terms of the incumbent revolt, let’s start with Alison.

ALISON POST: Yeah, I mean, you could even think about AMLO’s victory in 2018 as representing perhaps that shift that you’re describing. So the 2024 election really was kind of an endorsement of– a popular endorsement of the approach that he had been developing over the previous six years. The Morena’s support base is comprised primarily of the working class, younger people, rural areas, Indigenous populations, as well as those who had placed themselves on the ideological left.

So in some sense, this is a support of that program, of those groups. His overall policy program has focused on addressing poverty. And in fact, a number of new social programs were rolled out that contributed to satisfaction with his performance, although in comparative terms, I would say the Mexican economic performance has really been middling and hasn’t been by any means outstanding in the Latin American context in his administration.

But in particular, the rhetoric that Morena has used and that AMLO has used is really sort of an anti-system rhetoric that maybe we could tie to these other cases. So it’s very much of a us versus them. We are the masses versus the elites type rhetoric, which he exemplifies in his personal style refusing to use the presidential plane, reducing salaries, his own salary, those of top bureaucrats, railing against the conservative media.

And then looking for ways in which to elevate popular opinion but in a way that is not necessarily systematic in the same way that we might have an election. So for example, structuring ad hoc referenda on public projects and then canceling them. So for example, there was a long running construction project for a new airport for Mexico City. They put that up for referenda.

It didn’t win, and so they went to instead expanding an existing military airport instead. So arguably, taking decisions where the public didn’t necessarily have full information, putting it out to public vote, et cetera. He’s also elevated, very visibly, the role of the state vis a vis foreign investors. So strengthening state-owned enterprises by restricting opportunities for foreign investors in those areas, sometimes in ways that conflict with his own government’s environmental objectives.

So, for example, giving more control to the state electricity monopoly in the generation space when it was foreign investors bringing in the green investment into that sector. But the kind of broader picture is consistent with this kind of anti-system, anti neoliberalism approach that represents a repudiation of prior approaches.

And I’d say the final example of that is turning to the sort of an emphasis on nationalism that we see in things like turning to the military to perform functions that wouldn’t necessarily have been traditionally performed by the military, like managing public works projects or turning the war against cartels away from state level or municipal police officers to the military.

JAMES VERNON: Brilliant. Kwanele, do you want to talk about where you think that the– taming is the wrong word, but the shrinking of the ANC base, what’s motivating because it’s been going– this isn’t the first election. It’s been a progressive policy– a progressive trend, but this election seems to have been a decisive moment. And I’m wondering if you have any thoughts about what’s driving that.

KWANELE SOSIBO: I think we can think of what’s happening as a nannying of the ANC in some way because the coalition sort of called the Government of National Unity, largely supported by the DA, which is the biggest opposition party, the white-led party with the large white constituency.

So I think in a sense, like the ANC’s lack of controls over its cadres, which it’s deployed in various government departments and so on. And that sort of deployment of cadres was a way of dispensing patronage within the party. I think that sort of deteriorated through a lack of accountability and a lack of recourse to people who were plundering the public purse.

And, of course, ANC factionalism also led to a further entrenching of patronage as a system of keeping factions in place. But that lack of governance also allowed, I think, private sector interests to thrive in the health sector, in the education sector, in the energy sector. So it was kind of good for business interests that the ANC kind of was in collapse.

A couple of years ago, I think maybe probably 15 or so years ago, there was the emergence of– with the emergence of Jacob Zuma, who kind of– I think, his presidency represented a little bit of an upsetting of that cozy relationship between ANC and business to some extent in the extent that he allowed new people to enter the fray. Much has been made of his relationship with, for example, the Gupta family, a kind of oligarchic family from India with interests in different parts of the world.

Much was made of how that was a kind of a steep descent into the pilfering of the public purse for personal interests and for interests of this family. But that represented a kind of– maybe a departure with cozier relationships, say, with established capitalist interests with Mbeki and so forth. So I think, by and large, that led to a capturing of very key strategic resources in the country, and they fell into the lap of Zuma and his cronies.

And so what I think you have with the emergence of Cyril Ramaphosa in 2017 is an attempt to remedy that, to steer it back to the usual course, which, by and large, kind of overarchingly structures this relationship between the ANC and business and obviously has colonial roots in and of itself. So I think that’s maybe how you could characterize the GNU in its current state.

But what you also have is because of this lack of governance is huge agitation on the ground from the poor masses and so forth. And that has tended to take the form of xenophobia. Like, for example, everybody, everybody, every party smaller than the ANC campaigned around xenophobia. And xenophobia in the sense, it takes on many forms. But one of the form it takes on is it’s obviously brought on by corruption within Home Affairs, which allows the borders to be porous in a way.

So this large influx of people from the SADC region and in fact further afield even provides a very sort of cheap labor pool, which– and I think in the South African case, it’s not a case of people at the bottom of the economic ladder don’t want to take on these jobs. It’s more like these people are open to be exploited by South Africa’s largely very developed, sort of capitalist markets, which can absorb them into service industry jobs.

And they get exploited quite treacherously. But the capitalist class obviously exploits this. But I think it’s also now coming to bite because it’s obviously starting to lead to huge, huge tensions on the ground. So I think that would be a characterization, I think, at this point, yeah.

JAMES VERNON: Great. Trevor or Aarti, do you want to comment?

AARTI SEHTI: So one of the interesting things about this election is that the way it’s being read by commentators is that economic issues are back on the table in a very big way. And what Modi’s kind of rise to power had seemed to do was to consolidate– and this was his kind of creativeness as a politician, ever since his days where he began as chief minister in Gujarat, was to consolidate a Hindutva, a kind of Hindu identity, which was a cross caste identity.

The political scientist Christopher Jaffrelot, has a very persuasive reading of the rise of Hindutva. And he has essentially– has this description, which is that from the 1990s onwards, one can look at the terrain of Indian political life as a kind of contest between middle and lower caste assertion, a kind of democratization of Indian politics and the Indian political field that happened after the demise of the congress.

And the mandal, which was a kind of reservations for middle for middle and backward castes in jobs and government jobs and government educational institutions and so on in the early 1990s, where a new constituency actually entered into the structures of Indian political life, who had, in a sense, been marginalized through the era of Congress dominated politics.

Which the Congress party was– post-independence Congress party very much was a kind of clientelistic umbrella party which worked through local landed interests across the country. And this shattering of Congress dominance through the 1980s and this new kind of democratization is where then you have the era of coalition politics beginning. You then have liberalization.

And this upsurge of these middle and backward castes was viewed with a great deal of worry and anxiety by the RSS and by the BJP, who have– whose entire political kind of project is based on creating a seamless Hindu identity. And that Hindu identity has been created through all kinds of mechanisms, extraordinary polarization of public and social life, the continuous demonization of Muslims and minorities, Christians.

The kind of tentacular efforts of the RSS and all of the BJP-allied Hindu organizations through society. All of this created a– very successfully, Narendra Modi was able to exploit this Hindu– this kind of massive rightward movement of Indian polity along with these new aspirations brought on by liberalization in which the economy opened and opportunities expanded, but for a very small elite.

And all of this sort of comes to a head in the mid decades of 2014, by which time you have a lot of disaffection among many classes of people against an incumbent Congress government, which is seen as having created jobs for a small minority along– and Modi is able to mobilize this resentment and cast it in this– alongside this very potent cocktail mix of Hindutva and class and caste resentment.

That has, in a sense, shattered. And it’s shattered because over the last 10 years, this mix, in a sense, has– the limit of that kind of politics of his has been made evident now in this election, which is that this cross caste identity that the BJP had created has– caste is again back on the table in a very big way.

So all of this rhetoric of India moving forward– because this is what got a lot of people to vote for him, this idea that he is an outsider against the elitism of the congress, that he’s a man of the people who comes. He’s a speaker. He’s a doer. He is– connects with the dreams and aspirations of ordinary Indians against these elite– the elite of New Delhi and the Congress party.

His cozying up to big business, all of this created a– has, over the last 10 years, alienated very large numbers of people. And so the social compact that he had managed to create, The contradictions of that social compact, of radical joblessness, of crony capitalism, of– and so his rhetoric this time, which was one of the most communal campaigns India has ever seen, didn’t work.

And so even though the entire campaign of the BJP was aimed at stoking kind of resentment against Muslims and minorities, people finally voted again, in a sense, in a normal way, which is that people voted on what are called pocketbook issues in India after, we could say, 10 years of aberrant politics. Now, whether that sustains, we don’t know. But that’s the kind of broad terrain.

JAMES VERNON: So, Trevor, how does the nativism in Europe align or misalign with the material challenge of– challenges there?

TREVOR JACKSON: Well, so I think three things about this. And the first is that I think we are now something like 15 years into a giant global crisis of political legitimacy that I think I imagine will get to the fallout of the 2008 crisis, but that, I think, began then. And that has had the effect in some cases of a crisis of political legitimacy of politics as such or of political systems as such.

But I also think that it means that legitimacy has been up for grabs and that– on to the second point, that legitimacy seems to have been something able to be seized, not necessarily by new political movements that reflect existing material divisions, but that are able to reconstitute or reinvigorate or create new forms of political subjectivity, that we’re seeing the emergence of new types of identities that are able to be articulated, almost all of which have turned out to be exclusionary and xenophobic and racist in some way.

And it seems to me that most attempts at the creation of a new– well, of egalitarian universalist left political subjectivities have been defeated, either through the complicity of the center with a far right or perhaps because they’ve sometimes failed to articulate a new vision that they’re trying to, like, recreate a left subjectivity from some moment in a lost past rather than recognizing the current situation. And so it seems that there’s been a much more successful effect around constituting new political subjectivities that are in some way exclusionary and xenophobic.

That does and doesn’t map on to the actual material inequalities and realities. And that brings me, I think, to the third point, which I’m a historian, I’m going to reference books from the past, in his 1993 book, Politics and the People, our chair of this panel proposes that we can think about elections as a kind of text to be read and a text that is written. And it’s a text in which voters act out some imported melodramatic narrative that they think that they’re living through.

And one such narrative possibility is a romance, and not a romance in a, well, romantic sense, but a romance in the sense of some self-fashioning and overcoming the constraints of society, the kind of hero’s journey. And it seems to me that political movements that have successfully implanted themselves in that way have won in ways that others have not, that the performance of not being bound by social rules seems to be something that voters respond to.

And so we get these weird things where these political leaders seem to be able to do things that we would have otherwise would have thought to be impossible and seem to not face consequences for things that we would have previously thought would have been annihilatory, but nevertheless, there they are exactly because the performance of not being bound is something that seems resonant to people.

JAMES VERNON: Yeah.

AARTI SEHTI: I completely agree with you, Trevor. And what is interesting about the rise of the BJP– and I would really be interested to hear what others who are working on these other– in these other contexts, Mexico, South Africa feel about this– in India, we’ve seen in the last 10 years or– yeah, in the last 10 years, I would say, a massive transformation in the imagination of the relation between the state and people.

Till about the early 2000s, there was this kind of rights-based framework had emerged in which the state welfare was part of the social compact of citizenship, this is kind of Yamnaya. She writes very interestingly about social policy in India, and she has this– she’s written this very interesting paper where she talks about a kind of new techno patrimonialism as the mode now of– and this is what we see in India– where it is not– it is because the post liberalization economy has been so unequal and has left out most sections of Indian society.

India is one of the most unequal countries in the world. Only like 10% of the population controls 77% of national wealth. And 1% of the population controls 40% of national wealth. And so. This kind of India’s kind of growth story of 7% GDP growth a year and so on is one that has essentially been a jobless, unequal kind of growth.

Now, the response, strangely, of the state– and it’s not strange, it’s an interesting development– is that instead of investing in the creation of public goods like health, like education, skills, infrastructure, there has been– and this is the kind of rise of this whole technology, that the state now relies on cash transfers to the poor, what are called direct benefit transfers.

So the people no longer are seen as rights bearers who have a claim on the state, but as beneficiaries of targeted schemes, women, youth, unemployed. So the people now are a population of direct– of beneficiaries, which in a sense, flows from the generosity of the leader.

And it is in this context then that Narendra Modi’s charisma also for the last 10 years has devolved on this intense publicity of him as the paternalistic leader who gives the Indian people things his face on every COVID certificate, his face on every scheme, cooking gas subsidies for Indian women, and so and so scheme for Indian youth and so and so scheme.

It’s this kind of scheme-driven politics where everything seems to flow from the paternalism of the leader in this kind of technocratic mode of governance. And all of these bureaucrats who see themselves as technocrats. What this election was interesting was that lots of people began to say, I don’t want 2,000. rupees What am I going to do with 2,000 rupees?

I don’t want 5 kilos of grain. Like, 5 kilos of grain is not going to feed my family for even a month. I want a job. We want a job. Why don’t they fix Health Just one last thing, if you look at the career of a party called the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi, which came out of nowhere, it’s kind of civic party that came out of nowhere in the last 10 years, what they did was they said, we will fix schools and we will fix education.

And so that’s what they did. They fixed the schools and they fixed the education, and they have managed somehow to retain power at the level of the state because they have articulated a kind of welfarist agenda in the face of this decline of welfarism and the rise of this kind of techno patrimonialism what I would be interested to see post this election is if this older imagination of the state and citizens as having a right on the state for the creation of public goods has a way to make–

If that is again a political– if parties can continue to win– begin to win on a welfarist agenda again as opposed to this kind of technocracy that has come into being under Narendra Modi, where it’s personalized and himself and he has this direct address through cash benefits to individual voters.

JAMES VERNON: I’m going to ask you one last question, you all, because I’m conscious of how quickly the time is. So let’s try and keep it brief. And it’s really to pick up on the election that we’ve all just lived through in the US, where the rhetoric of the crisis of democracy was claimed by all sides. And this seems to be a common feature in all of the elections we’ve seen around the world, that democracy and the protection of democracy is variously interpreted but constantly articulated.

And so I wonder whether you have any thoughts about what’s actually going on there and whether there’s anything useful that we can say about the way in which democracy is invoked to defend what’s up for grabs.

KWANELE SOSIBO: Yeah, I think, firstly, to just to Aarti and Trevor, the romanticism around Zuma is kind of that he’s also been indestructible and he’s emerged after all of these attempts to go for his jugular and he’s emerged victorious. I think that’s part of his popular appeal. But to talk to the crisis of democracy, I think in South Africa, it often feels like the populace, voting or non-voting, it’s often been characterized by large so-called apathy.

But I don’t think it’s apathy. I think it’s really people grappling at where to go and what to choose, given the options that they are facing. It often feels like nobody is really up to the challenge of what the society presents and everybody is kind of using. Electoral politics as a way of looting the fiscus and kind of re-emerging as the singular political figures.

So I think, like 2021, when there was a looting sort of spree that was sparked by Jacob Zuma, kind of absconding from the state capture commission of inquiry, where he was kind of like being brought to account for the plundering of the state through this cronyism and his association with this oligarchic family that had entrenched itself into the South African state, I think what we witnessed there was one man’s ability to mobilize millions of poor people.

And the death toll of that event, which a lot of people forget, was in the region of about 500 people or so. So it was kind of on the scale of June 16, 1976, when young people were actually marching on legitimate grounds and catapulting the downfall of apartheid. But here you kind of have this party hemorrhaging from inside, and it leads to such a dastardly catastrophe, which kind of reshaped society in immeasurable ways.

It kind of brought to the surface racial tensions that had been simmering for a long time and going unchecked. It also brought into to the fore the enclavism that is at the heart of South African society, you know, the rich can always retreat to estates and big fenced walls and are armed to the teeth and they can kind of emerge and wave their guns when the situation calls for it.

And when you look at what do people have to gain and what gains do we have to show for 30 years of democracy? It’s really like next to nothing, yeah.

JAMES VERNON: Alison.

ALISON POST: Right. So I think in the Mexican case, what we see are two– this is simplifying, of course– but two quite different views of what constitutes democracy and how to achieve it. And we need to think about that against the backdrop of 20th century Mexican history, which was characterized by essentially one party rule within the context of regular elections where the PRI was always going to win. That was clear to everyone. You had opposition parties running, but the electoral victory of the PRI was just always understood that was going to happen.

And for a while, as a big tent party, they spanned much of the ideological spectrum. And it’s as you move into the 1980s with neoliberal reforms that you see these divisions developing between the technocrats who are educated in economics departments, the United States and the more traditional politicians. And at that point, you have a left of center party that breaks off. AMLO is one of the leaders in that shift, that party system, and then to eventually transition a Democratic transition in 2000 at the National level in which the center right party wins against the PRI.

And during that period of one-party rule, things like the press were not independent. I mean, they were on the payroll. Most major journalists were on the payroll of the party. Fraud was used, not always– it wasn’t used in a way often that was decisive in elections. The PRI typically won the majority of the votes outright and just padded it a bit so it looked like an overwhelming victory. But there’s a history of a sense of democratic institutions aren’t necessarily Democratic, particularly in a context with very high levels of inequality historically.

And then López Obrador in particular has a number of unsuccessful runs for the presidency before he actually wins. And he is convinced that there has been fraud, absolutely convinced that the National Electoral Institute did not administer the elections fairly. And so he builds up a new party that’s coming from a grass roots, more of a grass roots base to essentially challenge the existing system.

And so now what you see is this tension between that view of democracy, which is very much we need to challenge the existing institutions and party structure because they’re associated with this old regime with elite control, et cetera, with another vision, which is championed more by members of the middle class, educated groups, professionals, et cetera, which actually has a lot of faith in the institutions that have been developed post-transition.

In particular, this National Electoral Institute, which was pivotal in terms of facilitating the transition from one-party rule to democratic competition post 2000. And so now there are a set of constitutional reforms, some of which have already gone through, others of which AMLO simply proposed prior to leaving office that represent shifts or potential shifts from the sort of view of democracy that involves checks and balances and independent institutions kind of constraining each other towards a more majoritarian system, which is what AMLO and his movement is moving for.

And so things like. do we popularly elected judges rather than have them be chosen on the basis of professional experience and these sort of things? And that has recently gone through the Supreme Court, the move towards popularly electing all judges. They have just– in October, a new constitutional change went through that stops courts from reviewing legislation passed by Congress. And so there are a number of other proposed reforms, things like taking all of the independent regulatory agencies and moving their functions to line ministries, as well as taking–

Making the electoral officials within– basically changing the institutional structure for managing elections such that electoral officials are elected rather than being kind of an independent board that oversees elections. So it’s a lot of shifts that are kind of removing checks and balances that have certain constituencies very concerned. So just these two very different competing notions of what constitutes democracy against a very difficult history in which you really had elections, but they weren’t really free.

JAMES VERNON: Either of you want to have a very quick word on this?

TREVOR JACKSON: Just very briefly, one of the striking things about the past few years is that although there’s a great drama of these incumbents losing elections and a lot of the characters are kind of larger than life, that obscures the way that many of these elections are the result of very low turnout and some large degree of democratic disaffection. So, OK, there’s a dramatic shift in Britain, but that was the lowest turnout election thus far this century. And Giorgia Meloni comes to power in 2022 in Italy, and the lowest turnout election in post-war Italian politics.

And one way of reading the 2024 American election isn’t that it was a stampeding victory for Donald Trump and the Republicans. It was that it was a turnout collapse for the Democrats. And I think we’ve probably talked a lot, you’ve probably read a lot and heard a lot about all of these shifts of different demographic groups from Democrats and Republicans. Well, that’s a shift of the people who showed up to vote. And another way of reading this is that a whole bunch of people who showed up to vote in 2020 didn’t in 2024.

And one way that we might interpret that, which kind of picks up on some of the elements of my co-panelists here is that, well, look, the Democrats were trying to put together a coalition that, in their words, ran from Chomsky to Cheney. Well, that is itself already a failure of some sort of Democratic process to set aside the formalism of the Democratic process of not having a primary season.

If you’re in that kind of world, at some level, repudiation of that is a repudiation of a larger set of Democratic failures that have already happened and, I think, a repudiation of a willingness to believe the claims of the threats of democracy being in peril, that I just think if the Democratic Party genuinely believed that Trump was the end of American democracy, they would not be or, at least, should not be handing over the reins of power and authority in the way that they are. And so that makes me think they just don’t take it seriously.

And if they don’t take it seriously, well, then it’s hard for me to be mobilized to a politics that then would put me in the same political party as, like, a Bush era war criminal.

AARTI SEHTI: I mean, the–

JAMES VERNON: Very, very quick, Aarti.

AARTI SEHTI: Yeah, very quick, India is actually a intensely multi-party system because it’s a federal country and there are very, very strong regional parties. So very quickly, one of the things that happened in the last 10 years with the Modi regime was it appeared as though federalism is under great threat, this kind of enormous centralization of the polity. And what, again, this election is doing is hopefully reigniting and creating, again, a kind of coalition government where the BJP will be forced now, we hope, to be in coalition with strong regional parties.

So that’s one thing that is unique about India is the fact that it is a multi-party system. There are very strong regional parties which the party at the center has to make compacts with. The Modi era was, again, an aberrant era after the Congress, that is, where they didn’t have to do that. And I think Democratic opening will hopefully mean that this era of coalition governments actually comes back again.

JAMES VERNON: Great. We have time for questions, and I have a mic that you have to hold in order to ask a question. Does anyone have a question? And do us a favor and tell us who you are when you ask your question.

AUDIENCE: Hi, I’m Nat Arutasi. I’m a post-doc in history. So I have a question. We talked a little bit about the material conditions, but I have a specific question about inflation. So a lot of Democrats here have been consoling themselves that all globally incumbents haven’t been able to prevail because of this force from without that’s called inflation that they can’t control. And so I know it seems that the Mexican case proves that that’s not true and maybe a little bit the Indian case.

I also think, you know, in Turkey, Erdogan also prevailed, despite rampant inflation there. So yeah, I’m wondering if you could reflect a bit about the role of inflation in these elections and if the incumbents somehow that prevailed were able to manage it better or just the role of inflation in general.

TREVOR JACKSON: Well, everybody looked at me.

JAMES VERNON: They all will have to answer. So go on.

TREVOR JACKSON: I think my answer to that is that across the board, voters say inflation was a problem, cost of living is a problem, we want this solved. I think, though, that too could have been something that would have been fertile ground or maybe in some cases was for a set of claims to who is a friend and who is an enemy and like how a political subjectivity is constituted. Inflation isn’t just a thing that happens. It goes somewhere. And I mean particularly in the US case, when you break down the sources of inflation, it’s housing, health care, food, and fuel.

Well, OK, that’s not just the weather that happens. There are some people benefiting from those things. A political movement could have cast those people as villains who were the result of everyone suffering rather than either claiming that this isn’t happening, which the only other post-election panel I’ve been on was with a bunch of political scientists who were baffled because they felt that real wages had increased relative to prices.

And so why were people upset? Well, maybe that’s true, but I’m not sure that has been the lived experience of most people. And instead, in absence of a clear narrativity that explains how and why this has happened and whose fault it is, well, then it’s the fault of whoever is in power.

ALISON POST: Yeah, I’ll just say briefly, I think it’s also important to think about how current rates compare to historic rates and the frame of reference that people are coming in with. And I would say that in the Mexican case, historically, perhaps there were higher rates of– the rates in this recent period weren’t as different as previous periods. So you see a huge distinction though between the Argentine case elections in November 2023 and this inflation there.

They’ve had an entire restructuring of the political system because the Peronists were– lost the support of the working class because of inflation. They had just become completely discredited by their inability to contain inflation in a way that they can make up for with social handouts. And that’s how that explains Milei’s rise in Argentina.

AARTI SEHTI: Oh, yeah, in India, inflation was– it was absolutely one of the determining facets of this election. And what also happened, inflation is very high, food inflation, cost of living very, very high, fuel inflation very high. And the opposition was able to use all of this to their advantage. A lot of their ads, for instance, centered on inflation and the cost of living.

But they were also able to basically use this to target the Ambanis and the Adanis, which was to basically create a narrative about how, while the cost of living for normal people was going through the roof and people couldn’t afford atti dal kabhaab, which is the cost of lentils and the cost of flour. The BJP was making massive handouts to the capitalist class symbolized in these two industrial houses. Adani and Ambani, who are– I mean, they owned Narendra Modi, was the kind of rhetoric. So yes, inflation swung this election, I think.

AUDIENCE: Yeah, thank you so much. Professor of political science at Temple University and based at the Berkeley Economy and Society Initiative this year. Yeah, this is just such a wonderful panel. And as I listened to the different countries that were brought up and these different kind of factors, is it about anti-incumbent politics? And then also hearing about limits of explanations on politics of identity or limits on the racial resentment explanation.

And so I guess I’m just– I don’t know if it’s more of a thought or a comment, but just thinking about then where are we going, like, in the future? Is it about– At the end, democracy was brought up. And I think in Africa, in South Africa case, kind of a lack of solutions. But then Alison Post, you mentioned, well, in the Mexico case, there are these kind of democratic institutions that might still have strength and kind of played a role, particularly if you look across time of where the Mexican kind of landscape is going to.

But then when we look at the American case, we see folks who are so disenchanted with democratic institutions that maybe they’re not even coming out to vote. So I guess my question for all of you, if you have thoughts about this, is, well, what’s the future if it’s not about necessarily the politics of identity or maybe the limits to the racial resentment– or I’m sorry, the economic explanations?

How can we think about where– are we just going to continue to have these different pathways? Or how can we think about what’s going to happen next? Yeah.

AARTI SEHTI: You want to go first?

JAMES VERNON: Well, I think what’s started to happen in South Africa is that how news is consumed and how issues are understood, that has started to shift in the sense that new technology has brought about new commentators and new ways of engaging the current situation. I think, for me, I’m encouraged just listening to the political analysis emerging out of young people.

And also, I think there’s been an emergence of parties, even though marginal in terms of how much they were able to gain, in terms of percentage in the election, how many votes they were able to get, what you do have is kind of like people kind of taking this huge political shift that is still kind of waiting to be seen in terms of what it transpires to be.

I think people are kind of stepping into that breach and kind of thinking about citizen power in a more egalitarian way. And also, I think South Africa also is lucky in that it possesses a lot of soft power. Its cultural outputs continues to have relevance globally, be it in fine arts, be it in music, and in other forms of expression.

And I think that sort of creativity can kind allow new narratives to emerge and kind of new ways of breaking out of the stranglehold of electoral politics.

ALISON POST: So just in the Mexican case, I could see two possible pathways and I have no idea which one is going to prevail. One pathway is you essentially see the weakening of these various veto players or constraining institutions in the Mexican case, and you move back more into this pattern of one party dominance that we’ve seen historically. The other scenario then, which is it’s not uncommon in the Latin American context, is that the hand-picked successor eventually separates herself or himself from the patron.

And Sheinbaum is a very different pedigree than AMLO. She has a PhD in a science field. She worked on the international climate change report. She could end up– once she has had sufficient space to develop her own support network and alliances, she may be able to shift in a way that allows her to divert the kind of train from the direction that’s currently headed in, which would kind of leave more room for political pluralism in the way we’ve traditionally thought about it in an institutional sense. And so we have to see how things play out over the next year.

TREVOR JACKSON: I’m going to be extremely brief because historians shouldn’t be believed about the future. And so instead, I will I’m going to pose a question to all of you, which is what resources exist, institutional, energetic, financial or otherwise, to build a kind of countervailing politics to the xenophobic, anti-egalitarian, exclusionary politics that we’ve seen emerge around the world? What resources are there to oppose that?

AARTI SEHTI: I mean, I don’t know actually what it looks like. I think the entrenchment of anti-Muslim othering is very, very deep now in India. I think there has been a kind of deep social transformation. It’s not complete. India’s 1.4 billion people, so really, any claims to be made about social forms are always contingent.

I think the way forward, if there is one, is to really, really focus on– is to focus actually on the material conditions. They are not sufficient ever, of course. I think that’s what the rise of the BJP shows us, right, this question, why do people vote against their own class interests? Well, because people desire many things, and one of those things is a sense of self and symbolic resources. And the BJP has been able to offer those to large numbers of people.

There’s a long history to why and what. I hope that, again, that the states– that politics will move to the states in a big way because each of those have very different histories. The Southern states have deep, again, rooted democratic traditions and maybe– and those have always been very strong and vibrant. But I think that the future of what democracy looks like in India is very much an open question right now. I don’t really have– I don’t want to speculate on that.

JAMES VERNON: I love the fact that Kwanele has asked us to think about art and culture as a domain where new alliances and new visions can be enacted. We have time for one last question, which is from–

AUDIENCE: Yeah, that was such a great way to end. I hate to drag it back down into the morass of a more detailed question, but so I wanted to pick up on some of what’s been said by the panelists. And so a lot of what we’ve been talking about is a revolt against incumbency. And I really liked Aarti’s periodization schema of going back to the 1990s, the post 1989 moment in which a lot of these parties that we associate with incumbents and a kind of anti-incumbency cycle really kind of gained traction and form and the kind of identity of their politics, particularly in India.

I’m thinking of the Congress in the US with the Democrats under Clinton and its aftermath. And there are lots of things, as we’ve been talking about, that unite these parties globally, not only their emergence and sort of reconstitution in this moment, but one of the things that is also sort of shared amongst them is a kind of revulsion and a kind of– and sort of Trevor touched on this a little bit, a kind of hatred of doing popular politics or being perceived to be as engaged in a kind of populism from the left in particular.

So I’m wondering why you think that kind of style and that kind of symbolism associated with earlier moments of liberal politics is sort of no longer– seems to be kind of no longer present or sort of no longer part of the repertoire or political vocabularies of these parties. I think in the Indian case, it’s really fascinating where one of the kind of galvanizing, symbolic moments prior to the last election were these marches that Rahul Gandhi took, right?

And it was this– it was a very direct attempt, actually, to reconnect with a kind of populist sensibility and a move away from the sort of critique of elitism that had sort of enabled Modi’s rise. So I’m curious why the kind of why the kind of hatred of doing politics or the revulsion of doing politics and sort of, is that a kind of future for these liberal center left coalitions?

AARTI SEHTI: Say something very quickly? India is interesting because voter turnouts are very, very high, very high. Almost 70% of its– it’s very high voter turnout. You’re absolutely right. I think one of the things that they are doing, especially the Congress, Rahul Gandhi’s marches were a way to re-mobilize, re-energize a Congress base where the cadre-based party had basically– its own internal structure had been completely, like– it had been decimated, really, over the last 20 years for all kinds of reasons.

But I think much of the energy and invigoration of the opposition in this election came from the opposition parties doing politics again, especially the Congress party, very, very much so. And Rahul Gandhi saying we’re doing– we’re going out to the people again. We’re rebuilding the Congress from the ground up. Now, whether they have– how successfully they’ve done that remains to be seen. But yeah, that was certainly what happened in this election as well.

ALISON POST: I would say in the case of Morena, they have actually a quite well-developed grassroots infrastructure that has really been helpful for them in terms of building up their electoral majority at the national level. And their form of doing that has been more of the politics you’re describing than the traditional grassroots type network that the PRI administered, which in some cases, involved vote buying and exchanges of favors.

And so there’s, in some sense, a part of the reaction against the system is a reaction against that old form of clientelistic networks. But Morena has been using grassroots mobilization in a different sense, in an effort to differentiate themselves and build up a popular support base that looks quite different than what the PRI was able to use over time.

KWANELE SOSIBO: So I don’t know if I’m answering your question, but I can say that, in the case of the MK, let’s take this party that’s kind of eaten what was remaining of the ANC majority, at the moment, it’s kind of starting to recruit, credible leaders from other formations to the left of the ANC, in particular the EFF. It could go either of two ways, right, because on one sense, you get the sense that it’s working backwards, right?

It comes out of this fissure of the ANC, but it suddenly realizes that there’s real people’s aspirations that are also in its hands, firmly in its hands now. And I think it’s starting to build structures and it’s starting to recruit certain people who are considered credible, particularly in terms of their political capabilities. So I think for some people, they do see a real opportunity kind of emerging out of this as a way of this party being somehow a vehicle to provide the opportunity for a new politics to emerge.

TREVOR JACKSON: I mean, I think–

JAMES VERNON: Try and keep it hopeful again. Don’t bring us down.

TREVOR JACKSON: Oh, no. [CHUCKLES] I’m going to fail at that, James. I think two answers that are related, and one is that the parsimonious answer is that these parties do what their donors want them to do. And in the Chomsky to Cheney coalition, the donors are not on the Chomsky end. They’re on the other end. They are opposed to doing those kinds of politics. And so for that reason, a party like the Democrats are happier being a losing party of capital than a winning party of Labor.

And their leadership– and this is the second reason– is more concerned about their power within the organization than the organization’s power in the world. And so these parties are also not only are opposed to doing popular politics, but they’re also implacably opposed to internal democracy and are very good at keeping out challengers within the parties. And so the struggle over the control of the Labor Party, ultimately resolving against internal democracy is a good example of that.

JAMES VERNON: And on that cheery note, can we give these people a massive round of applause?

[APPLAUSE]

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

 

Podcast

Gendered Violence in Insurgencies: Interview with Tara Chandra

Tara Chandra

This episode of the Matrix Podcast features an interview with Tara Chandra, a consultant and independent researcher who received a PhD in Political Science with a Designated Emphasis in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies from UC Berkeley.

Chandra’s research focuses on the intersection of gender and international security. Prior to beginning her PhD, she worked in foreign policy in Washington, D.C. She holds a Master’s degree in Global Affairs from Yale and a BA in Political Science from the University of Chicago.

The interview was conducted by Julia Sizek, formerly a postdoctoral fellow at Social Science Matrix, and focused on Chandra’s work on gendered violence in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. [Note that the interview was conducted while Chandra was still a PhD candidate.]

Listen to the interview below or on Apple Podcasts.

Podcast Transcript

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] The Matrix Podcast is a production of Social Science Matrix, an interdisciplinary research center at the University of California, Berkeley.

[JULIA SIZEK] Hello and welcome to the Matrix Podcast. I’m your host, Julia Sizek. And today, we’re speaking with Tara Chandra, who is a PhD candidate in political science at UC Berkeley. Her research focuses on the intersection of gender and international security. And today, we’ll be speaking about her work on gendered violence in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Thanks for coming.

[TARA CHANDRA] Thank you so much for having me. I’m so excited to be here.

[SIZEK] So let’s get started with sort of the big question, which is, where does violence against women fit into the larger battle between insurgents and counterinsurgents?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, that’s a great question. My research looks more at the changes that happen in targeting of women during counterinsurgency operations. And I actually find that counterinsurgents’ behavior and presence can increase incentives for insurgents to target women.

So contrary to kind of what’s out there, a lot of folks will say, oh, violence against women is an inevitable part of conflict. There’s existing research that shows in particular that sexual violence is not something that is inevitable in war. That — there’s a great article by Elizabeth Wood, “Rape in War is Not Inevitable.

And I kind of build on this considering other forms of violence against women, kind of expanding on the literature that has focused largely on sexual violence. And I find that there are changes both within conflicts over time — actors of the same ideological persuasion will decide to allocate resources towards targeting women at certain points in conflict, and less allocation happens towards those kinds of attacks at other points in conflict — and then also between conflicts where the actors are kind of the same ideological persuasion.

You see a lot of difference in both the kind of investment in the intensity of violence against women but also the kind of form that that violence takes. And so my research kind of investigates why that is. And then I find that it is largely dependent on the actor who is performing the counterinsurgency that can actually change the incentives for insurgents to behave in particular ways.

And just to give you a really quick example, I guess a couple of examples I can point to, we think of Boko Haram, for example, as a group that really targets schoolgirls in particular, right? In 2014, they abducted about 270 schoolgirls from a town in Northeastern Nigeria called Chibok.

And this was the really infamous– if you were kind of around, politically active or on Twitter in 2014, you would have seen Michelle Obama and Malala Yousafzai started the– participated in, I don’t know who started it, but participated in the #BringBackOurGirlsCampaign.

And so this idea that these girls– this was a group that goes around abducting schoolgirls. And a lot of people thought that this was a really natural behavior for the group to do, particularly because the group’s name, when translated loosely, means “Western education is forbidden.”

And so a lot of people thought, well, this is natural. This group doesn’t want girls to go to school. They’re targeting schoolgirls. But actually, if you look at just a couple of years prior to the Chibok abduction, only about half a percent of the attacks that the group perpetrated took the form of abduction.

And by 2014, when they did the Chibok abduction, that number had risen to almost 14 percent. So that kind of variation between different points of a conflict is what my research really focuses on.

And I find that what happened between 2012 and 2014 was that the Nigerian government really started to perpetrate a much stronger counterinsurgency mission, and that that changed the incentives on the ground and the strategic dynamics that the group was facing. And so they really had to change their resource allocation towards different types of attacks. And that was one of the things that they tried and actually managed to then undermine — the Nigerian government extracted quite significant concessions from them.

So that’s like a sort of a motivating example. Another case that I look at is Somalia, and I look at Al-Shabab. And that’s a group that also is sort of considered to be a group that really targets women. And they were incredibly repressive in the years prior to the African Union mission in Somalia.

AMISOM came in and did a lot of counterinsurgency to deal with Al-Shabab. And prior to AMISOM being really ramped up and doing kind of much more robust counterinsurgency, they were– the group was very repressive towards women.

There really particularly stories of how they would– women couldn’t leave the house without wearing an abaya, which is a particular kind of covering. But they were not they would not perpetrate sexual violence against women.

But once AMISOM came in and started to really challenge the group on the ground, it changed the dynamics for the group. And it really– actually, you could see the change in their behavior because then after there was a much more robust counterinsurgency, that’s when they started to do a lot more sexual violence.

So these kinds of things like why do these changes happen in the middle of conflict is kind of what my research focuses on. And that’s the– bringing in the relationship to counterinsurgency, I think is the kind of new piece of it that I’m bringing.

[SIZEK] Yeah. So this raises a question about sort of the nature of the dynamic between insurgency and counterinsurgency and how this has changed over time. You mentioned that Boko Haram changed their strategy from not doing these abductions to doing abductions.

So how have these theories of counterinsurgency and insurgency changed over time? And where does your research sort of fit into these understandings of counterinsurgency?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, I think– well, it’s interesting because I think one of the advantages of being the insurgent group is that you kind of can throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks. And so counterinsurgents, because they are national militaries or they’re representing international coalitions, they’re required to, in theory, abide by the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law.

And so they’re limited in what they can do. And also, just training an entire military operation is much more regimented and disciplined than being an insurgent, where they obviously do planning, but their training is much less disciplined than kind of what a national military would do.

And then thinking about even a doctrine for a military that’s as big as the US operation in Iraq. I mean, that requires a lot of planning, a lot of thinking, and then really shuffling down all the way to the operational– from the operational to the strategic to the tactical on the ground, what people are doing day-to-day requires a lot of training and a lot of discipline. And there’s a lot of work that goes into that.

So changing that last minute in response to what insurgents are doing can be quite tricky. And so that is why you kind of get this dynamic where you have counterinsurgents who are militarily much stronger than the insurgents just almost all the time.

That’s just kind of the nature of doing counterinsurgency. But oftentimes, insurgents have particular other advantages. And one of the advantages they have is that they can be much more nimble, and they learn and adapt much quicker than the counterinsurgents do.

They learn very quickly. And this is kind of part of what my research finds is they learn very quickly what the weak spots are for the counterinsurgent.

And so my research finds that, for certain types of counter insurgents, in particular, I find that counterinsurgents who are domestic actors — meaning like national militaries doing counterinsurgency in their own borders — they are much more susceptible to being undermined by insurgents based on gender-based violence.

So I think that there’s kind of like– I wouldn’t necessarily– I don’t know if insurgents have a theory of insurgency that they’re necessarily adhering to. I think they have a lot of advantages that they avail themselves of.

There’s a great quote in the field manual, the counterinsurgency field manual, which is what the US government uses now, I think, as it’s sort of like theory of counterinsurgency, which is insurgents succeed by sowing chaos and disorder anywhere. The government, or the counterinsurgent, fails unless it maintains a degree of order everywhere, right? So the bars of success for insurgents and counterinsurgents are also wildly different. So I think insurgencies are interesting from that perspective.

But in terms of changes of theories of counterinsurgency, there’s actually been a lot of development on that front. And what’s so interesting about studying this time period is that the development of the kind of contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine occurred during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. So it’s pretty recent.

And one of the really interesting findings for me was talking to interview subjects who were in Iraq in the very first wave of the invasion, so people were there in like 2003, 2004, and asking them kind of, what was your training, what was your experience?

And it was wildly different and much sort of– much less developed and much less robust than folks who served in the surge, which started in 2007. But if you talk to people who served in like 2009, they just had much more training, much more emphasis on culture, understanding the culture, understanding kind of social norms.

So I think, you know, the US government learned and developed that theory better over time, but it did take a while. And so this was kind of the, you know, the, like, winning hearts and minds theory, which is the broader overarching idea, is that you only win in insurgency–

–against an insurgency if you are winning hearts and minds of the local population, because you can’t succeed without the support and cooperation of the local population. And so this was the idea that you really need to– you can’t do it coercively. And so that really was developed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[SIZEK] So this brings us back to women as perhaps, famously, women who are in these villages while the men are out doing insurgency activities, become a really important player in this battle between the insurgents and counterinsurgents.

So what is valuable for insurgents to target women specifically? And what are the sort of mechanisms that you have identified in your work as to why they would want to do that?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, so the theory that I propose has two parts. The first is that the actor who is conducting the counterinsurgency matters a lot. And I will just briefly outline why I argue this and why I find support for this, because in Nigeria against Boko Haram, it was very clear that the Nigerian people had a clear expectation that their government should not only protect its own citizens from these kinds of attacks, but that once they happened, they should be able to retrieve the citizens.

So the fact that the Chibok schoolgirls, it took so long for them to be returned — and not all of them were returned — was a real challenge for the government politically because people had– its own citizens had this expectation, and the metric of success that they were using in determining whether they would continue to support the government’s operations, was– like, were they– did these– one of the key metrics was, are they going to get these girls back?

And on the other hand, if you look at something like the war in Iraq, there’s a lot of evidence that Americans had a very high awareness — this was something that I found just in polling data from the kind of mid 2000s — that Americans had a very high awareness of how many American soldiers had died in the Iraq War, but really low awareness of how many Iraqi civilians had died.

So it was very clear that the metric of success that the US government was using to continue to gather support from its own electorate was how many service members are dying in Iraq, not how many Iraqi civilians are dying.

So what I said earlier is that insurgents are very good at learning the weak spots of the government. And so I think — it became very clear in Nigeria that abducting schoolgirls and violence against women and girls was really a core tool to undermine the counterinsurgent.

On the other hand, in Iraq, it was clear that violence against civilians or violence against women wasn’t moving the needle so much for the US government as was violence against American service members.

And so in Iraq, instead of allocating resources to violence against women and girls, what you found was that Al-Qaida was more allocating resources to developing better IED, which are improvised explosive devices technology, that would— those are the things that you would see blow up on the side of the road and then American, like, armored personnel carriers or tanks would just blow up. And so they invested in developing more of that technology because that was the sort of weakness, as it were, of the US government.

So that’s kind of the first part of the theory, that these insurgents begin to understand that for different types of counterinsurgent actors, the incentives are different. And then I think if gender is going to be a salient means of undermining the counterinsurgent, it will then happen through, I argue, these three mechanisms.

And the three mechanisms are, first, what I call information transmission suppression. And this kind of relies on the idea that, when you’re the counterinsurgent, you show up to a place, and you don’t know who the insurgents are. Everyone looks the same to you.

And this is true even in a place where— even in a domestic counterinsurgency. If you’re the Nigerian military, you largely come from the south, you’re now operating in the north. The norms are different. You don’t know the local kind of— sort of populations’, like, social structures.

You don’t know who’s in charge, who’s who. And this is what political scientists call the identification problem, which is show up, and you don’t know who the counterinsurgent– or who the insurgents are. And you need to get information on who the insurgents are from the local population.

And that, I argue, is a really important— that kind of information sharing between civilians and counterinsurgents is a really important part of doing counterinsurgency well. And so it’s in the insurgents interest to prevent that kind of information sharing between civilians and counterinsurgents.

And so I argue that targeting women is one way that they prevent this information sharing. And it happens kind of through two sort of pathways. One is that women actually have got really different and useful information. And this is something that I think wasn’t obvious at first. I think a lot of these places where— I studied these the cases of Somalia and Iraq and Nigeria, you think that, well, it’s a kind of patriarchal society so do these women, like, actually know anything. And are they actually sharing this information?

And in every case, actually, I found that not only do women have different information, but that they are sharing it with either the insurgents or the counterinsurgents. So that in stopping that, if you’re the insurgent, kind of, sharing process between the insurgent– the counterinsurgent, sorry, and the civilians is really important. And I argue that targeting women can be, like, one pathway to that.

The other part of the information transmission suppression mechanism is that targeting women can make the population in general feel unsafe and feel less likely to cooperate with counterinsurgents. And that kind of leads into the second mechanism, which I call the “emasculation mechanism,” which is that women are often cast by the counterinsurgent as this special class of civilian, that they’re special, they’re vulnerable, they need — particular innocent. They need, really– they need to be protected.

And that targeting women can actually be a means of emasculating the largely male counterinsurgent force. And then on top of that, it also– the emasculation can be both sort of internally felt by the counterinsurgents, but also really emasculating them publicly to show the civilian population that these counterinsurgents can’t really protect you because look, here we come. And we can, you know– you can’t even protect the most innocent of your civilians. You can’t even protect the women. So what good are you as a counterinsurgent?

And if your a civilian making the decision between supporting, either overtly or tacitly, the insurgent or the counterinsurgent, you’re sort of messaging to them that you’re not going to get good protection if you go with the counterinsurgent, so that you might as well kind of stick with the lesser of two evils, even if it means supporting the insurgent group.

So that’s the second mechanism that I propose. And then the third is this idea of bargaining leverage, which essentially we find most clearly in Nigeria, which is that gender-based targeting — or sex-selective targeting, as I call it — can actually be a means of extracting concessions — material concessions from the counter-insurgent, and that can actually lead to battlefield advantages for the insurgent group.

So in the case of Nigeria, they abducted these schoolgirls and the government was just desperate to get these schoolgirls back. And it’s not something that’s public, that the government hasn’t publicly acknowledged, so these are kind of different reports of what actually happened. But various reports suggest that the Nigerian government paid millions of euros to get a number of the schoolgirls back.

They released high-level Boko Haram commanders from jail in order to get the girls back. Obviously, these are really important strategic advantages for the group. And your adversary is basically just handing them to you. And so that is one way in which, really, that selective targeting can actually materially undermine the success of the counterinsurgency.

So those are the three mechanisms as I propose them. And then I argue that, in order for there to have been actual successful undermining, all three of the mechanisms need to have operated.

And kind of the point of the theory is that these mechanisms are more likely to bite if you’re a particular kind of counterinsurgent. And that’s why I look at three different actors, who are different types of counterinsurgents.

SIZEK: So I think we can really understand how insurgents can benefit from attacking women or abducting women. And one of the questions that I have is, how do these groups frame it for themselves? Or, what sorts of evidence do you have to understand how they’re thinking about it, in addition to how the counterinsurgents are thinking about this?

CHANDRA: Yeah, it’s so challenging because first of all, it’s hard to interview insurgents. And I should also note that this project was conducted entirely virtually because of the pandemic, but also because, leaving those sort of real — very real constraints aside, I personally think as a researcher that it’s very hard to take insurgents at face value, because when they are making public statements, they know that they are speaking to multiple audiences.

They are speaking to the intelligence agencies of basically every major government. They are speaking to the government of the country in which they’re operating. They’re speaking to the local population that they’re trying to convince to take a particular perspective.

They might be speaking to other insurgent groups if they have rivalries with other groups. So it’s these– in even internal documents, I think it’s really hard to say that, “oh, I found this on a document, and therefore, this is what the doctrine is and it’s for x, y, and z reason.”

So that was one thing that made this project really challenging. And I used a method, a qualitative method called “process tracing,” in which essentially, what you do is say, OK, as a researcher, I cannot observe the actual mechanism or the process that I am claiming occurred. But let’s say it did occur, what would be the traces of that mechanism or the empirical fingerprints that I could find that would suggest that, that mechanism did operate as I posited it? So there’s a lot of sort of thought experi– or thought ex– what’s the word? Thought–

SIZEK: Exercise? Or experiments?

CHANDRA: Yeah, exactly. Like, staring at the wall thinking, if this happened, and what would I be able to see? And then you go and look for those things.

And I’ll give you a really interesting example of why I think you can’t just take it at face value what they say. Because in 2012, I believe, just a couple of years prior to the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in Nigeria, the Nigerian military/police had arrested some of the wives of Boko Haram commanders.

And Boko Haram, these commanders were very upset about it. And the leader of the group said something like, now see what happens to your women. And when explaining the kind of change that I pointed to between 2012 and 2014, where the attacks on abduction of — as abduction as a tactic really grew from half a percent to 14% roughly, I — people really, scholars really use that as a way to explain why that change happened, that, oh, these Boko Haram commanders wives had been abducted. And so this was a revenge. The Chibok abduction was revenge for the abduction, or the arresting of these wives.

And when I actually got into it and thought, OK, well, does that make sense? Even though the group is saying stuff like, oh, we’re going to take revenge on you, in their actions, is that exactly what I would expect to see if they were actually taking revenge?

And so I take issue with this, what I call the “revenge narrative,” because if you think about it, the timing is really far off, right? It’s two years later that they start doing abduction of schoolgirls. If you’re taking revenge, you wouldn’t think that they would wait two years to do so, right?

Then the other thing is that, they say their sort of threat was, “see what happens now to your women,” which would suggest sort of high-level military wives as opposed to schoolgirls. So I think you don’t really think like your women are some schoolgirls in a different part of the region.

And actually, as it turns out, they had abducted right around the time when they made the threat, some wives of local military commanders. And then they were— it’s unclear. Kind of, again, some of these things are not public, so there are different varying reports. It’s unclear whether the wives were eventually exchanged or not, but they did sort of follow through on the threat in a much more kind of immediate way.

And then the third thing that I think really calls into question, taking at face value what they’re saying, is if you think about this kind of revenge story, like, oh, we’re going to take revenge for you arresting our wives, there’s varying degrees of reporting on the preparedness of the group to actually perpetrate the Chibok abduction.

So some people say, they actually came to the school that night because they wanted to steal a brickmaker from the school. And they found the girls there, and they thought, again, because they’re insurgents, they, like, can throw things at the wall and see what sticks. They found the girls there, and they thought, oh, this would be good. Let’s just take the girls. And some of the girls themselves report that they didn’t— they came on motorcycles, and they had to call for big trucks to come when they realized there were this many girls unattended in the school. They had to call for big trucks to come.

So if you were actually– if you think about it, if the group were actually trying to perpetrate a mass abduction, I think they would know that the girls were there. They would know how many girls were there, and they would be prepared for— they wouldn’t have come on motorcycles. They would come on big trucks.

And so I think this is one sort of, like, a lesson of thinking about evidence in looking at what they do and what we would expect them to do if the theory that we were positing were correct.

Because if the revenge story were true, I don’t think this would have unfolded in the way that it did. And so that’s why I think it is really challenging. I look at different types of evidence. There are Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty International reports, where they actually interview people on the ground was super helpful for me. That was good kind of firsthand accounting of what happened. I think also, you look at what the group says, other types of reporting, journalists who are on the ground, and then kind of coalesce it all together to see how you weight the evidence in different– different pieces of evidence based on the biases that might– that those pieces of evidence might bring.

But I think it is a very challenging question to approach. But I also think we have to be careful when we just say, like, the group said that they did it for this reason, therefore, they did it for this reason.

SIZEK: Yeah, I think you also point out that there are sort of, like, strategic, planned-ahead attacks on women, and that there are also just sort of, like, convenient moments where a bunch of Nigerian children appear and can be abducted, which also makes me curious about the sort of, like, convenience versus costliness of attacks against women, or perhaps abductions of women. So how, or in what ways is targeting women costly for insurgents or would not be in the benefit of insurgents? We’ve sort of covered the opposite direction, how they might benefit from it. But how is it not so great for them?

CHANDRA: Yeah, I think this is something that people do overlook quite frequently because again, I think there’s just this, out in the ether, this story that violence against women is just a part of war. But if you think about it, actually, violence against women can be quite costly to insurgent groups.

And that’s one of the reasons why I think it’s so important to study it, because it actually is quite puzzling when you think about it. And I identify three ways that violence against women is costly to the group.

The first is that it’s materially costly. And I look at forms of violence that are not just abduction. But if you think about abduction, right, if you think about what happened for Boko Haram right after they abducted these schoolgirls. And part of the challenge for the Nigerian government is that the schoolgirls’ abduction blew up into such a big international thing that the pressure became so high to get the girls back that it actually kind of encouraged the group to do more of that.

And I think that’s when I say that insurgents have the advantage to see what works. The initial abduction — and there are varying reports on the, like I said, the level of preparedness — so some people argue that they actually were prepared to abduct the girls that night, but they didn’t know that it was going to become such a big thing.

But they very quickly cottoned on to how valuable these girls were internationally, and how much pressure had been put on the Nigerian government and therefore, how much leverage they had, right, and gained in this way. And then, of course, that encourages kind of repetition of this behavior.

But if you’re also from the group’s perspective, you don’t know kind of what the tipping point is going to be, where the violence is going to start to gain so much attention from both the government or international organizations or whatever that it’s going to actually lead to your demise.

And so this– the kind of cost element of it, I think, is really important. And so the first way that I think about it is sort of the material cost. And if you look at the example of the schoolgirls, like a very basic-level thinking about logistics. You now have 270 schoolgirls. They’re not trained. They’re not– like, they’re not mobile. You have to carry them around on big trucks. They’re probably likely to run away. You have to feed them, clothe them, house them. It’s very difficult to move them.

And so from that sort of perspective of being, like, a nimble organization that you now have these schoolgirls, I think that’s really challenging.

But if you think more generally, not just about abduction, if you are, as an insurgent group, trying to select the target of your violence in particular ways, it means that there are certain indiscriminate tactics that you can’t use.

You have to be much more trained and much more disciplined. Like IEDs or whatever, you know, blowing up things are not going to work because you can’t guarantee who the victim of that attack is going to be, right?

So I think it eliminates a number of tactical options for insurgent groups to focus their attention and resources on attacks, like types of attacks that specifically target women. So I think that’s the sort of first thing is that it’s materially costly to the group in a number of ways.

It can also, like I said, cost the group on the battlefield. And a good example of this comes from Iraq, actually in Anbar province, where what the US government called the Anbar Awakening, which was– basically occurred when the US showed up to Anbar province, largely US soldiers, but of course, the sort of broader coalition in Iraq.

And it’s a largely– these are– it’s largely Sunni Iraqis living here, so there’s kind of a natural affiliation for Al-Qaeda. And, you know– so initially, the US is just not making a lot of progress because there’s kind of sectarian violence that’s unfolding. And in the beginning, the US kind of empowered the Shia Iraqis. And so I think there was just a lot of suspicion about the US and its motives and ability to protect the community.

And Al-Qaeda kind of took advantage of this, but then started to be really coercive towards the population, including forcibly marrying its fighters to girls in the community. And this was something that the community then started to take umbrage at. Like, how dare you come in and tell us like, who’s going to marry our girls? And this kind of overly coercive violence actually tipped the local community into supporting the US.

Then when they thought about it, they were like, well, the US is actually kind of the lesser of two evils, so we might as well support the US, even though there had been, prior, this kind of natural affinity to supporting the insurgent group.

And so one of the challenges is that, as the insurgent group, there are kind of– there’s a lot of research on the strategic benefits to insurgents of using violence against civilians to coerce them into cooperating and things like that.

But the challenge for the insurgent group is they don’t know what the straw is that’s going to break the camel’s back, right? They don’t know, like, this particular attack or this piece of violence or this thing is going to be a bridge too far and now all of a sudden, the entire civilian community is going to turn around and support the counterinsurgent.

So I think it can be quite costly. And violence against women is particularly, I think, visceral for people experientially. And so I think there’s a lot of kind of feelings that pop up in the community that they may not anticipate, and they don’t know that– what’s going to– when that is going–that tipping’s point is going to arrive and once it does, it’s really hard for the insurgent to kind of walk it back ,just because that violence is so visceral for the community to experience. So that’s another way in which it’s really costly.

And then the third thing is it’s really reputationally costly. Like, people don’t like violence against women. They don’t like– they don’t want to support groups that perpetrate violence against women. It’s not– it’s, like, horrific. It’s really– people have really strong reactions to it.

If you read stories about violence against women, I’ve read lots of horrible things that have happened to people in the course of doing this research. And it is really– like, it touches you very deeply. And so if you’re an insurgent group, and you’re thinking about needing to recruit from that population or have the population support you, even by not kind of ratting you out to the counterinsurgent, it can be really reputationally costly if the group is perpetrating just horrific levels of violence against— and really sort of like abhorrent types of violence against women and girls in the community.

So it is– I think we’ve talked about kind of the ways that it can be strategically beneficial in some ways to the group to attempt to invest in these kinds of tactics, but it is a really high-risk, high -eward strategy, I would say. There is definitely a downside. And that’s why it’s so interesting because you want to understand kind what are the conditions in which groups will make the investment and take on the costs of investing in these types of tactics.

[SIZEK] Yeah, so let’s talk a little bit about how these differences emerge or what the differences are that you tracked across the three different locations that you studied. So what does sort of the nature of the counterinsurgency have to do with whether or not targeting women is a good strategy for insurgents?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, so this is kind of the first part of the theory, I think I touched on this a little bit earlier, but essentially that the home population of the group — of the counterinsurgent actor, I should say  is really important in kind of determining what will undermine them, what are the things that they’re going to start to say, like their electorate is going to start to say. Like, is this cost worth it, right?

And I think the other point that I want to make is that, the reason that I chose these three specific cases, in looking at all groups that were, at the time that I studied them, affiliated with Al-Qaeda – so Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Shabab in Somalia – and Boko Haram in Nigeria, is that I think there’s a very strong tendency, particularly in the West, to assume that groups act a certain way — that these Islamist groups, specifically, act a certain way — because of their ideology.

Now, I’m not saying their ideology is not wildly patriarchal or sexist or problematic or even encourages violence against women. But what I find is that the ideology by itself does not explain the actions of the group. And that’s why I think it’s so interesting to look at these changes over the course of the conflict.

When you have the same actors with the same ideology making different decisions over time, I think it’s really important to kind of think about the context and what the strategic dynamics look like and what are the incentives that are being activated by what the counterinsurgent is doing.

And I think the kind of core part of the theory about why the counterinsurgent actor matters is really bringing counterinsurgents back into this. Because a lot of the research has really focused on, what is happening for the group that it’s making these decisions, and almost thinking about it in a vacuum as like they’re just deciding based on x, y, and z factors, what kinds of tactics to invest in.

And what I’m saying is, this is a dynamic between counterinsurgent and insurgent. And so what the counterinsurgent is doing, who they are, what they value really matters for how the insurgent will respond when the counterinsurgency really ramps up.

And so in terms of, why does the counterinsurgent actor matter? Because if you’re a domestic counterinsurgent, the sort of home audience to whom you are responsive as a government, who people who are funding you, the government that’s backing you, they expect that you are going to protect civilians.

They expect that you’re going to do everything you need to do to prevent this kind of harm from coming to civilians within your own borders. On the other hand, if you’re the US in Iraq, you may not have those expectations as clearly.

And I think that’s where I found that polling information so interesting, that people found— had a very high awareness— Americans in general, had very high awareness of how many civilians, sorry, how many service members had died, but not how many Iraqi civilians had died. They vastly underestimated how many Iraqi civilians had died in Iraq based on US operations there.

And so it just wasn’t– this is not to say that people didn’t care. Obviously, there were a lot of many different protests and different thoughts around the Iraq war at various different points. But in general, the American electorate did not use civilian death as a means of tracking whether the US government was succeeding in Iraq. What they used instead was how many American soldiers are dying in Iraq.

And if too many soldiers are dying in Iraq, then we have to ask ourselves, is this cost worth what we’re paying for it? And again, I think that’s where insurgents are smart, and they learned that these particular— these are the particular soft spots and weak points for the counterinsurgent. And can I– can we develop or invest in technologies that really expose those weaknesses?

[SIZEK] And so how does this work at the regional level? Because I know that we haven’t talked that much about Somalia. But what about the third case, and how does this sort of play in relation to this international counterinsurgent versus the national level counterinsurgent?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, Somalia is such an interesting case because it’s a case of a regional counterinsurgent. So it’s not like what I call an Iraq completely foreign counterinsurgent where the US shows up. Most vast numbers of US soldiers do not speak Arabic. They cannot communicate. They’re using locals for in translation. And there’s just no understanding of regional local norms at all, to the point where, in fact, a lot of folks thought that the violence that was occurring into what became just vast amounts of sectarian violence, that they thought it was normal. They just thought this is, like, what it is to be in Iraqi society.

So I think what’s so interesting about Somalia is that you have regional– a regional counterinsurgence made up of kind like neighboring states of Somalia. And so they have kind of more awareness of local norms and kind of, like, what is normal. And I think what I find there is that it’s kind of in the middle of the domestic counterinsurgent and the foreign counterinsurgent.

That in Iraq, the only mechanism that I found evidence for in accordance with the theory, was the information transmission suppression, because I find that women always have information, and they always are sharing it with counterinsurgents.

That is true basically no matter how patriarchal, how repressive the insurgent group, the society. It’s a way in which women have a lot of agency that we don’t actually kind of consider them having agency.

But in Somalia, I find that, in addition to information transmission suppression, the emasculation mechanism did operate, because civilians did start to express qualms about the efficacy of AMISOM’s operations, based on the increase and sort of change in the tactics that Al-Shabab perpetrated when AMISOM kind of ramped up its counterinsurgency operations.

So I find that there was more, you know, more sort of effect, and the kind of more effort on the part of the insurgent group in that case to try to undermine the counterinsurgent based– using sex-selective targeting. But it didn’t quite rise to the level of success of what we saw in Nigeria where, like I said, they were just able to extract millions of euros and actually get fighters released from jail, based on their sex-selective targeting.

So I think it kind of shows this interesting case of, it’s– the international kind of regional counterinsurgents have a strong interest in preventing civilian violence, also because it tends to spill over into their own borders. Whereas to be honest, there wasn’t a risk of spillover violence from Iraq into California, right? It wasn’t a thing that we worried about. Like, we’re doing this thing here and if we don’t do it well, then that means the US borders are less secure.

Whereas in Somalia, there was– the stakes were higher, if you’re a regional neighbor, to make sure that you’re doing counterinsurgency well. But it didn’t rise to the level of expectation of really preventing widespread violence against women. And I think it’s an interesting case because as kind of the US– you saw the US withdraw from Afghanistan, kind of– we’ll see what happens in the next election and see where sort of– how US policy develops.

But in general, I think there’s this kind of withdrawal of the US from these large-scale operations and kind of long-term missions and operations of military bases and just, like, thousands of soldiers indefinitely conducting counterinsurgency operations. And as that happens, I think you will see a shift towards empowering more these regional kinds of organizations like AMISOM or things like that.

And so I think it’s really important– it was an important case because as that sort of becomes, I think, more likely the way that the US, it will, instead of doing it itself, may fund or support or send support and training to these more regional organizations. I think it’s important to understand kind of how the incentives are operating in those cases as well. So it was a really interesting case study from that perspective.

[SIZEK] Yeah, so this brings us to perhaps our final question, which is obviously one of the goals of research like this is to try to prevent or reduce gender-based violence. What do you think your research can bring as a policy solution or as a strategy to try to reduce these harmful effects of sex-selective targeting?

[CHANDRA] Yeah, such a great question. I mean, that’s something that really motivated me every day when I was doing the research. And I think it would be a few things. One is that, again, I think there’s really this tendency to think that ideology explains a lot more than it does in these cases.

And again, that’s not to say that the ideology is not important. It’s just something I consider more as a background factor. And so I think understanding the context, and the kind of strategic dynamics on the ground and understanding these as conflict dynamics and decisions that are made in response to actions by counterinsurgents, I think is really important. I think that’s an important lesson from this research.

I think the other thing is, it really opens up avenues for future research, as well. Like, one of the things I think this kind of lays the groundwork for is thinking about whether there are discernible patterns that we could learn about or learn from when groups choose particular types of violence over others.

So I think when you say violence against women, most often people assume that you’re talking about sexual violence. So I think the other thing that I’ve done is really move beyond just sexual violence to looking at non-sexual, physical violence, abduction, things like that, kidnapping— that we hadn’t really studied in depth as a field too much yet. And I think it’s good. Lots of people are starting to do that work, which is really exciting for me as someone who’s in that space.

But I think there’s a lot of work still to be done, like thinking some groups, for example, the Taliban, which is a case I don’t study. But the original Taliban in Afghanistan, they did a lot of physical violence. They were really repressive, as people might remember if you were thinking about the very early days of the Afghanistan, war in Afghanistan.

But they didn’t do rape. They just were not– people would say like, oh, we leave our doors open. They’re not dangerous from a sexual violence. No one one’s going to come in into your house and, like, steal your kid or your daughter and, like, rape her.

And it was similar to Al-Shabab in the beginning, too, that they were incredibly repressive. I mean, there are these stories of– you know, there’s one story that really stuck with me of a woman who, her two-year-old ran out the door of her house. And so she ran after the two-year-old, of course, into the street. And she did not stop because, of course, her child had run into the street. She did not stop to put on her abaya. And Al-Shabab captured her and said– punished her pretty harshly for not having her abaya on, even though she had been running after her child who had run into the street.

And so there was a lot of non-sexual physical violence that they would perpetrate in punishment for having broken these rules, but they didn’t do sexual violence. So I think this– one avenue for future research is just thinking, what– why do some groups select into particular forms of targeting over others, and what can we learn from those patterns? So I think that’s another– it kind of lays the groundwork for future research.

But I from a policy perspective, the most important lesson is we think about these kind of contemporary theories of counterinsurgency as just cookie cutter in some ways, that you can apply it anywhere.

And I think there was a lot of work that went into developing the kind of hearts and minds and the kind of doctrine that the US eventually shifted to during the Iraq War. And it’s clear from this research that who the counterinsurgent is really matters, and that doing counterinsurgency in particular ways can actually increase incentives for targeting women.

So I think learning from this that you can’t just– if you’re the West, and you’re moving away from doing counterinsurgency yourself towards training and equipping or things like that, I think understanding the context of what’s happening, who the actors are, and how the particular behavior that we’re advocating — or the particular sort of operational approach that we’re advocating — can actually change the incentives for different types of behaviors in response is really important.

So not just going to places and saying, do it this way, but really thinking about, what is the context, what are the different incentives, and what are the conflict dynamics that are occurring here?

[SIZEK] Well, thank you so much for telling us about your research and learning more about the intersection of gender and international security.

[CHANDRA] Thank you so much for having me.

[MUSIC PLAYING]

[WOMAN’S VOICE] Thank you for listening. To learn more about Social Science Matrix, please visit matrix.berkeley.edu.

 

New Directions

New Directions in the Study of Labor

silhouettes of various people representing the labor workforce

In this “New Directions” panel, recorded on December 2, 2024, an interdisciplinary group of UC Berkeley graduate students explored the evolving dynamics of work, management, and labor organization.

The panel featured research by three current Berkeley PhD students: William Darwell (Jurisprudence and Social Policy), Kristy Kim (Economics), and Vera Parra (Sociology). The panel was moderated by John Logan, Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley Labor Center.

The presenters’ studies focus on such topics as the impact of pension systems on workforce participation, labor union organizing in automotive supply chains across North America, and how different political and economic systems influence workplace management practices.

This event was co-sponsored by the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment (IRLE), the UC Berkeley Labor Center, and the Berkeley Law Program in Jurisprudence and Social Policy. 

Panelists

William Darwall

William Darwall is a PhD candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy at Berkeley Law working on social, political, and legal theory of work, the workplace, and its management. Will’s dissertation employs a critical historical account of the emergence and ongoing development of the science of management to reframe and reconstruct normative debates over the legitimacy and appropriate legal regulation of workplace hierarchy, authority, and control. Special attention, here, is paid to the present and future of techniques and technologies of workplace management, as the workplace as we know it dissipates, if not disappears. Prior to graduate work, Will co-founded and managed a worker-cooperative cafe and bar in Philadelphia, PA.

Kristy Kim

Kristy Kim, a PhD Candidate in the UC Berkeley Department of Economics, researches issues at the intersection of public and behavioral economics. Her job market paper studies how changes in retirement benefits affect labor supply and workforce composition. Her other research focuses on the distributional impacts on tax-preferred property inheritances and behavioral welfare measures.

 

Vera Parra

Vera Parra, a PhD Student in the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology, interested in labor history, political economy, and organizing in the 21st century. She is researching the recent history of auto industry organizing drives, both in the US and Mexico. She is interested in examining how green industrial policy– in particular the transition to EVs and attempts to secure a North American supply chain– shape organizing conditions on both sides of the border.

 

John Logan
John Logan

John Logan (moderator) is Professor and Director of Labor Studies at San Francisco State University and a Visiting Scholar at the UC Berkeley Labor Center. He is an expert on the anti-union industry and anti-union legislation in the U.S., and comparative labor issues, particularly how multinational companies treat employees and unions differently in the U.S. compared to European countries.

 

Podcast and Transcript

Listen to the presentation as a podcast below or on Apple Podcasts.

 

[MUSIC PLAYING]

MARION FOURCADE: Hello, everyone. My name is Marion Fourcade. I’m the Director of Social Science Matrix. And it’s such a great pleasure to welcome you to this panel on the New Directions in the Study of Labor. Matrix organizes New Directions panels twice a year. These are panels where the presenters are exclusively graduate students. And so for us, it’s very special.

And I’m very excited today because our panelists will explore the dynamics of work management and labor organization. And as is common with all our Matrix panels, they come from different departments, jurisprudence and social policy, economics, and sociology. So you have a wide range of approaches to this topic.

This event is co-sponsored by the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, the UC Berkeley Labor Center, and the Berkeley Law Program in Jurisprudence and Social Policy. Before I introduce our moderator, let me just say a few upcoming events. This is a busy week at Matrix. This is the last week of the semester, but it is busy.

This panel today. Tomorrow, we have an Author Meets Critics panel. A book by my brand new colleague, Stephanie Canizales. And then actually my own book talk on Friday. This is an event that’s co-sponsored by Matrix but organized by BESI. So I actually did not schedule myself for this.

Anyway, let me now introduce John Logan, who is our moderator for today’s event. John is Professor and Director of Labor Studies at San Francisco State University and a visiting scholar at the UC Berkeley Labor Center. He is an expert on the anti-union industry and anti-union legislation in the US, on comparative labor issues, and particularly on how multinational companies treat employees and unions differently in the US compared to European countries. And so John will now introduce our panelists, and thank you all for being here, and I very much look forward to this.

JOHN LOGAN: Thank you all for coming. I will just briefly introduce the panelists who are all going to speak for about 15 minutes, and then we should have at least half an hour or slightly over for questions, and comments, and discussion.

I mean, we have a great panel to discuss new directions in labor history. As we just heard, people from three separate social science disciplines, from economics, from sociology, and from jurisprudence, law. I’m actually from history background originally. I never taught in the history– My first job was an industrial relations department at London School of Economics, and I taught comparative labor. And then I was Director of the UC Berkeley Labor Center.

But I mean, it’s appropriate, I think, to have these sort of multidisciplinary conversations when talking about new directions in the study of labor and I think new directions in the labor movement more broadly because, I mean, the two, depending on your discipline, are very closely connected often.

And the disciplines represented today, I mean, sociology for several years now has had the largest sort of labor contingent within academic disciplines. I don’t know how many hundreds of members are in the labor group at the ASA, but that’s where a lot of the scholarship has come out.

I mean, economics is obviously the labor economists, people like John R. Commons and Selig Perlman were the people who founded industrial relations and sort of labor scholarship as an academic discipline in the US. And economists have been sort of central to academic debates over labor ever since then. Even although I’m not an economist, I spent most of my academic life around economists.

And law and jurisprudence too. I mean, when I started graduate school over 25 years ago, it was the sort of critical legal studies scholarship. People like Karl Klare, and Mark Barenberg, and Kathy Stone, this sort of influenced my own work originally. And now Berkeley has become very much a sort of center for the study of labor law with Catherine Fisk and others who are now at Berkeley Law.

So are we going in this direction? Yes. So I apologize for the longwinded. First is Will Darwell, who’s a PhD candidate in Jurisprudence and Social Policy at Berkeley Law. And his research is on the politics and political economy, past, present and future regimes of workplace management, broadly defined.

WILLIAM DARWELL: Yeah. Thanks, everybody, for coming. Thanks so much, Ambrosia and Marion, for organizing and John for moderating. and yeah, showing up after Thanksgiving on an academic calendar is really something. So I’m glad to see more faces in the room than I expected, to be honest.

So yeah. I guess sort of in that spirit of interdisciplinarity that John mentioned, I thought that what I would use my time today to present is almost something like a method section for my dissertation. So I come from a philosophy background but do moral, political, and legal theory of work and the workplace. Particular, workplace management is what I’m most focused on.

But yeah. Since we’re coming from different disciplinary backgrounds, I thought it might make sense to just open the hood a little bit on how I approach that as a legal theorist. So the broadest way of talking about what I try to do is try to identify what’s fundamentally political about work, the workplace and its management.

So there’s been a sort of a really, really large and cresting tide of new scholarship and normative theories of political economy, of moral economy, and the workplace and workplace justice. In general, in my view though, that literature tends to conceive of the nature of doing political theory of work in terms of the normatively salient effects of institutions of work in the workplace and workplace management.

And the main conceptual intervention that I’m trying to make is to give an account really of what sort of constitutively political about work. The practices through which we work, the spaces in which we work, which is a slice of a broader question about what’s political about the economy in general.

So just some sort brief overview of the way that literature slices up sort of potentially normatively concerning effects of workplace management. Some are distributional, some account of unjust appropriation of the benefits of labor. Fruits of labor, some economic surplus to which the answer is some kind of regime of ameliorated, either pre or redistribution.

Other sort of like dignitary effects like vulnerability to demeaning working conditions, which are supposed to be protected against by the implementation of the right kinds of regulatory guardrails. Others are accounts of ways in which people are allowed to express their equal moral agency as working people, which is supposed to be protected by some set of fundamental rights of workers.

Others are about autonomy, concerns, ways in which the way that work is distributed, and structured, and managed might interfere with people’s ability to realize the sort of rational plan of life. These are sort of supposed to be protected against by different ways of structuring markets.

But obviously, most primarily structuring the labor market in specific ways. And there’s a more general concern about domination or subjection to arbitrary control, where theorists try to analyze and examine potential schemes for rendering the kind of control that work is supposed to necessarily involve, that labor is supposed to necessarily involve non-arbitrary or subject to some kind of scheme of co-determination of one kind or another.

So in my view, the tendency to conceive of the normative problematic of work in this way as sort of a question about the normatively salient effects of workplace management is kind of downstream of trends in the social sciences on the one hand that sort of conceive of the economy as a distinct realm of human activity.

On the one hand, that’s downstream of just neoclassical economic conceptions of efficient markets. On the other hand, Weberian conceptions of the economy as a realm of necessity, governed solely by instrumental rather than intrinsic reasons.

So moral philosophers, political philosophers, theorists in general, I think, try to tend to accept this picture. But in terms of a scholarly division of labor, I think it’s sort of our job to interrogate that conception of economic activity rather than accept it and then ask questions within or having accepted that assumption.

So here, I sort of like start from what’s a really well-worn observation in labor studies and studies of employment in general, that labor contracts are radically underspecified, which makes them sort of fit poorly as an object of economic analysis. And it’s hard to do market efficiency analysis of something that’s underspecified in this way. It sort of makes labor weird as a commodity, as it were.

So then to the extent that to the extent that work is treated by market institutions as a commodity, it’s something that we literally produce for sale into a labor marketplace. It’s always what heterodox economists would call a contested economy. That’s a contested commodity rather.

So it’s a commodity that nature or the content of which isn’t prespecified but is fought over, contested between the exchanging parties. So in their model, that means that labor as a commodity is subject to what they call enforcement rents. It basically means that the more powerful, whether that’s the form of social, or a market, or other kind of power, means that that empowered party will sort of win the day in determining the nature of that commodity.

That to me is a sort of a starting point for thinking about the political nature of work, the political nature of labor, and the labor exchange, which I take to be sort of constitutively political rather than political and the effects it produces.

Another way of saying that it’s sort of like necessarily a creature of political morality. But I take that to mean is that it’s a kind of a social practice that involves overlapping confluences and conflicts of interest for which the rules that govern those confluences and conflicts of interests aren’t pre-given and necessarily can’t be determined a priori but must be constituted, authored, and maintained by the parties to those practices.

And so I arrive at that sort formal definition by some grounding work in philosophy of joint action and social practices that I’ll skip, so that nobody leaves while I’m talking. Stuff that sort of only the philosophers want to stick around for.

But briefly, I find that that literature sort of fails on two accounts. One is a failure of attention to the internal organization of jointly acting groups, which except in what I take to be edge cases, involve some kind of vertical or asymmetric division of roles within those groups, which raises the question of control of any kind of joint or shared productive activity.

The other is that lack of attention to the structural dynamics that are generated by repeated and long term practices of social coordination and joint action. So institutions create sort of durable forms of social relations and a sort of a slogan, a way of saying.

The point here is that there’s no such thing as a merely technical division of labor. Divisions of labor are always social in the sense that they’re constructive of asymmetrical social relations, as well as the people or roles that fit in to those sort of relational matrices, not to make a pun.

So since those social relations tend to self-naturalize but are always, in every case, constructed by some kind of deliberate human activity, the social relations themselves are worthy or apt objects of normative analysis and criticism. So that’s the sort of starting point or how we get to the starting point for the project.

So I use that to then reconstruct this actually existing normative debate over workplace justice. So as I mentioned before, there’s a lot of recent writing. I was looking through the list of edited volumes that I have to read upcoming. And there’s just a lot of writing these days that people are compiling on normative questions about the nature of economic organization, from the highest to the lowest level.

Yeah. So again, against the sort of construction of that normative problematic as a set of questions about what sort of positive or negative effects are generated by the way that we structure our economic institutions.

I try to look for a way of reconstructing that debate in general from what you might call something like output reasons to input reasons or sort of where I generally find a normative requirement that people participate in the processes of their own subject formation.

So insofar as the kinds of social relations that are necessarily generated by the workplace construct us as individuals on lots of different kinds of normative frameworks. The result I find is that people have either a right or relevant interest of one kind or another to be able to participate in the processes and institutions that construct them as individuals.

I use that set of core normative interventions and then apply them to a set of real world cases in the latter parts of the dissertation. So those are going to be very, very familiar. But the first is algorithmic management. The second is platform employment or platform-based gig work.

And the second is corporate fissuring, corporate restructurings that place workers at one or two or three levels of removed from who we might think of as their real employer. Some sort of dominant form in a sometimes global value chain.

So that’s, again, that’s the sort of general pitch about how I do the kind of work that I do, which again is aimed at producing work for this, what I see as a kind of a cloistered set of conversations within normative theory around what might render the way that we work together just or at least in what ways that the ways that we work together are criticizable and might be ameliorated or require amelioration of one kind or another.

I figured I’d use the last couple of minutes that I have to just say a couple of things about what I take to be interesting new directions for the study of labor. Yeah. Here they are. So first, and these are sort of basically like stuff that I am paying attention to and reading that informs my work.

One is the a renewal of a certain kind of Marxian analysis built from people call the value form reading of Marx’s work, that reads the work rather than developing a critical political economy or something like that. Like built from assumptions about the labor being the source of all value, this kind of Ricardian Marxism.

Instead reads Marx as offering a critique of political economy, where he’s using the ways that political economists of his time have analyzed market society to try to identify in a kind of a German sense of the term, critique, what are the conditions of possibility of the society that we have and what set of historically specific social relations does it generate?

As part of that, growing out of that, I mean, there’s a reading group at the Matrix, I think, [INAUDIBLE] the Matrix, on the new translation of Marx that I think is bringing this reading also to the surface. So that’s really great. But yeah.

One particular way of describing the Marxist project on that reading is the analysis of the dynamics of class and a historically specific moment, where class means borrowing from Benkler and Syed, the asymmetric social relations in the Division of Labor and the distribution of its fruits, rather than conceiving class as either an identity category, a job category, or merely about distributional struggle or the expropriation of a surplus.

Yeah. So taking class in that way of describing it is describing the set of rules in a complex society and how they relate to one another. I’ll just say a couple of things. Yeah. One is just about the changing role of labor in global political economy and the way that that is creating changes in the nature of class composition domestically and globally.

So one set of literature comes from Robert Brenner and student Aaron Benanav about premature deindustrialization and global industrial overcapacity yielding secular decline in the global economy and how that is likely to generate chronic underemployment rather than something like automation creating technical unemployment or something like that.

What I see as a really sort of related thread insofar as it’s about the declining role of labor in social reproduction is work, on the one hand, on asset manager capitalism, and in particular, Melinda Cooper, and I forget her co-authors, book on asset economy, which emphasizes the sort of declining role of remuneration from work in household and in household finances essentially as compared with Minskian households, which are making decisions under uncertainty to manage capital flows and secure their sort of financial well-being in that way, rather than primarily through remuneration from work, whether it’s salary wages or whatnot.

I think to just bring us back to a picture of the working class as the most general category when we’re talking about class analysis as constituted by a negative unity, constituted by what it lacks rather than what it has, which is namely, in the old formula, the double freedom and inability to reproduce itself apart from the work that it can sell into the labor market.

And I think that Vera is going to talk about this a little bit more, but the last slide that I have is just about renationalisation in global political economy and the reassertion of states as economic actors. Yeah. And that’s just a big question mark, basically, what’s that going to look like. But I think it’s going to have really, really significant effects on international division of labor, domestic division of labor, and class structure in general.

[APPLAUSE]

JOHN LOGAN: Next, we have Kristy Kim, a PhD candidate in the economics department at UC Berkeley, whose work studies changes in retirement benefits affect labor supply and workforce composition. I won’t take up any of your time, but reporters contact me all the time about labor issues.

And one of the things that they want to know most these days. I mean, we’ve had these strikes, obviously, the big three, involving UAW and more recently, Boeing and Puget Sound. And everyone’s like, oh, are we going to get a return to defined benefit pension plans? And I say, not a chance. But I mean, of course, it’s more complicated than that. But it’s interesting that it has become back on sort of the union agenda in terms of the– pleas, sorry. Go ahead.

KRISTY KIM: Yeah, no. That’s perfect because– so I’ll go a little bit into my research, which actually looks at exactly the movement away from defined benefit pensions to more defined contribution plans. And so sorry. Thank you for hosting this panel, everyone, and for everyone who came.

So I’m Kristy. I work in behavioral public economics. So I really try to understand how individuals behave towards different policy designs with an emphasis on looking at quasi-experimental settings, sort of in the wilds, and trying to understand through the choices that people make, what the implications would be if policy was different.

And so I will go into my dissertation. And so I’ll start a little bit more niche and then try to bring it out more towards the political movements and the unionization efforts to change retirement benefits. But my dissertation focuses on how changes in workforce retirement benefits affect firm-specific labor supply.

And this is across the lifecycle. So throughout your whole life, as retirement benefits change, how does your labor supply decisions change? And so this is in part to understand how non-cash compensation, which has become this large portion of total compensation in the United States, is really affecting labor supply decisions, especially when we think about a marketplace of firms that are offering different compensation structures.

And so normally, empirically, this is difficult to understand for two reasons. So one, there’s just very limited data on private employer pension plans. And so we can theorize how these things go. But often, the incentives for retirement plans are non-linear, they’re dynamic, and so they’re very difficult to predict.

And if you do have data on them, they’re often very limited in scope, right? So you’ll have a few years. The second reason why it’s difficult is because it’s really hard to disentangle pure incentive effects of retirement systems that we’re interested in versus selection effects.

And so what I mean by that is that there are different types of people that will choose to work for different types of firms because of their retirement benefits. And so when we study the effects of retirement benefits, what we don’t want to do is conflate the fact that different types of workers are going into different types of work, versus the retirement benefit itself changing your behavior.

And so in my work, what we do is that we study federal government workers around a policy change that occurs in 1984. And there are some nice things about this setting. So one, it’s the US government, so it’s the largest employer. In the United States, they employ about 2% of all the workforce.

And two, it’s going to happen in the ’80s, right? And so we have 35 years of their entire work history. And so we can really follow these people through their life cycle or most of their life cycle. Some people will work more than 35 years.

And the last sort of quality about this policy change that’s really nice is that it’s actually retroactive. And so what that means is that the people who start under this new system, when they change it discretely for newly hired workers in 1984, they’re not going to be aware of what the retirement system looks like for about two years, which means this really helps us mitigate the selection effects. So we’re going to have pretty similar workers but with two different retirement benefits. And that’s really the strategy that I use to figure out what happens to the labor supply outcomes of these workers.

And specifically, what we do is that we study the last few cohorts of the old system and the first few cohorts of the new system, with the assumption being that these workers are similar and compare them across time. So I can explain a little bit about what the federal government does and why and how we should think about it.

And so in the ’80s, they’re going to make this move towards retirement benefits that look a lot like private sector retirement benefits. So prior to 1984, the retirement benefit that they had was just to a pure defined benefit plan, where they provided an annuity to their workers based on their work history.

And so we can think of this as really employer-tied benefits. Your benefits at retirement really depend on your wages that you’ve accrued there, the tenure at the firm, and whatever percentage they want to give. And they move away from that. They decrease that annuity portion, and they introduce more modern technologies.

So they introduce what we would think of as like a 401(k). So what that is that you would put some of your own money away, and that’ll grow in an investment vehicle. You would get it as a lump sum, but you sort of carry the risk of outliving it.

And in addition, they add Social Security, which is sort of like an annuity, but it’s based on your total employment history. And so what we think of this is as a movement away from employer-tied benefits to more portable benefits. Now you can pick up the 401(k). You can move it around to different employers. Social Security will only depend on all formal employment. So you can leave more freely.

And so what we’ll find in this study is that this movement away from defined benefit to a mixed defined benefit, defined contribution system is going to reduce the total lifetime retirement benefits that they’ll receive. It will reduce on average for workers by about $45,000, which is pretty substantial. We can think if people are in retirement for about 20 years, that’s about over $2,000 a year that they sort of lose out on from this new retirement system.

It is going to increase the portable benefits but really severely decrease the benefits tied to the employer. But it’s not going to change anything about the quality of the jobs or their cash compensation. So they’re not compensating these workers for this loss in benefits.

And what we’ll find when we compare the labor supply outcomes for these workers is as follows. So in the beginning, what we have suggestive evidence for is that workers are quite inattentive when they first enter work about the retirement system. So they don’t seem to be reacting to early incentives in your work.

So like vesting schedules, we don’t see any reaction towards, but we see some kind of learning happening around 10 years of service towards the federal government, where both young and old workers will start responding. So it doesn’t seem to be a function of how close you are to retirement but basically for how long you’ve worked at, in this case, the government for.

And essentially, we find that workers mid to late career are the workers that really start responding to these changes and benefits. They are about 2 to 3 percentage points less likely to be in the federal workforce between 15 to 30 years of tenure. This roughly translates into a one to three-year reduction in their tenure.

And so in a resource perspective, this sort of all checks out. You have a $45,000 reduction in your lifetime benefits. And for workers who maybe face better wages outside, maybe they can get $20,000 extra per year. They work that one to three years more and make up for that loss in benefits.

And this is really going to be concentrated among workers who have better outside options, so who face better private sector wages. So that tends to be workers who start off with higher education levels, higher pay, starting pay. And it’s also going to be concentrated amongst workers who seem to be working through the government pretty quickly and being promoted really fast.

And so what this seems to suggest is that moving away from a defined benefit plan does save the government a lot of money. It saves them about $94,000 per person. But they do start losing out on their very experienced and very productive workers.

And so ultimately, because I don’t have additional data on how productive these workers are or how much they might mean to the employer, the welfare consequences are sort of ambiguous. Or like the sort utility of workers from moving to one place to another, I don’t have information on where they move.

So we have this sort of ambiguous effect. And then sort of later on in life, we see a convergence of the percent of workers that are separated because now, most of the workers under the new system have left earlier. Under the old system, they’ll start to leave as they become eligible for retirement.

And so yeah. So now, it’s sort of become this interesting stage because in the last 50 years, many employers, institutions have really started moving towards the defined contribution type of benefit, right? Because it’s more sustainable fiscally or financially for the employer to provide these kinds of benefits.

So Berkeley has done it, for anyone who works here, and other state governments are now considering reducing their pension plans and really introducing these savings. And so we as economists, we can speak to what might happen to the workforce.

And it’s sort of interesting now that– so I think Boeing is the big one that want to bring back the pension plans. And ultimately, it’s hard to give a normative or even like a positive judgment on how this might affect the employer or the worker in economic terms.

It ultimately will depend on, so I can do the financials. I can say how much it saves. But ultimately it sort depend on what you’re losing from losing these older, more productive workers. There’s a tradeoff, right? Sometimes, what we want is we want to upskill an organization. And so having these workers churn out could be beneficial for both the firm and also for the worker because now that they have benefits that are less tied to the employer, they’re free to move to another employer that might better match their skills or preferences.

But on the other hand, these older workers bring a lot of experience, and it’s hard to retrain and rehire workers. And so you might be losing out on those workers. And these workers might be losing out on benefits that they don’t realize they’re losing out on.

And so ultimately, I think by revealed preference, it seems people prefer the defined benefit plan. I think the reason why employers seem to be very resistant against these defined benefit plans is because the costliness, they’re going to have to spend, at least if we look at the federal government, at least like $100,000 more per employee in addition to these regulations that they will have to follow and promise to these employers.

And so what I’m hoping to do with my research is give a little piece of the puzzle and really show empirically with data how workers are responding throughout their lifetime, which has been very difficult to do. Yeah. And so I’ll pass it on to Vera to talk about her research.

VERA PARRA: OK. Two caveats before I begin. One, I’m a second year, and this is all very new research. So first time I’m presenting about it. The other caveat is that the election really affects a lot of things about tariffs, trade, the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Every day, I get a fun new piece of news. So I have that to look forward to for the next four years.

And yeah. I’m still sort of like– and I think it’ll actually just take time to see how this shapes what was the pattern that was established under the Biden administration and in Trump’s first term. So with that, what I’ll do is I’ll share a little bit about my own research and how I came to it. And then I’ll also offer some extemporaneous thoughts about labor and the election.

So yeah. My master’s research topic is on the paradoxical impacts of US trade protectionism on the Mexican labor movement, which, as Will referenced, we are moving, it seems clear, into a world of more trade protectionism. We don’t know yet what that will look like. But increased competition over exports in a world with less demand, and in particular, increased competition between the United States and China.

And that has had actually some interesting– it puts at least Mexico, potentially, maybe other countries positioned similarly as Mexico, but in a pretty interesting position. So yeah. I’ll say a little bit more broadly my larger research agenda, like the questions that brought me to grad school, are about how the 21st century political economy is evolving and what that means in terms of the possibilities for labor organizing.

And I’ll share I come from a background of immigrant rights organizing. It became increasingly clear to me that the pathway on immigration runs through the labor movement. And with that brings the question of what the actual possibilities for labor and labor organizing are in the 21st century for some of the reasons that we’ll mention at the end that we can maybe talk about.

So as I was kind of looking around what was happening and sort of seeing what are some of the bigger picture, bigger structural changes, one is a clear move towards more protectionist trade policy that we saw under the Trump administration but also under Biden. So it’s something that is seemingly bipartisan. And in particular, as I mentioned, competition over exports.

And then with that, under the Biden administration, also green industrial policy, which we don’t know what will come of that. But a real attempt to stimulate, to use the energy, to use climate crisis as a, I don’t know, pretext, we could call it, to use state intervention to try to stimulate investment and an attempt to bring back manufacturing. That may or may not work. We’ll see. There’s a lot of reason to be very skeptical about the possibility of that, but it has certainly changed the politics.

So that was sort of like the stuff I was paying attention to. And then I went to a Labor Notes Conference this past year in 2023 or 2024, this year. Labor Notes, for those who don’t know, kind of interesting labor left institution that formed in the 1970s with a vision to try to reform unions from within through rank and file internal movements for internal democracy.

Labor Notes, interestingly, in this moment, it is a tiny old institution. And I think for a confluence of interesting, different set of circumstances, has massively exploded over the course of the last six years. So the conference they had last year had a waiting list of 4,000 labor leaders and organizers. So something interesting happening there, which of course overlaps with the leadership transition in the UAW with Shawn Fain.

So here I was at Labor Notes. And I met some organizers who had come from Mexico who were organizing Mexican auto plants and were there looking to build relationships with the UAW, with leaders at the UAW.

And they told me some pretty interesting things. Kind of the story is like a paradoxical impact of increased US trade protectionism. The USMCA, the new NAFTA negotiated under Trump, had actually really enormously benefited efforts to build independent unions in Mexico.

And they were like, we’re on the phone every day with the Department of Labor. To our surprise, they’re really helping us. We don’t totally understand why, but we’re taking the opportunity that we have in this moment and running with it. So I got curious about this, and that’s what the premise of what’s become my master’s project. So I’ll share just a little bit about the Mexican auto industry. So the Mexican auto industry largely supplies parts for the American market.

There’s an earlier wave of plants in Mexico. But really, it grew. It expanded massively after ’76 as profits– As the big three in the United States faced competition from Germany and Japan, they used Mexico in order to be able to– as basically for parts to supply cheap parts and cheap labor.

And during this period of time, Mexico switched from having an import substitution model to a low wage export model of development. And what you saw is really beginning in the late ’70s, rapid industrialization in Mexico but real wages declining during this entire period of time.

Now we’re in the midst of a shift where the US is trying to reindustrialize by onshoring or what sometimes also get nearshoring or sometimes called friendshoring. So manufacturing in response to the Trump election in 2016 and then also in the context of escalating trade competition.

And so there are three actually tightly interrelated policies that were passed between the years 2018 and 2022 under multiple administrations. So the USMCA was negotiated, finally approved in 2020 as Trump is leaving. Negotiations begin earlier.

And in addition, a 2018 labor law reform in Mexico. And then the IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act. And I’ll share a little bit about how these policies are all sort of woven together. So back up.

So Mexico has a corporatist model of Labor Relations. And this is basically from the Mexican Revolution, this system was in place, is built into the Constitution. Where the Mexican Revolutionary Party, the party that ruled as one party rule for a long time, relied on the labor movement in Mexico, on state-backed unions.

The Mexican Union Federation is called the CTM, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mejicanos, relied on them to do turnout and but also relied on them to control any more independent or militant labor organizing.

And so it was really like, the CTM is like a pillar of the party, which had single party control in Mexico for a long time. What that meant is that during the period of the ’60s and the early ’70s, you had under Import substitution. Basically, everybody was [INAUDIBLE] workers were benefiting under that model.

The union was quite powerful within the PRI. And then also the state supported the CTM to repress any kind of independent labor organizing efforts. There’s an interesting blip in the 1970s of union democratization, which sort of overlaps with the same period of time as you have big labor movements developing in Brazil and in South Africa. I can circle back to that.

But then starting in ’76 with the big three, beginning to produce auto parts plants in Mexico. There’s US pressure on Mexico through the IMF to clamp down on this like new wave of independent labor organizing that started, and the CTM begins a practice of employer protection contracts.

So basically, it’ll be like GM comes in, negotiates with the government of Mexico, says we want to build a plant here. They negotiate on a wage, agree to which union affiliate of the CTM is going to become the union that represents the workers. The union rubber stamps the wage and the contract, and the workers are none the wiser.

And that practice began in the 80s and then like continues Mexico’s entry into the GATT, and then NAFTA just exacerbates that. So that’s why you’ve seen rapid industrialization while wages decline for Mexican auto workers.

The question is what’s happening now? And I’ll say maybe just like a little bit in terms of the literature that I’m speaking to. So Beverly Silver’s Forces of Labor, masterful work. Who has this sort of like pithy summary is where capital goes, labor unrest follows. And Beverly Silver writing in 2003 looking for hope for workers of the world.

Basically is like it is– labor– so at the site of divestment. So for workers in the Global North where capital is divesting, that means that labor loses power. But at the site of investment in the Global South, if you have the expansion of new supply chains, investment in the Global South will also mean labor unrest in the Global South.

And she traces with a real focus on auto as like leading edge of capitalist profitability in the 20th century. And so her examples, she’s like, Brazil, South Africa, all examples of big labor unrest that develops in the ’70s and ’80s. In many ways, my question is like why not Mexico in this period of time? Why was there not big labor unrest in Mexico? And then also how do we explain the current moment where we’re seeing the seeds, like maybe little springtime of labor movement in Mexico?

And here I build on Silver by drawing on the political economy framework of growth models. So this is the work of Baccaro and Pontusson and Mark Bly. They published a– yeah. Anyways. And according to this framework, the idea is states pursue distinct growth models, importantly in relation to an integrated and also increasingly competitive and with low growth political economy.

And the thing I find very useful about this framework is it helps to think about how when growth is difficult to come to come by, political coalitions have to become unstable and have to shift and rearrange themselves. And it helps understand the kind of critical relationship between Mexico and the United States in influencing the shape of Mexico’s own labor movement.

So the argument I’m making is that the shifts in growth models impacts impact the state’s own system of labor relations and set new limits on the strategic possibilities for labor actors. And that the major changes in the US’s own growth model have in turn forced Mexico to adapt its growth strategy and in turn, its own system of labor relations is the overall hypothesis or thing I’m trying to argue.

So there’s these two phases. We’re in the late 1970s, facing rising international competition. The US, via the IMF, pressured the Mexican government to shift from an import substitution to a low wage export led growth model. And importantly, unlike Brazil, where Brazil also shifted from import substitution to export. But it was final assembly in Brazil, like final car assembly and for a more diversified export market.

In contrast, in Mexico, the real focus was auto parts, where wages must be much lower because profits are lower, and it goes entirely to the United States domestic market, which gives the United States an enormous amount of say and pressure on Mexico, as we all are seeing today.

And so in this context, the Mexican government, under the PRI pressures, the CTM, the Trade Federation, to encourage these employer protection contracts and suppress workers’ efforts to build independent unions.

And the argument is that in this latter period, from 2018 to 2024, the US’s own attempts to adapt its growth model through protectionist trade policy, an attempt at green industrial policy, which to be determined what comes of that, but impacted Mexican labor organizing in two ways.

So first, the USMCA directly empowers independent labor unions in Mexico to fight for higher wages through some mechanisms that I’ll explain. And it also incentivized AMLO and the Morena Party to implement a genuine reform of Mexico’s system of labor relations. So that’s the impact of the USMCA.

And second, IRA subsidies resulted in growing investments in Mexican EV manufacturing, thereby easing some of the pressure on Mexico to suppress wages in the auto industry. That first part remains in place or at least until the renegotiation of the USMCA in 2026.

The second part, there’s a big question now with Trump election. So Tesla had a plant that they already started constructing in Monterrey, which was canceled. Musk said he would wait until after the election to see if that plant would continue in effect.

Chinese. The Chinese auto EV company, BYD, is moving forward in building but also paused until after the election. In response to all of that, Sheinbaum has announced that she’s that they’re going to build a Mexican EV, but we’ll see how that goes. But this is all very much in flux.

And yeah. So just briefly, in terms of what the USMCA actually does. So one is Mexico’s labor law reform was a precondition for the passage of the USMCA. So basically, in order for– so negotiators, and this was largely pushed by the Dems, were like in order for us to be able to continue in negotiations over the USMCA and not pull out of the agreement, we’re forcing AMLO’s government to push through a labor law reform.

This was initially begun under Peña Nieto, more conservative under the PRI Party. And when AMLO comes in, they implement a much broader labor law reform than Peña Nieto would have done. But either way, there was a labor law reform that was going to be in place.

What the labor law reform does is a few important things. One, it requires like some internal mechanisms of union democracy. And then importantly, it also makes it much easier for workers to be able to form independent unions.

And the final thing that it did was it required all workers to approve the existing contracts. So contracts that weren’t up for a vote among workers got nullified. When a contract is nullified, then workers have the opportunity to vote if they want to put a new union in place. So that was the labor law reform, among other things. Oh, and it also moved union negotiations outside of the executive into the judiciary branch. So it’s no longer under the executive.

And then the USMCA, which sort of went like hand in hand with this labor law reform in Mexico, does a few things. Most notably, there’s a rapid response enforcement mechanism, which basically, if you are a worker or an organizer and there’s some experience a labor law violation, you can actually appeal to a body that was created, like an oversight body that was created through the USMCA with trade representatives from the United States and from Canada, and they will intervene on your behalf.

The enforcement piece of this, because there was some sort of nominal labor side agreement to NAFTA. But the enforcement piece of the USMCA is that if the company refuses to respond, then they actually could face penalties in terms of losing their special non-tariff status.

So this has actually been used a lot of times. And in fact, every case where there was an independent labor union that formed, that I’ve tracked in Mexico, there was some intervention of the USMCA on the American side, which is why the organizers were like we’re on the phone all the time with American trade officials. It’s very strange, but here we are.

And the other thing is that there is an enormous amount of money that came from the US Department of Labor that went into funding, organizing on the Mexican side through something called the Solidarity Center, which has a, for those who know, there’s a new book out, Blue Collar Empire. For those who know, there’s a long history of US intervention in international labor movements for IIL. This though might be a case of US intervention in Mexico for good. And it’s through this Solidarity Center, which then funds organizers in different places to form these independent unions.

So yeah. I have done some preliminary interviews and ethnographic work in Coahuila in Mexico, where there was a campaign and then also where there are active campaigns right now, where they’re salting in plants. And in the process of interviewing labor leaders and organizers and then also government officials who are responsible for implementing the labor reform law. And then also, we’ll be looking at archival records as well, comparing this earlier period to the present period.

And yeah, I’ve been talking a while. So I’ll close with that. Maybe just to say I think some of the questions that are up for grabs for sure in terms of the relationship between Trump and Sheinbaum. The USMCA gets renegotiated in 2026. Likely the main issue will be at stake is the question of electric vehicles built by Chinese companies in Mexico making their way into the American market.

And yeah, we don’t really know where it’s going to go. But in some ways, the USMCA really was negotiated when Trump attempted to pull out of NAFTA on the first round. The AFL-CIO saw an opportunity. The big three really can’t do that. And the AFL-CIO there saw an opportunity to be able to push forward something that they’d wanted to do for a very long time. And so we’ll see in an ongoing way how those negotiations play out moving forward. Yeah. We’ll close.

[APPLAUSE]

JOHN LOGAN: I’ll just open it up for questions and comments. I just said very briefly, and so as I said at the beginning, with the field like labor, I mean, it’s true of other fields too, of course, of subspecialties of study. There’s always this sort of balance between innovations in the discipline. Like if you’re an economist, if you’re a sociologist, and like what’s really new and exciting that’s happening within your discipline? How is your research agenda influenced by that?

But then there’s also the real world of labor out there and how that sort of impacts what you think are the most important questions to ask. And the balance between those two things is always like varies with individual people. Like my own work, I mean, I’ve worked with unions since I was a grad student, and I was always obsessed with contemporary labor issues, even although I supposedly was a historian, wasn’t a very good historian.

Most of my publications have not been historically historical. Hopefully not ahistorical, but they were always obsessed with this real world of labor, what’s happening out there. How does a sort of historical sensibility help us understand how we got to where we got. And I think, we see in the three presentations here too, there is sort of that dynamic going on. But anyway, sorry. I don’t want to take up time. Open it up to questions and comments.

AUDIENCE: Ah, yes. This was really, really interesting. So thank you all to the panelists. I learned a lot. I have a question for William. It’s kind of two-sided question. I’m curious about where you classify surveillance and sort of how do you think about competing moral claims between employers and employees, especially considering that courts typically side with employers and their moral visions?

WILLIAM DARWELL: Yeah. Surveillance is a big issue. It raises, lots of different kinds of normative concerns. I think like maybe what I’ll say just as far as my work goes, and yeah, I don’t have too much to say about the courts, apart from they’re very sensitive to employer concerns.

As far as what my sort of distinctive take on intervention, the way that I think about what’s going on there is, again, to think about the way that subjection to one kind of mode of discipline, control, vulnerability to being watched in any variety of ways across any variety of like ways of conceiving what a person is to think about sort of vulnerability to being out of control of the conditions of your own self-making or something like that, as a sort of, again, the formal language that I’m working with.

Kind of, maybe not obvious is too strong. But I take it as kind of obvious that like the modes of surveillance that people are subject to at work ought to really alarm us in many cases. My aim is to try to articulate what’s wrong with what’s going on there in those terms to add something to the literature in general.

JOHN LOGAN: Can I just add very briefly to that, Sorry? I try to think about your paper, and like I do not have any philosophy background, and I always have to think try to make things concrete. And I mean, obviously what you’re saying brings to mind Amazon. And Amazon has adopted this slogan, we are not robots, because this is the way they’re being treated. Every sort of like single movement within the workplace is being surveilled, and monitored, and people are being penalized for.

And so I guess when I tried to explain to people like what is it that’s happening right now with these union campaigns, Amazon, and elsewhere, I think, well, if people think they’re being treated unfairly, unjustly at work, they have some notion of what constitutes just treatment, and where they get these notions of what constitutes just treatment is a sort of complicated issue. It comes from all over the place. And like surveillance at work is one of the things that they have really focused upon in terms of articulating their notions of just treatment at the workplace. But sorry.

AUDIENCE: Yes, thanks. Thank you for this amazing panel. It was really instructive. I have two questions. One to William, one to Vera. I guess this is going to be like a huge question. I apologize in advance. But what do you exactly mean by political in this setting. Because political can mean a lot of different things. And you said work is inherently, constitutively, I think, political, which I would agree. But I would like you to clarify what you mean by that. And kind of like going on the political thread, I guess.

My question to Vera, when you were mentioning, like why not Mexico, with this 1970s, ’80s labor upsurge in Brazil and South Africa but not so much in Mexico, from drawing from Beverly Silver. One thing that came to my mind was like, well, there’s actually big political movements going on in these two countries in South Africa and Brazil.

In Brazil, it’s democratization coming out of the military dictatorship. And in South Africa, obviously, the anti-apartheid movement. So my question is like, what is going on at this time in Mexico? And I don’t know how to insert this in the causal chain, but like how would that factor into this map that your conceptual map that you’re drawing? Thank you.

WILLIAM DARWELL: Yeah. So thanks for the question. I think it’s really great. I’m really stoked to talk about it. So again, the first attempt at a definition that I tried to give is like what I mean when I say the word political and saying that there’s something constitutively political about work is that politics is about the terms on which we live together.

And what it means to live together is to be sort of in these overlapping situations or situations and practices together where they’re overlapping confluences and conflicts of interest. So we can’t do what we’re doing together, engage in a kind of a social practice. And the terms of that social practice bring us into conflict with one another, either over our role in the practice, or again, the disposition of the fruits of that practice.

And it’s that notion of living together but in a kind of a tense way. That’s what’s constitutive of politics for me. So like part of what’s– yeah, there’s some other work on like, yeah, there’s a live question in moral theory right now about whether there’s a distinctive kind of normativity called political normativity or whether that’s all just reducible to just moral claims building off of the work of Bernard Williams, who’s at Berkeley and who made the sort of first claim that there’s something sort of different about what we do when we operate as groups through institutions and most importantly, with the institution of estate that’s different than the kind of terms of interpersonal morality, blah, blah, blah.

And I think that, again, the best way to think about what that is that the political is the way in which we set the terms of living together in a sort of a social relationship. One more thing that I’ll say about that is like there’s another kind of slogan that I feel like is good for labor studies.

In the past, the labor movement saw as its telos industrial democracy, which means let us run the economy, right? Either as a sort of a full participant through our unions or just give us the firms. We’ll do it. We know how to do it, like factories to the workers.

And so I think that like one thing that I would push for is also a new direction. Labor is also thinking about talking more between labor studies and business studies and thinking of corporations, firms. However, we want to think about them, as sort of like a horizon for labor to aim toward.

The reason that I say that in the context of the question about what I mean by political is because there’s also lots of interesting new work in theories of the corporation, the things about the corporation as a political actor. And one version of it, it’s just the thinking about the corporation as operating a concession from the state as sort of basically being a deputized form of the state itself.

And when we think about the corporation as a sort of like fundamentally like franchised or deputized form of what we’re really doing as states or people governed by states, is again setting the terms by which we live together, that’s the way in which I’m thinking about the work. And again, work in firms, shared work, socially necessary work as necessary or constitutively political.

VERA PARRA: Yeah. Thanks for that question. I think it’s a really good question. So one thing I can say is so Mexico in ’68, there a big student movement. Many of the young people who came up in that movement had, kind of parallel to in the United States, the sort of like move to industrializing or salting. There were people who came out of the movement of ’68 and entered into to try to build independent unions.

And in the early ’70s, so under then Echeverria’s government, had something called the apertura democratica, so the democratic opening, which was a response to the Dirty War in Mexico and the student and guerrilla movements there.

And it created a momentary opening for independent unions to form of that legacy comes basically like a three-year period in which the only independent unions that exist, at least in the auto industry formed in Mexico.

The argument that I’m making is that moment was like a real moment of possibility, and it gets cut short in 1976. So it isn’t given the chance to develop because of the influence of the United States and this push or like a shift in Mexico’s growth model, if that makes sense.

So there was actually the leadership and the social movement possibility. And if we were to compare it to, I don’t know how it would compare to Brazil and South Africa. The kind of curious thing is that in Brazil, the labor movement in auto develops in the context of dictatorship, and it’s actually the shift into dictatorship during that period of time that the Brazilian labor movement grows. Whereas in Mexico, the Democratic closing then really clamps down. So it doesn’t totally answer the question.

I’ll say just like two more thoughts. This isn’t a real answer. I think probably I’ve been thinking about it as labor movement creates the conditions for broader social movements. And there might be, in your question, like maybe there’s a reverse causality thing or it’s sort of like multiple. But what I will say, of course, is like in the period of time that the labor like industrialization in auto like really kicks off. Obviously after NAFTA, though it’s growing and expanding throughout the 80s.

And of course, the big movement in Mexico is the Zapatistas during that period of time. And I think there’s something to explore about the relationship between the Zapatistas and the state. Like is there something less compatible between the Zapatistas’ strategy of taking territory and not contesting directly for state power and labor? I don’t know. So that’s kind of like a question mark.

Maybe the last thing I’ll say is in spending time there over the summer, it’s clear that the movement that’s really influenced the labor organizers and their perspective coming in a younger generation of labor organizers that has formed is the feminist movement and the like the Ni Una Menos like against violence. And they actually talk in terms of like workplace violence or the abuses in the workplace are a form of violence that then reproduce themselves in the family. So it’s like very much oriented their political consciousness, the feminist movement. Anyways, I’ll leave it at that. All very preliminary.

MARION FOURCADE: Thank you. That was really a wonderful panel. So I have a question for Kristy and one for Vera. So Kristy, if I understand correctly, so the treatment that you’re using is sort of comparing this, sort of the last generation that came in under the old system and then the new generation from the new system, right?

But I was wondering if there’s a way– is there a change in applications? Is there a change in the number of people who want to work in this issue? And it could be that the federal government is not the place where you can see that, and there might be other places. But I was wondering about that. Is there a change in the selection of people who are coming into for government jobs?

Another piece of that sort of question is, have you thought about looking at UC system? Because I mean, casually, you would expect that, especially with the transformation of the system for the younger generation, especially of faculty, you would expect a lot more turnover, and casually, this seems to be the case. But I don’t know if there’s any sort of truth to that.

And then to Vera, I find this whole question of this sort of development of the labor movement and both sides of the border to be really fascinating because on the one hand, you can say, and indeed, the institutions are sort of called this way. It’s about solidarity. It’s about worker solidarity. The Department of Labor gives them grants, and so on, and so forth.

But of course, if you manage to raise wages in Mexico, of course this is lessening competition with the US. And so the US labor movement directly benefits. So you have two institutions, the US labor movement and Mexican labor movement, who are really in competition with one another but who are using this as a way to assert worker solidarity. So I just want to see how in your interviews and so on, how people navigate this fundamental contradiction in their respective positions. Thank you.

KRISTY KIM: OK, great. I will try to answer really quickly. So the first question was about selection. And to your point, even today, so some things that we might worry about is like perhaps in anticipation of this change in system, even though they don’t know what it is, you might start to hire people a little bit earlier, right? And which will change the composition of workers and become a threat to the identification strategy, which I’m assuming that these workers are very similar.

So one example is that as if you’re trying to find a job today, the threat of a Trump hiring freeze, for example, might cause firms to start hiring in December before the new administration comes in place. So we do check for that. We don’t see necessarily any speed-up of hiring, so we don’t see any anticipation in that sense.

Now I do take it to your point that of course, there may be some unobservable characteristics. Perhaps people who like more risk are OK with entering in the new system without knowing what it is. And that may be true.

And so the limitation of the paper is that the only thing I’m able to look at are observable, measurable characteristics that have existed at that time. But so long as it’s not correlated with– if it’s correlated with observable measures that I have. So let’s say risk is associated with age or your compensation. If that’s the case, then I can more confidently say that we don’t seem to see differences in that.

But certainly there may be other differences that I can’t observe. And so this is just a step towards understanding life cycle effects. And it’s this big movement. So there’s that. And in terms of the UC system, so I think it might be too early to study it because I believe the change happens in 2002.

JOHN LOGAN: 2013.

KRISTY KIM: 2013. OK, OK. So we don’t have a lot of data, and I’m not sure if the UC would provide that data, although I’m sure it’s scrape able based on where faculty go, for example. Anecdotally, it does seem to be the case that younger faculty seem to be looking at their outside options.

The other thing that we might want to think about, so it’s dynamic. So you have these short term workers that might leave sooner, but you also have workers that intend to stay at Berkeley for a really long time. And if we compare like Berkeley versus Harvard, for example, Harvard has no annuity. There are pure savings. The Harvard professors tend to stay much longer than Berkeley professors. They tend to retire in their 60s here, and in Harvard, maybe around their 80s. And so we might see some kind of bimodal effect from these short term workers leave faster, but the ones that intend to stay long, stay longer to build up their retirement savings.

JOHN LOGAN: It’s a national trend among universities. So it’s not just Berkeley.

MAROIN FOURCADE: That would be really interesting to look at the [INAUDIBLE].

KRISTY KIM: We’d like to help.

[LAUGHTER]

VERA PARRA: Yeah. Thanks for the question. I think the like confluence and the interest in confluence and intention are actually quite complicated and also sort of shifting politically. And I think they’ve shifted now after the election. We’ll sort of see what the UAW does.

But what I’ll say is there’s kind of like, from the US labor movement perspective, in terms of specifically thinking, well, it’s like speak specifically about auto, there’s two options, which is do everything you can to try to get them pulled out of the USMCA. Or you do what you can to try to raise wages in Mexico and support independent union organizing.

I think the thing that’s tricky is, of course, if this is like labor ultimately is tied to the companies that it’s part of. So in some ways, I mean, if the United States were to pull out of the USMCA, the big three would totally collapse, and you’d be left with foreign auto companies and Tesla, which of course, are not UAW.

And so in some ways, there is sort of like rhetorically, the UAW, of course, is saying the USMCA was a bad deal. But in reality, the American, the big three depend entirely on Mexico. And so in order to be able to be competitive in any kind of way, you need the parts sector from Mexico.

So the idea is like for the big three to be globally competitive with China or with Chinese EVs, you need to be able to have this nearshore model. Of course, there are tensions and divisions within the UAW itself. And so the move that Fain has made or made at least before the election is to say we’re going to support independent union organizing in Mexico.

And I think within the UAW, there’s also Fain is not in control of the entirety of the UAW, and different local presidents are putting countervailing pressures on him. So I would say I would say that for sure, the sell of the AFL-CIO to the Trump administration and also under the Biden administration is if we raise wages in Mexico, the jobs will come back to the United States.

But the reality is that the wages would have to be raised enormously for it no longer to make sense for GM to be producing cars or to be producing car parts, at least in Mexico, if that makes sense.

So I think it’s part of what I guess I’m seeing is that there’s a kind of labor solidarity that’s possible because of shared interests, actually, where on the one hand, in Mexico, they really need the money and also money from the UAW potentially, I think they feel more comfortable with than money that comes from the American government, where it feels like, A, potentially more strings attached, but B, it’s much more like politically volatile. So people have said to me like we’re depending too much on the Department of Labor and on the rapid response mechanism, which could disappear at any moment.

So that’s on the one hand. And then on the other hand, I think the other potential confluence of interest for the UAW is not just about having wages rise in Mexico enough to bring jobs back, which would really take quite a powerful labor movement, but is also about the possibility of some kind of coordinated strategy and coordinated disruption.

So Stellantis agreed to reopen a plant in Belvidere as part of the big three strike. That was like a victory. And then now is walking that back and is also simultaneously announcing investments in Mexico.

In Coahuila, a place where I’m like doing my field research, if potentially there was actually a strong independent labor movement there that the UAW could coordinate with there would be much more strategic opportunity, certainly in terms labor disruption. and from the conversations I’ve had with people, the supply chains are quite vulnerable to disruption. Like it doesn’t take much to shut down an auto parts plant that then put it’s like just in time production.

And so that potentially the possibility of doing coordinated labor action I think is the real potential benefit to the UAW, more so than wages rising up so much that the jobs return back. I don’t know if that makes sense.

JOHN LOGAN: Thank you all. More comments on that and the auto industry later. Thank you very much for coming and terrific presentations and great discussions. Thank you, everyone.

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